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Liberalizing or `depressing' the financial sector has been at the forefront 
of the economic policy debate in developing and transition economies ever 
since Ronald McKinnon and Edward Shaw published influential tracts 
advocating the operation almost a quarter a century ago. To a greater or 
lesser extent, their policy recommendation has been adopted world-wide. 
This book comes at the right time with a good question - what has liberal- 
ization wrought? 
The answers turn out to be as complex as the concept itself. 
Derepression has many interpretations. The simplest is that competition 
in the financial sector should be encouraged, while at least glaring market 
failures should be dealt with by regulatory interventions. The case-studies 
herein show that these mundane goals have often not been attained; at 
times (witness the chapter on Nigeria) the shortfalls have been 
Rabelaisian. 
A more sophisticated version centres around the creation of markets, 
financial instruments, and/or market actors that were previously `missing'. 
Establishment of a market for Treasury Bills is one example; founding a 
stock exchange is another. The country studies show how such steps have 
been taken in several countries (India, Malaysia, etc.), typically with most 
success when new markets or instruments were introduced gradually. 
Presumably, enhanced instruments and markets should help the 
financial sector provide cheaper loan rates to a wider range of borrowers 
and/or higher returns to a growing pool of savers. The evidence regarding 
such outcomes is not clear. In the recent period, very large productive 
enterprises in developing countries appear to have relied more on external 
finance for their capital formation than do their counterparts in industrial- 
ized economies (where in flows-of-funds data business investment and 
retained earnings track closely together). Whether lower capital costs 
through bond and equity issues were thus attained, and whether small 
firms got similar access to external money, are questions that remain to be 
explored. 
Deeper financial markets are also supposed to be less `fragile' or more 
`robust'. Have such improvements resulted from liberalization exercises 
over the past twenty-odd years? A general answer is impossible to 
provide. On the positive side, patient creation of T-bill markets does 
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permit more flexible monetary policy and provides a `riskless' anchor for 
the complex of asset returns and prices. But nurturing markets is one 
thing, while rapid derepression of existing systems is quite another. The 
consequences of the latter sort of move can be devastating. 
Horror shows caused by the acts of free market policy zealots began in 
Latin America's Southern Cone in the late 1970s, and continued through 
Turkey and Mexico in the 1990s to pyramid schemes in the transition 
economies almost to the present (Albania is just pulling back from a near- 
civil war caused by the collapse of a pyramid as this is being written). In 
such circumstances, even greater financial `depth' as signalled by increas- 
ing rations of outstanding financial assets to GDP can be misleading. 
Kuwait's ratio went from 0.98 in 1979 to 2.14 in 1982 (compared with 
values of 1.2 to 1.5 typical of industrialized economies) -just before its 
booming stock market crashed. The previously `missing' financial instru- 
ments involved were post-dated checks that could be transacted in 
advance. 
Assuming that in the future such catastrophes can be avoided, the 
bottom line on liberalization is that in relatively poor nations in which 
there is a political consensus favouring economic growth, the social task 
of finance is to ease the burden of capital formation. Stably growing sup- 
plies of reasonably priced credit are essential to this end. Present-day 
orthodoxy (stemming directly from Shaw and McKinnon) suggests that a 
relatively unregulated, private-enterprise-driven financial system is the 
best means. 
The great strength of the present volume, in both its country studies and 
analytical chapters, is to show that this world view is simplistic. A 
country's financial history and existing institutions tightly constrain its 
possibilities for change. Several authors herein suggest that `full' liberal- 
ization might fit best only after what Simon Kuznets called `modern eco- 
nomic growth' is in full swing; along the way, an intelligent degree of 
repression makes good sense. Just how much repression and how it should 
be applied is difficult to say outside a specific country's own context. The 
work that the editors and authors have done for this volume provides the 
empirical and theoretical background needed to make the answer a little 
bit easier to come by. 
LANCE TAYLOR 
New School for Social Research 
New York 
Preface 
This book contains the results of a research project initiated and supported 
by Canada's International Development Research Centre and managed by 
CEDES (Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad) in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, under the direction of Jose Marfa Fanelli. 
During the formative period of this project in 1994, it was evident that 
while financial sector performance and reform in developing countries has 
received much attention, particularly in the aftermath of the Southern 
Cone experience of the 1970s, significant aspects of the issue remain 
cloudy, or are taken on faith by key players. On the basis of discussions 
with several persons involved in the research and application of financial 
reforms, two IDRC staff members produced a background paper' that 
formed the basis for the ambit of the research and creation of the project 
team. From the general framework provided by this paper and discussions 
during the project planning meeting held at IDRC in Ottawa in September 
1994, we chose to highlight three areas of enquiry. 
First, while it is clear in generic terms that initial conditions and the 
general economic environment within which financial reform occurs 
matter, we were interested in the institutional and enabling environment 
within which financial reform occurs in developing countries, particularly 
its role in determining the short-run and long-run outcomes that are subse- 
quently observed. 
Second, and related to the first, we singled out the role of the central 
bank during financial reform. Clearly, central banks - almost everywhere 
- are the key players in this process. However, their role differs across 
countries, and is often poorly understood among researchers and policy- 
makers alike. This is a particularly important issue, because when it comes 
to financial reform, central banks straddle the micro-macro divide. Their 
`macro' duties include being responsible for all aspects of domestic mone- 
tary policy and external payments. Their `micro' duties are more varied, 
but often include regulating and overseeing the financial sector and 
designing its reform. 
This second point also gave us an entry into the third area of concern to 
us, that of the role of finance in understanding the process of financial 
reform. Perhaps more a reflection on the profession than the subject, it 
was evident to us that there were different `sets' of literature and - there- 
fore - different levels of understanding of financial reform among and 
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within research economists and practitioners in the field. At the very least, 
perspectives from finance offered interesting counter-points to macro- 
economic approaches, and in the latter we could distinguish a `develop- 
ment' literature from an `OECD' one. 
Therefore, given IDRC's traditional emphasis on capacity building in and 
policy-relevant research on developing countries, we sensed a useful oppor- 
tunity to bring several `types' of researchers and practitioners together to 
work on the subject. (Despite our perception that nuances are important, 
particularly within the sub-disciplines of the economics and policy commu- 
nities working on this topic, we decided not to let semantics burden us any 
more than they should, and throughout this volume we use the phrases 
`financial reform' and `financial liberalization' interchangeably.) 
The five country case-studies allow for a detailed examination of the 
experience with financial liberalization in each country and at the same 
time permit comparability of results across countries. Although the 
researchers in each country followed a common work plan, these countries 
were selected because they represent a variety of experience with and 
position on the continuum of the financial liberalization process. 
Argentina, Turkey and Uruguay may be considered to be advanced in 
the financial reform process, albeit at different stages and under different 
macroeconomic and institutional conditions. Argentina's Southern Cone 
experiences and credentials are impeccable, though its Convertibility Plan 
sets it apart from its neighbours and, for that matter, most reforming coun- 
tries. Uruguay's relatively long experience with financial reform was inter- 
twined with its desire to be a regional financial centre, a mixed blessing in 
the eyes of our authors and one that is in their view more a chance devel- 
opment than a conscious policy. While not having received the same atten- 
tion as the Southern Cone countries, Turkey has had an equally long 
experience with liberalization and has a relatively open capital account 
regime - at least open enough to have been the subject of considerable 
instability that, while sourced in foreign capital inflows, is as much the 
result of inappropriate domestic policies and institutional arrangements as 
it is of ̀ hot' money. 
India and Nigeria are beginners in this process. This may have allowed 
them - especially India - to avoid some of the worst excesses of the experi- 
ence of the early reformers, though their low per capita incomes also give 
them less room to manoeuvre, especially when it comes to ensuring the 
welfare of consumers (read depositors and investors.) Nigeria's discontinu- 
ous record of reforms lays bare the importance of their credibility and con- 
sistency. Still, reform is entrenched and mostly irreversible in each country, 
so that there are an experience and a process that can be and are examined. 
Preface xvii 
We might add that our choice of countries was made easier by the exist- 
ence of strong researchers and research centres in each - an important con- 
sideration, given our aim to promote indigenous research and 
capacity-building rather than a `fly in, fly out' mode of policy analysis. 
Several issues crosscut the topics covered by the country case-studies, 
and these are dealt with by the authors of the thematic chapters. We took 
advantage of our contacts during the formative stage of this project with 
James Powell of the Bank of Canada to bring a developed country per- 
spective to our work. As he argues in his chapter, there are some interest- 
ing and pertinent aspects of Canada's experience with financial sector 
reform for many developing countries. Salient among these for our pur- 
poses are the separation of the independent central bank from the opera- 
tions of the agency responsible for financial sector regulation, and the 
wide-ranging (that is, micro and macro) sectoral reforms that form the 
Canadian experience. 
The Mexican debacle that occurred during the life of this project con- 
vinced us that not only could `success' in reforming an economy often be 
illusory (or poorly understood by important players involved in their 
design), but also the effects of a calamity in one portion of the globalized 
financial sector could easily be transmitted elsewhere. Guillermo Calvo 
examines this important aspect of financial liberalization at the 
supra-national level. 
Among the several approaches that have been taken world-wide to 
financial reform, a basic distinction may be made between the `big bang' 
approach and the `go slow' approach. Indonesia and Malaysia represent 
well these respectively, and Anwar Nasution provides useful insights into 
the causes and consequences of each country's chosen path, thus drawing 
lessons for other countries that face similar choices. 
Although we eschewed studying a specific experience from one of the 
economies in transition, certain characteristics are common to several. 
Rodney Schmidt identifies these, and focuses on the complex and import- 
ant links between banks and firms in Eastern and Central Europe. This 
chapter, once again, highlights the importance of understanding the macro 
economy as well as sectoral and firm level issues if a proper assessment of 
the working of the financial sector is to be made, not just in this region but 
everywhere. 
Finally, Varouj Aivazian puts a point to the several issues that underlie 
the work in this volume by bringing a more explicit theoretical and 
finance-related perspective to the analysis of financial reform in develop- 
ing countries, thus serving as the second 'book-end' in this volume to our 
own introductory and overview first chapter. 
xviii Preface 
As the process of financial reform continues and the process of integra- 
tion of capital markets accelerates nationally and internationally, its study, 
especially if it is to have any practical value, must continue to be as multi- 
faceted and agnostic as possible. This would be the time to mention that 
the views expressed in all the papers in this book are those of the authors 
alone, and not necessarily those of the institutions to which we all belong. 
More importantly, we trust that the depth and breadth of analysis 
presented in this volume fulfils, in some small measure, the task at hand. 
JOSE M. FANELLI 
ROHINTON MEDHORA 
Note 
1. `The Process of Financial Liberalization in Developing Countries: Research 
Directions' by Gary McMahon and Rohinton Medhora, Ottawa: IDRC, 1994. Copies 
are available from Medhora at IDRC or any of the principal authors in this volume. 
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1 Financial Reform in 
Developing Countries: An 
Overview 
Jose M. Fanelli and Rohinton Medhora 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
For the large number of developing countries undergoing significant struc- 
tural transformations, one of the most important and controversial adjust- 
ment areas is that of financial markets. Of the principal broad areas facing 
adjustment - which also include fiscal systems, labour markets, foreign 
trade regimes, investment incentives and the agricultural sector - the 
financial market may well be the most controversial and difficult market to 
transform. The consequences of poorly functioning or troubled financial 
sectors - on financial institutions, depositors, resource allocation and, ulti- 
mately, growth and development - are significant and well known. It is 
also now understood that financial liberalization is not an `event', but 
rather a process. However, there is little consensus as to when to liberalize 
financial markets, or how it should be done. What emerges from the recent 
literature, including the chapters in this volume, is that financial liberaliza- 
tion should be one of the last stages of the economic reform process, as 
much a signal of successful reform and development in other parts of the 
economy as a cause of it.' 
Nevertheless, even if theoretically desirable, the choice of the policy- 
maker rarely comes down to either liberalizing or not liberalizing financial 
markets. Some financial liberalization is often forced upon any country 
that is trying to `insert' itself in the global economy. Moreover, given the 
technological advances of recent decades and the trend toward globaliza- 
tion of markets, it has become increasingly difficult to isolate domestic 
financial markets from the outside. Therefore, at best, the decision often 
boils down to how far a country goes, how fast and in what sequence. 
Moreover, `liberalization' of the financial sector, more than that of other 
sectors, does not have a purely `classical' meaning of the withdrawal of 
the government from the functioning of a market. Rather, and typically, it 
involves a redefinition of the roles and responsibilities of the principal 
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institutions involved (such as the central bank, the finance ministry, the 
deposit insurance system, the other financial institutions and the stock 
exchanges); a re-regulatory rather than de-regulatory regime; and under- 
standing on the part of policy-makers of the micro-level and institutional 
milieu within which financial change occurs; and an equal understanding 
on their part of the effects of this liberalization on the setting of 
macroeconomic policy, particularly monetary policy. 
Yet, the international evidence regarding financial liberalization has not 
produced the results expected by theory. The most important (and disap- 
pointing) facts are: (1) although it is commonly observed that credit 
supply increases after liberalization, the results in terms of financial deep- 
ening are usually modest; (2) in many cases liberalization resulted in an 
open financial crisis a few years after it had been implemented; and 
(3) some interventionist countries (like Taiwan and Korea) achieved 
impressive levels of financial deepening without significant liberalization. 
When one compares the Southern Cone experience with financial liber- 
alization in the 1970s (disastrous by all accounts) with the East Asian 
experience with reform (until recently success blended with judicious 
financial repression) and efforts in sub-Saharan Africa (reform in the face 
of severe weakness in the enabling environment and economic structure), 
it is apparent that no unique recipe for success emerges. Broadly speaking, 
initial conditions matter - particularly the shape of the macroeconomy at 
the time of reform and the level of general development that prevails in a 
country. Finance matters - meaning the condition of the various financial 
markets and the range of choices and quality of intermediation available to 
asset buyers and sellers. The enabling environment matters - meaning the 
institutional and regulatory milieu within which all participants in the 
financial sector operate. 
Following this introductory chapter, the rest of the book presents the 
chapters that resulted from this project. The aim of this chapter is to 
describe the characteristics of the research, to examine the most relevant 
aspects of the analytical framework used and to situate these in the larger 
literature on financial liberalization. Our findings are related not only to 
the theory and empirical evidence but also to applied policy issues. 
1.2 UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
The first obstacle in evaluating a liberalization experience is the difficulty 
in defining precisely `financial liberalization'. It is not at all obvious what 
either a financial `liberalization' or a `liberalized' capital market means. 
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(Throughout this book the words liberalization and reform are used 
interchangeably.) 
At first sight it might seem easy to define the ultimate result of liberal- 
ization: a `liberalized' financial system is one free from financial repres- 
sion. Hence, it could be said that eliminating financial repression is what 
liberalization is all about. However, there is a grey zone. As the chapters 
in this book clearly show, this zone exists because there is no financial 
market structure free from interventions. There is always some degree of 
government intervention owing to the existence of market failures (related 
to certain market structures, externalities, uncertainty and informational 
problems). Consequently, it is necessary to determine which regulations 
are market `friendly' and therefore should not be considered instances of 
financial repression. 
The ambiguity of the literature on these points often results, as the expe- 
riences analysed in this book show, in the incorrect design of the policy 
packages which, in turn, give rise to severe policy dilemmas and even 
financial crisis. For example, although there is consensus on the import- 
ance of bank supervision in the literature, there is no systematic treatment 
of the way in which supervision should be adapted to specific country con- 
texts. One point made by the authors of the studies of Argentina, Nigeria 
and Turkey is that these countries suffered acute financial distress even 
though the central bank had implemented or was in the process of imple- 
menting the Basle standards on bank capital requirements. Another point 
is that there are no well-defined and clear boundaries for the role of lender 
of last resort of the central bank and for the guarantee on deposits. The 
country studies show that there is a significant and difficult trade-off 
between the need to limit systemic risk and the need to restrict moral 
hazard in banking. In Argentina, to avoid moral hazard, the government 
almost eliminated the lender of-last-resort activity of the central bank, and 
there was no guarantee on deposits. However, the sudden increase in 
financial fragility after the Mexican devaluation in 1994 obliged the 
authorities to step in and provide liquidity to the banks and a limited guar- 
antee to depositors. These actions were highly successful in circumventing 
the deepening of an incipient financial crisis in early 1995. 
Nevertheless, although it is important for determining policy goals, an 
exact definition of what a free capital market is would be only the begin- 
ning. The most challenging analytical and practical problems are created 
by the process rather than by the results of financial liberalization. 
Because it is almost impossible to make a once-and-for-all announcement 
and instantly eliminate all the institutional features of financial repression, 
the liberalization of financial markets is a process that will develop over a 
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significant period of time. There will necessarily be a transitional period 
during which `hybrid' situations will be observed in cases where only 
some elements of repression have been eliminated. In fact, it is highly 
probable that the authorities increase financial repression in some seg- 
ments of capital markets to ensure that the entire process of liberalization 
(which typically includes real markets as well) does not derail during the 
transitional period. For example, it may be necessary to introduce controls 
on capital movements to smooth the effects of external shocks on the 
domestic financial markets. 
The analytical weaknesses in the treatment of the transitional period 
were apparent in the liberalization attempts in the Southern Cone of Latin 
America in the late 1970s when ill-designed financial policies led to 
financial distress.2 In the chapters on Argentina and Turkey, both of which 
suffered from significant financial fragility after the implementation of the 
reform in the 1990s, there are important examples that resemble some 
features of the failures in the Southern Cone in the early 1980s. This is 
particularly true regarding capital inflows. 
In fact, the need to amend the theory to include the analysis of the tran- 
sition gave rise to the literature on the so-called sequencing problem in the 
1980s.3 The integration of the transitional period into the liberalization lit- 
erature, however, has not been an easy task, mainly because the trans- 
itional period is one of disequilibrium and the approach was originally 
developed within an equilibrium framework. In the chapters by Schmidt 
and Nasution in this volume there is an assessment of the analytical and 
practical problems posed by the transitional period. Schmidt analyses the 
problem in the economies in Eastern Europe with respect to the role of the 
banking sector in controlling firms in the private and public sector. 
Nasution evaluates the pros and cons of gradualism (Malaysia) versus 
shock (Indonesia) in the implementation of the financial reform. 
The change of regime from repression to free markets should per se 
improve resource allocation, because it frees the individual's behaviour 
from artificial constraints. However, a necessary condition for this is that 
private agents perceive that the authorities are determined to maintain the 
new regime. If private agents are not convinced that the elimination of 
regulations is permanent then they may not adapt their behaviour to the 
new situation and their decisions might be inconsistent with the survival of 
the new regime. For the same reason, the need to capture the credibility of 
the private sector from the very beginning of the reform process is stressed 
in the literature and is considered to be an important part of the liber- 
alization policy. However, it is now understood that credibility is not 
equivalent to `rules'. 
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The time consistency approach is more appealing than the debate on 
rules versus discretion, because it makes a simple yet powerful observa- 
tion - what matters is not whether rules are `superior' to discretion, but 
rather, whether a policy announcement, be it a rule or discretion, is cred- 
ible. The most forthright manner in which a policy can be made credible is 
to couch it in an institutional environment whereby the policy announce- 
ment is `locked in', once made. In other words, a rule is meaningless if it 
can be easily altered; discretion may be particularly coherent if it is formu- 
lated in the right manner, by the right people. A policy announcement is 
made time-consistent, then, if the costs of backtracking are high, and 
widely seen to be high, no matter whether such announcements follow a 
particular theme, or are discrete and individually disparate. 
In the context of the formulation of monetary policy, time consistency 
has been interpreted to mean (1) that the credibility of the monetary 
authorities matters more than whether or not they announce the adoption 
of `monetarist' or any other principles; and (2) that this credibility is 
enhanced when the central bank is distanced from the rest of the machin- 
ery of government, a point taken up later in this chapter. In the context of 
financial liberalization more generally, time consistency implies not so 
much the setting of a clear plan of action with hard targets that must be 
met at specified intervals, but rather the outlining of an agenda wherein 
regression is made difficult and expensive and the quality of its implemen- 
tation is not in doubt among market participants. 
The chapter on Nigeria illustrates this point with vigour and colour. 
Here, the authors show how uncertainty over the maintenance of the 
reform process was an important factor causing financial distress, which, 
in turn, enhanced the level of uncertainty prevalent in the financial sector. 
The insistence on credibility in the literature, however, does not imply 
that the issue has been solved. The chapter on the Argentine case men- 
tions that there is an exaggerated stress on fiscal disequilibrium, while 
the disequilibrium in the private sector debt and deficit does not receive 
the same attention. In the Argentine case, the current account imbalance 
was generated by the private sector deficit, a point also examined by 
Calvo in his chapter. He argues that the lack of credibility in the mainten- 
ance of the reform policy can lead to a consumption boom and, at the 
same time, to the false impression that the fiscal house is in order and that 
the degree of monetization has increased. This will occur because the 
temporary increase in economic activity pushes up both fiscal revenues 
and the demand for money. When the boom fades, the increase in the 
fiscal deficit and the fall in the demand for money lead to a balance of 
payments crisis. 
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1.3 FINANCE MATTERS 
The McKinnon-Shaw Approach 
The main reason why the McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) approach 
has been so influential in policy-making in developing countries is not so 
much its emphasis on liberalization but rather the recognition that finance 
matters for development. In the 1970s, in contrast with the mainstream 
analysis of money and finance in the growth process, which neglected an 
independent role for such factors, McKinnon and Shaw made it clear that 
the lack of financial deepening was a relevant obstacle to development.4 
The lack of financial deepening matters, but what does `lack of financial 
deepening' actually mean? In our view, it means that some financial 
markets do not exist, while others do but are underdeveloped. That is, the 
markets for the intermediation of funds are incomplete and imperfect. This 
has real effects, because the absence of some key financial markets implies 
either that some transactions will not be carried out or that they will but at 
wrong prices. Growth, specifically, will be hindered because under incom- 
plete and imperfect markets some contracts between savers and investors 
will not be possible or will stipulate wrong prices. In this regard, a 
significant insight from the liberalization school was that, ceteris paribus, 
the lack of financial deepening would result in the scarcity of savings and 
the misallocation of investment resources. 
Owing to varying degrees of evolution of the market structure in devel- 
oped and developing countries, Shaw (1973)5 suggests in his seminal work 
that, to understand why finance matters for development, the theory of 
finance in developing countries should adopt a `debt intermediation view' 
(DIV), which differs from the `wealth view' (WV). The DIV takes into 
account the particularities of financial intermediation in developing coun- 
tries, while the WV is more suitable for studying financial issues in devel- 
oped countries. One distinguishing feature of the DIV vis-d-vis the WV is 
that the former emphasizes the role of credit in contrast to conventional 
monetary economics, which has a bias in favour of the assets side of the 
economy. The point is not that the agent's demand for deposits and bonds 
is irrelevant but rather that the credit side of the banks' balance sheets and 
the interactions between banks and the other sectors in the economy 
cannot be ignored in explaining why finance matters. This emphasis on 
the role of credit puts the banking system and firms' decisions regarding 
liabilities at centre stage on the DIV's research agenda. 
Shaw's advocacy in favour of the DIV, nevertheless, gradually lost 
momentum in the liberalization literature, which favoured the study of 
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practical problems associated with the elimination of financial repression. 
Under the assumption that the analytical framework was correct, the fail- 
ures in liberalization were attributed to errors in the sequencing of deregu- 
lation and to the inability of the authorities to gain control over money 
creation and/or the fiscal accounts to ensure macroeconomic stability. The 
findings of our project, however, suggest that to explain the implementa- 
tion problems it is still necessary to have a deeper understanding of key 
phenomena related to the issues emphasized in the DIV approach. 
Specifically, the authors of the chapters in this volume emphasize the fol- 
lowing points: the transformations in firms' capital structure following lib- 
eralization; the way in which governments finance the deficit and the 
composition of the stock of public debt; the effects on domestic credit 
availability of unexpected shifts in portfolio preferences of individuals 
regarding domestic vis-a-vis external assets after opening the capital 
account; and the evolution of the operational efficiency of the banking 
system. All these prove to be key factors for understanding the outcomes 
of financial reforms. 
In our view, the comprehension of these factors entails reinvigorating 
rather than abandoning the spirit of the DIV. Reinvigorating the DIV 
implies consistently integrating into the analysis of liberalization experi- 
ences: credit rationing phenomena that are pervasive not only in the 
financial system but also in the bond and international markets; the pecu- 
liarities of agency problems in developing economies which give rise to 
financial fragility and macroeconomic instability; low capitalization and 
narrow diversity of productive activities `represented' in stock markets; 
the role and determinants of the external finance premium for different 
categories of firms with differential access to segmented markets; the 
details of the credit channel for monetary transmission under different 
exchange and monetary policy regimes; the determinants of operational 
efficiency of banks and the optimal regulation of the financial system; the 
role of liquidity constraints, especially for those agents with imperfect 
access to financial markets. 
The Role of Financial Assets 
Although the growth in the supply of near-monies, derivatives, and other 
`exotic' financial instruments may be seen as largely the response of 
profit-maximizing firms to the needs of asset consumers, the role of lower 
transactions costs (that is, improved technology) and a more accommo- 
dating institutional and legal environment in this process cannot be 
ignored.6 
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In the developing country context, a number of issues present them- 
selves. First, despite liberalization, the immediate policy issue is not the 
control of a dizzying spiral of assets, as the expansion is likely to be 
within `conventional' limits of customer needs and choice. Dollarization 
may be seen as an increase in the range of assets used by agents, but as the 
chapters on Argentina and Uruguay make clear, its evident benefits have 
to be weighed against a range of consequences at the macro and sectoral 
levels that may well change the calculus of the desirability of such 
systems. 
Second, when it comes to asset supply, developing countries are `takers' 
of the wide array of existing types of assets, which, in a deregulated and 
global environment, will present themselves as the need arises. That is, 
there is no particular aspect to asset supply in developing countries that 
cannot be covered by the available stock of assets that are known to 
market participants. This suggests that the relevant issue for the authorities 
in developing countries is not creation or innovation, but rather the proper 
management of the flow into the country of a wide range of financial 
assets from abroad. 
Finally, the role of the market for government bonds during financial 
development and liberalization should be flagged. A wide market for gov- 
ernment bonds plays a crucial role in providing signals to the rest of the 
financial markets. Specifically, the existence of a strong market for gov- 
ernment bonds helps to provide a term structure of interest rates, which 
acts as a frame of reference for the private sector. For example, in the 
USA, the benchmark for long-term interest rates is the thirty-year govern- 
ment bond rate and for the short-term the treasury bill rate. If the market 
for government bonds is thin and/or weak then the market signals sent to 
the rest of the financial sector will also be weak and unreliable. This raises 
the level of uncertainty in the trade of financial instruments. Indeed, from 
a theoretical point of view, it is very difficult to conceive of the CAPM 
without the 'risk-free' rate provided by government bonds. (Another and 
wholly different strand of thinking will be briefly mentioned here. The 
increase in the availability and use of assets potentially makes the job of 
controlling monetary aggregates more complex. This issue is taken up 
later in this chapter). 
There are many country-specific examples in this book about how and 
why finance matters for development when the market structure is incom- 
plete and quantitative credit constraints are relevant. In particular, many of 
the chapters emphasize the real effects of bank behaviour and credit evolu- 
tion. Schmidt concludes that because capital markets were largely absent 
in the East European transition economies, the ability of banks to establish 
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an inside money system and a hard budget constraint regime was crucial to 
the success of the macroeconomic transition. Calvo, in turn, stresses the 
effects of credit on the supply side in the context of the Mexican crisis. In 
the Argentine case, the explanation of the evolution of the activity level, 
the real exchange rate and the current account deficit relies heavily on the 
credit cycle triggered by the reform and the stabilization of the economy 
that followed the implementation of convertibility. 
Managing and Allocating Risk 
Capital markets in developing countries are typically very inefficient at 
processing both diversifiable and systematic risk. Regarding non- 
systematic risk, one of the most important obstacles observed in the coun- 
tries that were analysed is the absence or narrowness of the stock market. 
Risks that can be diversified away when the stock exchange operates nor- 
mally cannot be in developing countries because of the absence of well- 
functioning stock markets. Hence, given the expected return of a project, 
the difficulties to diversity risk through the market structure leads to 
`wrong' combinations of risk and return. This determines either that 
socially productive projects are not profitable to any private agent or that 
firms try to `internalize' diversification, incurring costs that imply a social 
waste of resources. For example, in Latin America the popularity of 
`grupos' in industry and services seems to be associated, among other 
factors, with the necessity of diversifying risk in the absence of well- 
developed stock markets. The diversification of the grupo replaces the 
diversification of risk via the capital market. Ceteris paribus, this form of 
risk diversification generates deadweight costs associated with both lack 
of sufficient productive specialization of firms and difficulties for individ- 
uals - who do not share the property of a grupo - to diversity their portfo- 
lio. In this fashion, the lack of financial deepening has real effects on 
growth: profitable projects are abandoned because of the impossibility 
to finance them at the optimal risk/return combination or funds are 
misallocated owing to wrong pricing of risk. 
There are also problems for managing systematic risk. The rudimentary 
financial development implies that it is very difficult to reallocate system- 
atic risks via the existing market structure. That is, it is not possible to 
sign a contract to share non-diversifiable risks with those agents willing to 
bear it. Hence, the entrepreneur must decide whether to carry out the 
project and fully bear the systematic risk or to quit. Either decision has a 
cost in terms of efficiency for the whole economy. A point that worsens 
the imperfections in the allocation of systematic risks is that systematic 
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risk in developing countries has special characteristics that make it more 
`corrosive' for economic efficiency. We come back to this point later. 
Financial Intermediation and Transactions Costs 
Financial intermediation may be considered the gamut of institutional 
arrangements within which savers interact with borrowers, thereby creat- 
ing equilibrium in the financial sector. A principal determinant of the size 
and scope of the financial intermediation sector is transactions costs, 
which, in turn, may be said to be driven by improvements in communica- 
tions and other technology, and legal impediments to trade in financial 
instruments. While changes in the relevant technological parameters, par- 
ticularly in developing countries, may be assumed to be `exogenous' (or 
readily importable), the legal and institutional financial environment is 
directly related to the nature of the financial liberalization. 
Special attention should be paid to the overall approach to creating 
financial markets and intermediaries in developing countries. Should the 
Anglo-Saxon model of equity-based financial systems be encouraged, or 
should the German and Japanese bank-based models be encouraged? 
Singh's (1993) survey comes out in favour of the bank-based model. What 
is evident from the country case-studies in this book as well as the the- 
matic chapters by Aivazian and Schmidt is that no model is a priori supe- 
rior to the other. Issues related to risk management, transactions costs and 
at the extreme, fraud, may equally be linked to either model, because the 
strengths and weaknesses of each depend on the regulatory regime and 
institutional environment within which they operate. The more general 
lesson here is that particular conditions in the country in question should 
determine the ultimate prescription, not a general statement of principle of 
the intrinsic superiority of one model over the other. 
In the financial sector, efficiency and transparency are not equivalent to 
technological prowess. There is a large literature on the potential destabil- 
izing impact of 'far-too-advanced' technology in this sector. Witness, for 
example, the debate over the role of programme trading and derivatives in 
market stability, covered in Part 2 of Miller (1991). Few, if any, develop- 
ing country financial sectors have reached the `sophistication' of the North 
American or Western European bourses, but similar questions, adapted to 
local conditions, may usefully be raised. 
In the case of developing countries, where financial sectors are still rela- 
tively underdeveloped, an additional issue arises. If there is an asymmetry 
among the key players, then the potential for destabilization exists. One 
example is the impact on exchange rates and reserves when capital is more 
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mobile internationally than it is within a country. This can and does 
happen when the domestic financial system is not as well developed or 
integrated, as one or a few national financial centres are with the inter- 
national financial system. 
Such a scenario has two likely implications. The first occurs if the 
inefficiency of the domestic recording and other back office functions 
allow some agents to take advantage, either legally or illegally, of the 
slowness of the system.7 The second is if the imbalance between inter- 
national and intra-national funds movement makes exchange rates and 
reserves more unstable than they would have been had the domestic 
adjustment mechanism been up to speed. 
An alternative formulation of the asymmetry would be when foreign 
banks or financial houses operating within a developing country have 
access to more advanced technology (or other means) than their domestic 
competitors. This has implications for the development of a domestic 
financial sector, and methods of industry regulation. There is ample evi- 
dence of these features in the studies on Argentina, Nigeria and Turkey 
and in the chapter by Nasution. 
High costs of intermediation tend to introduce a sizeable wedge 
between the cost of borrowing for the firm and the rate of return on 
savings for individuals. Under such circumstances, the firm faces a great 
differential between the costs of internal and external finance. A typical 
reaction to this is for the firm to `internalize' the capital market via a high 
retention ratio. The firm tries to use as much of its own funds as possible 
to finance investment. This has costs in terms of growth. Once the funds 
are exhausted, many high-rate-of-return projects may be abandoned 
because of the sizeable premium that firms must pay for external finance. 
The chapters on Argentina, Nigeria and Turkey are good examples of 
how difficult it is to reduce the spread between borrowing and lending 
rates after liberalization. In the case of Nigeria, additionally, the quality of 
the financial services remained very low. The government was obliged to 
set a minimum standard for the quality of the financial services, which in 
practice, of course, did not guarantee that the standards were met. 
1.4 THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH MATTERS 
In some theoretical scenarios, wealth distribution does not matter from the 
point of view of efficiency. This is because the separation theorems will 
hold in such an economy. That is, because the Fisher separation theorem 
holds, the investment decision can be relegated to managers who will 
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maximize shareholders' wealth. Funds can be efficiently allocated from 
individuals with few productive opportunities and great wealth to individ- 
uals with many opportunities and insufficient wealth. Given that the port- 
folio separation principle holds, the riskiness of any given security is 
measured by its own characteristics in relation to the market, independent 
of an individual's risk preferences and, therefore, entrepreneurs can con- 
centrate on their activities without worrying how individuals will manage 
the risks of their portfolios. In sum, in this world the distribution of 
resources among entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs does not matter. 
But this does not hold when markets are imperfect. The imperfections in 
the process of transferring funds from those with resources to those with 
the best projects imply that entrepreneurs may not find financing and there 
could be a net loss for society. This is true in developed and developing 
countries alike. However, the lack of financial deepening means precisely 
that the distance between perfect markets and the real world is further in 
developing countries than it is in developed ones. Hence, the negative 
effects of market imperfections are likely to be more sizeable in develop- 
ing countries. 
This factor has a strong impact on the real side of the economy, espe- 
cially during the transition period. Liberalization usually induces major 
wealth redistributions via changes in relative prices and as a consequence 
of the restructuring of the state. It may even happen that those with better 
entrepreneurial skills are adversely affected by the policy. If financial 
markets worked reasonably well then those who were favoured by the 
reform would finance entrepreneurs. However, in a financially underdevel- 
oped environment this would not be possible. For example, because 
markets providing long-term financing for restructuring do not exist, the 
transitional period will be more difficult and less efficient. 
These issues play a central role in many of the chapters in this book, but 
they are particularly stressed in the cases of Argentina, Eastern Europe, 
India and Turkey. Bernanke and Gertler (1990) suggest that the 
economy's growth capacity will be restrained when financial distress 
hinders the net worth of those agents with the greatest entrepreneurial 
skills. Given that a fall in net worth reduces the debtor's creditworthiness, 
a collapse in investment can occur if net worth is low enough. After 
analysing the complex interlinkages between the banking sector and enter- 
prise control in the transition economies, Schmidt reaches the conclusion 
that the collapse of the long-term credit market was due to excessively 
high monitoring costs. Monitoring costs, in turn, are high because the net 
worth of firms is low, given the reduced value of assets after the imple- 
mentation of structural reforms. In the cases of Argentina and Turkey, the 
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problem of the distribution of wealth between entrepreneurs and non- 
entrepreneurs appears in the context of financial fragility. In the case of 
Turkey, the authors emphasize the negative consequences of the increase 
of the interest rate on the entrepreneurs' balance sheets. In the case of 
Argentina, the problem is that the appreciation of the currency after liber- 
alization heavily reduced the net worth of producers of tradable goods. 
It seems that the issue of the negative effects of financial fragility during 
the transition calls for a more gradualist approach in the dismantling of 
government subsidies. This point is raised in the India study. The authors 
believe that the greater gradualism of the reform helped to prevent serious 
disruptions in economic activity, especially regarding the agricultural 
sector and small-scale industry. Indeed, it is a stylized fact of the liberal- 
ization experience that the beneficial effects of deregulation on investment 
have not been as great as had been expected. The effects of the reform on 
the net wealth of entrepreneurs and hence on financial fragility may help 
to explain this. 
1.5 INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AND MICRO-MACRO 
INTERACTIONS 
From the research of this project it follows that there are two fundamental 
factors behind the difficulties encountered in managing risks and reducing 
financial transaction costs in developing countries: the low quality of the 
infrastructure-supporting transactions in the financial market on the one 
hand, and the special features of macroeconomic disequilibria on the 
other. 
By `quality of the infrastructure for financial transactions' we mean 
both systemic elements and the operational efficiency of firms in the 
financial sector. Of the systemic factors that tend to increase transaction 
costs, the imperfections in the functioning of the legal and regulatory 
framework stand out because they increase both ex ante and ex post costs 
of contracting.8 These comprise not only the design of norms regulating 
financial transactions, but also the degree of efficiency and corruption of 
the judiciary system, the public officials in the central bank and so on. 
That is, there are difficulties to design and enforce contracts, ambiguity in 
defining property and control rights under certain states of nature, and so 
on. This generates `institutional uncertainty' which affects credit risks. 
Under certain circumstances, there may be a disproportionate increase in 
the amount of the external finance premium. In fact, for some long-term 
financial instruments, the premium could climb so high that the market 
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could disappear. These issues are stressed in the chapter analysing the 
transition in East Europe, where the ambiguity in the definition of property 
rights was one of the most important elements generating financial dis- 
tress and macroeconomic instability. The Nigerian case, on the other 
hand, is an extreme example of the high financial costs of `institutional 
uncertainty'. 
Another important systemic factor is the quality of practices regarding 
accounting and auditing. The lack of reliability and credibility of available 
information sometimes makes it impossible for the parties to design a con- 
tract in which the optimal quantities to be interchanged are different from 
zero. That is, there are financial contracts that go unsigned because of 
principal-agent problems that could be `solved' if the financial market 
infrastructure related to the production and processing of information were 
more developed. 
In this regard, we would like to highlight the positive externalities that a 
well-developed tax structure generates for the agents operating in the 
financial markets. If the authorities in charge of fiscal revenues control 
and monitor the reliability of the information in the firms' and individuals' 
balance sheets to avoid tax evasion then the information will be credible 
not only for the government but also for other market participants. This 
would foster the development of capital markets. In fact, the credibility of 
the agents' balance sheets is more important for the bond and stock 
markets than for the banking system. For one thing, it is possible that 
bankers and firms share inside information that is hidden from the author- 
ities. But it is not possible to share `hidden' information in that way with a 
myriad of investors in the stock market. We believe that the weakness in 
monitoring tax compliance in developing countries is a significant element 
working against capital market development. 
The efficiency of the firms performing the intermediation of funds is 
crucial. To enhance the markets' operational efficiency, the firm must be 
able to allocate funds at minimum expense. To achieve allocative 
efficiency the costs of funds (adjusted by risk) must be the same for all 
borrowers, and the same must happen with the rate of return offered to 
savers. This has not been the rule in the countries we have covered. The 
typical causes of deviation from operational and allocative efficiency 
were: a certain degree of market power exerted by banks, the existence of 
market segmentation and difficulties in exploiting fully the economies of 
scale because of the smallness of domestic markets. This latter factor was 
especially important in those countries where a long-lasting period of 
inflation and macroeconomic instability induced a permanent drop in the 
demand for domestic assets. Note that there is a kind of vicious circle 
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between the lack of financial deepening and high operational costs of 
intermediation: costs are high because the market is small and high inter- 
mediation costs prevent the market from growing. 
Another important element generating high costs is the effect of the 
transitional period on firms' behaviour. When the economy is moving 
from repression to deregulation, the intermediators lack experience in 
allocating credit in a free market setting, and hence will be forced to 
go through a period of restructuring and learning. This will cause the 
operational costs to increase in the short run. 
The effects of macroeconomic disequilibria is the second important 
factor we mentioned above. Two features frequently present in countries 
with financial problems deserve to be highlighted. The first is that macro- 
economic disequilibria tend to show signs of instability; they tend to be 
recurrent, relatively long lasting and deep. Second, there is typically far 
more built-in noise in the stochastic process governing the evolution of 
key macroeconomic variables such as the activity level, interest rates, 
wages and the exchange rate (IDB, 1995; Fanelli and Frenkel, 1995). 
The recurrence and greater durability of macroeconomic disequilibria 
significantly affect financial markets. Instability tends to generate institu- 
tional uncertainty, because agents anticipate that the government may have 
to implement draconian financial measures to preserve a minimum of 
macroeconomic stability. Examples of this are the Bonex Plan in 
Argentina and the Collor Plan in Brazil, which expropriated a good part of 
financial wealth from depositors to deactivate the explosive trend of public 
debt. 
The micro-macro and real-financial interlinkages described above 
derive from an assessment of situations of financial reform in the presence 
of macroeconomic instability, of which the Southern Cone experience of 
the 1970s is the most salient. Because financial liberalization inevitably 
results in higher real interest rates, the government deficit and the cost of 
servicing it increase precisely when these aggregates are supposed to be 
compressed. At the same time, revenue from seigniorage is reduced, a fact 
that is exacerbated if financial liberalization is accompanied by a currency- 
board-type of arrangement. Finally, the higher real interest rates will push 
precarious firms into bankruptcy, thus increasing pressure on their creditor 
institutions. But beyond the Southern Cone experience, the studies on 
Nigeria and Turkey in this book illustrate the inefficacy of financial sector 
reform without an accompanying change in fiscal policies. 
The causes of many structural imbalances in the banking system can 
easily be traced to macroeconomic instability. When the inflation rate is 
high over a prolonged period of time the microeconomic structure of the 
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financial system adapts. Banks multiply branches beyond the optimal point 
so as to capture the inflationary tax. The portfolio preferences of individu- 
als also change. There is a shortening of the planning horizon and the phe- 
nomenon of `short termism' arises, while in some countries there is a 
dollarization of financial intermediation coupled with capital flight. 
An important characteristic of the structural transformations due to 
macroeconomic instability, highlighted in the chapters, is that there is a 
certain asymmetry: once macroeconomic stability is diminished or 
deactivated then the structural transformations do not disappear automati- 
cally. When financial liberalization implies that the government ceases to 
absorb credit and there is a higher availability of credit to the private 
sector then the financial institutions face the problem of lack of expertise 
in assessing the quality of private projects. The restructuring of banks to 
obtain such expertise, nevertheless, is not easy, because the banks typi- 
cally show an overinvestment in physical infrastructure (owing to branch 
proliferation) and an underinvestment in human capital. This situation 
cannot be changed in the short run and, in the meantime, operational costs 
are high. Hence, financial liberalization does not induce a dramatic rever- 
sal in the margin between borrowing and lending rates. Other asymmetric 
phenomena are dollarization and the fall in the demand for domestic 
deposits. Once instability has been removed, reversion is not automatic. If 
high inflation persists for a prolonged period of time then the agent will 
take costly actions to save transaction costs originating in the use of 
money. Once the costs are incurred, the new technology of transaction is 
used in spite of the after-stabilization reduction in the costs of using 
domestic money. The Uruguayan experience is a good case in point. After 
almost two decades of financial liberalization, there has been no reversion 
in the dollarization of the economy. 
One last point related to macroeconomic instability is the way in which 
it affects non-diversifiable risk. Systematic risks can be subdivided into 
those that are broadly predictable by probabilistic calculation (such as the 
cycle) and those that are subject to uncertainty (such as financial crises 
and changes in regime) (Davis, 1992). The higher the macroeconomic 
instability, the higher is the component of uncertainty in systematic risks. 
Given that systematic risks can be shared but not eliminated, it follows 
that macroeconomic instability has costs. Ceteris paribus, if there is a 
correct pricing of systematic risk then the discount rate used for discount- 
ing the benefits of the project will be higher in unstable countries and, 
hence, a project that is profitable in a macroeconomically stable country 
may not be so in an unstable one. If market failures prevent the correct 
pricing of risks then it will result in financial fragility. 
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All the authors in this volume strongly stress the costs of macroecon- 
omic instability in terms of both real and financial growth. In addition to 
the fiscal deficit, Calvo emphasizes the instability of the demand for 
domestic assets and external factors such as the variation in international 
interest rates. Powell makes the case for flexible exchange rates based on 
the Canadian experience. Although Canada is not a developing country, its 
experience is highly relevant, because it is a relatively small, open 
economy exposed to external shocks. It relies on foreign savings to finance 
a significant proportion of domestic expenditures. One of the most often 
cited sources of macroeconomic disturbances is the instability of capital 
movement. The chapters on Argentina, Turkey and Uruguay give centre 
stage to capital inflows as a determinant of the evolution of the economy 
under liberalization. 
1.6 THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK 
An important, indeed key, player in any discussion of the institutional 
environment within which financial liberalization occurs is the central 
bank. Today, five broad functions may be attributed to a central bank. It is: 
(1) banker to the government; (2) banker to domestic financial institutions; 
(3) regulator of the domestic financial sector; (4) responsible for currency 
issue and management of international reserves; (5) responsible for the 
operation of monetary and credit policy. These, in turn, may be classified, 
in the manner of Goodhart (1992), as `micro' (functions 1-3, but particu- 
larly 3) and `macro' (functions 4 and 5, especially 5). A sixth function, 
that of promotion of financial development, may be added in the case of 
developing countries. Rather than seeing this function as belonging to 
either the `macro' or `micro' sphere, it may be considered more as 
an overarching aim that underlies all central banking operations in 
developing countries. 
In this respect, Collyns's (1983) analysis of central banking in develop- 
ing countries is instructive. Besides the obvious point about these central 
banks reflecting, until recently, historical imperatives and arrangements, 
they typically have `many' functions (with obvious repercussions on 
financial sector control and liberalization), because of (a) the shortage in 
many countries of the required technical expertise, and (b) the subsump- 
tion to the needs of `national development' of the various societal institu- 
tions and traditions. Both point to large and powerful central banks, given 
very many tasks, in a general environment of dirigisme. The gamut of con- 
trols, regulations, and distortions that have come to characterize many 
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developing country financial sectors - all of which may fall under the 
broader implications of the moniker `financial repression' - and which 
financial liberalizations now have undone or are attempting to undo, 
should thus come as no surprise. 
The most important development in the contemporary practice of 
central banking is the emphasis on rational agents and credible policy. 
This section will not go into the intricacies of the huge literature on the 
rules-versus-discretion debate, save for citing the `standard' reference on 
time consistency, Kydland and Prescott (1977), and the relevant literature 
on central bank independence. 
In the context of the formulation of monetary policy, time consistency 
has been interpreted to mean that (1) the credibility of the monetary 
authorities matters more than whether or not they announce the adoption 
of `monetarist' or any other principles, and (2) that this credibility is 
enhanced when the central bank is distanced from the rest of the machin- 
ery of government. 
Empirically, the success of independent central banks has been taken to 
mean low inflation rates, and, sometimes, low costs, in terms of lost 
output, of fighting inflation (that is, a more inelastic Phillips curve).9 The 
weight of the empirical evidence is in favour of the central bank independ- 
ence hypothesis, and this may be found in Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman 
et al. (1992), Cukierman (1992) Swinburne and Castello-Branco (1991), 
and Banaian et al. (1983). 
Despite this, at the macro, inflation-output level, the debate is far from 
concluded, and here is not the place to delve into it. Suffice to say that a 
number of issues remain to be addressed: (1) Do independent central 
banks bring about low inflation, or do societies predisposed to monetary 
discipline more easily accept independent central banks? (2) Do we have a 
long enough track record, and among enough countries, to make a proper 
determination on the matter? and, related to this, (3) Does it follow that 
extending independence to central banks in a host of countries around the 
world will `result in' lower inflation rates - that is, is independence either 
a necessary or a sufficient condition for success in the fight against elastic 
Phillips curves? 
The macro-level issue outlined above does impinge on more sectoral 
and financial liberalization issues, but this has not received the same atten- 
tion among researchers as the larger debate. Principally, two issues should 
be addressed. 
First, what are the links between successful financial liberalization and 
independent central banks? More generally, what constitutes time- 
consistent policy when it comes to dismantling and rationalizing the appa- 
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ratus of repressed financial sectors? Clearly, credibility in, say, denational- 
izing a banking system, or attracting funds into it, or improving the quality 
of its lending, requires that the policy move be well-announced and per- 
manent. How important is the rate of inflation (and perhaps more impor- 
tantly, its variability and predictability) before, during and after a financial 
liberalization? The answer to the second question is becoming clear. As 
noted earlier, financial liberalization during macroeconomic instability can 
go badly wrong, and surely if reforms to the central bank enhance its cred- 
ibility then this is a desirable development. However, the first question 
goes to the very heart of the matter of credibility and institutional reform. 
The interplay between extending a central bank's statutory independ- 
ence, its actual independence and its somewhat traditional role as regulator 
of and lender of last resort to the commercial financial system is a 
complex matter to which no clear answer exists at present. The literature, 
even for the Federal Reserve and European countries, is mixed or silent on 
this matter. 10 `Classic' contemporary statements on the need for and opera- 
tionalization of central bank independence, such as Fair (1979) and Burns 
(1977), concentrate on distance from government in their characterization 
of independence, and here the nature of appointment and duration of term 
of senior management, or statutory objectives, for example, get much 
attention. 
Empirical measures of independence, too, concentrate on such criteria. 
Only Grilli et al. (1991) explicitly consider `banking supervision not 
trusted to central bank, or central bank alone' as counting towards more 
independence. The logic here is as follows. By delegating supervision to 
a separate entity, and leaving solvency finance issues to a private and 
fully funded deposit insurance scheme, there is less pressure on a central 
bank to step in and `save' a bank or banks (that is, irate depositors) in 
crisis by monetizing the losses, and thus violating a credit and inflation 
ceiling. 
But in developing countries, where even middle-income depositors may 
be poor, and - as in Africa and Central America - increasing democratiza- 
tion makes governments particularly responsive to such public pressure, 
divorcing central banks from their financial sector role is impractical. But 
if indeed this distinction is pursued as a matter of policy then care has to 
be taken in designing a system that contains an independent central bank, 
a credible public supervisor and an actuarily sound insurance system. The 
lessons from examining episodes of financial and monetary reforms in 
South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia suggest that prudence and rectitude 
may be more important than independence, and that in financial matters 
the latter does not imply the former.'' 
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More generally, it remains still to be seen just how `Chinese' the walls 
are in countries where the relevant supervision and insurance functions 
are entrusted to bodies other than the central bank. 
This in turn leads to the larger issue of the impact of financial liberaliza- 
tion on the money and credit creation process and the conduct of monetary 
policy more generally in developing countries. 
Two broad strands of thought should be distinguished here. The first is 
political economic, and derives from the `political business cycle' 
approach starting with Nordhaus (1975), and comprising, as notable con- 
tributions, Frey and Schneider (1981), Waller (1989), Alesina (1989), 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), and Roubini and Sachs (1989). The gist of 
this line of thought is that macro-economic aggregates are, not surpris- 
ingly, responsive to political and social institutions and changes in a 
country. One example has already been noted - pressure to compensate 
the losers from a financial sector failure may affect credit targets, the 
degree of affectation depending on the degree of independence of 
the central bank and related bodies. 
Here, one would simply add that the impetus for, and speed and nature 
of, the financial liberalization itself is endogenous to the political economy 
of a country, buffeted, to a greater or lesser extent, by external pressure for 
stabilization and adjustment. It follows that it may be worth studying how 
various cases of financial liberalization came about. 
From this, however, a second and more technical matter arises. Simply 
put, how do the relevant money and credit multipliers behave during and 
after liberalization, particularly as capital markets become globally or 
regionally integrated, and widen and deepen (that is, as the number and 
nature of financial instruments increases)? Brunner states: 
Money is still best defined in the classical tradition as referring to any 
object generally accepted and used as a medium of exchange. Financial 
innovations associated with technological or institutional changes do 
not modify this definition. They do however change the empirical coun- 
terpart of the definition and this requires intermittent changes in the 
measurement procedures for the nation's money supply. (Brunner, 
1992: 803). 
It is evident that in most developing countries financial liberalization is 
accompanied by a more unstable money supply process than earlier. This 
in itself is not a condemnation of liberalization, particularly when causal- 
ity from one to the other cannot be clearly established. It is entirely poss- 
ible that this instability is symptomatic of the same events that lead 
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national authorities to reform their financial sectors. What is clear, though, 
is the larger issue raised by Brunner above. At one extreme, the discussion 
in the study on Argentina suggests quite plainly that in the presence of the 
Convertibility Plan the central bank has practically no powers. In countries 
such as Turkey and Uruguay, where capital flows (in and out) have played 
a large role, important issues arise about the ability of and indeed desir- 
ability for the domestic monetary authorities to control these (and by 
extension domestic money and credit) to any significant extent. 12 
We do not claim to have the last word on this matter. What we do 
understand from the work presented in this book is that financial liberal- 
ization in an era of globalization forces us to reflect further on what consti- 
tutes money, what the ambit of the financial sector should be, and who 
should play a key regulating role in it. 
1.7 MARKET LIBERALIZATION OR MARKET CREATION? 
From the chapters in this book it follows that government `failures' are 
highly relevant in explaining the lack of financial deepening, but, as the 
previous discussion shows, they are not the only important factors. In 
the literature on liberalization, however, government failures were given 
the prominent role in generating `market repression' and, therefore, the 
lack of financial deepening. Why? Our hypothesis is that, in the 1970s, 
the accent on institutional factors (such as interest rate controls or the 
inflationary finance of public deficits) as obstacles to financial develop- 
ment could be understood in light of the pervasiveness of these phenom- 
ena. This historically determined emphasis, nevertheless, has had a cost in 
the long run. It was implicitly understood that the abandonment of repres- 
sive policies would automatically result in financial deepening. This led to 
the disregard for other crucial institutional factors that generate market 
failures in developing countries, such as the underdevelopment of the 
legal and regulatory framework; the lack of skilled human resources and 
of experience regarding screening, monitoring and enforcement of con- 
tracts in a free market environment; and so on. 13 Another side-effect of the 
emphasis on the role of the public sector was the incorrect analysis of the 
factors determining macroeconomic disequilibria in the context of liberal- 
ization experiences. The stress on the role of the fiscal deficit and policy 
mismanagement resulted in the overlooking of other relevant causes of 
macroeconomic instability. This was particularly true of the private sector 
tendency to generate widening deficits in the wake of liberalization that 
lead to unsustainable current account deficits. The neglect of this point 
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impeded the authorities from implementing corrective measures in 
advance. The belief that the private sector is `always right', if the funda- 
mentals are right, impeded the authorities from foreseeing the crises in 
Chile in the early 1980s and in Mexico and Argentina in the 1980s where 
the public sector accounts were equilibrated. 
To make a proper evaluation of financial liberalization, ultimately, the 
proverbial short and long runs - and the adjustment path from one state to 
the next - have to be delineated. The evidence and discussion alluded to 
earlier in this chapter strongly suggest that financial liberalization reduces 
distortions and rent-seeking behaviour in the credit markets. The jury is 
probably still out on the larger and related questions: Do liberal financial 
sectors foster financial development better than illiberal ones, or not? And, 
is some degree of dirigisme necessary to put in place the preconditions for 
financial development before it is then best left to the forces of the market 
to take over the process of widening and deepening? 
The emphasis on liberalization and repression in much of the literature 
has obscured the main goal of any policy of financial reform: given that 
finance matters for development, to eliminate the negative effects of the 
lack of financial deepening on growth potential, it is necessary both to 
create financial markets and to improve the functioning of existing 
markets. It is very well known, nevertheless, that there is no market 
economy with a complete structure of markets. Hence, the real- 
world-amended aim for policy-makers in developing countries is, in fact, 
to reach as complete a structure of financial markets as possible, which, in 
turn, means as complete as the one existing in developed countries. One of 
the lessons that could be drawn from this project is that it is better to con- 
ceive of the problem of market liberalization as the problem of creating 
and improving financial markets in a context where the ultimate long-run 
goal is the achievement of a liberalized financial structure. Yet, the exist- 
ence of a liberalized financial system should be conceived of as the con- 
clusion and not the beginning of the reform process. The achievement of a 
financial system that is as liberal as possible should be the indicator that 
the reform process to create the absent markets has finally succeeded. 
This view has some advantages for both research and policy-making. In 
this view, the success or failure of a financial policy is judged by the 
results achieved in `filling the gaps' in the structure of financial markets. 
Besides, it is not necessary to assume a priori that all interventions are 
detrimental to market development under all circumstances. This is spe- 
cially true because of two factors that call for government action: struc- 
tural causes of market failures and the existence of a transitional period 
during which markets will be operating in a disequilibrium. For this 
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approach there is no contradiction between the strategies of Hong Kong 
and Korea. In terms of the research agenda, the advantage is that research 
does not end but rather begins with reform policies oriented to liberaliza- 
tion. For example, it is necessary to investigate why a country like 
Argentina, which eliminated almost every element of financial repression 
in the 1980s, has not achieved a level of financial deepening that is higher 
than that in the 1960s, which were `years of high repression'. In other 
words, if government failure is not the only cause of financial underdevel- 
opment then the logical question is: What other factors are there? Stiglitz 
(1994) is a good example of how much can be learnt in trying to answer 
this question. Our own guess, after having completed the project, is that a 
deeper analysis of institutional, regulatory and legal factors and the 
interaction between micro and macro elements would be a safe bet. 
Notes 
1. Stiglitz (1993) argues that financial markets are significantly different from 
other markets and more prone to failure. He then discusses seven key mani- 
festations of market failure in the financial sector, which suggests that some 
amount of financial repression may be beneficial until very advanced stages 
of the development process. Gibson and Tsakalotos's (1994) survey also 
argues along similar lines, as does much of the literature assessing the East 
Asian experience. For a recent contrarian view see Coles's chapter in 
Harwood and Smith (1997). 
2. On the liberalization attempts in the Southern Cone, see Diaz-Alejandro 
(1985). 
3. On the problem of sequencing, see Fanelli and Frenkel (1993) and the litera- 
ture cited there. 
4. Prior to the work of these authors there was an implicit assumption that 
finance did not affect the rate of growth of the economy. Tobin's (1965) 
suggestion that the rate of change of money creation could have a bearing 
on the level of capital deepening was downplayed and criticized by the 
mainstream in monetary economics, In particular, Sidrauski (1967) and 
Sargent and Wallace (1973) developed growth models in which money cre- 
ation did not affect any real variable. 
5. The most important distinctive characteristics mentioned by Shaw are: 
market segmentation; short-term horizon for decision-making owing to 
high levels of uncertainty; difficulties in the process of information- 
gathering; low factor mobility; reduced capital markets and difficulties 
in distinguishing between internal and external debt in relation to the 
private sector. 
6. See, for example, Rose (1993) for accounts of the overall environment 
within which the explosive growth in the number of financial instruments 
has flourished. 
7. This is one of the reasons given for the scandal in 1993 in the Indian 
financial system. 
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8. We use the terms in the sense of Williamson (1990). Ex ante costs are 
incurred before the transaction takes place. The contract must be drafted 
and the terms of the transaction must be negotiated. Ex post costs are 
incurred in consummating and safeguarding the deal as originally struck. 
9. A la Lucas (1973) - that is, the more inelastic the Phillips curve, the smaller 
the rise in unemployment for a given reduction in inflation. 
10. One recent exception is Heller (1991), who argues in favour of a limited 
mandate for the central bank, in this regard. McCallum (1994) uses simula- 
tions of US data from the 1970s and 1980s to suggest that a central bank can 
adhere to a monetary policy rule while also fulfilling its function as a lender 
of last resort. 
11. In this respect, the case of the Banque Centrale des Etats de 1'Afrique de 
1'Quest (BCEAO) is instructive. Using the criteria set forth in Grilli et al. 
(1991), Medhora (1996) finds the BCEAO to be very independent - easily in 
the top third of OECD country rankings, and probably the most statutorily 
independent central bank among those in developing countries through much 
of its history. While this did produce an enviable inflation performance until 
the early 1980s, the macroeconomic problems of the BCEAO region are well 
known (culminating in the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994), 
and most countries in its purview have had troubled financial sectors. The 
BCEAO is no longer solely responsible for the commercial financial system, 
but it remains to be seen how `Chinese' the walls really are. For a discussion 
of recent financial sector crises, see Sundararajan and Balino (1991), which 
contains case-studies of Argentina, Chile, The Philippines, Thailand and 
Uruguay. Akyuz (1993), in a survey that is on the whole sceptical of `doctri- 
naire' financial liberalization, comes out in favour of retaining control of 
several aspects of the financial sector, on grounds of prudential regulation. 
12. For an analysis of the recent experience of developing countries with capital 
movements, see Helleiner (1996) and Ffrench-Davis and Griffith-Jones (1995). 
13. The `second' McKinnon is far more aware of these factors. In McKinnon 
(1991) there is much richer analysis of institutional factors, the dynamic 
problems and the role of the state and institutions in the transition to a 
market economy. 
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Country Case Studies 

2 Argentina 
Jose M. Fanelli, Guillermo Rozenwurcel 
and Lucio Simpson' 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first important attempt to liberalize financial markets in Argentina 
took place between 1977 and 1981, and it was a complete failure. 
Throughout the 1980s, the degree of `financial repression' oscillated but 
interest rates were basically market-determined. However, the financial 
system operated under important distortions related to the volatile macro- 
economic environment. 
The implementation of the Convertibility Plan (CP) in March/April 
1991 and the drop in international interest rates gave a decisive thrust to 
the liberalization policy undertaken in mid-1989, whose aim was to 
restructure the economy along the lines of the `Washington Consensus'. 
Two distinctive features characterized the Argentine reforms. The first was 
the adoption of a `big bang' approach, where sequencing considerations 
were completely disregarded. The second was the establishment of a con- 
vertibility regime by law, which requires the central bank (CB) to back 
the whole monetary base with foreign exchange reserves. Besides, the new 
CB charter drastically limited the scope of monetary policy and the CB's 
role as lender of last resort. 
In fact, the Argentine liberalization programme tried to transform the 
whole structure of capital markets by increasing the participation of the 
private sector in the allocation of loanable funds and in the pricing of risk, 
and by rapidly eliminating both the distortions existing within each market 
and the barriers that could limit competition between the different segments 
of the capital market. Integration with the international capital market was 
reinforced with the Convertibility Law, which allows contracts to be denom- 
inated in any currency. The foreign exchange market was completely deregu- 
lated and currently there are no restrictions on buying and selling currencies. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to analyse the Argentine experience 
with financial liberalization after the implementation of convertibility. The 
approach adopted favours a comprehensive analysis that takes into 
account as many financial instruments and agents as possible and 
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addresses what has happened with credit generation in terms of quantity, 
quality (maturity, for example) and allocation patterns. 
There are good theoretical and/or methodological reasons for adopting a 
broad approach in terms of the financial markets considered. First, it is in 
the tradition of the liberalization literature to adopt a `debt-intermediation 
view' to study the problems of financial development (Shaw, 1973), an 
approach where the process of credit generation is no less important than 
the process of money creation. Second, the discussions on the virtues and 
shortcomings of policy packages that followed the first attempts at freeing 
financial markets showed the need to consider a broader asset menu when 
analysing, for example, whether liberalization policies induced financial 
deepening. Thus, there could be an increase in the demand for deposits in 
the banking system without financial deepening if, after liberalization, 
there is a substitution between different instruments instead of an increase 
in their total demand (Taylor, 1983). A richer menu is also important in 
examining sequencing problems and, especially, the relationship between 
external and domestic financial liberalization. 
Thus, to give a consistent view of the development of the whole struc- 
ture of intermediation, this chapter will examine: (1) the evolution of the 
matrix of assets and liabilities (MAL) of the economy after the implemen- 
tation of liberalization; (2) firms' portfolio decisions on the basis of 
a sample of firms quoted on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange; and 
(3) performance indicators of the banking system. 
Although we will define a broader than usual quantitative measure of 
financial deepening by using the MAL, we have also made efforts to 
incorporate quality measures of both the assets and the institutions that 
create them. The Southern Cone liberalization failures2 led to a greater 
concern about the effects of deregulation on moral hazard, a concern that 
suggests paying attention to the evolution of the solvency and liquidity of 
the banking sector and hence to the impact of liberalization on systemic 
risk. Consequently, we construct a set of indicators to assess the degree of 
`excellency' achieved by capital markets after the reform, taking the Basle 
norms as a first step. However, other indicators, apart from capital ade- 
quacy, are necessary, especially in economies where there is an important 
degree of dollarization in the financial system, while the role and quantita- 
tive significance of (non-diversifiable) systemic risk as a determinant of 
asset returns tends to be much more important than in developed countries. 
Another reason for adding quality indicators to assess the degree of 
financial development has to do with the management of risk and informa- 
tion within the system. A situation is conceivable where there is no incre- 
ment in the financial assets/GDP ratio, but there is an improvement in the 
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quality of such assets in terms of their efficiency to spread risk or process 
relevant information. For example, in applying prudential regulation, a 
particularly conservative central bank will strongly discourage risk-taking 
by commercial banks. But this may depress the rate of growth of financial 
assets created by the banking system, thus restraining financial deepening. 
However, by reducing the degree of systemic risk faced by the system, 
this behaviour of the regulator could be very friendly to financial develop- 
ment. An additional example has to do with the term maturity of financial 
instruments. It is a well-known fact that underdeveloped capital markets 
are characterized by a weak supply of long-term credit. Consequently, a 
longer term-maturity of financial instruments would be an improvement. 
However, there might be an increase in the term maturity of assets without 
an increase in their total supply. This would occur if there were a portfolio 
shift in favor of assets of longer maturity after liberalization. To detect 
this kind of improvement it is necessary to analyse the term structure of 
assets and liabilities in the books of financial intermediaries. A very 
similar situation would occur were there to be a major substitution of 
equity shares for bank deposits in the portfolio of agents over time. Such a 
movement in favour of the equity market and against the banking system 
would allow improvement in the ability of each agent to manage and 
diversify risk. But it would appear as a weakening of the financial deepen- 
ing process as measured by the money/GDP ratio. 
Finally, the role of `informal' markets in the intermediation of funds 
should be addressed. Given that in Argentina the bulk of the assets thus 
generated consist of inter-firm credit, the analysis of the firms' balance 
sheets may help to uncover the effects of financial liberalization on these 
practices. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 pre- 
sents analysis of the changes in the financial structure during the period 
under study, and Section 2.3 deals with the evolution of the banking 
system under liberalization; the discussion in each section is organized 
around a series of salient `stylized facts'. Section 2.5, the last, reviews the 
main conclusions and suggests some directions for further research. 
2.2 FINANCIAL DEEPENING AND THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
OF FIRMS 
Given the close interaction between developments in the financial sphere 
and the general macroeconomic environment, in what follows we briefly 
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After the implementation of the CP in March 1991, the economy has 
undergone two very different phases (see Table 2.1). In the first, inflation 
was drastically reduced but there was a significant appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. The period was characterized by a significant growth in 
GDP, rising trade deficits and capital inflows, financial deepening and 
increasing tax revenues. In contrast, the second phase, marked by the so- 
called tequila effect, showed a deterioration in all these aspects and wit- 
nessed a financial crisis that put the CP on the brink of collapse. 
Catastrophe was avoided, but only with the exceptional support of multi- 
lateral institutions and after incurring significant quasifiscal costs. On the 
other hand, the recession greatly accelerated the pace of the required 
external adjustment. 
The Matrix of Assets and Liabilities and the Stylized Facts of 
Liberalization 
On the basis of the MALs in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, we can say there is 
`financial deepening' when the sum of the total assets (or liabilities) 
appearing in each cell of the MAL increases in relation to GDP. This 
measure takes into account all operations of intermediation carried out in 
the formal system. In the same way, the level of domestic financial deep- 
ening can be calculated by summing up the cells corresponding only to 
domestically generated assets/liabilities. 
The MALs show that there was financial deepening in the period 1991-5, 
because (re-expressing the MALs in nominal terms) the total amount of 
assets in the economy rose by $114.8 billion, which implies a rate of cre- 
ation of new financial assets of 15.1 per cent per year. As a consequence, the 
total assets/GDP ratio rose from 75 per cent in 1991 to 89 per cent in 1995). 
Domestic financial deepening also took place, not only in the form of an 
increase in the quantity of assets and liabilities, but also through a change in 
the sources of creation of financial instruments in favour of the domestic 
ones. Thus, while in 1991 foreign debt represented 39 per cent of the 75 per 
cent assets/GDP ratio, its share dropped to 22 per cent of an 89 per cent 
assets/GDP ratio in 1994. However, many of the results in terms of higher 
financial deepening were not robust enough to resist the Mexican shock. 
In order to have a more complete assessment of the qualitative aspects 
of the process in what follows, we present the most relevant stylized facts 
of the period. 
(1) There was a dramatic change in the process of money creation, which 
became much more dependent on capital inflows. 
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Rest of Total assets/ 
the world liabilities 
(1) MB -4.2 1.6 2.6 4.2 
(2) SD$ -1.7 1.0 0.7 1.7 
(3) TD$ -3.1 0.6 2.5 3.1 
(4) SDE -0.4 0.0 0.4 0.4 
(5) TDE -3.3 0.0 3.3 3.3 
(6) L$ 10.5 -3.4 -7.1 10.5 
(7) LE 6.7 -1.5 -5.2 6.7 
(8) BG$ 0.4 0.5 -1.3 0.4 1.3 
(9) BGE 0.6 0.5 -4.1 1.5 1.5 4.1 
(10) FRC 4.4 -4.4 4.4 
(11) FRF 0.0 0.7 -0.7 0.7 
(12) X -1.9 -3.4 -26.5 -2.9 34.7 34.7 
(13) TA 5.4 20.5 1.6 11.4 36.2 75.1 
(14) TL -6.1 -12.0 -36.8 -15.2 -5.0 75.1 
(15) NW -0.7 8.5 -35.1 -3.7 31.1 
(16) TAE 5.0 7.9 0.1 5.2 36.2 
(17) TLE -1.9 -7.2 -32.1 -8.1 -5.0 
(18) NWE 3.1 0.7 -32.0 -2.9 31.1 
The financial instruments that appear in the rows are: (1) the monetary base 
(MB); (2) sight deposits denominated in pesos (SD$); (3) savings accounts and 
term deposits denominated in pesos (TD$); (4) sight deposits denominated in 
dollars (SDE); (5) savings accounts and term deposits denominated in dollars 
(TDE); (6) banking credit in pesos (L$); (7) banking credit in dollars (LE); (8) 
government bonds in pesos (BG$); (9) government bonds in dollars (GBE); 
(10) foreign reserves of the Central Bank; (11) foreign reserves of the banking 
system; and (12) foreign debt with foreign banks. The sum of the assets held 
by all agents of each financial instrument appears in the last column of the 
matrix. 
The agents in the columns are: the central bank, the financial system, the 
non-financial private sector, the non-financial public sector and the rest of the 
world. The algebraic sum of the magnitudes appearing in each cell of a column 
represents the net financial worth (NW) of the agent. The value of NW for each 
agent appears in row number 15 in the matrix and it is the difference between row 
13 (agent's total financial assets, TA) and row 14 (agent's total liabilities, TL). In 
rows 16, 17 and 18 the TAE TLE AND NWE variables stand for the part 
denominated in dollars of the agents' total assets, total liabilities and net financial 
worth respectively. 
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Central Bank, Ministry of the Economy data. 
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Rest of Total assets/ 
the world liabilities 
(1) MB -4.5 1.0 0.2 3.4 4.5 
(2) SD$ -2.4 0.9 1.4 2.4 
(3) TD$ -4.7 0.5 4.1 4.7 
(4) SDE -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 
(5) TDE -7.7 0.2 7.5 7.7 
(6) L$ 9.3 -1.7 -7.6 9.3 
(7) LE 11.4 -1.3 -10.1 11.4 
(8) BG$ 0.0 0.4 -2.4 1.5 0.5 2.4 
(9) BGE 0.6 1.6 -18.1 3.2 12.7 18.1 
(10) FRC 4.5 -4.5 4.5 
(11) FRF -0.1 1.0 -0.9 0.9 
(12) X -2.5 -4.6 -7.7 -7.7 22.5 22.5 
(13) TA 5.2 24.6 1.8 21.4 35.6 88.6 
(14) TL -7.1 -19.5 -31.2 -25.4 -5.4 88.6 
(15) NW -1.9 5.1 -29.4 -4.0 30.2 
(16) TAE 5.2 14.0 0.2 10.9 35.1 
(17) TLE -2.6 -12.5 -27.2 -17.8 -5.4 
(18) NWE 2.6 1.5 -27.0 -6.8 29.7 
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Central Bank, Ministry of the Economy and 
Carteco data. 
The strict limits imposed by the new Central Bank Charter (CBC) on the 
expansion of rediscounts and credit to the Treasury were strictly enforced 
(until the tequila period), so the higher demand for cash could only be 
satisfied via accumulation of reserves. In effect, in the period 1991-5, the 
monetary base increased by $5.2 billion and foreign reserves grew by $4.9 
billion, despite the permanent current account deficits. This was possible 
because of huge surpluses in the capital account. So, capital inflows not 
only financed the increase in domestic absorption, but also the remonetiza- 
tion of the economy after hyperinflation. Under these circumstances, the 
Mexican shock - which changed the portfolio preferences of the private 
sector against peso-denominated assets - led to a 20 per cent drop in the 
monetary base in 1995, the first fall registered during the CP. 
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(2) Demonetization and dollarization characterized the 1980s. After lib- 
eralization the former was reversed but at the cost of deepening the 
latter. 
Although a recomposition in the demand for money is an expected result of 
a successful stabilization policy (and the M2* (m2 + dollar deposits)/GDP 
ratio rose from 9.5 per cent to 18.3 per cent during 1991-94), what was 
specific to the Convertibility Plan was the way in which this recomposition 
occurred. By granting contracts in dollars full legal status, the government 
discouraged the intermediation of domestic savings abroad, but this measure 
gave an additional stimulus to the dollarization process. Thus, while the 
private holdings of deposits in pesos grew by 200 per cent during 1991-4, 
those denominated in dollars grew by 248 per cent over the same period. 
Moreover, the December 1994 shock reinforced the dollarization trend, 
because it provoked a deeper contraction in peso-than in dollar-denominated 
deposits. 
(3) There was a marked increase in the amount of credit generated by the 
banking system and deep changes in both the sources of credit and 
the allocation pattern 
The increase in demand for deposits in the domestic banking system 
allowed a remarkable expansion in the supply of credit. In effect, total 
loans grew by $27.5 billion between December 1991 and December 1995, 
mainly supported by a $26.7 billion increase in deposits. However, the 
$6.7 billion rise in foreign liabilities, in the context of easy capital inflows, 
was also important in credit generation via the financial system. 
As a result of the higher degree of dollarization, the increase in the 
supply of credit denominated in dollars ($20.1 billion) was much higher 
than the increase in loans in pesos (7.3 billion). Consequently, loans in 
dollars represented 55 per cent of total loans in the third quarter of 1995. 
The reform succeeded in avoiding the crowding out of the private sector 
in the credit market, which benefited from a 126 per cent rise in its loans 
against a reduction of 4 per cent in the credit allocated to the public sector. 
As a consequence, the latter's share in total credit fell from 29 per cent to 
14 per cent. 
(4) The public sector produced a complete reorganization of its balance 
sheet that resembled the reorganization of a firm trying to avoid 
bankruptcy. 
With a view to reduce the level of systemic risk faced by private economic 
agents, the authorities advanced on three main fronts to improve the public 
sector's financial position. The first was the signing of the Brady agree- 
ment in late 1992. Second, the massive privatization process, in which 
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more than $17 billion in nominal value of public debt was repaid or 
rescued via debt - equity swaps. Third, the government consolidated its 
debt with its suppliers and with retired workers from 1991 on by issuing 
domestic bonds denominated in dollars ($7.1 billion) and pesos (5.5 
billion). Table 2.3 shows the consequences of these three initiatives, par- 
ticularly the sizeable increase in public bonds, because both the Brady 
Plan and the consolidation of debt existing prior to the CP implied a rise in 
its stock. Moreover, the latter explains most of the 30 per cent rise in the 
total public debt, an increase that did not originate in the accumulation of 
deficits during the period. The public debt/GDP ratio, in turn, declined 
from 35 per cent in 1991 to 29 per cent in 1995. 
(5) As in previous experiences of liberalization, the economy increased 
its use of foreign savings. 
The rest of the world provided net financing to the other aggregate agents 
during the period for over $29 billion. In effect, all domestic sectors expe- 
rienced a decline in their net wealth. It follows that, after liberalization, 
Argentina increased its use of foreign savings since there was no increase 
in net domestic financial savings. 
As a consequence of this and of the dollarization of domestic portfolios, 
there was a marked increase in the level of agents' financial exposure to 
the devaluation risk. However, the evolution of net financial worth in 
dollars that results from the simultaneous increment in assets and liabili- 
ties differs greatly among domestic agents. While the private and public 
sectors increased their levels of financial exposure in dollar-denominated 
liabilities, the opposite occurred with both the Central Bank and the 
financial sector. 
The Changes in the Firms' Portfolio Decisions 
The above-mentioned changes in the financial environment affected the 
firms' financial decisions. On the basis of the balance sheets of the firms 
quoted on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange,3 the following stylized facts 
can be identified. 
(1) The capital structure of firms changed. There was a generalized pref- 
erence for higher leverage ratios after liberalization. 
The greater availability of credit following liberalization allowed firms to 
almost double their leverage levels between 1990 and 1995 (Table 2.4). 
This is in contrast to the 1980s, when credit rationing forced private cor- 
porations to work with leverage ratios that were lower than optimal or 
desired. Although the rate of growth differs among the groups of firms, 
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leverage levels in 1995 were not too different across them, and the average 
leverage ratio (67.5 per cent) is similar to that observed in other large 
economies of Latin America (82 per cent in Brazil and 62 per cent in 
Mexico (Lopez Larroy et al., 1995)). 
(2) There was no improvement in the predominance of short-run 
financing in the debt structure of firms. Owing to market segmenta- 
tion, however, the situation of medium-sized firms is much worse. 
The short-run/long-run liabilities ratio for the whole sample fluctuated 
around 67 per cent between the end of hyperinflation and the beginning of 
1995 (Table 2.5). This is fully congruent with the stylized facts obtained 
from the evolution of the MAL. Despite the increase in the leverage ratio 
and in the availability of credit, the inability of the system to generate 
long-run financing persisted after liberalization. 
However, there is a marked difference between the largest firms (the 
privatized and holdings in our sample) and the rest; while the leverage 
ratio is about the same, the former are much less dependent on short-run 
financing, and there is no tendency for this difference to disappear. This 
may reflect market segmentation. Indeed, only the largest Argentine firms 
have easy access to the international capital market and need not rely on 
the domestic banking system for credit. Thus, banking debt represents 
26.4 per cent of total liabilities in the case of large firms and 43 per cent in 
the case of medium-sized ones (Lopez Larroy et al., 1995). 
With regard to the currency composition of debt, the holdings and 
newly privatized corporations show an increase in the proportion denomi- 
nated in dollars after liberalization, while the opposite occurs in the 
remainder of the sample. 
Table 2.4 Argentina: leverage° 
Total Tradable Non-tradable Privatized Holdings 
1990 34.5 36.5 37.0 n.a. 22.9 
1991 41.2 43.2 49.7 22.0 27.0 
1992 56.8 62.0 54.2 32.2 41.4 
1993 72.3 77.3 62.5 50.7 64.2 
1994 79.5 80.2 63.0 58.5 66.5 
(II) 1995 67.5 70.5 65.5 65.0 64.9 
a Total liabilities/net worth. 
Source: Calculated on the basis of Buenos Aires Stock Exchange data. 
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(3) After the implementation of the liberalization programme, there was a 
huge increment in Tobin's `q'. However, the analysis of the firms' 
balance sheets suggests that they privileged the rebuilding of 
`working capital' instead of real investment. 
The strong upward trend in Tobin's `q' after the implementation of the 
financial reform is consistent with the evolution of overall investment in the 
economy, which grew significantly after the convertibility plan and until the 
Mexican shock. However, the firms' balance sheets show that their privi- 
leged item on the asset side was by far `commercial credit', which recorded 
the highest growth rate followed by cash. Both phenomena are related to the 
recovery of financial intermediation after hyperinflation. The increase in 
cash reflects the recomposition in liquidity, while the increase in `commer- 
cial credit' is due to the need to rebuild `working capital'. This kind of inter- 
firm credit, which is endogenously generated by supplier/customer 
Table 2.5 Argentina: short-run debt/total debt 
Total Tradable Non-tradable Privatized Holdings 
1990 66.8 67.4 79.3 n.a. 41.1 
1991 68.2 68.8 78.9 62.7 44.7 
1992 69.2 73.0 78.7 63.3 32.7 
1993 67.0 71.6 79.1 52.0 34.9 
1994 62.7 68.6 73.2 48.2 27.7 
(II) 1995 67.1 73.2 72.8 51.5 38.0 
Source: Calculated on the basis of Buenos Aires Stock Exchange data. 
Table 2.6 Argentina: dollar debt/total debt 
Total Tradable Non-tradable Privatized Holdings 
1990 46.1 50.9 35.7 n.a. 23.4 
1991 50.8 55.8 42.8 41.1 29.2 
1992 33.6 34.8 23.3 33.6 38.4 
1993 23.8 19.9 12.8 32.9 49.5 
1994 24.4 24.1 17.3 32.5 32.4 
(11) 1995 22.5 19.5 11.1 66.3 43.0 
Source: Calculated on the basis of Buenos Aires Stock Exchange data. 
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relationships, constitutes the core of the informal financial system in 
Argentina. To a great extent, working capital was destroyed by 
hyperinflation, and this had very distortive consequences on the efficiency of 
firms. As in the case of the leverage ratio, it seems that macroeconomic 
instability and credit rationing in the 1980s led the firms to operate with a 
suboptimal amount of working capital. The rapid recovery of inter-firm 
credit, pari passu with the recovery in the availability of credit in the formal 
system, suggests that there is an important correlation between changes in 
the supply of loans in the formal market and changes in the informal one. 
This leads to two conclusions. First, monetary policy can have a strong 
impact on the activity level via this channel. Second, the banking system's 
resort to credit rationing - for example, because an external shock has 
increased systemic risk - has a powerful impact on the productive sector 
by drying up commercial credit and, hence, working capital. Notice, more- 
over, that the lowest rates of growth correspond to the largest companies, 
which have probably been the least affected by credit rationing in the 
1980s. 
2.3 THE EVOLUTION OF THE BANKING SYSTEM UNDER 
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
Despite massive financial distortions induced by high inflation and macro- 
economic uncertainty throughout the 1980s, Argentina has not been a typ- 
ically `repressed' economy since the liberalization attempt of the late 
1970s. In the 1980s interest rates were basically market-determined, credit 
allocation was increasingly decentralized, and the conventional goals of 
monetary policy were pursued mainly through indirect policy instruments. 
After the implementation of the CP some of the distortions remained while 
others were eliminated. Here the principal stylized facts are as follows. 
(1) Argentina's financial system still displays an excessive number of 
institutions and is physically oversized when compared with the rela- 
tively reduced volume of funds it intermediates. 
Demonetization has been chronic in the Argentine economy since the late 
1950s and deepened dramatically during the debt crisis period. But 
throughout the CP's initial expansionary phase there was a sustained 
recovery in the monetization level. However, the level of financial inter- 
mediation (relative to the size of the Argentine economy) is still not only 
well below that of developed countries, but also below that of other 
economies on a similar level of development. Indeed, all relevant mea- 
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sures of liquidity as a proportion of GDP are at present quite inferior to 
those reached by Argentina before the financial crisis of the early 1980s. 
In contrast, the number of financial institutions and their branches func- 
tioning in the domestic system is quite large, despite a steady reduction as 
from the early 1980s. In fact, prior to the eruption of the most recent 
financial crisis in late 1994, there were still 205 financial institutions. But 
the 1995 financial crisis accelerated the process of concentration and by 
August that year the number of financial institutions had fallen to 166. 
Because mergers and take-overs predominated (there were just nine liqui- 
dations), the number of bank branches was reduced only from 4081 to 
4053. 
Although the proportion of inhabitants per branch is similar to that in 
industrialized countries (8000), it is inconsistent with Argentina's lower 
degree of monetization. In effect, despite their important growth, total 
deposits per branch were just 11.2 million dollars in late 1994. Indeed, the 
use of banking services by the Argentine population is very low compared 
with that of developed countries, and even with that of other Latin 
American countries with a similar level of development. Thus, while the 
ratio of sight deposits over M1 (a plausible indicator of the level of 
`bankarization') is less than 50 per cent in Argentina, it is 63 per cent in 
Brazil and about 70 per cent in Mexico and Chile. 
(2) The financial crises experienced in the early 1980s and in 1995 
strengthened greatly the degree of concentration prevalent in the 
domestic banking system. 
The 1995 crisis reinforced the trend toward concentration in terms of the 
distribution of deposits and loans that has taken place since the 1980/81 
financial crisis. Thus, while the ten largest banks in the system held 40.2 
per cent of total bank deposits in 1979, they held 58.1 per cent in July 
1995. 
Though the degree of concentration is pushed up because of the size of 
public banks, high level of concentration was prevalent in the private 
banking sector. In July 1995, the 10 largest banks controlled 61 per cent of 
total deposits in private institutions and the 20 largest held 78 per cent. 
The distribution of bank loans among borrowers also shows a high degree 
of concentration. In April 1995 the so-called `principal debtors', that is the 
debtors with loans that exceeded 250 000 dollars, or who made up the list of 
50 major debtors of any single financial institution, concentrated 65 per cent 
of total bank financing. The financial system's 10 main debtors concentrated 
14 per cent of total financing (of which 86 per cent corresponded to public 
banks and the remaining 14 per cent to private banks). 
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The high concentration of both deposits and loans is the result largely of 
a persistently volatile and uncertain domestic financial environment char- 
acterized by pervasive imperfections and asymmetries in information, and 
therefore by an extremely cautious behaviour of depositors and banks. A 
sharp segmentation between large and small bank customers regarding 
loan conditions and the access to other financial services appears to be one 
of the most negative consequences of this predicament.4 
(3) Public banking retains a key position in the domestic financial 
system. 
Public banks played a decisive role in the period of import- 
substitution industrialization (ISI), replacing the virtually non-existent 
domestic capital markets as suppliers of long-term financing, but have 
been immersed in a deep crisis since the collapse of the ISI in the mid- 
1970s. The smallest provincial public banks, in particular, are probably 
technically bankrupt and should be privatized whenever possible, or other- 
wise liquidated openly. 
However, public banks are still very significant in Argentina's financial 
system. In effect, 4 of the 10 biggest banks are public, including the 2 
largest in the system. Prior to the tequila crisis, in November 1994, public 
banks held 38.8 per cent of total deposits and granted 41.6 per cent of total 
loans; in July 1995, as a result of the crisis, their share both in 
total deposits and loans had expanded to 40.9 per cent and 43.2 per cent 
respectively. 
Indeed, the stability of Argentina's immature and volatile financial 
system, as well as the financial needs of certain activities and regions with 
very limited access to the private banking system, are still likely to require 
an active participation of a smaller but efficient public banking sector, 
including a few strong provincial or regional banks, a national public 
bank, and probably the national mortgage bank (BHN) and the foreign 
trade bank (BICE). 
(4) Liberalization and increasing competition with other capital markets 
led to a swift development in universal banking, posing new threats to 
prudential regulation and supervision. 
A permissive regulatory framework, while discouraging the development 
of specialized banking institutions, made a strong expansion in commer- 
cial banks possible. As a result of this policy, investment and develop- 
ment banks have virtually disappeared and there is only one publicly 
owned mortgage bank left. 
Although universal banking protects financial intermediaries from 
increased instability of interest rates, exchange rates and inflation by 
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allowing wider portfolio diversification, it also poses serious threats to 
prudential regulation and supervision (particularly in terms of accounting 
and disclosure provisions), owing to the potencially risky conflicts of 
interest it raises.5 
(5) The adoption of convertibility narrowed greatly the CB's powers 
regarding both the conduct of monetary policy and banking 
prudential regulation. As a result, the financial system became more 
vulnerable to systemic risk. 
The September 1992 CB charter established the CB's autonomy from the 
executive power. In practice, however, the government's drastic approach 
to stabilization `cum' structural reform narrowed greatly the CB's powers 
regarding both the conduct of monetary policy and the prudential regula- 
tion of banking. 
Specifically, the new regime stipulated that the CB should maintain 
freely available reserves in gold and foreign currency to the equivalent of 
100 per cent of its monetary base (although up to 33 per cent of reserves 
can be held in dollar-denominated public bonds). Consequently, the CB 
was only to finance the national government allowed through the purchase 
of treasury bonds at market prices, and to provide funding to financial 
institutions exclusively in situations of transitory illiquidity and only for 
small amounts. 
Another step in the same direction was the virtual elimination of deposit 
insurance. Although a special limited fund was set up with the voluntary con- 
tributions of financial institutions, its meagreness in relation to the deposits in 
the system discouraged the banks from adhering to it. Moreover, after some 
institutions chose not to join the proposed scheme, the decision to participate 
could be interpreted as a sign of weakness by investors, not to mention 
the burden in terms of additional costs. In practice, therefore, the CP left the 
financial system with no safety net. 
In fact, the absence of both a working deposit insurance scheme and a 
lender of last resort contributed greatly to propagating the Tequila crisis in 
Argentina, because it increased the financial system's vulnerability to sys- 
temic risk.6 The authorities claimed that this approach was the proper way 
to deal with moral hazard problems and as a step forward in the process of 
financial deregulation. However, the strict application of the Law of 
Financial Institutions would have forced the liquidation of a large number 
of banks, and would have made it impossible for the authorities to handle 
the crisis. In fact, there were no solid theoretical arguments in favour of 
this stance, which also ran against most of the accumulated international 
experiences in the field. 
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In the end, the 1995 crisis forced the government to allow for a greater 
role of the CB as a lender of last resort, at first de facto and later de jure, 
broadening the CB's power to grant rediscounts and advances in both 
amounts and terms as long as it did not affect the backing of the monetary 
base specified in the Convertibility Law. The authorities were also 
prompted to create a compulsory deposit insurance scheme, which had a 
positive impact on the expectations of small investors. 
(6) No matter how significant the improvement in the prudential regula- 
tory framework has been, banking supervision is still weak in 
Argentina. 
While the convertibility regime certainly limited the regulatory powers 
of the CB, the optimism prompted by the favourable international situa- 
tion and the progress of structural reform in the early 1990s may have 
led to the somewhat light approach to supervision and enforcement of 
banking prudential regulation adopted in Argentina before the Tequila 
crisis. Thus, given that a systemic financial crisis seemed very unlikely, 
the monitoring and enforcement capacity of the supervisory authorities 
were not strengthened as required by the policy regime. With the escala- 
tion of the financial crisis, the whole monetary and financial scheme 
based on the Convertibility Law, the new 1992 Central Bank Charter, 
and the Law of Financial Institutions (with the 1992 modifications) was 
put to the test. Reality showed quickly that some of the basic traits of the 
new scheme could not handle adequately a systemic crisis. 
Consequently, major modifications had to be made in the regulatory 
framework. 
To be sure, this problem had very little to do with the suitability of the 
framework itself. On the contrary, in 1992 the Supervisory Board of 
Financial Institutions was created and stricter norms concerning capital 
adequacy, diversification of credit risks, provisions for bad loans and 
minimum auditing standards were adopted. 
In some cases these norms became even stricter than those defined in 
the first version of the Basle Accords.7 Thus, in the case of solvency provi- 
sions, besides taking into account banks' risk-weighted assets, as estab- 
lished by Basle I standards, additional capital requirements were imposed 
according to their level of immobilizations and that of their lending inter- 
est rates (penalizing riskier strategies based on charging loan rates far 
higher than the market average). 
As a result, in December 1994 the stated capital/assets ratio in the 
Argentine banking system was on average 16 per cent. This means a far 
lower leverage than that found in the financial systems of most other coun- 
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tries, developed or developing, and is a cost associated with the rigidity of 
the policy regime, particularly with the lack of a lender of last resort.8 
In fact, although the high bank reserves were not sufficient, their exis- 
tence prior to the crisis was important in helping to overcome it. 
Moreover, the CB modified reserve requirements as of August 1995 based 
on the experience gathered during the crisis, which suggested reducing the 
coefficient on checking and savings accounts and increasing requirements 
on term deposits (the most negatively affected by the bank run). To com- 
pensate the banks for the high level of reserves, and given that the CB's 
charter prevents it from remunerating them, the CB authorized reserves to 
be held in some (mostly public) financial instruments. 
Some improvements were also made regarding the disclosure of more 
detailed balancesheet information by banks. With a similar purpose, the 
National Securities Commission (CNV) determined that bonds issued by 
financial institutions would have to be rated by authorized private agencies 
in order to go public. The CNV also determined that all deposits made by 
the recently established private pension funds could go only to banks rated 
by these agencies. 
However, in late 1994, more than three years after the CB became inde- 
pendent, despite the improvements made in the prudential regulatory 
framework, the supervisory authorities were not yet ready to perform full- 
scale, regular inspections of financial institutions according to modern 
international standards.9 The crisis showed that a significant number of 
banks were not fulfilling even the most basic prudential regulations, nor 
were they reporting accurately their actual situation to the CB. 
Indeed, some analysts have suggested that stated capital is overestimated, 
because an important fraction is likely to be eroded by provisions and write- 
offs of bad loans currently on the books of the banks.10 
(7) The memories of protracted high inflation and the more recent 
hyperinflation episodes imposed severe constraints on the 
performance of the financial system. 
In effect, past history matters a great deal in present performance. This is 
reflected in the following four issues: monetary hysteresis, dollarization, 
preference for flexibility and portfolio diversification. 
After five years of increasing price stability, demand for domestic 
financial assets and other banking services in Argentina is still 
significantly lower than before the high inflation period, and much lower 
than in most other countries with comparable inflation levels. This shows 
the existence of monetary hysteresis. At the same time, since the 
beginning of convertibility the banking system has become even more 
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dollarized than in the past. Both developments tend to accentuate the vul- 
nerability of the financial system to macroeconomic shocks, and particu- 
larly to volatile capital flows.I i 
Other evidence of the inadequate development of the financial system is 
the low average term-maturity of deposits. Although there has been a 
minor improvement in this regard, this average is slightly longer than 30 
days. Depositors are still strongly risk-averse, and consequently choose to 
keep very flexible financial positions. 
This extreme preference for flexibility seriously impairs the maturity- 
transformation role of financial intermediaries. The exceptionally high 
spreads prevalent in the domestic system partly reflect this situation. 
Moreover, most of the banks' loan portfolios are also extremely short- 
term. Overdraft facilities with an average maturity of 1.2 days account for 
25.3 per cent of total credit; secured loans with an average maturity of 99 
days are equivalent to 33.5 per cent of the total; and personal loans with an 
average maturity of 208 days represent 13 per cent of the total. On the 
other hand, medium- and long-term financing is basically channelled 
through mortgages, which account for just 19.3 per cent of total credit and 
have an average maturity of only 1470 days, and liens, which represent 8.9 
per cent of the total and have an average maturity of 449 days. 
Last but not least, the massive capital flight caused by the turbulent 
macroeconomic environment of the 1980s had a permanent impact on the 
financial behaviour of domestic agents, leading to a much higher interna- 
tional diversification of domestic portfolios. Thus, it de facto integrated 
domestic financial markets with international ones, drastically limiting the 
room for autonomy in monetary policy by strongly increasing the sensitiv- 
ity of portfolio choices to differentials in expected returns between domes- 
tic and foreign assets. 
(8) Exchange rate overvaluation plus a swift financial liberalization led 
to overindebtedness and financial vulnerability. 
Both the expansion in absorption and the external deficit were primarily 
financed by massive capital inflows, which were channelled through 
domestic credit and capital markets, therefore contributing to a fast 
buildup of private and public indebtedness. 
As was the case with many other attempts at rapid financial liberaliza- 
tion, most notably (but not only) the Southern Cone experiences in the 
late 1970s, the mix of aggressive bank lending with lax supervision once 
again resulted in a dangerous accumulation of bad loans and a growing 
fragility in the financial system. This process started well before the 
tequila crisis. 
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In fact, the incidence of non-performing loans in total credit for the 
whole convertibility period presents wide discrepancies between different 
types of institutions. National public banks registered a considerable 
reduction in bad loans up until the end of 1994, partly as a result of the 
restructuring process undertaken by these institutions. Nevertheless, in 
December 1994 bad loans still amounted to 21.9 per cent of the total. 
Provincial and municipal public banks were in an even more delicate situ- 
ation; and the decrease in their bad loans was quite modest, so that in 
December 1994 these stood at 37.6 per cent. Stated problem loans in 
private banking, though much lower than in public institutions, showed a 
slight tendency to increase. Official information on non-performing loans 
net of provisions relative to net worth offers a fairly similar picture (Table 
2.8). 
These figures, however, probably conceal the full incidence of problem 
loans in bank portfolios. For one thing, the information for the period 
beginning in June 1994 is not strictly comparable with the previous one, 
because the CB changed the rating of debtors as from that month. For 
another, there are strong presumptions that bank books systematically 
underestimated the incidence of bad loans. 
In effect, even allowing for the severity of the recent crisis, the inci- 
dence of problem loans could not have reached its 1996 levels in just 
twelve months. Moreover, credit costs for the pre-crisis period strongly 
suggest a pre-crisis buildup in problem loans, and impressions gained 
through informal discussions with individual banks point to the same con- 
clusion (Corrigan, 1996). 
(9) High operational unit costs and significant credit risks lie behind the 
simultaneous wide spreads and low profits. 
The fact that country risk remained at a high level is one of the key variables 
explaining the persistence of an appreciable spread between domestic and 
international interest rates. On the contrary, convertibility has been truly 
effective in producing a marked fall in expected devaluation.12 In any case, 
the Tequila crisis interrupted the declining trend in domestic borrowing rates 
and prompted a substantial rise both in peso and dollar rates, which 
extended throughout the first half of 1995. 
Borrowing rates exceeding international ones, and intermediation 
spreads that, though declining, remained extremely large, result in exces- 
sively high domestic lending rates, especially in real terms (Table 2.7).13 
Wide intermediation spreads basically originate from two factors: on 
the one hand, the high operational unit costs associated with the physical 
oversize of the financial system, relative to the low level of monetization 
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Table 2.7 Argentina: interest rates and financial spread annual interest rates on 





Lending Borrowing Lending Borrowing Financial 
(1) (2) (col.1/CPI) (col.2/CPI) spread 
1991 March 196.07 135.14 -15.37 -32.79 60.93 
1991 December 85.76 52.97 3.27 -16.02 32.79 
1992 December 32.12 11.62 11.14 -6.05 20.50 
1993 December 24.65 10.17 15.89 2.23 14.48 
1994 December 30.00 9.75 25.41 7.15 20.25 
1995 January 35.00 10.83 30.23 8.20 24.17 
February 45.00 11.76 39.88 9.11 33.24 
March 65.00 19.51 59.17 16.68 45.49 
April 55.00 19.08 49.53 16.26 35.92 
May 45.00 15.85 39.88 13.11 29.15 
June 35.00 10.81 30.23 8.18 24.19 
July 30.00 9.65 25.41 7.05 20.35 
Source: Calculated based on data from BCRA and Carta Econ6mica. 
and bankarization of the economy; on the other, the significant credit risks 
connected with the heavy burden of bad loans in bank portfolios. 14 
Precisely because of the same factors, and despite the above-mentioned 
wide margins, profitability in the bank system is astonishingly low. The 
rate of return on equity (total net revenues as a proportion of net worth) 
showed some improvement from the beginning of convertibility, as a 
corollary of the growth in financial intermediation, the increment in rev- 
enues from service commissions, and the important capital gains accrued 
by the financial institutions from their holdings of public and private 
bonds. However, starting from the Mexican crisis in December 1994, this 
indicator worsened again. Falling deposits, the shrinkage of net income 
from services, the increment in bad loans, and the capital losses derived 
from the fall in the prices of securities were all causes of this deterioration. 
2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The liberalization process led to significant structural transformations in 




























































































































































































































































































































































































financial point of view, the most positive initial developments were the 
increase in financial deepening, the reversal in capital flight and the lifting 
of the foreign credit rationing faced by Argentina in the 1980s. From the 
`micro' point of view the most relevant facts were the recomposition of 
the credit channels between banks and firms and the recovery of inter-firm 
credit. This enabled the firms to increase their leverage and to rebuild their 
working capital, which had remained suboptimal following hyperinflation. 
However, some developments are giving rise to a concern about the 
future evolution of financial markets. First, there was financial deepening 
but, at the same time, dollarization also `deepened'. On the one hand, the 
private sector greatly increased its foreign indebtedness. On the other, 
most of the newly generated domestic credit is denominated in dollars. 
Second, the quality of the credit generated by the Argentine financial 
markets is still low. In particular, there was no significant reversal in the 
term maturity of the assets and/or liabilities generated by the financial 
system. Besides, because only large firms have access to foreign credit 
markets, small and medium-sized companies still face a tight credit 
rationing which constrains their performance and depresses their 
investment. 
The banking crisis triggered by the late 1994 Mexican devaluation made 
evident not only the fragility of the domestic banking system, but also the 
rigidity of the current convertibility regime and the lack of a suitable 
safety net with which to confront a run on deposits. In fact, with the crisis 
already under way, the government was forced to make urgent legal 
modifications to set a limited safety net that is consistent with the mainte- 
nance of convertibility. 
The most important of these changes was the restitution of the CB func- 
tion as lender of last resort, though on a very modest scale. Another 
significant step was the CB's recovery of the power to deal with problem 
banks according to a vast menu of normative alternatives to protect the 
investors' deposits, thus making it possible to limit the number of liquida- 
tions. Although real possibilities of coverage were virtually nil initially, 
given the meagerness of the Guarantee Fund, the restoration of a partial 
deposit insurance positively affected the confidence of small investors. 15 
The financial crisis also generated major changes in the structure of the 
financial system. Wholesale institutions and the small provincial banks, 
both public and private, were hardest hit. This led to liquidations in some 
cases, mergers in others, or takeovers by the more solid institutions in 
most, resulting in a reduction in the number of entities and, hence, a rise in 
banking concentration. This process, which is far from finished, will most 
likely deepen the segmentation of the financial market and result in further 
Jose M. Fanelli, Guillermo Rozenwurcel and Lucio Simpson 53 
restrictions on the already insufficient credit support received by the small 
and medium-sized firms. 
At any rate, although some anti-crisis regulatory instruments were 
recovered and utilized with a certain degree of efficacy, it must be pointed 
out that overcoming the crisis was only possible thanks to the large 
volume of external resources obtained principally from the multilateral 
financial institutions. With these, the government was able to improve 
expectations on the maintenance of convertibility, the fiscal balance and 
the soundness of the financial system. 
All this tends to support the view that the current economic scheme is 
extremely dependent on capital movements, and therefore quite vulnerable 
in the face of external shocks. This has an upward impact on systemic risk, 
leading to higher intermediation costs in the banking system than under 
more flexible monetary regimes. 
Moreover, even if the financial crisis had significantly subsided by the 
end of 1995, certain indicators suggest that the system is currently not all 
that less fragile than before the crisis. 
In the first place, according to the increasing weight of bad loans in 
bank portfolios, the solvency of many institutions has further deteriorated 
because of the sharp recession induced by the crisis. In the second place, 
although a deposit insurance regime is in effect, the Guarantee Fund 
counts on an almost insignificant volume of resources, which makes the 
efficacy of the instrument pretty doubtful in case it needs to be utilized. In 
the third place, the monetary authority still has very limited resources with 
which to fulfill its role as lender of last resort. Finally, the possibility of 
assistance from the multilateral financial organizations is now very 
limited, given the profuse use of these resources during the recent crisis. 
Therefore, within the tight limits imposed by the convertibility regime, 
a less vulnerable financial system is likely to require not only very high 
bank reserves and a much stricter regulatory framework, but also fewer 
and bigger institutions and a larger participation of foreign banks.16 There 
are some signs that the financial system may already be heading in this 
direction. However, the relevant question of how to ensure that this system 
is also consistent with a sustained and equitable economic growth remains 
open. 
The Argentinian experience also raises some interesting theoretical 
questions. The first one involves the modelling of risk. Is the traditional 
distinction between diversifiable and systemic risk suitable for a capital 
market like Argentina's? There are two important issues regarding this 
point. On the one hand, the thinness of the stock market makes domestic 
diversification difficult. On the other hand, there is not only a `macro' 
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systemic risk associated with the economic cycle but also a `macro' sys- 
temic risk associated with devaluation, financial crisis and default in a 
highly dollarized economy. 
Second, it is necessary to have a better understanding of how the 
changes in the money supply originating in the private sector's portfolio 
decisions affect the financial position of firms. Under convertibility, the 
changes in the demand for domestically generated assets affect the avail- 
ability of credit. How does this affect the firms' working capital, their net 
worth, their cost of capital (the interest rate spread between internal and 
external finance) and the level of financial fragility? 
Third, it is important to consider what the optimal capital structure is for 
a firm working in an environment characterized by severe imperfections 
in capital markets (that is, the existence of segmentation, the lack of 
availability of long-term financing, and the extent of prevalence of 
dollarization). 
Fourth, special attention should be paid to the characteristics of pruden- 
tial regulation in a dollarized financial system characterized by recurrent 
uncertainty and volatility triggered by external shocks. In such a context, it 
is extremely relevant to assess the optimal trade-off between the need to 
have a safety net for the system (via lender-of-last-resort activities and 
deposit insurance) and moral hazard in banking. 
Finally, thought needs to be given to what kind of indicators should be 
used by the authorities to distinguish between liquidity and solvency 
problems when a macroeconomic external shock takes place. 
Notes 
1. This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented at the final meeting of 
the project on `Financial Liberalization in Developing Countries', supported 
by IDRC (Canada), held at Bilkent University, Ankara, June 1996. We are 
grateful for the comments received there. Previous research together with 
L. Bleger, M. Damill and D. Kampel has greatly contributed to this chapter. 
Remaining mistakes are, of course, exclusively our own. 
2. See Diaz-Alejandro (1985). 
3. The indicators used in the analysis have been calculated on the basis of 
balance sheet data from a sample of 68 firms quoted on the Buenos Aires 
Stock Exchange (BASE). These companies are the largest in Argentina and 
their capitalization is equivalent to 99 per cent of total market capitalization. 
For the purpose of analysis the sample was organized into four groups of 
firms. The first one comprises 38 companies whose main activity is the pro- 
duction and sale of tradable goods. The second group consists of 19 that 
largely produce and sell non-tradables. A third group includes 4 holding 
companies, which, because of the diversity of their activities, cannot be 
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neatly classified as either tradable nor non-tradable producers. The fourth 
group is constituted by the 7 privatized firms that quote on the BASE. 
4. See Stiglitz (1993) on information problems in underdeveloped financial 
markets. 
5. On this issue, see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). 
6. For a theoretical analysis of safety nets in financial systems, see 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). 
7. For a detailed description and critical assessment of the Basle Accords, see 
Davis (1995) and Dewatripond and Tirole (1994). 
8. After the Tequila crisis, the CB has even begun to take the necessary steps 
to include some of the more recent Basle proposals regarding interest rate, 
liquidity and other market risks in capital requirements. 
9. In fact, the CB had only recently begun to consider the implementation of 
new inspection procedures based on the CAMEL standards. The aim of the 
programme was initially to rate all financial institutions according to the 
CAMEL system, and then to take this rating as the basis for capital and 
other prudential requirements. 
10. See Corrigan (1996). From this fact, Corrigan argues that a banking crisis 
was probably in the making in Argentina even before the tequila effect. 
11. Calvo (1995) stresses the vulnerability of the domestic financial situation to 
volatile capital flows as an important factor behind the recent collapse in 
Mexico. 
12. We take the difference between the IRR of Bonex (a dollar-denominated 
public bond) and the LIBOR rate as proxy for country risk, and the spread 
between the average rate of peso deposits and the IRR of Bonex as proxy 
for expected devaluation. 
13. It is worth noting, however, that the cost of credit exhibits strong disparities 
linked, among other things, to the size and geographical location of borrow- 
ers. The most adversely affected are the small and medium-sized firms 
excluded from international financial markets. The large economic groups, 
of course, are far less affected because of their access to foreign credit and, 
to a lesser extent, to the local capital market. 
14. Of course, exceedingly high real lending rates have themselves lately devel- 
oped into one of the causes of the growing weight of problem loans. 
15. It is worth stressing the already-mentioned regulatory mechanism of bor- 
rowing rates, designed to limit the moral hazard inherent in any deposit 
guarantee regime. See on this issue Glaessner and Mas (1995) and 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). 
16. In fact, these are some of the recommendations proposed in Calvo (1995). 
Bibliography 
Calvo, G.A. (1995) `Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Management, Tequila 
Lessons', paper presented at the seminar on `Implications of International 
Capital Flows for Macroeconomic and Financial Policies', 11-15 December 
1995, IMF (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund (mimeo)). 
Corrigan, G. (1996) `Building a Progressive and Profitable National Banking 
System in Argentina' (Report to the Ministry of the Economy) (Buenos Aires: 
Ministry of Economy). 
56 Argentina 
Davis, E.P. (1992) Debt, Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk (Oxford: 
Clarendon). 
Dewatripont, D. and J. Tirole (1994) The Prudential Regulation of Banks 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). 
Diaz-Alejandro, C. (1985) `Goodbye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash', 
Journal of Development Economics, 19: 1-24. 
Glaessner, T. and 1. Mas (1995) `Incentives and the Resolution of Bank Distress', 
World Bank Research Observer (Washington, DC: World Bank) 10 (1): 53-73 
Lopez Larroy D., M. Anido, M. Adrogue and M.M.R. Miguez (1995) 
`Endeudamiento empresario en Argentina', Cuaderno de Investigacion (Buenos 
Aires: IAMC). 
McKinnon, R. (1973) Money and Capital in Economic Development (London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press). 
Shaw, E.S. (1973) Financial Deepening in Economic Development (New York: 
Oxford University Press). 
Stiglitz, J.E. (1993) `The Role of States in Financial Markets', in Bruno, M. and 
B. Pleskovic (eds), Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on 
Development Economics, 1993 (Washington, DC: World Bank) (May): 19-52. 
Taylor, L. (1983) Structuralist Macroeconomics (New York: Basic Books). 
3 India 
Kunal Sen and Rajendra R. Vaidyal 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1991, the Indian government initiated a comprehensive market-oriented 
reform programme. At the core of the programme was a phased deregula- 
tion of the financial sector, along with reforms of trade and industrial pol- 
icies. Important elements of the financial liberalization programme were a 
lifting of several interest rate ceilings in both credit and bond markets, an 
easing of requirements that had made it mandatory for banks to hold a part 
of their portfolio in non-interest-bearing reserves and low-yielding govern- 
ment securities, a partial dismantling of barriers to entry into the banking 
sector and greater freedom given to banks to close unviable branches in 
rural and semi-urban areas. Along with the liberalization measures was a 
move to introduce a regulatory mechanism that could ensure the safety 
and solvency of the financial sector in the deregulated environment. 
This chapter has as its purpose to analyse the process of financial liber- 
alization and the regulation of the financial sector in India for the period 
from 1991/92 to 1994/95.2 It undertakes an examination of the changes in 
major sectors (banks and development finance institutions) and key 
financial markets (stock, money and government securities).3 It also analy- 
ses two specific issues in the reform process: first, the regulatory regime 
pertaining to banks and development finance institutions; and second, the 
link between the financial liberalization process and the general macro- 
economic environment within which it occurs. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss the 
motivation for the financial sector reforms. In Section 3.3 we provide an 
overview of the financial intermediation process in India for the period 
from 1971/72 to 1992/93, using data drawn from the flow of funds state- 
ments published by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) with a view to identi- 
fying salient features of the financial intermediation process in India 
during the pre-reform period and the years immediately following the 
reforms. In this section, we analyse the effects of the reforms on the 
two major sets of financial intermediaries in India - commercial 
banks and other financial institutions. We also trace the evolution of 
financial markets during the reforms. In Section 3.4 we describe the 
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macroeconomic environment in which the reforms took place and the 
effects, if any, that financial deregulation might have had on macro- 
economic stability. Finally, in Section 3.5, we provide an overall 
assessment of the financial liberalization process. 
3.2 REPRESSION AND REFORM IN THE INDIAN FINANCIAL 
SECTOR, 1969-95 
Background to the Reforms 
Prior to 1969, the Indian banking sector operated in a more or less deregu- 
lated environment with all commercial banks (except the State Bank of 
India, SBOI) being privately owned. The State Bank of India, which was 
earlier named the Imperial Bank, and its associate banks came under RBI 
supervision in 1946. `Social control' of the banking sector effectively 
began in July 1969, when 14 of the largest Indian scheduled commercial 
banks were nationalized. The nationalization of these banks, when com- 
bined with SBOI and its associate banks, meant that 22 of the largest 
banks accounting for 86 per cent of the deposits had become public sector 
banks (Krishnaswamy, et al., 1987). In April 1980, six more banks were 
nationalized, bringing the share of public sector banks' deposits to 92 per 
cent. The ostensible objective of the nationalization was the need for the 
government of India to `control the heights of the economy and to meet 
progressively ... the needs of development of the economy in conformity 
with national policy and objectives'.4 With resource mobilization a key 
objective of the Indian planning process, the newly nationalized banks 
were `asked' to mobilize deposits on a massive scale by setting up 
branches in rural and semi-urban areas. At the same time, with the adop- 
tion of the Fourth Five Year Plan in 1969, a strategy for agrarian develop- 
ment that put great emphasis on technological modernization was initiated 
(Chakravarty 1987). 
One important element in the above strategy was the provision of ade- 
quate credit to the agricultural sector. Furthermore, there was renewed 
emphasis on poverty alleviation and employment generation in the plan- 
ning process during this period. This led to intense pressure on the public 
sector banks by the government of India to lend to the priority sectors 
(covering agriculture and allied activities, small-scale industry, retail 
trade, transport operators, professionals and craftsmen). By March 1979, 
the `priority sector lending requirements' (as they came to be known) stip- 
ulated that 33 per cent of each bank's total credit should be advanced to 
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the priority sector, with not less than 16 per cent going to agriculture. This 
was later raised to 40 per cent (where it has stayed ever since), with a 
further stipulation that half the advances to the agricultural sector should 
consist of loans to small and marginal farmers. During this period, the 
banking sector was protected from competition by significant barriers to 
entry imposed on both foreign and private domestic banks. 
The other financial institutions have had a longer history of public own- 
ership, with existing insurance companies being nationalized in 1956 to 
form the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC). Financial institutions 
such as the Unit Trust of India (UTI, which is a publicly owned mutual 
fund) and the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) were set up by 
RBI5 in collaboration with other financial institutions. UTI was established 
to promote the stock market (the goal of UTI was to invest savings mobil- 
ized from households in corporate stocks and bonds), whereas IDBI was to 
provide direct and indirect long-term finance to firms in the industrial 
sector. Term loans to the industrial sector were also provided by the 
Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) and the Industrial Credit 
and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI). 
It should be noted that the policies of financial repression began in the 
Indian context with the bank nationalization episode of 1969. However, 
while the need for social control of the banking sector provided the initial 
rationale for the policies of financial repression, the subsequent 
intensification of these policies over the 1970s and 1980s was due in great 
part to the government's increasing need to use the banking sector to 
finance its deficits. The fiscal deficit/GDP ratio increased steadily during 
this period, from 3.56 per cent in the period from 1971/72 to 1975/76 to 
8.29 per cent in the years from 1986/87 to 1990/91. The way the govern- 
ment used the banking sector as a captive source of funds was by means of 
the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR). The SLR is the proportion of net 
demand and time deposits that banks have to maintain in India in cash, 
gold and approved government and semi-government securities. 
Originally, the SLR requirement was intended as an instrument of mone- 
tary policy so as to prevent banks from offsetting the effects of changes in 
reserve requirements by liquidating their holdings of government secur- 
ities. However, over the years, the SLR `has provided an expanding 
captive market for government securities and hence served as a means of 
allocating a larger share of banks' resources to government' (Chakravarty 
Committee 1985, p. 254). The SLR also performed another important role: 
that of allocating cheap funds to development finance institutions whose 
bonds were a part of approved securities. The SLR requirement, which 
was 28 per cent in 1970/71, stood at 38.5 per cent in 1989/90. 
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To partially neutralize the effects of the increase in the monetary base 
brought about by deficit financing, there was a steady increase in the Cash 
Reserve Ratio (CRR) from 7 per cent in 1973/74 to 15 per cent in 
1989/90. This meant a larger proportion of bank funds were locked into 
non-interest-bearing bank reserves. At the same time, to keep the cost of 
borrowing low for itself, the government systematically suppressed gov- 
ernment securities markets (and money) markets during this period. As a 
result, open market operations, which were important instruments of mon- 
etary policy in the pre-repression period, lost their effectiveness as policy 
tools. 
The effects of financial repression policies quite clearly had a negative 
effect on the financial sector: markets were heavily segmented and the 
underdeveloped nature of secondary markets inhibited competitive pricing 
of assets (Rangarajan 1994); the presence of non-price allocation mecha- 
nisms led to an inefficient use of credit; the several restrictions on banks' 
uses of funds and the imposition of branch licensing requirements had a 
significant negative impact on bank profitability; and the restrictions on 
bank entry and the dominance of public sector banks greatly inhibited 
competition and efficiency in the banking sector. 
The Strategy of Financial Sector Reform 
The impetus to reforms in the financial sector came with the submission of 
three influential reports by the Chakravarty Committee in 1985, the 
Vaghul Committee in 1987 and the Narasimham Committee in 1991. The 
first committee suggested ways of activating the treasury bills market so 
that open market operations could gradually become the dominant instru- 
ment of monetary policy. The second committee recommended a phased 
decontrol and development of money markets and the gradual integration 
of these markets with other key short-term markets such as the treasury 
bills market. The recommendations of the Narasimham Committee pro- 
vided the blueprint of the reforms that followed in the post-1991 period, 
especially with regard to banks and other financial institutions. 
Since the mid 1980s, RBI has implemented, in phases, several key re- 
commendations of the Chakravarty and Vaghul committees. In the govern- 
ment securities markets, a scheme for 182 days treasury bills was 
introduced in November 1986, initially on a monthly auction basis and 
without any rediscounting facility with the RBI. The RBI also took several 
steps to develop the money markets. In April 1988, the RBI instituted the 
Discount and Finance House of India (DFHI), to provide liquidity to the 
money markets. In May 1989, as a further step towards the liberalization 
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of the money markets, the ceiling on the call money rate was withdrawn. 
In 1988/89, RBI also introduced commercial paper and certificates of 
deposit as new short-term instruments in the Indian financial market. 
Consequently, by the late 1980s, there was significant deregulation and 
development of the short-term segment of the financial markets in India, 
with little progress in the deregulation of credit and capital markets. 
More radical reforms had to wait till the adoption of the structural 
adjustment cum stabilization program by the Indian government in mid- 
1991. With the adoption of the reform package, two important pre- 
conditions for financial sector reform were fulfilled. First, with a sharp 
reduction in the central government's fiscal deficit in the first year of the 
reforms, there was less of a need to use the banking sector as a captive 
source of funds. Second, the implementation of far-reaching reforms in 
trade and industrial policies meant that the allocation of resources was 
increasingly market-driven. This implied that for the reforms in the real 
sector to succeed, trade and industrial policy reforms had to be supported 
by reforms in the financial sector so that scarce investible funds could go 
to the most productive use. 
3.3 STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN FINANCIAL 
SECTOR 
There are two major sets of financial institutions in the Indian economy - 
commercial banks and other financial institutions. Other financial institu- 
tions in turn can be classified into three groups: (1) all-India development 
banks (or development finance institutions); (2) the state financial institu- 
tions (SFIs); and (3) the investment institutions, consisting of insurance 
companies and mutual funds (the most important being the Unit Trust of 
India (UTI)). The development finance institutions (DFIs) specialize in the 
provision of long-term finance to agricultural and industrial sectors. The 
most important of the DFIs are the Industrial Development Bank of India 
(IDBI), the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI), 
the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) and the Industrial 
Reconstruction Bank of India (IRBI), which primarily provide long-term 
finance to the industrial sector. Along with the above are two other DFIs, the 
Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) and the National Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), which specialize in 
catering to the needs of the small-scale and agricultural sectors respectively 
All the major institutions in the above three categories, except ICICI, 
are government-owned. All these institutions provide assistance to firms 
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Table 3.1 India: selected macroeconomic indicators, 1981/82-1994/95 
Year 1981182- 1986/87- 1991/92 1992193 1993194 1994195 
85/86 90/91 
Output 
Growth rates of: 
GDP 5.0 6.3 0.8 5.1 5.0 6.3 
GDP, agriculture 2.7 4.6 -2.6 6.6 3.4 5.1 
GDP, manufacturing 8.1 7.2 -3.7 4.1 4.3 9.0 
GDP, finance" 6.1 7.6 10.5 3.0 8.5 4.3 
Prices 
Inflation 6.8 7.8 13.7 10.1 8.4 10.4 
Savings and investment 
As percentage of GDP: 
Domestic savings 19.1 21.4 22.8 21.8 21.4 24.4 
Real investment 22.6 24.0 20.4 21.8 20.2 n.a. 
Monetary variables 
Growth rates of: 
M3 16.4 17.6 18.5 16.4 18.2 19.7 
Monetary base 14.4 18.4 13.4 11.5 24.9 22.4 
Net RBI claims 
on govt 19.1 18.0 5.8 4.7 0.9 2.2 
Foreign currency 
assets 2.4 19.7 136.0 20.2 127.1 45.3 
Real bank credit 10.4 50.6 -5.1 10.0 -0.2 11.4 
Fiscal policy 
CPSDb (as percentage 
of GDP) -9.8 -11.9 -10.6 -10.2 -11.7 -12.2 
Financing (%): 
Internal borrowing 76.5 75.1 79.8 74.1 82.1 89.3 
External borrowing 8.3 7.3 9.4 8.4 5.6 4.9 
Monetization 15.2 17.6 10.8 17.5 12.4 5.8 
As percentage of GDP: 
Fiscal deficit -6.8 -8.4 -5.9 -5.7 -7.5 -6.5 
Primary deficit -4.3 -4.6 -1.6 -1.3 -2.9 -1.8 
Seigniorage 1.8 2.2 1.9 1.2 n.a. n.a 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
Year 1981182- 1986187- 1991192 1992193 1993194 1994195 
85/86 90/91 
External debt 
Debt/GNP 16.96 24.1 34.0 37.5 37.3 n.a. 
Debt service/Exports 17.76 29.9 30.6 29.4 28.4 n.a. 
Short term/Total debt 7.8b 10.4 8.4 7.0 4.0 n.a. 
n.a. = not available. 
a Combined public sector deficit (includes public sector enterprises). 
b Averages for years 1982/83-1985/86. 
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, various issues; RBI, Report on 
Currency and Finance, various issues; World Bank, World Debt Tables, various 
issues; Easterly et al. (1994) and Buiter and Patel (1993). 
either by providing loans or by subscribing to shares and debentures 
issued by them. They also underwrite new issues and provide guarantees 
for term loans and deferred payments to enable firms to tap into other 
sources of credit. 
To examine the relative importance of commercial banks and other 
financial institutions in the intermediation of funds, we present the distri- 
bution of assets across major financial intermediaries at four different 
points of time in Table 3.2. It is clear from this table that the pre-reform 
period, 1971-91, can be divided into two distinct sub-periods. The first 
sub-period, 1971-81, was the period of growth for commercial banks, 
whose share in total assets of financial intermediaries increased sharply 
from 26.4 per cent in 1971 to 42.9 per cent in 1981. The second sub- 
period, 1981-91, is the period of growth for financial institutions, whose 
share in total assets increased from 16 per cent in 1981 to 25.6 per cent 
in 1991. The most noticeable growth was that of the term-lending insti- 
tutions, whose share in total assets increased from 5.9 per cent in 1981 to 
10.9 per cent in 1991. Interestingly, this trend has continued in the post- 
reform period, with the share of commercial banks in total assets falling 
by 2 percentage points in 1991-93. On the other hand, the share of 
financial institutions has increased by 1.3 percentage points in the same 
period. 
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Table 3.2 India: distribution of assets, banking and financial institutions (%) 
Assets (as at end-March) 1971 1981 1991 1993 
Banking 66.0 84.0 74.4 73.1 
of which: 
RBI 21.0 24.4 25.8 26.8 
Commercial banks 26.4 42.9 46.5 44.3 
Financial institutions 34.0 16.0 25.6 26.9 
of which: 
Term-lending n.a. 5.9 10.9 11.0 
IDBI n.a. 3.0 4.7 4.6 
ICICI n.a. 0.7 1.5 1.8 
IFCI n.a. 0.6 1.2 1.4 
IRBI n.a. 0.1 0.2 0.2 
State financial institutions n.a. 1.7 2.1 1.9 
Investment institutions n.a. 8.0 12.2 13.6 
Insurance n.a. 7.7 7.4 8.5 
UTI n.a. 0.5 4.8 6.2 
Other institutions n.a. 0.2 0.4 0.4 
Sources: RBI (1985) and RBI, Report on Trend and Progress in Banking 1993194. 
An Overview of the Financial Intermediation Process 
Analysis of the economy-wide flow of funds over the period 1971/72 to 
1992/936 indicates that the two surplus sectors (net lenders) were the 
household and the rest of the world sectors, while the two deficit sectors 
(net borrowers) were the government and the private corporate sectors 
(Table 3.3). The surpluses of household and the rest of the world 
sectors increased steadily over time, as did the deficits of the government 
and private corporate sector. With the government sector reducing its 
dependence on external funds, there was some indication of a change in 
this trend after 1991/92. 
Among the three non-financial sectors, the government was the largest 
borrower, as indicated by its share in total sources of funds (Table 3.4). 
Again, there is an indication of a reversal of this trend after the 1991 
reforms. Not surprisingly, although the importance of corporate securities 
was steadily increasing, government securities were the second most 
important financial instruments in total sources (after loans and advances). 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































years. While the household sector was the largest lender, its share in total 
uses of funds showed a surprising downturn in the first two years of the 
nineties (Table 3.5). While currency and deposits are the most preferred 
financial assets for the non-financial sector to invest in, the share of corpo- 
rate and other financial institutions' (OFI) securities in total uses of funds 
was increasing steadily over the years. 
To undertake a more detailed analysis of changes in corporate financing 
brought about by financial sector reform, we use a data set compiled by 
the Reserve Bank of India. This data set refers to a sample of private cor- 
porate firms with a paid-up capital of over Rs 10 million and covers the 
period from 1986/87 to 1992/93 (Table 3.6). The size of this sample 
increases marginally over the period. The firms in the sample account for 
well over 40 per cent of all non-financial firms in the private corporate 
sector in terms of paid-up capital. 
From Table 3.6 the following important observations about the 1986/87 
period emerge: 
(1) Internal sources were not the dominant source of finance over the 
period. In fact, generally speaking, their importance was decreasing 
and the decrease was rather dramatic after 1990/91, the year in which 
financial sector reforms were initiated. 
(2) Borrowings from banks, which are predominantly in short-term 
credits, generally accounted for 8 to 11 per cent of the total except for 
the year 1987/88. This share rose marginally after 1990/91. 
(3) Borrowings from financial institutions (both Indian and Foreign) are 
generally term loans. Their share was rising and in 1992/93 it stood at 
15.4 per cent. 
(4) The share of borrowings from others (which include inter-corporate 
loans and deposits from the public) varied a great deal over the years, 
and ranged between 7.8 and 19.3 per cent. 
(5) Trade credit and other current liabilities were always important 
sources of finance. 
(6) The importance of shares as a source of finance increased over the 
years, with a dramatic rise from 7.8 per cent in 1991/92 to 22.9 per 
cent in 1992/93. 
Clearly, the most striking feature was the dramatic rise in funds channelled 
through the stock market. Between 1991/92 and 1992/93 there was a shift 
from internal sources, borrowings from others and trade and other current 
liabilities in favour of shares. This was possible because of the presence of 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































procedures governing the stock markets and, especially, the primary markets. 
We discuss these reforms below in the subsection on the stock market. 
We have found that while the government and the household sector 
were the largest borrowers and lenders in the real sector for the period 
from 1971/72 to 1991/92, there are indications that the relative importance 
of these two sectors in their role as sources and users of funds may be 
declining with the onset of the reforms. We now turn to an examination of 
the state and level of development of the two groups of financial interme- 
diaries - commercial banks and other financial intermediaries - at the 
beginning of the reform process and the implications of the reforms for the 
evolution of these two groups in the future. 
Commercial Banks 
After 1969, there was significant growth in the commercial banking 
system, both in its geographical coverage and in the amount of resources 
mobilized. All indicators of bank progress show a distinct improvement 
during 1969-93. Perhaps the most revealing indicator of the development 
of the commercial banking sector in India is the increase in deposits as a 
percentage of national income, from 15.3 per cent in 1969 to 44.7 per cent 
in 1993. This has been arguably the key factor behind India's impressive 
performance in the mobilization of domestic savings. India's savings rate 
is one of the highest among countries at a similar stage of economic devel- 
opment (Joshi and Little 1994). 
There have been two reasons behind the high levels of deposits mobil- 
ized by the banking sector. First, there has been a phenomenal increase in 
geographical coverage of banks, with a more than seven-fold increase in 
the number of bank branches. Most of the new branches were opened 
in rural areas. This has led to a sharp decline in the population per bank 
branch, from 65 000 in 1969 to 14 000 in 1993. As a result, the rural popu- 
lation increased its share in total deposits from 7.2 per cent in 1973 to 14.6 
per cent in 1993. Second, there was a positive real rate of return on bank 
term deposits (barring the years of oil price shocks of 1973/74 and 
1979/80 and the high-inflation period of 1989/90 to 1991/92). McKinnon 
(1973) has argued that a deposit rate that is positive in real terms is an 
essential prerequisite for financial deepening. In the Indian context, there 
are few studies that have investigated the relationship between the bank 
deposit rate and financial deepening. A recent study with Indian data that 
uses a modern time series perspective to examine this relationship finds an 
unequivocal positive relationship between the real deposit rate and 
financial saving (Athukorala 1995). 
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The rationale behind the current financial sector reforms was the fact 
that two decades of social control of banks had led to a `decline in the 
productivity and efficiency and erosion of the profitability of the banking 
sector' (Narasimham Committee, 1991: iii). The erosion of profitability of 
banks has emanated from factors operating on both the income side and 
the expenditure side of the banking industry. On the income side, banks 
have not been able to realize their potential income, owing to various 
restrictions on the use of funds. The most important of these have been the 
directed investment and credit programmes. Directed credit programmes 
have consisted of lending requirements to designated `priority sectors' in 
the economy. One feature of these programmes has been that the rates of 
return available to banks on directed credits have been less than rates of 
return available on alternative uses of funds. 
Since 1991, however, there has been a scaling down of the directed 
investment programmes, particularly with regard to the SLR. There has 
been a gradual reduction in the SLR since the onset of the reforms: in 
October 1994 it stood at 31.5 per cent, a level last observed in 1972. There 
has been less progress in reducing the CRR, owing mainly to an unstable 
macroeconomic environment. 
An important change in the branch licensing policy since 1991 has 
been the freedom given to banks to convert non-viable rural branches to 
satellite offices on certain conditions. Banks are also allowed to close 
down loss-making branches, but only if the areas affected by the closure 
are being served by two other commercial banks (other than specialized 
banks for the rural sector, the `regional rural banks'). Other changes in 
the policy include the freedom given to banks to open specialized 
branches per centre (in the categories of industrial finance, non-resident 
accounts and treasury management) without the prior approval of the 
RBI. These changes imply that while banks have been given consider- 
able freedom in rationalizing the structure of their branches, the broad 
thrust of the pre-reform licensing policy in ensuring that the rural popula- 
tion have access to banking facilities has been maintained. Following the 
Narasimham Committee's recommendations, RBI announced in 1992/93 
guidelines for the entry of new private sector banks. These guidelines 
attempted to ensure that new entrants were professionally managed, 
financially viable and will bring about technological upgrading of the 
banking sector. 
Significant reforms in the banking sector have occurred with respect to 
regulations on the pricing of credit. There has been a gradual rationaliza- 
tion of bank lending rates, from 6 different rates prior to 1991 to 4 in 1991 
to finally to 3 in 1993 (Table 3.7). In October 1994, the minimum lending 
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rate on bank advances over Rs 0.2 million was discontinued and banks 
were given total freedom to set their own lending rates.7 The tendency in 
the credit market for commercial banks has been to use the advance rate 
of the State Bank of India (the dominant public sector bank in the country) 
as the prime lending rate. In Figure 3. 1, we plot the real lending rate and 
the spread between the lending and deposit rates. Except for the oil price 
shocks, the real lending rate has remained positive at around 8 to 10 per 
cent. Both the extremely high level of the real interest rate and the spread 
between the lending and deposit rates can be seen as outcomes of the dis- 
tortion in bank use of funds, with a significant proportion of the latter 
`locked' into low-return priority sector loans and government securities 
and non-interest-bearing reserves. 
In the Indian context, it is difficult to argue that the high real interest 
rate on loans to private corporate firms may have led to a more productive 
use of investible funds. Because bank loans are mostly used as working 
capital, a more plausible argument would be that private firms may have 
passed on the high interest costs they faced to their customers through 
higher prices (Taylor, 1983; van Wijnbergen, 1983; Sen and Vaidya, 
1995). 
The reforms in the financial sector have not so far encompassed a reduc- 
tion in the priority sector lending requirements.s In part this is due to the 
fear of possible repercussions of such a move, particularly reactions of the 
well-organized and politically influential large and medium farmers. In 
part it could also be due to an awareness among policy-makers about the 
need to put in place an effective system for the financing of agriculture 
and small-scale industry before priority lending requirements are reduced. 
As has been argued in Sen and Vaidya (1996), given that agriculture is 
particularly prone to market failures owing to problems of asymmetric 
information and contract enforcement, there is little reason to expect that 
banks will lend voluntarily to agriculturists once lending requirements are 
withdrawn. 
Regulation of Commercial Banks 
In a deregulated environment, prudential regulation of banks is obviously 
of added importance. Deposit insurance has historically been an important 
aspect of bank regulation in most countries, and in India is provided by the 
Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC), which also 
provides guarantee cover to eligible financial institutions for their priority 
sector advances to small borrowers and small-scale industries. DICGC 

































































































































Table 3.7 India: structure of bank lending rates 
Category of account October April April September October 
1991 1992 1993 1993 1994 
Up to and inclusive 11.5 11.5 12.0 12.0 12.0 
of Rs 7500 
Over Rs 7500 and up 13.0 3.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
to Rs 15 000 
Over Rs 15 000 and up 13.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
to Rs 25 000 
Over Rs 25 000 and up 15.5 16.5 16.5 15.0 13.5 
to Rs 50 000 
Over Rs 50 000 and up 
to Rs 0.2 million 
16.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Over Rs 0.2 million 
(minimum rate) 
20.0 19.0 17.0 15.0 Free 
n.a. = not available. 
Source: RBI, Report on Trend and Progress in Banking, various issues. 
paid-up capital of Rs 150 million being contributed entirely by the central 
bank. 
All commercial banks are registered as insured banks, affording a 
uniform protection to depositors. Every depositor of an insured bank that 
goes into liquidation is entitled to receive from DICGC, through the liq- 
uidator, repayment of his or her deposits in all branches of the bank, up to 
a maximum amount prescribed from time to time (RBI, 1983: 154). In 
May 1993 the limit of insurance cover was increased from Rs 50 000 to Rs 
100 000 per depositor per bank. In July 1993 the insurance premium was 
increased from 4 paise to 5 paise per Rs 100 per annum (that is, from 0.04 
to 0.05 per cent per annum). With the growth in the banking system in the 
1970s and 1980s, there has been a large increase in the number of fully 
protected bank accounts, which at 360 million in 1993 comprised 99 per 
cent of total bank accounts. 
RBI has also altered the supervision system relating to banks by estab- 
lishing the Board for Financial Supervision (BFS) in November 1994. 
BFS has been authorized to exercise powers of supervision and inspection 
in relation to banks and non-banking financial institutions including the 
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term lending institutions. Another important aspect of regulation in the 
post-liberalization period has been stricter application of accountancy 
norms, especially in terms of definition of non-performing assets and pro- 
visioning norms. Moreover, all banks were required to meet the BIS 
capital adequacy norm of 8 per cent by March 1996. At the end of March 
1996, out of the 27 public sector banks, 13 had attained a minimum capital 
to risk-weighted asset ratio of 8 per cent, 11 had reached 4 per cent and the 
remaining 3 less than 4 per cent. The move to minimum capital adequacy 
ratios has been greatly facilitated by infusion of fresh capital into several 
public sector banks by the government in its 1993/94 and 1994/95 
budgets. The government kept aside Rs 57 000 million and Rs 56 000 
million in its 1993/94 and 1994/95 budgets to recapitalize public sector 
banks. 
Other Financial Institutions 
We present in Table 3.8 the percentage distribution of financial assistance 
disbursed by all these institutions to the industrial sector. Some of the all- 
India development banks do not figure in the table, because their share is 
negligible. The table indicates that the all-India development banks have 
all along contributed over 60 per cent of financial assistance to the indus- 
trial sector. Another important feature is that the UTI has grown in import- 
ance over the years, whereas the importance of the state level institutions 
has been on the decline. 
We now turn to analyse the working of three of the important all-India 
financial institutions - IDBI, ICICI and SIDBI. 
The two important changes financial liberalization has brought about 
are: 
(1) Interest rate deregulation. 
(2) The contraction of subsidized and captive sources of funds. 
The interest rates at which IDBI and other all-India development banks 
lent before 1990/91 either directly for project loans to firms or as refinance 
to other financial institutions, was fixed by the government. The basic 
lending rate for direct loans was fixed at 14 per cent. This rate had 
remained constant over a long period. Term loans were rationed among 
various firms/sectors depending on the priorities set out by the govern- 
ment of India and the inherent soundness of the projects. The all-India 
financial institutions lent funds on a consortium basis till 1991/92, when 
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In August 1990, as part of the liberalization programme, the IDBI and 
other development banks (except SIDBI) introduced a two-tier interest 
rate structure. The first tier referred to the initial two years of the loan 
period or the implementation period (whichever was the shorter) of the 
project over which the interest rate was retained at 14 per cent. The second 
tier referred to the remaining period of the loan, over which the interest 
rate was raised to 15 per cent. In August 1991 the government permitted 
all term-lending institutions to charge interest rates in accordance with the 
perceived risks inherent in the projects, subject to a minimum lending rate 
of 15 per cent. This was an extremely significant policy initiative, which 
basically freed the interest rate on term loans. During 1991/92 the interest 
rates charged by IDBI ranged between 18 per cent and 20 per cent. The 
freeing of interest rates was followed by a significant rise in interest rates. 
During 1992/93 the IDBI reduced interest rates on term loans to a range of 
between 17 per cent and 19 per cent. The year 1993/94 saw a further 
decline in the interest rate, and the interest rate charged ranged between 
14.5 and 17.5 per cent. In 1994/95, however, the interest rate charged was 
between 14.5 per cent and 18.5 per cent. 
In the process of financial liberalization, the rates of interest SIDBI 
could charge to its direct borrowers has changed substantially. 
Nevertheless, the interest rates it charged are lower compared with those 
charged by IDBI and ICICI. In 1990/91 the interest rate SIDBI charged 
ranged between 6.5 per cent and 11.5 per cent, which rose to between 
7 per cent and 15.5 per cent in 1991/92. This was a sharp increase, but was 
not comparable to the increase in interest rates of IDBI and ICICI. The 
rates SIDBI charged during 1992/93 and 1993/94 were between 8.5 and 
17 per cent. During 1994/95, however, the interest rates charged ranged 
between 9 and 14.5 per cent. 
The generally large range in the interest rates charged is due to the large 
number of financing schemes introduced by SIDBI each of which carries a 
different level of interest rate subsidy. The SIDBI has been lending to the 
small-scale sector at rates of interest much below the market rates. This is 
a conscious policy decision of the government, aimed at reducing the 
adverse impact that an extraordinarily sharp rise in interest rates would 
have on the small-scale sector. 
Another significant change since 1990/91 has been the reduced depend- 
ence of IDBI and ICICI on the government of India and the RBI for funds. 
Moreover, with the reduction in the SLR for banks, an important captive 
source of funds for the IDBI, ICICI, IFCI, SIDBI, and SFIs has contracted. 
The bonds, shares and debentures issued by all of the above-mentioned orga- 
nizations are eligible to be counted under the SLR. This implies that subsi- 
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dized and captive sources of funds have been reduced, and that the IDBI and 
ICICI have had to depend more on the market to raise resources. 
Nevertheless, the SLR requirements remain extremely important sources of 
funds. It should be noted that in recent years subsidy on this source of funds 
has been almost negligible, as all instruments held as part of the SLR carry a 
rate of interest close to the market rate. SIDBI nevertheless continued to 
receive a substantial amount of subsidized funds from the government and 
from the RBI. As regards lending operations, since 1990 the indirect loans 
made by both IDBI and SIDBI have declined dramatically. As in the case of 
banks, these institutions were also required to meet the BIS norms for capital 
adequacy by March 1996, which both IDBI and ICICI have achieved. 
Regulation of Development Finance Institutions 
In the process of financial liberalization, the environment facing the devel- 
opment banks has been substantially transformed. Regulations, in such an 
environment, are needed to keep watch on the asset quality of these insti- 
tutions. Before the financial and real sector liberalization measures were 
introduced, the grant of an industrial licence to a firm was followed, 
almost automatically, by the sanction of assistance from the development 
banks. Thus, prior to the liberalization measures, these institutions used to 
follow rather liberal lending norms, with firms possessing a licence, partic- 
ularly the high leverage allowed and preferred (debt equity ratios of 2:1 
were the norm). The fact that the fiscal system favoured debt over equity 
led to weak financial structures of firms, which made them susceptible to 
sickness when faced with increased market uncertainties in the liberalized 
environment. For example, in September 1992, sick units in the private 
sector had outstanding bad and doubtful debts of Rs 125 860 million. Thus 
the quality of the development banks' portfolios prior to the reforms left a 
lot to be desired. We have also noted that over the past few years the two 
largest development banks (IDBI and ICICI) have to some extent been 
successful in improving the quality of their portfolios. With licensing 
requirements being dramatically reduced, those development banks with 
better abilities of techno-economic evaluation of projects will over the 
years improve their asset quality. 
As the apex bank, the IDBI is the coordinating agency of the operations 
of all development banks; and the development banks, taken together, 
have been operating as a consortium. There were regular meetings of the 
institutional heads and, moreover, almost all development banks had rep- 
resentation on each other's boards of directors, which helped in coordinat- 
ing the consortium agreements. With the areas of activities being neatly 
divided between banks, development banks and state level institutions, the 
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borrowers have little choice in selecting the institution to approach for 
loans. Though consortium lending had advantages (for example firms did 
not have to approach several institutions for funds), its greatest drawback 
was that if a particular loan application was rejected then the borrower 
had no other option to turn to. This created serious barriers to entry for 
firms. Moreover, this kind of coordinated lending did not pressurize each 
institution to independently scrutinize each project carefully. 
Before the financial sector reforms were initiated, the consortium 
financing agreements included assistance to projects costing above Rs 100 
million. Leasing finance, equipment finance and bills discounting were 
outside the consortium financing agreements. In 1990/91, the financial 
institutions were allowed to sanction assistance to projects costing 
Rs 200 million or less without reference to the inter-institutional fora. By 
1991/92, the formalized system of consortium financing had given way to 
an informal system of loan syndication. There still exists nevertheless, 
some coordination between the various institutions, and they do not 
compete in the true sense of the term. Another impediment to promoting 
competition between institutions hitherto protected is that some institu- 
tions, such as SIDBI, still receive subsidized credit from either the RBI or 
the central government. For the subsidies to be passed on to the targeted 
sector, a clear restriction of areas of activities is inevitable. Though at a 
conceptual level increased competition between DFIs could lead to some 
improvement in resources allocation, the existing institutional structure 
precludes such a possibility. 
Evolution of Financial Markets 
The Stock Market 
Compared with other developing countries, India has had fairly well- 
developed stock markets, whose role in the financial system has dramat- 
ically increased since the 1980s. In 1993 India ranked 22 in the world in 
terms of market capitalization, 24 in terms of value traded and 2 in 
terms of listed domestic securities. Currently there are 22 stock 
exchanges in the country, of which 20 are associated with particular 
cities. The largest stock exchange in the country is the Mumbai Stock 
Exchange (MSE), which accounts for more than 80 per cent of transac- 
tions. Recently two new exchanges were set up - the Over the Counter 
Exchange of India (OTCEI), which was established in August 1989 and 
became operational on 29 September 1992, and the National Stock 
Exchange of India, which was set up in November 1992 and started 
operations on 30 June 1994. 
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Market capitalization in the BSE at the end of March 1995 was 
Rs 4 688 370 million, compared with Rs 102 190 million in December 
1984, market capitalization as a ratio of GDP rising from 4.7 per cent in 
March 1983 to 51.4 per cent in March 1995. Market capitalization as a 
ratio of GDP for all the stock exchanges put together rose from 7 per cent 
in March 1983 to 68.8 per cent in March 1994. This is a phenomenal 
increase by any standard. 
In September 1992 the government of India allowed unrestricted entry 
in terms of volumes of investments both in primary and secondary markets 
to reputed FIIs such as pension funds, mutual funds, investment trusts and 
asset management companies. FIIs were required to obtain an initial 
registration with SEBI before making investments. They faced no lock-in 
period as regards disinvestment, no limit on total investment and a conces- 
sional tax rate of 10 per cent on long-term (more than one year) invest- 
ment and 30 per cent on short-term capital gains.9 As of October 1994, 
there were 234 FIIs registered with SEBI and as at end-September 1994 
their cumulative net investments both in primary and secondary markets 
were estimated to be Rs 83.9 billion, or $2676.1 million, of which $1665 
million was invested in 1993/94 alone. 
An important feature of stock-holding in India is that a large proportion 
of shares are owned by government-owned financial institutions. The 
thirty firms whose shares form the basis of the Mumbai stock exchange's 
index have a government-owned institutional share holding that ranges 
from 13 per cent to over 50 per cent. Therefore, the government can indi- 
rectly influence the market, and it has done so on some occasions by 
asking the financial institutions to prop up the market by increasing their 
buying activity when the market has shown signs of a major downswing. 
The financial liberalization process has brought about fundamental 
changes in the operations of the stock markets in both the new issues market 
and the secondary market. Two of the most important among these meas- 
ures have been the establishment in 1992 of the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India, which now works as the apex regulatory authority; and the 
freeing in 1992 of the pricing of new issues, which hitherto had been under 
strict government control. This measure explains the large increase in the 
role of shares as a source of funds for the private corporate sector. 
Money and Government Securities Markets 
Since 1991, with the initiation of the stabilization cum structural, 
adjustment programme, there has been an acceleration in the pace of 
change in the Indian money markets. This was a consequence of the 
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RBI's move toward the greater use of indirect tools for monetary 
policy, with the money market `increasingly becoming the fulcrum for 
central bank intervention in the economy' (EPW Money Market Review, 
15 October 1994: 2711). With the gradual phasing out of automatic 
monetization of the budget deficit, monetary policy has also become 
less subservient to fiscal policy, and has begun to take on an independ- 
ent shape of its own. 
In the treasury bill market, there was a phasing out of the 182 days trea- 
sury bill on 16 April 1992, with the introduction of the 364 days treasury 
bill on an auction basis on 28 April 1992. In January 1993, the govern- 
ment also introduced a scheme of auctions for 91 days treasury bills. 
There has been significant growth in the primary market for Treasury 
bills, with the total amount of outstanding auction-based 91 days treasury 
bills increasing from Rs 2500 million in January 1993 to Rs 34 500 
million in mid-August 1994. The total amount of outstanding 364 days 
treasury bills increased from Rs 6660 million in April 1992 to 
Rs 71 600 million in mid-August 1994. An important reason for the 
growth in the primary market for treasury bills has been the use of open 
market operations by the RBI to absorb part of the excess liquidity in the 
banking system caused by the surge in foreign capital inflows. However, 
as with other segments of the money markets, secondary activity in trea- 
sury bills has not yet shown signs of picking up, with DFHI's annual 
turnover in the latter actually declining in the period between 1990/91 and 
1994/95. 
3.4 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND THE 
MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
In the summer of 1991, India was in the middle of a severe balance of 
payments crisis, with foreign exchange reserves that covered less than two 
weeks of imports. The immediate causes of the crisis were the increase in 
world oil prices and the drop in remittances of migrant workers in the Gulf 
following the annexation of Kuwait in September 1990. The foreign 
exchange crisis was exacerbated by the drying up of commercial loans and 
the outflow of foreign currency non-resident (FCNR) term deposits, 
because there was an expectation of default by the Indian government on 
its external commitments. FCNR deposits fell from $1536 million in 
1990/91 to $290 million in 1991/92. However, the roots of the crisis were 
more long-term in nature and lay in the increasing deficits at all levels of 
government and in particular, in the central government's deficit. 
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The fiscal deficit to GDP ratio increased steadily over the 1980s, 
reaching a peak of 8.3 per cent in 1990/91. The fiscal imbalance spilled 
over to the external sector with the current account deficit to GDP ratio 
standing at 3.2 per cent in 1990/91. Also, with fiscal deficits being 
increasingly monetized, the inflation rate increased fairly steadily during 
this period to a high of about 14 per cent in 1991/92. At the same time, 
the 1980s were a period of strong growth for the Indian economy, with 
real GDP growth rates averaging over 5 per cent. This was mostly the 
result of a high rate of growth of manufacturing output. We provide a 
summary of the salient features of the macroeconomic environment in 
Table 3.1 (for details of the macroeconomic crisis and its aftermath, see 
Agrawal et al., 1995). 
The government that came to power in 1991 undertook a comprehen- 
sive stabilization programme in that year. This involved a drastic cut in the 
fiscal deficit, a devaluation of about 18 per cent in nominal terms, and 
removal of constraints on monetary growth. The measures seem to have 
had an almost immediate impact, with the inflation rate falling to around 
10 per cent by the next fiscal year. Foreign exchange reserves increased 
from a low of $5479 million in 1990/91 to $9220 million in 1991/92. With 
the easing of restrictions on foreign portfolio investment, there was a large 
inflow of the same in 1993/94, leading to a further buildup of reserves to 
$19 254 million in the same year. 
As expected, the austerity measures led to a slowdown in the growth 
rate of real output in the first year of the stabilization programme. By 
1992/93, however, the GDP growth rate was showing signs of recovery, 
in most part owing to strong growth in agricultural output. The growth in 
output was maintained in 1993/94 and 1994/95, with the manufacturing 
sector now stepping up its rate of growth. However, there were indica- 
tions of a return to macroeconomic instability by the end of the fiscal 
year 1993. This was evident by a resurgence in the inflation rate, which 
had once again crossed double digits by mid 1994. The return to macro- 
economic instability may be attributed to a surge in private capital 
inflow, following the 1991/92 easing of restrictions on private capital 
inflow. 
The initial surge in private capital inflow came in the form of portfolio 
investment, which increased from $92 million in 1992/93 to $3490 million 
in 1993/94, accounting for 85 per cent of total foreign investment inflow 
in that year (Table 3.9). Most of the increase in portfolio investment in 
1993/94 came from an increase in foreign borrowings by domestic firms 
(in the form of GDRs) and FII investment in the Indian stock market. 
However, in 1994/95 the share of portfolio investment in total foreign 
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Table 3.9 India: foreign investment inflows, 1991/92-94/95 ($ millions) 
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Type of investment 1991192 1992193 1993194 1994195 
Direct investment 150 341 620 1 314 
Portfolio investment 8 92 3 490 3 581 
GDRs - 86 1460 1839 
FIIs - 1 1665 1503 
NRIs 8 5 15 N/A 
Offshore funds and others - - 350 239 
Total 158 433 4 110 4 895 
Source: RBI, Report on Currency and Finance, 1994/95. 
investment inflows decreased to 73 per cent, because there was an increase 
in foreign direct investment from $620 million in 1993/94 to $1314 
million in 1994/95. The surge in private capital inflows in 1993/94 led to a 
sharp increase in India's total capital inflows, from $2966 million (1.7 per 
cent of GDP) in 1992/93 to $8992 million (3.5 per cent of GDP) in 
1993/94. Foreign investment, which comprised 20 per cent of total capital 
inflows in 1992/93, increased its share to 46 per cent in 1993/94. 
The increase in total capital inflow in 1993/94 did not lead to any 
significant widening of the current account deficit in that year, which in 
Table 3.10 India: balance of payments, 1990/91-94/95 
Item 1990191 1991192 1992193 1993194 1994195 
Balance on current account 
$ million -9 680 -1 178 -3 526 -315 -2 315 
As percentage of GDP -3.2 -0.4 -1.8 -0.1 -0.8 
Balance on capital account 
$ million 7 188 3 968 2 966 8 992 8 218 
As percentage of GDP 2.4 1.6 1.7 3.5 2.7 
Overall balance 
$ million -2492 2 790 -560 8 677 5 903 
As percentage of GDP -0.8 1.2 0.1 3.4 1.9 
Source: RBI, Report on Currency and Finance, 1994/95. 
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fact improved from -1.8 per cent of GDP in 1992/93 to -0.1 per cent of 
GDP in 1993/94 (Table 3.10). Instead, there was a sharp increase in 
official reserves, which went up from -$560 million (0.1 per cent of GDP) 
in 1992/93 to $8677 million (3.4 per cent of GDP) in 1993/94. This indi- 
cated that the capital inflow was met with a rather heavy degree of foreign 
exchange intervention by RBI as it attempted to limit the effect of the 
capital inflows on the exchange rate. 
To sterilize the impact of the foreign capital inflow, the RBI under- 
took large-scale open market operations during this period that were 
equivalent to a 2.8 per cent increase in the cash reserve ratio. Also, after 
initially reducing the CRR from 15 per cent to 14 per cent between 
April and May 1993, the RBI raised it back in three phases from 
14 per cent to 15 per cent between June and August 1994. While these 
steps may have mitigated the increase in money stock, clearly the thin- 
ness of the treasury bill market and the already high level of the CRR 
acted as constraints to any further sterilization of the capital inflow. 
Therefore, a large proportion of RBI intervention in the foreign 
exchange market during this period was in the form of purchasing 
foreign currency for domestic currency. Consequently, the growth rate 
of net foreign assets went up from 17.7 per cent in 1992/93 to 110.9 per 
cent in 1993/4. This led to a sharp increase in reserve money and M1 
during this period. 
The sharp increase in domestic liquidity in the latter half of the fiscal 
year 1993 had an immediate and perceptible effect on the domestic price 
level. The inflation rate had shown a steady decline since September 1991. 
However, this was reversed in mid-1993, and the rate of inflation climbed 
back to double digits by mid-1994. After that, the rate of inflation showed 
no discernible trend, hovering in the range between 8 per cent and 12 per 
cent. The high inflation rate in 1993/94 and 1994/95 was the major factor 
behind the sustained real appreciation of the rupee in this period, with RBI 
maintaining a more or less stable nominal exchange rate during this period 
(Figure 3.2). 
In 1994/95, with private capital inflows still continuing unabated, there 
were indications of a lesser degree of intervention by the RBI in the 
foreign exchange market. Now, part of the capital inflow has been met by 
a higher current account deficit, as aggregate investment increased from 
21.6 per cent of GDP in 1993/94 to 25.3 per cent of GDP in 1994/95, 
leading to an increase in the investment - savings gap by 0.7 per cent from 
1993/94 to 1994/95. Reflecting the lower amount of RBI intervention in 
the foreign exchange market, the growth rate of net foreign assets declined 



















































































































































3.5 AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS 
IN INDIA 
It is now over four years since the introduction of financial sector reforms 
in India. Though not enough time has elapsed to arrive at any firm conclu- 
sion about its success or failure, there are clear patterns emerging that 
indicate the possible course and likely implications of the reform process. 
It should be remembered that the reforms were undertaken at a time when 
the economy was in the midst of a severe macroeconomic crisis. That the 
reforms have not led to serious disruptions in economic activity can 
be attributed to both the initial conditions and the `gradualist' approach 
followed. 
Important among the initial conditions was the presence of a diversified 
financial sector with institutions that had a long history in the intermedia- 
tion of funds. Three sets of institutions (in contrast to other liberalizing 
economies) of which special mention needs to be made are the commer- 
cial banks, which had already contributed significantly to the financial 
deepening in the economy, the development finance institution, which 
over a period of time had built strong links with the corporate sector, and 
the stock market, which, though underdeveloped in many respects, had a 
fairly important position in the mobilization of funds. Another favourable 
initial condition was that the reform process in the real sector had already 
begun well before the financial sector reforms. As a consequence, the 
market mechanism already had a significant role to play in the allocation 
of resources across various industries. 
The gradualist approach followed involved the cushioning of certain 
sectors from the possible adverse consequences of deregulation. This is 
particularly evident in the case of commercial banks, whose mandatory 
lending requirements were kept intact to ensure the continuous flow of 
credit to the agricultural sector and the small-scale industries. Also, while 
the reform process has led to a decline in subsidized and captive sources 
of credit for development finance institutions in general, institutions spe- 
cialized in the provision of long-term loans to the small-scale sector such 
as SIDBI continued to have access to them. Moreover, interest rates on 
both short-term and long-term credit have been deregulated in a phased 
manner. 
The deregulation of financial markets has followed a sequence, with 
short-term markets such as the money and treasury bills markets being 
deregulated first. This was followed by the deregulation of credit markets 
(both short-term and long-term), the stock market (especially the primary 
issues market) and the market for dated securities. The timing of deregula- 
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tion of interest rates on long-term loans (which led to a immediate and 
significant rise in the interest rate) and the primary issue markets (which 
led to a substantial decrease in the cost of raising funds because of free 
pricing of new issues) enabled the corporate sector shift from the rela- 
tively costlier source to the cheaper source within a year. Though the 
investment climate was uncertain for about a year after deregulation of 
interest rates, within about two years the lost tempo was revived with the 
primary issues market playing a far larger role than ever before. An 
important characteristic of the way Indian firms (and firms in other devel- 
oping countries) finance their operations is the importance of external 
sources of funds. This dependence on external sources has increased after 
the onset of reforms. 
Perhaps the most complex issue in the process of financial liberalization 
is the sequencing of steps in the various markets and sectors. The experi- 
ences of other countries have shown that the appropriate ordering of the 
steps involved have often been the key determinant of the success of 
the reforms. Two aspects of the sequencing issue are of particular rele- 
vance for India. These are: (1) the sequencing of microeconomic and 
macroeconomic reforms and (2) the sequencing of real and financial sector 
reforms. With regard to the first, it can be argued that the ordering of the 
steps left a lot to be desired. In particular, the liberalization of controls on 
foreign portfolio investment without having adequately developed the 
treasury bills market led to problems of macroeconomic management two 
years into the reforms. Here, given that `the need of the hour' in the wake 
of the 1991 crisis was macroeconomic stability, a more cautious opening 
up of the Indian capital market to foreign portfolio investment was called 
for, along with a greater use of quantitative controls on the inflow of short- 
term capital. 10 As Devlin et al. (1994: 41) have argued, `the more pressing 
the need for management, and the more underdeveloped fiscal and mone- 
tary policy is, the more likely it is that the use of direct regulations on 
certain types of capital flow will be warranted, even if temporarily.' 
Therefore, while regulation of capital inflows can have possible micro- 
economic costs, it could be argued that, in the Indian context, the costs 
would perhaps have been offset by the benefits obtained from macroeco- 
nomic stability. 
With regard to the pace of financial sector reforms in the future, two 
important constraints are likely to arise from the real sector. First, though a 
lot has been done to reduce legal barriers to entry, no real attempt has been 
made to streamline the operations of bankruptcy laws and exit procedures 
(see Sen and Vaidya 1996 for a more detailed discussion of these issues). 
Second, privatization of public sector enterprises (including those in the 
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financial sector), which is an important component of any comprehensive 
reform package, is not seen as a policy option in the near future (Vaidya 
1994). It can be argued that for financial sector reforms to deliver the 
desired efficiency gains, reforms in the real sector, especially those relat- 
ing to the exit and bankruptcy procedures, are vital. 
Notes 
1. This chapter was first presented as a paper in workshops at IGIDR, Mumbai 
and Bilkent University, Ankara, during February-March 1996 and June 
1996 respectively. We gratefully acknowledge the comments of participants 
at these workshops, in particular, Dr Melvin Ayogu of the University of Jos, 
Dr Erol Cakmak of Bilkent University, Dr Jayati Sarkar of IGIDR and 
Dr Charles Soludo of the University of Nigeria. We would also like to thank 
Dr Jos!e Mar!ia Fanelli of CEDES, Dr. Rohinton Medhora of IDRC and 
Dr A. Vasudevan of the Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, for incisive 
comments on an earlier draft. 
2. Henceforth, we will use the following notation in this chapter: 1991/92 for 
the Indian fiscal year, 1 April 1971 to 31 March 1972, and 1991 for the cal- 
endar year. 
3. Our analysis in this chapter is based on material drawn from the Reports on 
Currency and Finance (RCFs), the main publication of the Indian central 
bank. We are constrained to limit our coverage of the Indian financial 
sector reforms till mid-1995, because the most recent RCF available 
(the 1994/95 issue) does not go beyond mid-1995 for most financial and 
monetary data. 
4. Preamble to the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of 
Undertakings) Act of August 1969. 
5. IDBI was taken over by the government in 1975 and converted into a sepa- 
rate organization 
6. Data on flow of funds after 1992/93 is not available. 
7. However, lending rates on two slabs - advances under Rs 25 000 and 
between Rs 25 000 and Rs 0.2 million - continued to be administered. 
8. Since October 1993, however, banks have been permitted some flexibility in 
their priority sector advances; small-scale industry being redefined to 
include units with investment in plant and machinery of up to Rs 6 million 
(previously it was Rs 3.5 million). 
9. There was, however, a ceiling of 24 per cent of issued share capital on the 
total holdings of total FII investment and a ceiling of 5 per cent on a single 
FII investment in any one company. 
10. The Latin American experience with foreign portfolio investment in the 
1990s is particularly revealing. Chile employed a wide range of quantitative 
controls on short-term capital inflow and was able to manage capital flows 
fairly effectively till late 1995. Mexico, on the other hand, suffered a run on 
its international reserves in early 1995, owing to be confirmed in part to a 
more `laissez-faire' attitude to short-term capital inflows (on this, see Devlin 
et al., 1995). 
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4 Nigeria 
Melvin D. Ayogu, Chidozie Emenuga and 
Charles C. Soludol 
4.1 INTRODUCTION: THE EXPERIENCE TO BE ANALYSED 
We document Nigeria's experience with financial reforms during 1986 to 
1993, with some continuing adjustments thereafter. On the basis of the 
standard performance indicators in the literature, we find no evidence that 
the reforms have either enhanced the financial system or facilitated macro- 
economic stabilization. However, the perfidious execution of the pro- 
gramme suggests that the reformers have not kept faith with the reforms 
either. A clear lesson that seems to emerge is that institutions matter, so 
that capacity-building ought to be an integral part of any feasible reform 
programme. Achieving economic growth of the kind typically associated 
with financial reforms requires fiscal discipline and other enabling roles by 
the state because of coordination failure, and other imperfections inherent 
in financial markets. 
A structural adjustment programme (SAP) may be defined as a policy 
package designed to induce sustained economic development in less 
developed countries. The package is a set of policy instruments that 
attempt to effect a transition from government-dominated, import- 
dependent economies to market-oriented, export-driven ones. Analysts 
(Summers and Pritchett, 1993, for example) generally agree that one of the 
most difficult reforms in a structural adjustment programme is microeco- 
nomic reform. Included in microeconomic reforms are divestiture of some 
public enterprises with commercialization of yet others; civil service 
reforms; and financial liberalization. Generally, institutional reforms are 
tough, because improvement requires `good governance and considerable 
institutional capacity', both scarce resources. In fact, within the gamut of 
institutional reforms embodied in the microeconomic reform phase, 
financial liberalization is perhaps one of the most difficult. It is therefore 
unsurprising that much has been written (for instance, Dias-Alejandro, 
1985, Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994) based on the experiences (gains, pains 
and woes) of the various countries that have gone through the process. 
Lessons have been drawn, including in some instances a rethinking of the 
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optimal sequencing of the reforms, within the larger context of the struc- 
tural adjustment programme. McMahon and Medhora (1994) note that 
even McKinnon, `the most well-known proponent of financial liberaliza- 
tion, has somewhat reversed his position on the matter and sees it as one 
of the last steps in the sequence toward a market oriented economy'. The 
experience of Mexico with capital flight in early 1995 and its repercus- 
sions, including the subsequent debate on the manner in which the crisis 
was managed by the international financial community (particularly the 
response of the Bretton Woods institutions), portend that the liberalization 
issue is far from resolved. 
This study contributes to that growing literature, by analysing Nigeria's 
experience with financial reforms. As the evidence will reveal, explaining 
the process of financial liberalization in Nigeria appears to echo Gibson 
and Tsakalotos (1994) that `the typical programme of financial liberaliza- 
tion need not, and indeed should not be the only game in town ... and that 
a proper and successful programme of reform must distinguish between 
the different types of intervention.' Our premise is that institutions matter, 
and that some of the disappointments with outcomes of the Nigerian 
experiment may be rooted in the exclusive reliance on the guiding princi- 
ple of the classical framework of McKinnon and Shaw (apparent from the 
programme content), and certainly in the perfidious execution of the pro- 
gramme. Too much reliance on the classical framework may have discour- 
aged the giving of sufficient attention to the role of institutions during the 
(improvised) design of the reform, which nevertheless should have taken 
cognizance of Nigeria's peculiar political and social circumstances. 
Although Nigeria's experience appears to have been characterized by 
what some observers call `stop - go' policies, the neo-structuralist would 
argue that such an observed outcome is simply a predictable consequence 
of neglecting to integrate the design of institutional framework into the 
initial programming of the reforms. The observable implications, they 
note, are `a series of cycles of first deregulation leading eventually to 
problems (financial crisis, structural economic weaknesses, and so on) 
then to reregulation as these problems become more acute, before a new 
move again materializes in favour of deregulation' (see Gibson and 
Tsakalotos, 1994). The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 
4.1 defines in terms of policy packages and results, `financial liberalization 
the Nigerian way', and describes concisely the evolution of the economy 
within the period to be analysed. Section 4.2 analyses the impact of the 
reform on the structure, conduct and performance of the financial market 
(savings, service and intermediation), as well as its catalytic role on the 
regulatory framework. In Section 4.3, we examine the interaction of 
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stabilization policies and financial market reforms, examining specifically 
the effect of financial reforms on the conduct of monetary policy, invest- 
ment and growth. Section 4.4 concludes by providing an overall assess- 
ment of the impact of liberalization on the financial system, and as well 
draws policy lessons and suggestions for further research. We deliberately 
shied away from any rigorous econometric analysis, because to attempt 
such with the degrees of freedom available (seven years of reform data) 
would be an oxymoron. 
The Meaning of Financial Liberalization 
In terms of the main measures adopted, financial liberalization in the 
Nigerian experience could be functionally defined to encompass elements 
of interest rate liberalization, reform of quantitative and sectoral allocation 
of credit, changes in operating procedure announced by the central bank, 
reform of capital controls, liberalization of entry into banking, and expan- 
sion in the number of permissible hybrid financial institutions and 
financial product lines. 
For the Nigerian experience, a formal definition of financial liberaliza- 
tion in the overall context of the reform programme is difficult, because 
financial reform was not professedly an integral part of the structural 
adjustment programme. The general policy goals of SAP were to restruc- 
ture consumption and production patterns, eliminate price distortions and 
to diversify and promote the export base of the economy. In particular, 
the aims were to: 
(1) restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy in order 
to reduce dependence on the oil sector and on imports, (2) achieve fiscal 
and balance of payments viability over the period, (3) lay the basis for a 
sustainable non-inflationary or minimum inflationary growth, and 
(4) lessen the dominance of unproductive investments in the public 
sector; improve the sector's efficiency and intensify the growth potential 
of the private sector. The policy strategies in terms of the main measures 
to be adopted were, (i) a realistic exchange rate policy coupled with the 
liberalization of the external trade and payments system, (ii) appropriate 
pricing policies in all sectors with greater reliance on market forces and 
reduction in complex administrative controls, and further rationalization 
and restructuring of public expenditure and custom tariffs.2 
It was in August 1987 that the government took what was perhaps its first 
explicit policy step towards addressing the issue of liberalizing the 
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financial system. It began to incorporate specifically the phrase `develop- 
ment of the financial system' into its policy initiatives.3 Therefore, in 
terms of conception, the financial reform programme was an `after- 
thought', and of necessity improvised. 
Initial Condition and Evolution of the Economy 
The structural adjustment programme began in July 1986 as a medium- 
term economic reform intended to end in June 1988. However, because of 
the government's commitment to continue pursuing the programme's 
objectives until they were fully achieved, the adjustment programme was 
effectively transformed into one of long-term reform, with an endogenous 
(and thus variable) endpoint. 
Prior to the reforms that began in the 1980s, the financial sector was 
characterized by the following: an environment of passive competition; 
generally poor customer services; significant government equity presence 
in the banking industry; a scheme of sectoral credit allocation; limits on 
domestic credit expansion to the private sector; regulated interest rate 
regime; stringent entry conditions into the financial services industry (and 
banking in particular); capital controls including restrictions on foreign 
direct and portfolio investments; and a fiat monetary policy regime. In 
short, by what has become a classic definition (McKinnon, 1973, 1991b; 
Shaw, 1973), the financial sector was repressed. During the period 1986 to 
1995, several financial reform measures were tried out, and several policy 
reversals occurred. These changes, which may be broadly categorized into 
exchange control and monetary control reforms, are summarized in Table 
4.1, in chronological order under each category. The exposition that 
follows next is an overview of the macroeconomy within the period 
covered by our study. 
The core of the economic reform was the move to a market-determined 
exchange rate system, which began with the introduction of the second- 
tier foreign exchange market in September 1986, and effectively deval- 
ued the naira instantly by 66 per cent. That, and the decontrol of interest 
rates in August 1987 were the main economic factors that, together with 
the political events that began to unfold four years later, set the course for 
the macroeconomy within the decade. Also implemented in 1986 
were the elimination of the import licensing system and the abolition of 
commodity marketing boards. A noticeable impact of the 1986 reforms 
on the macroeconomy was the rapid growth in banking system credit, 
which exceeded the prescribed limit by a margin of 19 per cent. Most of 
the expansion occurred within the last two quarters of the year, both as a 
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response to the announcement effect of the devaluation, and as part of 
the impact. The announcement effect induced a rush to borrow to settle 
foreign-currency-denominated obligations before the devaluation. The 
effect of the impact was to induce borrowing activities on the part of 
those who could not conclude their transactions before the change, who 
had continuing obligations or who needed to fund the now higher 
working capital requirements. 
The annual growth rate of inflation doubled from 5.4 per cent in 1986 to 
10.2 per cent in 1987. The capital account weakened substantially, from a 
deficit of N845.8 million in 1986 to one of N6.15 billion in 1987, and 
direct investment declined by 40.7 per cent. The flow of investment spend- 
ing was poor, particularly among the small and medium-scale enterprises 
considered to be the foundation for the new development and growth strat- 
egy for the country. Thus on 27 December 1987 the minimum rediscount 
rate was reduced in an attempt to initiate a downward trend in the interest 
rate profile; the initiative was predicated on high interest rates being a 
critical factor in low investment spending. 
Progress with the reforms was jeopardized in 1988 in the face of oppo- 
sition from labour and student unrest due to rising food prices, and also 
political backlash from losers under the reform programme. In May 1989, 
the country experienced serious riots against the Structural Adjustment 
Programme. The government's reaction to the increasingly restive mood 
of the citizens was to propose a reflationary package that embodied a 
heavy dose of government spending, raising the minimum wage, unfreez- 
ing wages in the civil service and removing the ban on civil service 
recruitment. Deficit financing of the expansionary government expendi- 
ture induced a rapid expansion in monetary aggregates, with domestic 
prices increasing by 38.3 per cent (10.2 per cent in 1987) and food prices 
rising by 52.2 per cent. Central bank lending to the government averaged 
N5.278 billion monthly (as compared with N1 billion for the entire 1987). 
Similarly, the balance of payments changed from a surplus of N159.2 
million in 1987 to a deficit of approximately N2.3 billion, while the 
exchange value of the naira continued to depreciate. 
Beginning in mid-1989, the government began to focus more on polit- 
ical changes than on economic reforms, and this bias continued until the 
financial reforms of 1995 (Table 4.1). Therefore, from 1989 onwards, con- 
sistent implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme basically 
gave way to patchy reforms that were carried out whenever they were 
expedient. In the financial sector, attention was directed to regulatory 
enhancement and institution-building. Instances of patchy reforms were 
the launching of commercialization, and, where feasible, privatization of 
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public enterprises to achieve operational efficiency. The federal govern- 
ment also divested its holdings in banks in order to reduce political inter- 
ference in commercial banking operations. To enable the process, banks 
were directed to grant credit facilities to Nigerians for the purchase of the 
shares. Furthermore, credit extended for this purpose was exempt from 
operative credit ceilings. Another instance of reforms was the policy 
change from direct to indirect monetary control with a transition pro- 
gramme that began in 1992 with the establishment of discount houses to 
deal in government securities. 
The high rate of monetary expansion in 1988 provoked a higher 
inflation rate in 1989. Broad monetary aggregates in 1990 grew at 40 per 
cent, five times the rate of 1989. Continuing this trend in 1991, aggregate 
credit to the economy experienced its highest rate of expansion in more 
than a decade. The net claim on the government by the central bank 
increased by a whopping 134.6 per cent. In 1992 CBN battled, through 
direct monetary control measures such as the periodic issue of stabilization 
securities, to contain inflation and the impact of government's increasing 
extra-budgetary expenditure. The opposing forces of government spending 
and central bank's attempts to contain the adverse effect of the spending 
were inducing macroeconomic instability. Consequently, the financial 
market turned very volatile and loan quality at financial institutions deter- 
iorated. Political uncertainty due to protracted strikes and civil unrest 
following derailment of the transition to civil rule contributed to the 
continuing macroeconomic instability. 
The year 1994 was to be notable for its major policy reversals. Not 
only was the financial reform process halted, but some of the gains were 
reversed. The government pegged the exchange rate of the naira, reim- 
posed exchange control regulations, which were previously softened to 
encourage foreign capital, regulated interest on foreign currency 
deposits, proscribed the parallel market for foreign currencies (actually it 
was now less tolerated), imposed control on bankers' tariff, reregulated 
deposit and lending rates, reintroduced aggregate domestic credit limit, 
applied selective credit expansion to banks, and imposed a period of 
moratorium on classified loans to certain group of borrowers. These 
policy reversals could be seen as a sign of panic by an incumbent gov- 
ernment that had lost its courage. It is also easy to understand how the 
government at this point could have been overwhelmed by the very 
problems it partly created, but had mostly inherited. For instance, there 
were the continuing inflationary pressures, the persistent depreciation of 
the naira, the real shock from the removal of petroleum subsidy, the 
phenomenal rise in nominal interest rates (although real rates were still 
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negative), acrimonious labour relationships and an explosive political 
arena. All these would be more than enough to rattle even the most 
resolute of regimes. 
The main macroeconomic policy thrust in 1994 was increased reliance 
on command instruments such as the fixing of interest rates, the centraliza- 
tion of foreign exchange receipts and the pegging of the official exchange 
rate. During the year, currency in circulation increased by 60.8 per cent, 
exceeding the deposit component of M1 (the sum of currency outside 
banks and checkable deposits) for the first time. The growth rate of aggre- 
gate financial savings dropped sharply to 20.3 per cent, down from the 
63.4 per cent recorded in 1993. The policy reversals of 1994 continued to 
affect the economy adversely. However, lessons from experimenting with 
some of the policy changes may have induced subsequently some degree 
of positive adjustment in the direction of financial liberalization. Indeed, it 
could be argued that some of the more obvious negative consequences of 
the policy reversals may have partially jump-started the reform again. But 
most of the renewed progress, was in the area of regulatory rather than 
market reforms, although market reforms were hit the hardest in terms of 
policy reversals. Market reforms are notoriously difficult to keep on track, 
because they either generate appropriable rents or portend adverse redis- 
tributive effects to politically powerful groups, which thus make the 
reforms controversial and easily derailed. 
On 16 January 1995 the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission 
Decree of 1995 was enacted, permitting direct and portfolio investment in 
any business enterprise in Nigeria except for items on the `negative list' as 
specified in the decree. The Decree and its complement, the Foreign 
Exchange Decree of 1995, together laid to rest the anachronistic Exchange 
Control Act of 1962, thus allowing for the beginning of a meaningful 
analysis of the implications of capital movements for macroeconomic sta- 
bilization. Fiscal policy was commendably restrictive in 1995. Monetary 
policy was also tight, with M1 growth at 8.1 per cent, mostly currency in 
circulation, and demand deposits actually fell. Responding to the tight 
monetary and fiscal policies, inflation fell during the year from 76.7 per 
cent in December 1994 (after peaking at 89.6 per cent in June 1995) to 
51.6 per cent in December 1995.4 
4.2 STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 
This section analyses the impact of the reform on the structure, conduct 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































regulatory framework, the number and type distribution of firms in the 
industry and financial sector performance indices such as savings mobil- 
ization and intermediation (credit allocation). A diagram and description 
of the structure of the financial system within which these changes 
occurred is in Appendix 4.A. For a developing economy, the Nigerian 
financial system is relatively active, by having a wide range of securities, 
although trading in specific instruments is generally thin (except for active 
trading in the inter-bank market in the early 1990s to cover bidding for 
foreign currencies). 
Impact Assessment 
We now turn to the assessment of the impact of the reform on the struc- 
ture, conduct and performance - savings mobilization, service quality and 
intermediation - of the financial services industry. Table 4.2 presents a 
profile of the industry from 1980 to 1995. The relaxation of entry restrict- 
ions into banking in 1987, combined with incentives for arbitrage opportu- 
nities inherent in the system of foreign exchange allocation, induced 
significant entry into the industry.5 The number of commercial and mer- 
chant banks increased from 41 in 1986 to peak at 120 in 1993. But this sta- 
tistic, relating, as it were, to banking alone, does not even begin to capture 
the full range of the vigorous entry activities that transpired within the 
financial services industry during the reform period. The number of bro- 
kerage houses increased from 23 to 140, the number of insurance compa- 
nies from 88 to 107, new institutions came on line (three discount houses 
were `shelf registered' and investment trusts were established), and 144 
bureaux de change existed at the end of 1993. From a modest number in 
1986, the industry has experienced a rapid growth that in 1995 featured six 
regional stock trading centres (from one floor in 1986); 116 banks with a 
network of 2394 branches nationwide, but mostly concentrated in urban 
centres (where service quality is surprisingly worse), 279 mortgage banks, 
970 community banks, 275 people's banks and 292 licensed finance 
houses (618 are estimated to be in existence). It is, therefore, of concern 
that in 1995 service quality was still so poor that the authorities found it 
necessary to specify minimum requirements on quality. Legislating 
service quality, after almost a decade of reforms that distinctly produced 
an almost phenomenal increase in the industry configuration, presages 
structural flaws in the system (the significant increase in number has 
simply failed to deliver). An expectation of a well-functioning system is 
efficient intermediatory services. But because intermediational services 
could be priced both explicitly and implicitly, the existing array of explicit 
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price controls (in terms of regulated service charges and interest rate) may 
have forced substitutions at the margin that now manifest themselves 
through poor services.6 
If the impact of structural changes is troubling, even more incredible 
tales await the reader regarding conduct and the systemic distress it engen- 
dered. The widespread distress in the industry is traceable to a combina- 
tion of factors, the centre piece of which is an outright moral degeneracy 
(in the environment of the pervasive get-rich-quick mentality of the 
1980s), which culminated in the passing of the Decree against fee fraud, 
popularly known as `419'.' First, there was the unbridled expansion in the 
number of institutions without a countervailing base of adequate regula- 
tory capacity; hence an increased demand pressure on an already scarce 
managerial resource. Then followed the numerous shorter-than-arm's- 
length transactions in bank lending that flowed from a complex interpene- 
tration of political, economic and financial powers. Many banks were 
either owned by a state government or the federal government, or were 
Table 4.2 Nigeria: growth profile in the financial services industry, 1980-95 
Brokerage firms Commercial banks Merchant bank Insurance 
1980 20 6 70 
1981 20 6 66 
1982 22 8 79 
1983 25 10 85 
1984 27 11 88 
1985 20 28 12 87 
1986 23 29 12 88 
1987 n.a. 34 16 91 
1988 43 42 24 92 
1989 61 47 34 98 
1990 80 58 49 103 
1991 110 65 54 107 
1992 140 65 54 132 
1993 140 66 53 132 
1994 140 65 51 n.a. 
1995 n.a. 65 51 n.a. 
n.a. = not available. 
Sources: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts 
(various issues), and the Nigerian Stock Exchange, Annual Reports and Statement 
of Accounts, 1988 and 1989. 
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subject to the controlling interest of governments - the results were cor- 
ruption, insider dealing and imprudent lending. 
If moral turpitude was the mastermind of the financial distress then gov- 
ernment policies that generated appropriable rents (socially perverse 
incentives) were its willing assistants. The situation was compounded by 
lack of credible enforcement mechanisms, or at least so it appeared 
ex ante. Ex post, with the passing of the Failed Banks Decree 1994, 
`everybody who is anybody' who owes money to distressed banks is being 
carted off to jail houses until they redeem their debts. This maverick 
method of enforcement contrasts with the Chilean case, in which, Diaz- 
Alejandro (1985), argued, `When a crisis hits, agents will reason, bank- 
ruptcy courts will breakdown; when most everyone (who counts) is 
bankrupt, nobody is!' 
Finance houses, community banks and mortgage banks have since joined 
the ranks of distressed institutions. Currently, 60 (commercial and mer- 
chant) banks are distressed; they account for over 50 per cent of the indus- 
try. These banks hold a total deposit liability of N92.523 billion (of which 
N52.613 is insured). Total banking system credit as at December 1995 was 
N121.809 billion, of which N56.978 billion is from the distressed banks 
and N19.083 billion is to insiders in general (N16.517 billion to insiders of 
distressed banks), mostly directors. Approximately N57.872 billion, or 
48 per cent of the system credit, consists of non-performing loans, of which 
N35.884 billion was granted by distressed banks. At the end of 1993, a 
total of 32 community banks and 31 finance houses were in distress, while 
118 finance houses were in default of matured obligations. But in 1994, a 
total of four banks and 20 finance houses were shut down, a record number 
since Nigeria has been a sovereign nation.8 
The Regulatory Framework 
Examining the character of the regulatory framework within which these 
events transpired reveals that prior to financial reforms, the regulatory 
arena was as passive as the industry it superintended. But once began, 
progress in regulatory enhancement was sustained. Nevertheless, it was 
not until three years after the inception of the reforms that deposit insur- 
ance was introduced. The Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation was 
established in 1988, but commenced operations in 1989. We do not mean 
to imply that an earlier introduction of deposit insurance would have 
averted the current crisis - rather, we believe that the establishment of a 
deposit insurance scheme signified the government's ostensibly growing 
concern about the soundness of its regulatory domain and its ability to 
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police its explosive expansion. The NDIC augments the central bank's 
supervisory capacity by increasing, at least in absolute terms, the numercal 
strength of supervisory personnel already under pressure. Furthermore, 
unlike the CBN, which has multiple responsibilities, the NDIC's preoccu- 
pation is the policing of insured banks. Obviously the shared supervisory 
responsibility offers some relief to CBN. 
Nevertheless, it was not until five years into the programme that major 
banking reforms came (with the promulgation of Decrees nos. 24 and 25 
in 1991), although, as part of the evolutionary process, changes in 
accounting standards and capital gearing - including the adoption of Basle 
concordant - had preceded these banking decrees a year earlier. Because 
our thesis is that requisite institutional capacity was lacking, we dwell on 
the description of the regulatory changes, for the reason that the govern- 
ment's efforts to install these institutions in midstream indicates its cog- 
nizance of the said deficiency. There is little to discuss by way of 
assessing the impact of enforcing the regulations because the regulations 
came too late to avert the disaster. However, diligent enforcement of 
accounting standards relating to classification and provisioning for doubt- 
ful accounts may have helped in ferreting out distressed institutions. 
Furthermore, it does not appear that deposit insurance coverage induced 
any distinct change in the behaviour pattern of insured banks. In any case, 
many depositors are de facto uninsured, because limit of coverage is rather 
low, at approximately $600 per depositor (at the current exchange rate). 
Our discussion of the regulatory developments is anchored around the 
two 1991 landmark regulations, the Central Bank Decree of 1991 (no. 24), 
and the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Decree of 1991 (no. 25). 
These decrees were necessary to consolidate amendments over time to the 
banking laws, as well as specific policy decisions of the government 
usually aimed at making the banking system a more effective instrument 
of national development. Second, the new laws were a major component 
of the broader programme of financial sector reform directed at promoting 
competition and efficiency. Consequently, they enhance the central bank's 
control over monetary management, the supervision of banks and the 
enforcement of banking regulations. 
The monetary control component of the regulation is Decree no. 24, 
designed to strengthen the Bank's ability to maintain monetary stability. It 
reduces substantially the size of advances the central bank may grant to 
the federal government in any year. Furthermore, the decree contains 
various provisions to facilitate the use of market-based instruments for 
monetary control, such as an extensive menu of public and private sector 
securities, as well as the power to purchase, sell, discount and rediscount 
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these securities. The power of the bank to request and obtain relevant 
information from economic agents and to issue specific directives are both 
strengthened and broadened to include all major classes of financial insti- 
tutions in the economy. 
Decree no. 25, the financial institutions component, governs the opera- 
tions of banks and other financial institutions, and contains several provi- 
sions aimed at establishing a solid basis for financial sector development 
in a deregulated environment. (1) It consolidates in the central bank the 
functions of bank licensing, regulation and supervision, as well as creating 
both an off-site supervision division and an on-site banking one. (2) It 
strengthens significantly the regulatory powers of the bank with respect to 
such matters as the keeping of proper books of accounts by institutions, 
the control of distressed institutions and the insolvency resolution proce- 
dure for failed institutions, especially because national deposit insurance 
coverage is available only to commercial and merchant banks. (3) It 
enlarges the duties and responsibilities of directors as well as those of 
external examiners of banks, provides increased security for such external 
auditors, and also clarifies and reinforces the enforcement powers of the 
central bank regarding directives arising from routine examination of 
banks. (4) The conflict of interest provisions of the decree designed to deal 
with insider abuse of various kinds are approached comprehensively. 
(5) The decree confers on CBN the authority to grant licences for non- 
bank financial business (with the exception of insurance and stock broker- 
age) and prohibits the conduct of a wide range of non-bank financial 
business without a licence from the central bank. In this way, virtue of the 
decree, the central bank became in 1991 the omnibus regulator of financial 
intermediaries. 558 existing financial services firms applied for licences 
in that year alone. 
These laws revamp the operating framework of the financial 
institutions' regulators, as well as enhance enforcement powers. 
Unfortunately, a sound law is no substitute for institutional capacity, 
which develops only over a course of time. Adding to this constraint was 
the expansion in the number of financial services firms that came under the 
supervisory domain of the central bank, particularly after the passing of 
the monetary control decree and the resulting annexation of finance 
houses. In retrospect, it seems that the financial morass in which 
the system is currently immersed could have been averted by a more 
restrained embrace of the laissez-faire dictum. Since 1991 there has been a 
virtual embargo on de novo entry of banks into the industry. 
Subsequently, other laws evolved to complement the 1991 decrees. 
Specifically, in November 1994, the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) 
Melvin D. Ayogu, Chidozie Emenuga and Charles C. Soludo 107 
and Financial Malpractices in Banks Decree was enacted. This law pro- 
vides for the recovery of debts improperly granted directly and indirectly 
to directors and management staff of banks, and imprisonment for such 
and other malpractices, including those committed by bank employees. To 
ensure speedy trial of cases under the law and to enhance its deterrent 
effect, the law provides for the establishment of special courts or tribunals, 
each headed by a high court judge. Persons convicted under the decree 
could be sentenced to up to five years imprisonment without an option of 
fine. As part of the move to strengthen the overall regulatory framework, a 
committee to coordinate and harmonize the standards and supervisory 
efforts of the various regulatory institutions in the financial services indus- 
try was established. The committee - known as the Financial Services 
Regulation Coordinating Committee - is composed of representatives of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Federal Ministry of Finance, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Nigeria Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Nigerian Stock Exchange, the Federal Mortgage Bank of 
Nigeria, the National Insurance Supervisory Board, the National Board for 
Community Banks and the Corporate Affairs Commission (the last named 
being responsible for registering corporate bodies). 
The current systemic distress ranks as one of the most serious contem- 
porary economic issues confronting the country, next to the debt overhang 
(that is, the burden of internal and external debts that now accounts for 
over 65 per cent of all federal expenditure). Judging by the magnitude of 
the losses involved (which affect over 50 per cent of the industry, with 
approximately N92.5 billion of deposits out of which N52.613 billion was 
insured), the combined financial and human resources required to expedi- 
tiously resolve the insolvencies far outstrip the capacity of the nascent 
deposit insurance fund. Yet progress with insolvency resolution remains 
slow, encumbered both by political pressures to grant regulatory forbear- 
ance, and by the lack of explicit budget allocation to NDIC and CBN to 
deal with the distressed institutions. Presumably a tacit acknowledgment 
of this fact is in the maverick (extra-judiciary) approach to the recovery of 
the bad debts with which the insolvent institutions are saddled, particularly 
the recovery of insider loans. 
Analysis of Industry Performance 
Turning now to the performance of the industry, the evidence (Figure 4.1) 
suggests that there has been increased financial resource mobilization 
since the inception of the reforms, although the growth rates of both 
demand deposits and savings (passbook and time deposits) has varied, 
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sometimes dropping to figures below those obtaining before the reform. 
Analysis of sources and allocation of funds in Table 4.3 indicates that 
banks remained the chief mobilizers of domestic funds, and that deficit 
financing is the dominant application of funds. In 1993 the supply of funds 
to banks ballooned owing to the flight to quality from finance companies 
(recall that 31 finance companies were in distress, and 118 in default of 
matured obligations that year). 
While there was little intermediation in mortgages, activities in the 
capital market were driven mainly by the privatization and commercializa- 
tion - public enterprise reform - exercise. In comparison to the money 
market, very little funds were raised through equity issues; an outcome 
similar to a finding for OECD countries by Mayer (1989). Indeed, the gist 
of Table 4.3 is captured in Diaz-Alejandro (1985: 14): 
The freeing of interest rates and the relaxation of controls over financial 
intermediation will not necessarily encourage intermediation beyond 
short-term maturities. The flourishing of private financial intermediaries 
in the Southern Cone, even at the height of the boom, was limited to 
deposits and loans of less than six months' duration. Long-term inter- 
mediation via banks or bonds, not to mention via active stock markets, 
remained very weak ... Stock markets may witness short booms, but 
will mobilize very few funds; charges of manipulation ... lack of 
protection for minority stockholders, will reduce public interest ... 
Very little has been discussed about capital market activities, because the 
core of the set of problems here lies in more fundamental issues such as 
credible and efficient enforcement of contracts, reliable communication 
facilities and the state of transaction technologies (infrastructure prob- 
lems), rather than in financial repression per se. Although Table 4.4, 
based on a sample of 20 out of 100 listed firms on the exchange, shows 
the trend toward reduction in leveraging by corporations, we caution that 
the table is only illustrative, and any conclusions from it must be circum- 
spect. Working capital requirements were being met mainly through 
short-term credits and retained earnings. The reduction could be partially 
a management strategy to reduce bankruptcy risk. Throughout the reform 
period, capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector averaged 40 per 
cent, and industrial relations were acrimonious, indicating a severe 
business environment. Overall financial resources have grown, despite 
the fact that the impact of the reforms on financial deepening has not been 
outstanding; for the trend since the reforms see Figure 4.1. Also, we 
should bear in mind that a major factor in the growth of the monetary 
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aggregates is the monetization of both the petrodollars and the govern- 
ment deficit, so that it is not clear whether or not the observed growth 
rates would have occurred anyway. 
The McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis that an increase in real interest 
rates increases savings has spurred a body of empirical evidence that is yet 
inconclusive (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994, survey the evidence). Here, 
we contribute to that literature by reporting that the evidence from Nigeria 
appears not to support our prior expectations of the behaviour of the real 
interest rate and financial savings (Figure 4.2). Beckerman (1988) sheds 
some light on the observed accumulation of savings given negative real 
interest rates, by contending that 
individuals may still hold financial savings because of excess liquidity 
preference (resulting from uncertainty about the future) or because they 















Figure 4.1 Nigeria: financial reforms key performance indicators, 1980-94. 
Deposits are checkable deposits. Savings are passbook and time deposits. M2 is 
the sum of currency outside banks, savings and deposits. Data of Central Bank of 
Nigeria, Annual Reports and Statement of Accounts, various issues and Central 
Bank of Nigeria (1994a). 
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purchase. The liquidity which financial assets offer may compensate 
them for the low if not negative real returns. 
One final issue in our review of industry performance is the question of 
how, other than to insiders, was credit allocated in the economy? The evi- 
dence on that is clear - the government cornered all the money (Figure 
4.3) - but not at the expense of crowding out private investment through 
the usual channels. Banks were awash with liquidity throughout the period 
analysed. In fact, a great deal of the preoccupation of CBN during the 
period was with containing excess liquidity in the system (Table 4.3). To 
the extent that crowding out occurred, it would be mainly due to the nature 
of monetary policy-making (described in the next section). It does seem 
from looking at Figure 4.3 that liberalizing interest rates has not led to a 
spectacular allocation of credit to the private sector. On the contrary, it 
appears that credit (particularly the private sector component) grew just as 
much, if not greater, during the pre-reform period. Allocative efficiency 
may have improved, though the current distress in the industry tends to 
belie this line of thought. 
Next, we examine the macroeconomic effects of the reforms, with 
emphasis on stabilization policies and investment response. 
4.3 FINANCIAL REFORMS AND STABILIZATION POLICIES 
Savings Investment and Growth 
A great deal is made in the liberalization literature of the connection 
between credit availability and investment and hence economic growth - 
the savings-investment spigot. In fact the second link in the 
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis is that as more savings become available, so 
investment increases both in quantity and quality. The hypothesis is 
premised on the ability of the market to clear in the absence of external 
intervention. The hallmark of the Keynesian critique of this neo-classical 
view is that markets are not necessarily self-regulating. Savings and 
investment are not brought into equilibrium through the adjustment of 
interest rates, because investment and also savings depend on other factors 
besides interest rates. Tobin (1982) argues that financial and capital 
markets are at best highly imperfect coordinators of savings and invest- 
ment. The evidence indicates that throughout the reform period, existing 
capacity remained largely underutilized, with capacity utilization in manu- 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1986 21.8 3.8 17.1 20.9 
1987 22.5 6.1 16.0 22.1 
1988 23.5 7.5 13.8 21.3 
1989 25.8 3.8 9.8 13.6 
1990 28.8 4.5 8.4 12.9 
1991 27.4 4.3 7.8 12.1 
1992 36.0 3.2 6.1 9.3 
1993 31.1 2.8 6.0 8.8 
The figures were computed as averages of a random sample of 20 listed firms. 
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Figure 4.2 Nigeria: real interest rate and financial savings 
Savings is the sum of time and passbook deposits. 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (1994a). 
1995 
upward adjustment in nominal interest rates and continued depreciation of 
the naira increased borrowing costs and product prices, which in turn 
reduced turnover and discouraged accumulation of inventory. Figure 4.4 
plots the comovement (or lack thereof) among growth in financial savings, 
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Figure 4.3 Nigeria: growth in public and private sector credit, 1980-95. 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (1994a). Figures for 1995 are provisional from 
the World Bank Resident Mission in Nigeria. 
in real investment and in non-oil real GDP. One does not need to look 
hard to discern the lack of a systematic relationship between the variables, 
although the apparent relationship between investment and GDP in 
1989-91 would hardly impress even the most sanguine observer. 
In 1991, when interest rate controls were reimposed, the official word 
was that the measure became necessary to reduce its adverse effect on 
investment. Figure 4.4 shows investment as declining in 1987, and again 
from 1990 to date, despite all the tinkering with interest rates. It is just as 
likely that the reduced flow of investment following the decontrol of inter- 
est rates in 1987 may equally have been due to increased uncertainty 
(financial market volatility, and political instability that was periodically 
eruptive). Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide a new approach to the capital 
investment decisions of firms, stressing the irreversibility of most invest- 
ment decisions, and the ongoing uncertainty of the economic environment 
in which these decisions are made. Using insights from the theory of 
options in financial markets, they point out that a firm with an opportunity 
to invest is holding an option that it loses when it makes an irreversible 
investment expenditure. This lost option value is an opportunity cost that 















Annual growth in savings, in investment and, in non oil 
real GDP at 1984 factor cost 
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Figure 4.4 Nigeria: financial reforms and economic growth. 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (1994a) and World Bank (1996). 
According to them, recent studies have shown that this opportunity cost 
of investing can be large, and that investment rules that ignore it can be 
grossly in error. More importantly, this opportunity cost is highly sensitive 
to uncertainty over the future value of the project, so that changing econ- 
omic conditions that affect the perceived riskiness of future cash flows can 
have a large impact on investment spending, greater than, say, a change 
in interest rates. This may help explain why neo-classical investment 
theory has so far failed to provide good empirical models of investment 
behaviour, and has led to overoptimistic forecasts of the effectiveness of 
interest rate and tax policies in stimulating investment. 
Monetary Policy and Capital Movements 
It is necessary to preface this section with the observation that discussions 
about the efficacy of monetary policy in Nigeria will remain largely incon- 
sequential until fiscal policy is rationalized (that is, by means of trans- 
parency in public spending; reduction in recurrent budget deficits; and 
control, if not the elimination, of extra-budgetary expenditure). This is 
because the conduct of monetary policy is constrained by the requirements 
of financing government expenditure with high-powered central bank 
money. 
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Over time, the broad goals of monetary policy have been (1) domestic 
price stability, (2) reducing pressure on external reserves, (3) exchange 
rate stability, and (4) promoting employment and economic growth. 
Before the SAP, the main objectives were price stability, stimulating 
output and employment, and a healthy external balance. The same overrid- 
ing objectives were still applicable during the reform period, with an addi- 
tional goal of promoting the development of a market-oriented financial 
system (through ensuring a sound and stable financial market). 
Recognizing the limited instruments available to it, and the difficulties 
of meeting all the policy objectives satisfactorily, the overriding concern 
of the central bank has been price stability, a `conducive' level of interest 
rate and a strong currency. This focus is perhaps due to the perceived link 
between exchange rates and price level, and between interest rates, credit 
allocation and investment. Prior to June 1993 (the period of fiat monetary 
control), the policy instruments were credit ceilings on banks, administra- 
tively fixed interest rates, preferential sectoral credit allocation and the 
fixing of exchange rates. Cash reserve requirements and supplementary 
deposits were also used. With the switch to indirect control (in 1993), the 
chief instrument became open market operations. So far the operations 
have gone only one way: open market sale (to contain the persistent mone- 
tary expansion from deficit financing). The operating strategy could thus 
be described as reserve targeting, with monetary aggregates as the inter- 
mediate target. So far, its application has been fraught with problems, and 
the outcome disappointing. 
This has been for several reasons. On the one hand, under the old fiat 
monetary control regime, banks found innovative ways of circumventing 
the restrictions, and at other times found the penalty for violating mone- 
tary policy guidelines acceptable. The central bank acknowledged that 
huge amounts of human and material resources were being wasted on the 
burdensome task of policing compliance with the guidelines. On the other 
hand, for the new regime of indirect monetary control seemingly proceed- 
ing in an environment of financial reforms, it is inappropriate to analyse 
how the results of the reforms helped or impeded the conduct of monetary 
policy. The reason is that the most important components of the reforms 
bearing on monetary policy were reversed shortly after the regime change. 
Specifically, in 1994, interest rate control was reintroduced, and the 
exchange rate fixed at a very low parity (400 per cent discount from the 
parallel market rate). Also, data capture is still very deficient, and the flow 
of critical information for policy evaluation and correction regrettably 
slow. Therefore, claims of financial reform contributions to the conduct of 
monetary policy is at the least suspect. 
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Another issue that merits discussion is the relationship between 
exchange rate management and monetary policy. First, we recall that 
setting of exchange rates was one of the direct instruments of monetary 
policy. The choice of exchange rate control as an instrument is predicated 
on the belief that in setting a low parity (fewer naira per unit of a cur- 
rency), `imported inflation' could be mitigated. But the setting of low 
parity conflicts with the goal of conserving external reserves. Attempts to 
resolve this conflict have been mainly through the rationing of the quantity 
of foreign exchange generated. Unfortunately, the scheme for allocating 
foreign exchange induced destabilizing behaviour on the part of market 
participants. Banks inflated their applications at the auctions in the knowl- 
edge that they would get only a fraction of the quantity bid - a strategic 
behaviour that is individually rational but has a high social cost. Because 
bidding was subject to a cash-in-advance constraint, banks borrowed at 
outlandish inter-bank rates, discounted their portfolio of securities, and 
held off on lending - just to participate. Inflated bids meant even higher 
levels of borrowing to back up such bids. The bottom line was that banks 
moved away from traditional lending and into the foreign exchange 
business. Traditional lending was out, foreign exchange business was in! 
The excess demand in the currency market fuelled a growing parallel 
market premium, with the resulting arbitrage opportunity engendering 
speculative bidding, and rent-seeking. Moreover, with the reform of trade 
policy, the extra budgetary expenditure, and the persistent monetization of 
domestic debt, a great deal of purchasing power was let loose in a nation 
with a fondness for foreign goods, irresistibly priming excess pressure of 
demand on the foreign exchange. But there was yet another source of pres- 
sure: the servicing of the external debt, which was absorbing a high propor- 
tion (currently over 60 per cent) of federal government revenue (Table 4.5). 
The debt overhang implies an even higher fiscal deficit, more monetization 
and a continued increase in the level of excess demand for foreign 
exchange, unless a combination of measures is adopted - measures such as 
a reduction in fiscal spending - a recession, a severe import compression, 
and/or debt absolution. The appropriation of a large proportion of foreign 
exchange revenue to debt servicing thus has the dual effect of reducing the 
supply of foreign currency to the domestic economy, even as it stimulates 
the demand for it. Clearly, the structural imbalances, especially the ratio- 
nalization of fiscal policy and the total elimination of fixed parity, must be 
addressed before monetary policy can be effective. 
The central bank administers capital controls in conjunction with 
exchange control regulations. Together, these controls have involved 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as the level of equity participation by foreigners in ventures within Nigeria. 
Since 1992 there has been some relaxation of controls in respect of direct 
investment. However, it was not until January 1995 that substantive 
reforms occurred in respect of capital controls. Two major decrees abolish- 
ing capital controls and partially liberalizing exchange rates were enacted: 
the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree 
of 1995 and the Nigerian Investment Promotion Decree of 1995. These 
decrees abolished almost all capital controls on both foreign direct and 
portfolio investments, and created a dual foreign exchange regime (there 
are still some ventures off limits). In the one segment (the autonomous 
market) the value of the naira is determined by market forces, with central 
bank intervening occasionally, while in the other it is at a fixed parity. The 
fixed parity is used for government transactions. 
The dismantling of capital controls is the latest event in the reform pro- 
gramme. Consequently, data on the impact of the decontrol are yet to be 
available, but little is expected to change. The reason little will change is that 
prior to decontrol, capital flight continued to occur through a vibrant parallel 
market. As indicated in Figure 4.5, net capital flow has been persistently neg- 
ative, presumably owing to intolerably high country risk. With interest rate 
controls still in place, there is little opportunity for destabilizing international 
capital flows. The prognosis on the investment climate does not, on a risk- 
adjusted basis, look attractive. In any case, where would the (clean) `hot 
money' go?9 To the private sector, or to finance deficit spending? 
In the private sector, the fundamentals do not look promising. The 
Federal Office of Statistics reports GDP growth in 1995 at 2.2 per cent, 
with the industrial sector at 2.1 per cent and services at 2 per cent. The 
perception in most parts of the Lagos business community is that 1995 
was much worse than 1994, with a fall of 5.1 per cent in the index of man- 
ufacturing activity.10 In the public sector, CBN reports that appropriations 
in 1994 for debt servicing exceeded 60 per cent of the current revenue, and 
this does not even take into account the fact that most domestic debts are 
rolled over at maturity. Therefore, although treasury securities may proxy 
for risk-free investments to internal investors, it is doubtful whether 
externally it will be priced as such. Moreover, such pricing remains 
hypothetical as long as interest rates are controlled. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
Overall, financial reform increased the scope, but not the depth of the 
financial system. It failed to improve the quality of financial services, but 
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Figure 4.5 Nigeria: (public and private) capital flow through formal channels, 
1980-84. 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (1994b). 
induced systemic fragility. Moreover, it does not seem to have enhanced 
the process of credit allocation in the economy, judging by the prevalent 
distress and the conduct of firms in the industry (of which the primary 
mortgage institutions are a classic case; see Table 4.3). Why has competi- 
tion failed to deliver? 
First we note that results from this study agree with Caprio and Summers 
(1993) that, `the assumption that perfect competition will solve all problems 
in finance - especially banking - can be dangerous'. Thus we are back to the 
same theme that has been stressed by many authors - the role of the state in 
economic development, particularly the need to distinguish between the dif- 
ferent types of intervention, rather than excising the state (Datta-Chaudhuri, 
1990; Krueger 1990; Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994; Stiglitz 1994 (to name a 
few)). Second, it is even more difficult to assess the negative contribution of 
the reforms, because of the contemporaneous political instability. Therefore, 
without controlling for other major events, we cannot fairly judge the 
outcome of a reform that was occurring contemporaneously with other 
changes (government was pursuing reforms on several fronts), the least of 
which are political reforms in the nature of the recalcitrant transition to civil 
rule. At certain periods, it seemed that the government had resolutely 
pursued political goals without regard to the economic consequences. It is 
also obvious that the reformers have not kept faith with the reforms, vacillat- 
ing as it were between interest rate control and decontrol, as well as between 
liberal and repressed exchange rate regimes. 
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From the incidence of macroeconomic instability, the lack-lustre perform- 
ance of investment during the reform period (which, we have suggested, 
may be due to uncertainties) and, especially, the failure of the financial ser- 
vices industry to deliver, one inescapable empirical question that must linger 
is the extent to which lack of a programmed financial liberalization exercise 
affected the outcome of the reform. As so often in other cases, the question 
was also raised here of how much of the failure was due to ill design, or how 
much to faulty implementation. We stated at the outset that the programme's 
design was improvised, and although the scope of this study has not permit- 
ted us to delve into the casual factors and hence to specify which of the ele- 
ments of the undesirable outcome were due to that improvisation, such a 
line of inquiry suggests itself naturally for further studies. 
Nevertheless, we would like to end on two key points in this regard. 
First, as Datta-Chaudhuri (1990, p. 23) notes: 
one often hears people talking about `a good plan implemented badly.' 
This dichotomy between the formulation and the implementation of a 
plan is usually false. If a plan is supposed to be a feasible action 
program, then it must have been designed on the basis of realistic 
assumptions regarding the expected behavior of economic agents. 
Difficulties regarding implementation should arise only from unantici- 
pated exogenous shocks.' 
Second, Krueger (1990) warns that `decisions regarding economic policy 
are not made by economists/technocrats, except in rare instances; hence 
political pressures often shaped economic reform programs in ways that 
were not consistent with the ideal resource allocation goals initially envis- 
aged.' The point that seems to emerge is that institutions matter and 
perhaps should constitute those critical components of the `realistic 
assumptions regarding the expected behavior of economic and political 
agents'. 
APPENDIX 4. A STRUCTURE OF THE NIGERIAN FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM 
Financial Intermediaries 
These consist of four categories of depository institutions, two types of 
contractual savings institutions and five classes of investment intermedi- 
aries (often called other non-bank financial intermediaries). 
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Depository Institutions 
1. Commercial banks dominate the Nigerian banking industry. As at 1994, 
there were 65 commercial banks with a network of 2259 branches. 
2. Merchant banks - transact wholesale banking business. They are 
expected to focus on medium and long-term lending, thereby filling 
the niche created by the concentration of commercial banks on short- 
term credits. 
3. Specialized banks - are established to target socially desirable pro- 
jects for financing. 
(a) People's Bank of Nigeria - opened for business in October 1989 
to provide credit facilities at grassroots level and thereby promote 
self-reliance. Loans have an upper limit of N10 000 and a 
minimum of N50, with credit requirements lower than conven- 
tional criteria at commercial banks. 
(b) Community banks - are designed to be financially viable banks 
owned and managed by a community or group of communities. 
Their popularity is evidenced by the growth from a single bank in 
December 1990 to 970 at the end of 1994. 
4. Development banks - are established to provide medium and long- 
term finance to targeted sectors of the economy. They are, beginning 
with the newest addition, the Urban Development Bank, the Nigerian 
Industrial Development Bank, the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and 
Industry, the Nigerian Agricultural Development Bank, the Nigerian 
Export-Import Bank and the mortgage institutions. 
(a) Urban Development Bank - commenced operation in 1992; is 
designed to provide financing for the development of infrastruc- 
ture facilities in urban centres. 
(b) Nigerian Industrial Development Bank - provides credit to the 
industrial sector on favourable terms. The CBN and the govern- 
ment own major interests. The bank is authorized to borrow 
locally and internationally. 
(c) Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries - is designed to 
promote the growth of small and medium-scale enterprises by 
granting loans, underwriting securities and performing feasibility 
studies. 
(d) Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank - finances agricul- 
tural development projects as well as investments in allied indus- 
tries. A total of 634 898 agricultural projects benefited from the 
bank, whose outstanding advances totalled N5.9 billion as at the 
end of 1994. 
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(e) Nigerian Export Import Bank (NEXIM) - was established in 1990 
to manage several credit facilities aimed at improving the 
nation's non-oil exports. It provides rediscounting and 
refinancing facilities, trade finance and project finance, and 
underwrites export-trade risks. 
(f) Primary mortgage institutions - are thrift institutions engaged 
principally in mortgage originations. 
Contractual Savings Institutions 
- are financial intermediaries that acquire funds at periodic intervals on a 
contractual basis. These are pension funds, life insurance companies, and 
fire and casualty insurance companies. 
1. Insurance companies - consist of fire and casualty, life companies, 
and those that offer both types of coverage. The loan portfolio is con- 
centrated on non-business consumer facilities and mortgage credits 
(mostly loans to employees in the industry and to policyholders). 
There is also a modest investment in private sector debt and equities. 
Investment in public debt is relatively small. 
2. National Provident Fund - is a mandatory pension scheme for non- 
pensionable public servants and employees in the private sector. The 
NPF is required to invest a specified proportion of its funds in govern- 
ment securities. Its record of performance is considered relatively 
poor. 
Investment Intermediaries 
These are other non-bank financial intermediaries and hybrid institutions 
such as bureaux de change and discount houses. 
1. The National Economic and Reconstruction Fund is designed to 
mobilize domestic and foreign funds to assist small and medium-scale 
enterprises. 
2. Finance houses - are the latest incorporation into the formal sector 
from the informal financial sector following the Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions Decree (BOFID) no. 25, 1991 which authorized 
the central bank to license all finance houses operating in the country. 
Although not depository institutions, finance companies are allowed 
to borrow a minimum of N100 000 from any person or corporate 
organization subject to certain statutory limitation on total outstanding 
borrowing. Finance houses are authorized to transact a general class 
of lending and leasing business to consumers, industrial, commercial, 
and agricultural enterprises. They can also engage in export financing, 
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financial advisory services, business consulting, electronic funds 
transfer, and issuing of vouchers, credit cards and token stamps. 
3. Discount houses - a discount house is any person in Nigeria whose 
business is trading in and holding of treasury bills, commercial bills 
and other securities, and whose operations in the opinion of the 
CBN are those of a discount house. Discount houses are designed 
to promote efficiency and the rapid growth of the money market, 
and to act as intermediaries between the central bank and other 
banks. 
4. Unit trusts - established in 1990 as financial intermediaries that 
acquire funds from savers for portfolio investment. 
5. Bureaux de change - were established in 1989 to accord legal recog- 
nition to small dealers in foreign exchange. 
Financial Instruments 
These consist of money market instruments (of maturity less than five 
years) and capital market instruments of long-term maturity (over five 
years). Commercial banks and merchant banks dominate the money 
market, while capital market activities centre on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange, with five regional trading floors. Government debts, corporate 
debts and equities trade on the floors. There were 140 brokerage firms reg- 
istered to trade in the market in 1994. 
Money Market Instruments 
1. Call money is generally unsecured interbank placements of maturity 
from overnight to 90 days. 
2. Treasury bills (on the basis of volume outstanding) dominate the 
money market. 
3. The Nigerian Treasury Certificate was introduced in 1968 as a 
medium-term instrument of one- to two-year maturity designed 
to bridge the gap between treasury bills and other medium term 
instruments. 
4. Certificates of deposit are of maturity from 90 days to 3 years, and are 
traded among banks. Merchant banks are the main issuers, while com- 
mercial banks are the leading holders. 
5. Commercial papers are the main supplement to bank loans for 
fulfilling seasonal credit requirements of the private sector. 
Commercial papers are popular with both commercial and merchant 
banks. 
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Capital Market Instruments 
1. Nigeria Government Development Stock - are long-term debts of the 
federal government. Government stocks are unpopular and transactions 
have declined since 1987. Savings institutions are the dominant holders. 
2. Industrial loans - are corporate bonds with fixed coupon rate. 
3. Preference stocks - are shares in corporations that entitle holders to 
dividends before any other class of investors. 
4. Bonds - refer to municipal bonds issued by state governments. 
5. Equities - are ordinary shares in corporations. 
Overview of Financial Markets Regulation 
The principal regulatory agencies are the Central Bank of Nigeria, the 
Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria and the Federal 
Ministry of Finance. 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) - regulates investment intermediaries, 
and all depository institutions except mortgage firms. 
Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) - provides limited 
insurance coverage on the deposit liabilities of all licensed banks to a 
maximum of N50,000 per depositor. NDIC also conducts periodic 
examination of the books of insured institutions. 
Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) - is the licensing and the 
principal regulatory agency for mortgage institutions. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) - regulates operations in 
the capital markets to ensure orderly trading and probity, licenses 
stockbrokers and issuing houses, investigates cases of abuse and 
`insider trading.' 
Federal Ministry of Finance - licenses and regulates bureaux de change 
and insurance companies. The National Insurance Supervisory Board 
also has maintains oversight responsibilities on insurance companies. 
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2. Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 
1986. 
3. Central Bank of Nigeria, `Amendment to the Monetary Policy Circular 
No. 21 of January 1987', Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1987, 
p. 7. 
4. Source: 1995 provisional data from World Bank (1996). 
5. The official parity was determined administratively, and the supply of cur- 
rencies to authorized dealers from the formal channel (CBN) was rationed. 
Consequently, banks who were the only authorized participants at the 
foreign currency bidding session made profitable business from arbitrating 
foreign currencies. 
6. Another explanation could be due to switching costs in banking, which tend 
to confer local monopoly powers on banks even in the presence of multiple 
incumbents. In such a circumstance, a finite increase in the number of active 
firms may not necessarily engender competition (and improved services). 
Stiglitz (1994) makes the same point. 
7. In terms of similarity, a reading Diaz-Alejandro's recount of Chile feels like 
a dejd vu. 
8. Source for distribution of bank credit: Omachonu (1996). 
9. Recently, with the decontrol of capital movements, the Nigerian capital 
market has been alerted by Interpol on the possibility of money laundering. 
See, for instance, Anaeto (1996). 
10. Source: World Bank (1996). 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Integration of the developing national economies into the evolving world 
financial system has been achieved by a series of policies aimed at liberal- 
izing their financial sectors. The motive behind liberalization was to 
restore growth and stability by raising savings and improving economic 
efficiency. A major consequence, however, has been the exposure of these 
economies to short-term capital movements, which have increased 
financial instability and caused a series of financial crises in the develop- 
ing countries. 
Integration was further deepened by the dollarization of these 
economies when they became reliant on foreign capital for their privatiza- 
tion programmes. Such a reliance became inevitable when governments 
were unable to implement credible anti-inflationary policies while at the 
same time demanding access to foreign currency. In many cases, inflows 
of short-term capital were used not to create new productive investments 
that would generate growth, but instead simply created new dollar obliga- 
tions for which there was no clear source of repayment. The existence of a 
currency board in Argentina, for example, provided short-term stability, 
but the fact remains that the current exchange rate of the Argentine peso 
against the dollar has been financed with offshore debt and privatizations. 
As such, this policy is unsustainable. 
Financial liberalization, by way of reliance on short-term capital 
inflows, intensified the already existing problems such as budget deficits, 
monetary instability and market distortions. The problems were the conse- 
quence of the very nature of these flows, because they created instabilities 
in exchange rates, interest rates and financial asset prices. Because most 
developing country stock markets are in their infancy, they display a high 
degree of volatility. From 1982 to 1985, share prices (in US dollars) on the 
Brazilian stock market rose fivefold. Two years later, they fell more than 
28 per cent of their 1985 value. In the first nine months of 1987, share 
prices on the Mexican stock market rose six-fold. Following the October 
crash, however, prices fell to a tenth of their previous level (Singh, 1992). 
In Turkey between 1992 and 1993, share prices rose four-fold. The next 
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year they fell by 50 per cent. This link between short-term capital flows 
and stock markets increased the potential for further crisis. Because the 
return on investments depends largely on the movements of the exchange 
rate, serious shocks experienced by these countries that caused a devalua- 
tion in their currency triggered a sharp decline in equity prices and an 
outflow of capital (Akytiz, 1995). 
Short-term capital flows are now considered the double-edged sword of 
economic development. On the one hand, they tend to create an environ- 
ment that enhances and increases the efficiency of the domestic financial 
markets via intensified competition. On the other, however, evidence also 
suggests that short-term capital speeds in and out of developing countries 
for reasons not always related to their discretionary monetary policies. As 
a result, countering positive expectations such as increased efficiency in 
financial markets, short-term capital flows are likely to result in a number 
of equally detrimental consequences. First, they tend to increase financial 
fragility. Second, they increase the interest rates and inflate financial asset 
prices, causing stock market bubbles to emerge. Third, they create con- 
tractions in the real economy that have real consequences for employment. 
Fourth, they worsen the income distribution. Fifth, they reduce a govern- 
ment's ability to conduct monetary policy. 
The Turkish economy experienced its first major financial crisis in the 
first quarter of 1994. One of the best-performing emerging stock markets 
in 1993, the Turkish stock market suffered huge dollar losses during this 
period, owing to a 65 per cent devaluation in the Turkish lira. The 
Istanbul Stock Exchange Composite Index fell 50 per cent in dollar terms 
as volatility of capital markets and political instability further reduced 
confidence in the lira, despite efforts to reduce Turkey's current account, 
budget, and trade deficits. The currency crisis led to implementation of an 
austerity programme in April 1994, the aim of which was to restore 
confidence in the Turkish lira and establish a clear commitment to reduc- 
ing fiscal and external imbalances by reducing government spending and 
slowing down rapid inflation. Several unpopular measures were adopted, 
including higher taxes and state-controlled prices, a speed-up of the pri- 
vatization programme, and a further devaluation in the lira. The central 
bank intervened in the foreign exchange market, and between January 
and 5 April it used over $3 billion (about half of its year-end 1993 
reserves) to support the lira. Between the end of 1993 and the end of 
April 1994, the value of the lira fell by 60 per cent in nominal terms 
against the US dollar. 
In part, the currency crisis was a result of deteriorating macroeconomic 
fundamentals that were rooted in public sector imbalances, but to a large 
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extent the crisis can be traced to unsustainable growth in current account 
deficits as a result of short-term capital inflows. 
The main objective of this chapter is to analyse the determinants of spec- 
ulative short-term capital flows and their consequences on various aspects 
of the Turkish economy during the recent financial liberalization experi- 
ence. First, in Section 5.2, we briefly examine the main motivation behind 
attempts at liberalization by returning to the structure of the economy prior 
to liberalization. Then we discuss the evolution of the financial sector in 
Section 5.3, by looking at various aspects of the system. In Section 5.4 we 
highlight some of the consequences of financial liberalization, concentrat- 
ing on the effects of short-term capital flows into the economy. In our con- 
clusion, Section 5.5, we pull together the main characteristics of the 
liberalization period that led to the present financial instability. 
5.2 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN TURKEY: A BRIEF 
HISTORY 
Turkey's attempts at liberalizing its financial system began along with the 
structural adjustment reform programme initiated in 1980. Before then, 
the system revealed all the attributes of `financial repression', with nega- 
tive real interest rates, a high tax burden on financial earnings, and high 
liquidity and reserve requirement ratios. Overall, financial markets suf- 
fered from a highly regulated and inefficient banking system, with conse- 
quent low-quality portfolio management. Given the underdeveloped and 
fragmented nature of the capital and stock exchange markets, corporations 
had to over-rely on banking credits rather than issuing stocks to finance 
their working capital balances (OECD, 1988). The fiscal deficits were 
mostly financed by direct monetization through the central bank. 
On January 1980, with the introduction of a comprehensive stabilization 
programme, the overall development strategy was reoriented from a highly 
regulated, inward-looking economy to that of an outward-oriented, open 
economy operating under market incentives. The major elements of the 
reform programme were the switch to a pegged exchange regime of con- 
tinuous adjustments, elimination of price controls and phasing out of sub- 
sidies, and the gradual removal of trade restrictions towards full 
commodity trade liberalization. Many aspects of the Turkish structural 
adjustment have been well documented in Rodrik (1991), Nas and 
Odedokun (1988) and Aricanli and Rodrik (1990). 
In retrospect, it can be stated that the mode and pace of financial 
reforms have progressed in leaps and bounds, mostly following pragmatic, 
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on-site solutions to the emerging problems. In the beginning, the major 
aim of the reforms had been the deregulation of the financial system, 
which had naively been expected to be sufficient to create a competitive 
financial structure more efficient over the previous one (Ersel, 1991). The 
first action undertaken was the removal of legal ceilings on deposit interest 
rates, which led to a fierce struggle among the banks and the broker insti- 
tutions to attract funds from the public. This bonanza of fake 
`Switzerlandization' was short-lived, however, and came to a halt with the 
emergence of the 1982 financial crisis. 
The foreign exchange regime was liberalized early in 1984. Banks were 
allowed to accept foreign currency deposits from citizens and to engage in 
foreign transactions. Deregulation of restrictions on foreign exchange led 
to enormous pressures towards currency substitution. Such influences led 
to very high real rates of interest throughout the reform period, because 
the monetary authorities tried to defend the Turkish lira by increasing the 
real interest rate to improve the capital account. With full liberalization of 
the capital account, and the recognition of full convertibility of the lira in 
1989, however, there has been a massive inflow of short-term capital into 
the domestic economy (Boratav et al., 1995). Even though there was no 
officially stated exchange rate management policy during this period, the 
government seemed to use the exchange rate as the nominal anchor in 
trying to control the inflationary expectations. This policy led to an annual 
depreciation of the exchange rate below the inflation rate. For example, 
the extent of the real appreciation ranged from 33 per cent in 1990 to 2 per 
cent in 1992. In 1995, real appreciation was 15 per cent. Much as in the 
Southern Cone experience, however, this use of the exchange rate to attain 
the inflationary targets led to significant fluctuations in the real economy 
and was severely deflationary (see Dornbush, 1982; Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; 
Fanelli and Frenkel, 1993). 
In the credit market, the central bank's control over commercial banks 
was simplified with a revision of the liquidity and reserve requirement 
system. An interbank money market for short-term borrowing facilities 
was enacted in 1986. In 1987, the central bank diversified its monetary 
instruments by starting open market operations. And in October 1989 it 
abandoned the use of rediscount facilities as an instrument of selective 
credit policy.' Finally, in early 1990 the central bank announced a new 
monetary program based on a new concept of controlling the stock of its 
balance sheet on both the assets and the liabilities sides, formulated as 
central bank money (CBM). To restrain the growth of CBM, the central 
bank signed a protocol with the Treasury to limit public sector borrowing 
requirements and monetization of the fiscal deficit. 
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In order to regulate and supervise the capital market, a Capital Market 
Board was established, and initiated the reopening of the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISE) in 1986. To encourage equity financing, significant tax 
incentives were granted and, since 1986, all dividends and capital gains 
have been exempted from personal taxation. 
The adjustment experience of the real sector to financial liberalization 
had been one of boom-and-bust cycles. As documented in Table 5.1, the 
post-1988 performance of gross domestic product revealed intensified 
short-term business cycles, with rates of annual growth ranging between 8 
per cent in 1993 and -5.5 per cent in 1994. Following the production 
cycle, both consumption and investment demand fluctuated sharply over 
the same period. Similarly the external economy was in turbulence, with 
the balance on current account suffering from severe fluctuations between 
-$6.4 billions in 1993, and $2.6 billions in 1994, and again -$2.3 billions 
in 1995. The domestic rate of inflation reached the plateau of 70 per cent 
to 80 per cent per annum and displayed strong resistance at this threshold. 
Given the Turkish experience, one can easily trace out the drastic 
impacts of the reform measures on the domestic financial markets and the 
ongoing trend towards financial deepening. Contrary to expectations, 
however, the public sector share in financial markets remained high. The 
financing behaviour of corporations did not show significant change, and 
credit financing from the banking sector and inter-firm borrowing contin- 
ued. Furthermore, the share of private sector securities in total financial 
assets fell. Thus, the observed upward trend of the proportion of direct 
securities to GNP originated from the direct new issues of public sector 
securities and treasury bills. Because the commercial banking system has 
been the major customer of such securities, however, the share of aggre- 
gate security instruments fell in private portfolios. In fact, with the imple- 
mentation of positive interest rates, and the new possibility of foreign 
exchange accounts, the advance of financial deepening for the private 
households has meant increased foreign exchange deposits with vigourous 
currency substitution. Thus, it can be stated that the `pioneers of financial 
deepening' in Turkey in the 1980s have been public sector securities and 
foreign exchange deposits. As Akyuz (1990) attests, from this observa- 
tion, Turkish experience did not conform to the McKinnon-Shaw hypoth- 
esis of financial deepening, with a shift of portfolio selection from 
`unproductive' assets to those favouring fixed capital formation. 
The process of financial deepening had matured by 1990. Total deposits 
in the banking system had risen from 18.6 per cent of the GNP in 1980, to 
30 per cent by 1988 and have been relatively stable since then (Table 5.2). 
Signs of tension, however, were visible after 1990, when the degree of 
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monetization of the domestic economy was under scrutiny. Ratios of mon- 
etary aggregates M1 and M2 were found to be on a declining trend, 
whereas that of M2Y increased.2 We observed that while the ratio of M2 
to GNP had decreased from 21.1 per cent in 1988 to 16.6 per cent in 1995, 
that of M2Y had increased from 28.4 per cent to 34.3 per cent during the 
same period. This development hints at the decreased confidence on the 
domestic currency, and reveals the increased threat of currency substitu- 
tion, which, combined with the threat of international speculative capital 
flows (hot money), would be the prime cause of the vicious cycle of high 
real interest rates along with currency appreciation. 
The process of financial deepening was shaped directly by the financing 
needs of the public sector. Table 5.2 documents this episode. The new 
issues of securities by the state increased from 6.9 per cent of the GNP in 
1988 to 20.3 per cent in 1995. On the other hand, issues by the private 
sector stood at 2.2 per cent of the GNP as of 1995. The state granted a 
series of incentives to the banking sector for holding its government debt 
instruments (GDIs). GDIs could be used as collateral and be held against 
the liquidity requirements. This process led to three important conse- 
quences: first and foremost, it substituted fiscal policy for monetary policy 
and hindered the central bank's capacity to conduct monetary policy; 
second, it enabled the Treasury to assume a monopoly power to regulate 
the distribution of domestic credit and crowded out the private sector; 
third, as a result of the sudden and unexpected changes in the issues of the 
GDIs through captive methods of liquidity requirements, it led to a highly 
volatile money multiplier. 
5.3 STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM 
The structure of the financial system prior to the liberalization episode 
can be summarized briefly by highlighting several of the main character- 
istics. First, there were ceilings on the interest rates for deposits and 
credits, and real interest rates were negative. This encouraged corpora- 
tions to use excessive leverage, but to a large extent it caused the 
financial sector to shrink in real terms. Second, the reserve requirement 
ratios were relatively high, resulting in increased costs of bank intermedi- 
ation. Third, there were no institutionalized capital markets. Fourth, 
public sector deficits were primarily financed through monetization. 
Because the money markets and government securities markets were not 
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purpose of monetary control. Fifth, there were restrictions on the entry of 
foreign and domestic banks into the banking sector. Sixth, foreign 
exchange operations were significantly restricted. And finally, corporate 
financing was achieved through borrowing rather than equity financing. 
Commercial banks were the dominant financial institutions, and bank 
loans were the main instrument of financing. Under these structural con- 
ditions, liberalization measures were introduced to correct the balance 
of payments problems in an attempt to end financial repression and 
stimulate real economic growth. 
The multiple aims of the 1980 Stabilization Programme were to recon- 
struct the economy by moving towards more of a market orientation, 
which would allow a far more efficient allocation of resources, so as to 
control the chronically high inflation rate, to improve the balance of pay- 
ments problems through the reduction of current account deficit, to imple- 
ment an investment policy to increase capacity utilization and the efficient 
allocation of resources, to establish a more realistic exchange rate policy 
to promote exports, to promote foreign investment and the inflow of 
foreign capital, and to have a credible public finance policy to increase tax 
revenues. To meet these goals, import substitution was replaced by export 
promotion, opening the economy to foreign capital flows. 
During the same period, financial reform measures were introduced in 
an effort to promote financial market development through deregulation 
and competition. The strategy was to make entry into the banking sector 
easier, so as to increase the role of the financial system in promoting 
growth. Significant structural changes in the financial system followed 
from the these measures, especially during the second half of the 1980s. 
The Banking System 
The banking system, generally, viewed the implementation of the financial 
liberalization programme as benign, and made an effort to accommodate 
its measures. Banks began to modernize themselves, by adopting new 
technologies in their operations. The liberalization of interest rates and the 
foreign exchange regime, along with the entry of new domestic and 
foreign banks, increased competition in the banking sector. In this new 
environment, efficient supervision became an important issue in the main- 
tainance of the safety and soundness of the banking system. Some meas- 
ures pertaining to the adequacy of capital were introduced to strengthen 
banks' capital structures. The minimum amount of a bank's required 
capital was raised from 25 million to 5 billion Turkish lira in 1988. In 
addition to the minimum capital requirement, a capital adequacy ratio was 
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established to minimize the risks of a bank's assets. In 1992, the capital 
adequacy ratio was increased to 8 per cent, by using BIS guidelines to 
determine primary and secondary capitals and risk weights. Firms with 
low equity/debt ratios were unable to pay their debts, resulting in an accu- 
mulation of non performing loans in the banks' portfolios. Because there 
were no legal obligations, the classification and provisioning of non- 
performing loans were at the discretion of the banks. In 1986, through an 
amendment to the Banking Law, the government issued a decree for provi- 
sioning, requiring banks to keep specific loan loss reserves as well as 
general reserves for their loan portfolios. Although the practice was not in 
accord with international practices, this can be seen as a first attempt to 
require banks to classify and keep reserves for their past due loans. The 
rates for provisions were very low. In May 1988, a new decree on loan 
classification and provisioning was put into effect, based primarily on the 
creditworthiness of the borrowers. 
After the initial implementation of the financial liberalization measures, 
in addition to on-site examinations, the establishment of an effective off- 
site supervision system became an important objective of the regulatory 
authorities. Therefore, all banks were required to use a uniform chart of 
accounts. Another important measure of supervision of the banking system 
was the independent auditing of banks. Reports from independent auditors 
were evaluated to assess banks' strengths and weaknesses. 
All these measures were aimed at increasing the efficiency of super- 
vision and led to more transparency of banks' financial statements. 
In 1983, to protect depositors against possible bank failures and to 
increase the public's confidence in the financial system, the Savings 
Deposit Insurance Fund was established. The coverage of insurance was 
limited to saving deposits only. The law authorized the Treasury to liqui- 
date or rehabilitate problem banks. 
Developments in the banking sector throughout the liberalization period 
can be summarized as follows (Akkurt et al., 1992): 
(1) The banking system was strengthened by establishing prudential regu- 
lations in line with international practices and guidelines. The stan- 
dards for loan classification and loan-loss provisioning helped in 
identifying and classifying non-performing loans. Besides these stan- 
dards, the banks have been required to fulfill the risk-weighted capital 
adequacy ratio, which was 8 per cent in 1992. 
(2) The soundness of the system was also enhanced by improving the on- 
and off-site supervision, establishing an independent auditing mecha- 
nism, and making uniform accounting practices. 
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(3) The banking system has developed as a result of the introduction of 
new markets such as the foreign exchange and gold markets; and 
improvements in capital markets through refined instruments, liberal- 
ization of the foreign exchange regime and interest rates, reduction in 
the volume of preferential credits and more effective taxation of 
financial intermediation. The liberalization of the foreign exchange 
regime created an opportunity for the banks to increase their 
profitability by mobilizing foreign exchange funds while increasing 
the tendency for currency substitution. 
(4) The central bank played a leading role in the reduction of the volume 
of preferential credits that had created an obstacle to increasing the 
efficiency of the banking system. The rediscount facilities for prefer- 
ential credits were terminated, and the banks have been allowed to 
use the discount window only for their liquidity requirements at a rate 
determined by the CB. 
(5) Distortions in the efficiency of the banking system, caused by high 
taxation on financial intermediation, were reduced to some extent by 
lowering the reserve requirement ratios.3 
(6) Despite the rapid growth of non-financial economic institutions 
throughout the liberalization period, the banking sector remained as 
the main contributor to fund mobilization. 
(7) Owing to their rapid growth, most of the new financial instruments 
were introduced by these institutions.4 
(8) The share of banks in the secondary markets of these instruments 
amounts to 90 per cent. Additionally, the predominant financial 
instruments are bank deposits and government securities. 
A closer examination of developments in the banking system, however, 
reveals that its growth was neither smooth nor completely in line with the 
liberalization programme.5 There was a decline in concentration measured 
by the share of the five largest banks in total assets. For example, concen- 
tration for the five largest banks declined from 69 per cent in 1980 to 52 
per cent in 1995. Similarly, the concentration for the largest ten banks also 
declined from 88 per cent in 1980 to 76 per cent in 1995. During the same 
period, the share of government securities in the banks' portfolios 
increased.6 There also was an increase in the banks' capitalization. And as 
a result of opening the economy, commercial banks' share of claims on 
and liabilities to non-residents increased after 1986. Since then, total 
domestic credit as a percentage of GNP declined while banks' profitability 
increased. After 1986, the role of foreign banks in promoting competition 
in the banking sector was negligible. 
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Capital Markets 
The liberalization process was initiated by the creation of legal framework 
for the enactment of the Capital Market Law in 1981. This was followed 
immediately by the establishment of the Capital Market Board in 1982 as 
the supervisory and regulatory authority to ensure the functioning of the 
market.? Besides the supervisory and regulatory functions, the Board was 
also given the authority to develop the markets themselves. The distin- 
guishing feature was that the Board had the authority to set the framework 
and then to amend its regulations according to changing market conditions. 
Between 1982 and 1986, the infrastructure of the markets was almost 
completed. The main principles for the financial intermediaries and for the 
scope of their operations were set, the instruments were defined and the 
rules for issuing securities were specified. 
A new law was enacted in 1992 to lay the foundation for a market- 
determined financial innovations process. The scope of authority of the 
Board was enlarged and financial innovations were made easier in terms 
of the development of new instruments and institutions by the market 
itself.8 The principal measures that were taken can be summarized as 
follows (Sak, 1995): 
(1) Instruments of direct finance were defined by the Board. Disclosure 
requirements were set and conditions required from the issuers of secu- 
rities were defined,9 while merit regulation principles were adopted.10 
(2) The roles of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries in the secu- 
rities markets were specified, leading to an acceptance of the universal 
banking system. Banks were allowed to undertake all kinds of 
financial market activities without requiring any additional licensing. 
(3) The Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) was established in 1985 as the 
secondary market of securities and became operational in 1986. Fiscal 
incentives were granted to bring all trading on corporate stocks under 
the auspices of the ISE. After 1989 the ISE became large enough to 
attract foreign investors and to absorb the issue of shares of large 
SEEs for privatization purposes." The Board has acted not only as a 
regulatory authority but also as a leading innovator for the whole 
industry, with a special emphasis on investor protection. 
5.4 DETERIORATION OF THE FISCAL BALANCES OF THE STATE 
The post-1980 period witnessed the rapid deterioration of the fiscal posi- 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































occurred in the flow of factor revenues generated by the state economic 
enterprise system and in the rapid rise of the transfer expenditures. Factor 
revenues declined by 4.6 trillions TL in real 1987 values in a period of 
four years from 1988 to 1992. Even though there had been modest 
improvements in tax revenues, the surge in transfer expenditures overran 
such gains. Likewise, the capacity of the public sector to generate savings 
was eroded severely and turned negative after 1992. The aggregate dispos- 
able income of the public sector fell by 30 per cent in real terms between 
1988 and 1995 and the savings - investment gap widened nearly four-fold. 
All these developments led to a sharp increase in the public sector bor- 
rowing requirement (PSBR), which increased to as much as 12.1 per cent 
of the GNP in 1993, just before the outbreak of the 1994 economic crisis. 
The state has resorted to a massive operation of domestic debt financing 
by way of new issues of debt instruments. As a result, the stock of domes- 
tic debt grew rapidly, to reach 20 per cent of the GNP by the end of 1995. 
The interest payments on domestic debt increased from 2.4 per cent in 
1990 to 6.2 per cent of the GNP in 1995, and as a result constituted an 
important mechanism of income transfer within the domestic economy. In 
this way, the Treasury assumed a regulatory role in redistributing the 
economic surplus in favour of financial rentiers, a phenomenon discussed 
more extensively in Yeldan (1995). 
Another mode of finance for the state's fiscal operations has been the 
opening up of the domestic financial sector to speculative short-term 
foreign capital flows. Turkey completed the liberalization of its capital 
account in 1989 by deregulating all its capital movements in its balance of 
payments transactions. Since then, such flows have effectively displayed 
very high sensitivity to the net differential between the domestic and 
foreign interest rate and the rate of currency depreciation. In this situation, 
the central bank has lost its overall control over these two instruments; 
they have practically turned into exogenous variables controlled by the 
external financial markets. From the view of the domestic financial 
markets, liberalization of the capital account necessitated a higher rate of 
return on domestic assets, as compared with foreign currency (as given by 
the rate of nominal depreciation). The rationale for this link can be traced 
directly to the threat of currency substitution (dollarization and/or D- 
markization) of the domestic liquidity markets. Given this threat, the mon- 
etary authority had to assume a passive role against excessively high real 
rates of interest on domestic assets, coupled with an overvalued exchange 
rate. It is actually a misnomer to refer to the foreign exchange rate regime 
as one of overvaluation. In fact, it is the balance of payments accounts 
that yield such an equilibrium in the first place, because liberalization of 
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the capital account in the short-term capital transactions requires a com- 
mitment to high real rates of domestic interest exceeding the rate of cur- 
rency depreciation. As this commitment stimulates more direct portfolio 
investments, domestic currency appreciates, inviting an even higher level 
of hot money inflows to the domestic economy. 
All of these connections help to create an extremely unpredictable envi- 
ronment. The 1989-93 experience shows the serious problems confronting 
a developing economy than decides to move into full external and internal 
deregulation in the financial system under conditions of high inflation. 
`The spectre of capital flight' becomes the dominant motive in policy- 
making and creates commitment to high interest rates and expectations for 
cheap foreign exchange. The links between these two policy variables and 
the real sphere of the economy, that is, investment in physical capital and 
the current account balance of payments, are deeply severed. When 
adverse impacts on the current account balance become excessively desta- 
bilizing, real depreciation seems imminent, which, however, needs to be 
matched by further upward adjustment in the rate of interest if currency 
substitution or capital flight is to be restrained. Even with all the necessary 
adjustments, the country may experience capital flight for reasons beyond 
its control. Instability in the rates of foreign exchange and also in interest 
rates creates feedbacks that lead the economy into further instability. 
The elements of this process are displayed in Table 5.4. We report the 
net return on hot money in column 1. This return is calculated as the rate 
of difference between the highest nominal interest offered in the domestic 
economy and the rate of nominal depreciation of the TL. It yields a net 
return to a foreign investor who switches into TL, captures the interest 
income offered in the domestic economy and switches back to the foreign 
currency at the end-of-period exchange rate. The difference between the 
interest earned and the loss due to currency depreciation is the net earnings 
appropriated by the investor. 
The returns on such speculative transactions are contrasted with the 
alternative international yields, summarized by LIBOR, in the second 
column. The inflows show high sensitivity to whether or not the domestic 
rate of return compares favourably with the LIBOR. Except for 1990 
values, the net flows are observed to be of the expected sign. Net flows 
fluctuated widely, especially between 1993 and 1995, and caused drastic 
business cycles, with 1994 the worst economic crisis in the postwar 
republic's history. 
Note, though, that one has to be aware of the gross magnitudes of such 
flows, rather than net amounts, because it is here that the destabilizing 
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columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.4 we report the gross inflows and outflows of 
hot money to the domestic financial markets for the post 1991 period 
(unfortunately such detailed data were not available for the previous 
period at the time of writing.) For our purposes, we define hot money as 
(1) the flows of portfolio investments; (2) the FX deposits of non- 
residents; (3) the FX credits brought by the banking system; and (4) the 
net errors and omissions from the balance of payments statistics (mostly to 
account for the so-called `unrecorded' transactions). 
We can see that the gross inflows grew rapidly from $50 billion in 1991 
to reach $165 billion in 1995. This difference is almost the size of the 
overall Turkish GNP! Clearly, the domestic financial system is under 
severe pressure from the international speculative centres and is no longer 
in a position to generate an independent monetary and foreign exchange 
policy. Furthermore, those centres constituted the major reason for the 
short-termism and volatility of the real business cycles, led to increased 
fragility of the financial and the external position of the domestic economy 
and resulted in worsening the distribution of income. We now study these 
issues in more detail. 
Short-Term Capital Flows Restrict the Independence of the Central 
Bank 
With the opening up of the domestic economy to speculative foreign 
transactions, the monetary authority is bound to a passive role. Two of 
the most important tools of the central bank, rates of interest and foreign 
exchange, fall under the exclusive directives of the external centres, and, 
consequently, the domestic economy is trapped in the vicious cycle of 
high real interest rates and an overvalued domestic currency. To accom- 
modate this process, the central bank is pushed into a passive role of 
foreign reserve administration and is forced to hold significant foreign 
exchange. Indeed, one of the most direct consequences of the hot money 
inflows was the massive buildup of international reserves of the central 
bank. Figure 5.1 depicts this relation using monthly data. On the right- 
hand scale of Figure 5. 1, we display the movements of hot money 
inflows; on the left-hand scale, we trace the monthly position of the inter- 
national reserves of the central bank. With a proper adjustment of the ver- 
tical scale, one can easily observe the striking comovement of the two 
variables over time. Rather than financing productive investments in 
the real sector, short-term capital inflows lead to a rapid buildup of the 
reserves of the monetary authority. This presents a serious contrast to the 
orthodox expectations, prognosticating a complementarity between 
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financial liberalization and the expansion of investment funds in the 
domestic economy. In this setting, the only proper role that remains for 
the monetary authority becomes that of monetary sterilization, so that the 
surge in the M2Y value of money supply is checked by restricting the 
domestic component, with a consequent rise in the domestic interest rates, 
and a recommencement of the cycle. 
Short-Term Capital Flows Disassociate the Financial and the Real 
Sectors and Create Bubbles in the Stock Exchange Market 
Another direct consequence of the speculative hot money flows pertains to 
the links between the real and the financial spheres of the domestic 
economy. Speculative flows, given their sheer size and volatility, lead to 
artificial bubbles in the stock markets than have no real foundation and 
end up inflating the stock prices. In theory, stock prices have to depend on 
the productive performance of the corporations. In principle, a well- 
functioning stock market should help the economic development process 
through (a) the growth of savings, (b) the efficient allocation of invest- 
ment resources and (c) better utilization of existing resources, through the 
pricing process (Singh, 1992). Nevertheless, with the inflows and outflows 
of speculative capital that are almost the size of the national product, all 
financial returns are inflated and an artificial burst on nominal values is 
created. Figure 5.2 portrays this process succinctly, where we plot the 
monthly gross speculative inflows on the left-hand scale and plot the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange Index (ISE, 1986=100) on the right-hand axis. 
The evolution of the bubble is clearly visible, starting from March 1993, 
where the ISE Index accelerates along with the intensification of hot 
money flows. Such bubble-burst-bubble performance of the stock market 
is clearly dissociated from the real production capacity of the economy. 
Rather than enhancing the aggregate credit volume, it reveals itself as the 
major cause of the economic crisis. 
The analysis showing that short-term hot money flows have destabiliz- 
ing consequences for the process of financial deepening can also be aug- 
mented by an analysis of the volume of securities market transactions 
(Table 5.5). In 1995 aggregate volume of trading in ISE market reached 
$52.3 billion of which $16.5 billion were government securities. Thus, 
with this volume, the stock market stood very shallow, given the magni- 
tude of hot money flows. The secondary market transactions volume, on 
the other hand, can be observed to be have been more vivid, totalling $410 
billion. Almost 98 per cent of such securities traded belonged to the public 
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Turkish context, as the long arm of fiscal policy, overcoming the credit 
and monetary constraints of the monetary authority. 
The availability of such funds enabled the fiscal authority to postpone 
any adjustment in its revenue-enhancing capabilities, such as the imple- 
mentation of added taxes on capital earnings and the reduction of evasions 
on taxable corporate earnings. Yeldan (1995) discusses this stance in 
terms of a discretionary surplus redistribution strategy on the part of the 
state via its fiscal policy. Through the availability of short-term borrow- 
able funds, the state has become a viable apparatus to generate an econ- 
omic surplus for corporate incomes by way of a lax attitude towards tax 
evasion and the consequent deficits. 
Acting in this way, the Treasury offered market yields on its instru- 
ments and thereby became the dominant agent in the financial economy. 
Table 5.6 contrasts returns on deposits and GDIs of different maturities. 
GDI yield returns are seen to be more favourable in most instances. 
Short-Term Capital Flows Increase External Fragility and Lower 
Creditworthiness 
Another consequence of hot money flows concerns the creditworthiness of 
the recipient country. Although the composition of external borrowing has 
Table 5.5 Turkey: main indicators in securities markets (million US$) 
Istanbul Stock Exchange Secondary market 
trading volume transaction volume 
Number Government Repo° rev-repob 
of firms Total securities Private Public trading volume 
1988 79 115 1 075 7 295 
1989 76 773 2001 15 210 
1990 110 5 854 7 359 37 000 
1991 134 8 502 312 3 139 66 873 
1992 145 8 567 2 403 2 305 88 771 
1993 160 21 771 10 717 3 719 157 861 4 794 
1994 176 23 202 8 828 4 941 180 587 23 704 
1995 193 52 357 16 509 6 003 404 643 123 254 
Repurchase 
6 Reverse Repurchase 
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changed dramatically relative to the debt crisis period, several credit- 
worthiness indicators show that foreign investors have been continuously 
lowering Turkey's creditworthiness. This is associated with the unstable 
economic environment caused by continuous speculative capital flows. 
Creditworthiness is associated mainly with balance of payments prob- 
lems, the likelihood of devaluation, and overall economic and political sta- 
bility. All of these indicators have been extremely volatile in the 1990s. 
Looking at total debt outstanding as a percentage of export earnings, it is 
clear that this indicator was extremely high for Turkey during 1988-95. 
Just to make a comparison, at the height of the debt crisis, in 1982, 
Mexico's ratio of debt outstanding to exports was around 236 per cent, 
while during the same period the same ratio for Turkey was around 200 
per cent. In 1993, this ratio for Turkey was 431 per cent. 
The volatility in the current account balance is another indicator of 
creditworthiness and fragility. Table 5.1 shows that the current account 
balance for 1993 was -$6433 million, for 1994 $2631 million, and for 
1995 it stood at -$2339. Another interesting indicator is the ratio of short- 
term debt to total debt. In 1993, short-term debt was around 28 per cent of 
total debt. In the following year, it fell to 17 per cent and in 1995 it rose to 
27 per cent in 1995. These fluctuations were exclusively the result of 
short-term capital flows that led to intensified financial instability in the 
domestic economy. 
Short-Term Capital Flows Increase the Volatility of Business Cycles 
and Worsen the Income Distribution 
With disassociation of the financial from the real economy, hot money 
inflows lead to more intensified fluctuations in real output in a shorter time 
span. The post-1993 experience is indicative of this observation. The 
fourth quarter of 1993 saw conditions in Turkey at their most fragile, with 
currency appreciation and the consequent current account reaching 
unprecedented levels. With the sudden drainage of short-term funds at the 
beginning of January 1994, the production capacity contracted. Industrial 
output fell continuously throughout that year. Together with this contrac- 
tion, the post-1993 crisis management has given rise to significant shifts in 
the income distribution and intensified the ongoing transfers of economic 
surplus from wage-earners and industrial/real sectors towards the financial 
sectors. Real wages fell rapidly to 25 per cent in just two years. Likewise, 
dollar-denominated wage costs decreased and enabled export earnings to 
rise. In this manner, Turkey once again has switched its mode of surplus 
extraction from the domestic economy back to the exporting sectors. 
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5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The integration of the Turkish economy into the global financial system 
through financial liberalization and privatization has been a mixed bless- 
ing. Even though the main motive behind financial liberalization was to 
restore growth and maintain stability through increased efficiency and 
savings, it created financial instability. The inflows of short-term capital 
were not used to create new and productive investments, but instead 
simply created new dollar obligations for which there is no clear source of 
repayment. It has also intensified the already existing problems such as 
budget deficits, monetary instability and market distortions. In short, 
relying on short-term capital flows proved to be detrimental to the health 
of the economy. 
The 1989-95 experience shows the serious problems confronting a 
developing economy that moves into full external and internal deregula- 
tion of its financial system under conditions of high inflation. The spectre 
of capital flight became the dominant motive in policy-making and created 
unsustainable commitment to high real interest rates and expectations of 
cheap foreign exchange. Meanwhile, links between the financial sector 
and the real sector have been severed. Instability in the rates of interest 
and foreign exchange created feedbacks that led the economy further into 
instability. 
During the same period the fiscal position of the state deteriorated 
rapidly as factor revenues declined. Likewise, the capacity of the public 
sector to generate saving was eroded. The state has resorted to a massive 
operation of domestic debt financing by issuing new debt instruments. As 
a result, the stock of domestic debt has grown very rapidly. The interest 
payments on domestic debt also reached high levels during the same 
period and constituted an important mechanism of income transfer within 
the domestic economy. 
The threat of currency substitution surfaces with the liberalization of 
the capital account, necessitating a higher rate of return on domestic assets 
as compared with foreign currency. As a result, the monetary authority 
has had to assume a passive role against excessively high real interest rates 
on domestic assets coupled with an overvalued currency. 
The overall Turkish experience also showed the problems and limits of 
financial liberalization by relying on the exchange rate as a nominal 
anchor and riding on short-term capital inflows to finance deficits. Such a 
stabilization programme is often attractive for governments, because it 
avoids politically unpopular and painful measures. Its chances of success 
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are also high in the short run, because financial markets tend to be short- 
sighted. The issue is not whether capital flows are good or bad, but rather 
the challenge they pose to the state's ability to make sound and credible 
macro and micro policy that would ensure that such capital flows are 
directed toward the promotion of long-term growth, economic develop- 
ment and social equity. 
Notes 
1. To implement monetary policy, the central bank started to construct a pro- 
gramme and set monetary targets for the first time in 1986. The monetary 
programme continued to be implemented in 1987 and 1988, but the targets 
were exceeded by substantial margins. In 1990 a new programme was 
announced in which the targeted variable was the lira liabilities of the bank, 
also known as central bank money. 
2. As is known, M1 and M2 measure supply of money in domestic assets, 
whereas M2Y includes foreign exchange deposits. 
3. Zaim (1995) shows that there have been increases in both technical and 
allocative efficiency in the banking sector. 
4. These instruments include corporate bonds, commercial paper, profit and 
loss sharing certificates and equity stock. 
5. See Atiyas, and Ersel (1994). 
6. Banks' obligations to hold government securities against high liquidity 
requirements created a large market for government securities. In addition, 
public securities offered very high yields, which made them highly 
attractive. 
7. The financial crisis in 1982 gave an impetus to create the Capital Markets 
Board. 
8. New institutions, such as real estate investment companies, rating agencies, 
clearing and depository institutions, mortgage backed securities centre, were 
being regulated. Short sale, margin trading and repo became available by 
securities intermediaries. 
9. This was the first attempt to define the contractual rights in the securities 
markets. Obligations were defined in the Commercial Code for corporate 
shares and bonds only. However, obligations in terms of disclosure require- 
ments were first entered into the legislation during the reform process (Sak, 
1995.) 
10. Merit regulation leads the regulatory authority to specify interest rates at 
the end. However, after the financial crisis in 1982 there was serious 
concern about investor protection. The absence of rating agencies, 
independent auditing institutions, accounting standards and so on were con- 
sidered imperative in accepting a system of merit regulation. In 1992 the 
Capital Markets Law was amended and disclosure regulation defined. 
11. The capital market, however, has been dominated by public sector 
securities, because the financing of the deficits has been done largely by 
auctioning treasury bills and government bonds. 
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6 Uruguay 
Nelson Noya, Carlos Casacuberta and 
Fernando Lorenzo ' 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the financial liberalization reforms undertaken in 
Uruguay and their long-run effects. The reforms enacted in the 1970s 
created an institutional framework that has survived a deep recession and a 
severe financial crisis (1981-83), several negative external shocks (such as 
the debt crisis of the early 1980s) and the transition from the military 
dictatorship to democracy in 1985. 
In the Uruguayan case, financial liberalization is neither a recent phe- 
nomenon nor an isolated reform. It was conducted in the context of a 
broader programme of economic reforms toward a market-oriented 
economy, similar to those implemented in the mid-1970s in other Latin 
American Southern Cone countries. The Uruguayan financial liberaliza- 
tion was a set of reforms that removed all restrictions on interest rates and 
on credit allocation to specific agents. The opening of the capital account 
and the deregulation of the foreign exchange market are also relevant, and 
impossible to disentangle from the deregulation of the domestic financial 
markets. 
Section 6.2 outlines the contents of the reform and the economic evolu- 
tion of the country in the period under study. Section 6.3 summarizes the 
main stylized facts in the evolution of financial markets and the changes in 
the regulatory framework. In Section 6.4 the long-run effects of financial 
liberalization are analysed. Section 6.5 is dedicated to the relations 
between macroeconomic policies and financial liberalization. Finally, 
Section 6.6 contains our conclusions. 
6.2 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION MEASURES AND OVERALL 
EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMY 
The twenty years that preceded the financial liberalization reforms were 
characterized by economic stagnation and an upsurge in inflation 
156 
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(Table 6.1). Controls on domestic interest rates caused a process of 
financial repression, with a sharp fall of the credit and deposit ratios to 
GDP. Financial disintermediation was aggravated by a major banking 
crisis in 1965. 
The country experienced adverse terms of trade shocks in 1973-4. This 
prompted the military government, which took office after a coup d'etat in 
1973, to abandon government intervention. The financial market deregula- 
tion process started in September 1974 and lasted until 1979. The most 
significant policy measures were as follows: 
(1) Gradual deregulation of interest rates, on both loans and deposits, by 
raising their legal maxima until their complete removal in June 1979. 
In fact, by 1977 the maximum legal rate was no longer binding. 
Deregulation of interest rates on dollar-denominated deposits was 
even faster. 
(2) Abolition of exchange controls and adoption of full convertibility of 
national currency. Total freedom of capital movements was granted 
by September 1974. The opening of the capital account preceded the 
domestic financial market deregulation and was introduced all at 
once. 
(3) Elimination of the restrictions on allocation of bank credit to specific 
sectors. This included the rediscount system, which was removed in 
June 1977, also as a means to control money supply. Promotional 
credit to exporting firms was initially increased, but was eliminated in 
1979. In June 1976 all restrictions on the banks' foreign-denominated 
net asset position were also removed. 
(4) Reduction of the minimum legal reserve requirements until they were 
eliminated in May 1979. Policies in this respect fluctuated: reserve 
requirements were increased from 1974 to 1978, and restored in 
November 1982, with the move to a floating exchange rate regime. 
This was the only liberalizing measure reversed. 
(5) Relaxation of regulations on entry of new financial institutions, allow- 
ing in 1976 the operation of banking houses, and in 1981 lifting the 
prohibition of entry to new banks. 
(6) Suppression of the so-called compulsory domestic currency `legal 
tender' in March 1976, allowing real or financial contracts to be 
denominated in dollars or any other unit of account. 
Along with financial reforms, trade liberalization started with the removal 
of non-tariff barriers to imports. In 1978 a tarrif reduction program was 
announced to gradually unify them, but it was halted in 1983. 
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Additionally, tax reforms were undertaken in 1972 and 1974, simplifying 
the tax system, introducing a VAT and reducing the distortions. Price 
deregulation was also considerable. Between 1974 and 1978, active export 
promotion policies were pursued. 
After the reforms, the performance of the economy improved: GDP 
grew at 4.9 per cent annually from 1974 to 1980 and financial deepening 
increased, with high dollarization of assets and liabilities. From 1978 on 
wards a price stabilization programme based on the exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor reduced inflation, but real appreciation of the peso led to 
current account deficits. A recession started in 1981, and when capital 
inflows reversed, the exchange rate policy was unsustainable leading to a 
steep real devaluation of 120 per cent in November 1982 that triggered 
capital losses in dollar-indebted firms and fuelled a financial crisis. From 
1982 to 1984 GDP fell by 13 per cent. 
Although growth resumed during 1985-7, and the economy experi- 
enced several favourable external shocks, the late 1980s saw an upsurge in 
inflation and low growth. In 1990, after inflation rose to 130 per cent, a 
new exchange-rate-based stabilization program was launched. As a result, 
inflation receded slowly, falling to an annual rate of 40 per cent in 1994. 
GDP grew after 1991, led by domestic absorption, while domestic cur- 
rency appreciated in real terms. A current account deficit emerged, bal- 
anced by private capital inflows. In 1990 Uruguay joined the customs 
union of MERCOSUR, and there were also further tariff reductions with 
respect to the rest of the world, which may be considered the main struc- 
tural reforms of the 1990s. 
6.3 STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Evolution of the Financial Structure 
In what follows we present briefly the institutional agents in the 
Uruguayan financial system, considering two main classes. The first is for 
public-owned banks and it includes the following: 
(1) Banco de la Republica (BROU), a commercial bank also with devel- 
opment bank functions. It grants medium- and long-term loans to 
finance firms' investment, obtaining short-term funds as a commercial 
bank, and holds a monopoly of deposits from the public sector. 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(3) Mortgage Bank of Uruguay (Banco Hipotecario del Uruguay, BHU) 
that lends on terms from 15 to 25 years for housing purposes, index- 
ing its assets and liabilities by an accounting unit (Unidad 
Reajustable, UR) linked to the aggregate nominal wage. 
The second group is composed of private institutions including: 
(1) Commercial private banks, which operate mainly with short-term 
loans and deposits, though they are not restricted from doing it in 
longer maturities. Since 1976, they have also performed offshore 
transactions. 
(2) Banking houses (Casas Bancarias or Casas Financieras), which are 
not allowed to hold savings from domestic agents, take dollar- 
denominated deposits from non-residents and are oriented to offshore 
activities, but grant a significant amount of credit to residents. 
(3) Financial cooperatives, which intermediate between their associates 
and have existed since 1972, growing in the 1980s as a result of 
mergers. Their share is significant only in the domestic currency loan 
market, particularly in agricultural and consumer credit. 
(4) External financial institutions (Instituciones Financieras Externas, 
IFEs), allowed since 1989 to operate exclusively in offshore 
transactions. 
Financial Repression 
Uruguay offered in the 1950s and 1960s a clear case of financial repres- 
sion. Nominal ceilings on interest rates and high inflation determined 
strongly negative real rates. A sharp disintermediation process took place, 
measured by the ratios of both credit and deposits to GDP. The banking 
system was reduced to a minimum, and in the second half of the 1960s 
financing outside the formal system flourished. 
Though the banking system was shrinking steadily, the activity level 
did not fall in an order of magnitude comparable to that of the fall in 
financial intermediation. An explanation may be that the funds driven 
away from the banking system were redirected to informal credit markets 
or to purchases of foreign assets (as reflected by negative figures in 
balance of payments errors and omissions). Some degree of inter-firm or 
informal financing via larger firms' credit to customers and from suppliers 
allowed firms to continue their activity, although it was a less efficient 
intermediation. Evidence from firms' balance sheets shows that they 
resorted to extraneous means of financing such as unpaid taxes (Pascale 
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1978, 1982). Differences by firm size in access to bank credit indicate 
rationing in the credit market. 
Financial Deepening, Portfolio Substitution and Dollarization 
After two decades of strongly negative values, real domestic rates slowly 
increased after the 1974 reforms, though they did not turn positive imme- 
diately nor permanently. 
The banking system recovered after the reforms (Table 6.2). Deposits 
grew steadily after 1974, while total credit did the same after 1975. The 
proportion of financial wealth held as bank deposits rose systematically 
after 1974 until the 1982 crisis. 
It must be noted that there was no significant increase in private 
savings. Thus, the main source of financial intermediation recovery was 
the reallocation of the domestic private sector financial portfolio from 
foreign assets to bank deposits. The second source of the recovery were 
capital inflows, mostly from Argentina, part of which was channelled to 
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%of total assets - %offinancialassets 
Figure 6.1 Uruguay: households' assets in foreign currency (%) 
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The financial intermediation recovery was carried out by increased dol- 
larization of banking assets and liabilities. The proportion of dollar- 
denominated deposits rose, but the currency denomination structure of the 
household's financial portfolio (including foreign assets) was not 
significantly altered through the first years of the liberalization experience. 
Actually, dollarization of financial portfolios existed from the financial 
repression period on wards, as households had built up foreign assets via 
capital flight in the 1960s. 
Table 6.2 Uruguay: credit to firms and deposits from households (in percentage 
of GDP) 
Banking credit to firms Deposits from households 
Period Private Central BROU Total Private BROU BHU Total 
banking° bank banking° 
1954-1963 21.2 0.0 8.7 30.0 15.8 3.9 0.2 19.9 
1964-1973 9.7 0.2 6.5 16.5 5.7 1.7 0.7 8.1 
1974 8.1 0.6 8.6 17.3 2.1 1.4 1.4 4.9 
1975 8.9 0.8 8.3 18.0 2.3 1.7 1.7 5.7 
1976 9.9 0.6 9.3 19.8 3.3 2.4 1.8 7.5 
1977 13.7 0.2 9.3 23.3 4.5 2.7 1.6 8.8 
1978 16.7 0.1 9.1 25.9 4.9 3.2 1.6 9.7 
1979 21.3 0.1 8.3 29.6 6.0 2.9 1.3 10.1 
1980 24.3 0.0 7.7 32.0 8.2 3.3 1.6 13.1 
1981 24.6 0.0 8.4 33.0 12.5 4.4 2.1 18.9 
1982 47.1 2.5 10.6 60.2 21.0 8.0 3.4 32.4 
1983 30.2 9.7 13.7 53.7 16.3 7.4 3.4 27.1 
1984 26.0 10.3 13.0 49.4 15.8 9.6 4.2 29.6 
1985 22.5 8.2 14.5 45.1 18.5 13.0 4.7 36.2 
1986 20.8 5.2 13.3 39.3 17.3 12.4 4.6 34.3 
1987 18.1 4.0 11.9 34.0 16.2 12.9 4.5 33.6 
1988 18.3 2.9 13.1 34.3 17.7 14.3 5.7 37.7 
1989 15.9 0.3 13.5 29.7 22.1 17.0 6.8 45.8 
1990 13.1 1.3 13.6 28.0 24.4 18.7 8.0 51.0 
1991 11.3 0.3 11.1 22.7 21.5 17.2 7.5 46.2 
1992 12.4 0.3 10.2 22.9 18.1 14.8 6.2 39.1 
1993 11.6 0.2 9.1 21.0 14.9 12.6 5.7 33.2 
1994 10.6 0.2 9.0 19.7 14.3 12.1 5.3 31.7 
1995 12.9 0.1 10.8 23.8 13.5 11.9 5.8 31.2 
° Includes private banks and banking houses. 
Source: Estimated from central bank. 
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Dollarization of deposits led to dollarization of credit. In the years that 
followed, despite price stabilization attempts, dollarization of credit was 
not reversed, as shown in Figure 6.1. 
A specific consequence of dollarization of domestic intermediation was 
to turn more fragile the whole financial system. Domestic households 
became net creditors, in dollars, of the banking system, and the banks in 
turn lent these funds to non-financial firms, keeping the same currency 
structure in their assets and liabilities. Non-financial firms accepted bank 
indebtedness in dollars, because it was the main credit source available 
to them, and assumed an exchange rate risk that they, specially those in 
non-tradable industries, were not facing before. 
Another consequence of dollarization is that the leverage of firms 
became correlated with the real exchange rate. When the real exchange 
rate is below long-run equilibrium, the solvency of firm's as measured by 
leverage apparently improves, even though this is only a transitory effect. 
As a result of the recovery of financial intermediation, the balance sheet 
data of firms show a relative loosening of the financial constraints after the 
liberalizing reforms, particularly for medium-size firms, which increased 
their leverage coefficients more than the larger ones. Firms' leverage 
increased immediately after the reforms and until the 1982 crisis. 
Financial Crisis and Government Intervention 
A crucial aspect of the Uruguayan experience was the 1982 financial 
crisis. After the recession started in 1981, signals of a crisis were given by 
the increase in non-performing loans of private banks. Lack of confidence 
in the exchange rate policy grew, and was reflected initially in an increase 
in the spread between interest rates in pesos and in dollars. This fuelled the 
recession, through its impact on the loan interest rates. When depositors 
switched from pesos to dollars, banks forced the firms to renew their for- 
merly contracted loans in pesos for new loans in dollars. The firms' posi- 
tion became increasingly risky. Finally, in 1982, the preannounced 
exchange rate system was abandoned, which led to a substantial real 
devaluation. Insolvency of firms, aggravated by the capital losses arising 
from devaluation, led most of the banks to financial trouble. 
The crisis led to a massive government intervention. First, the central 
bank bought from bankrupted nationally-owned banks their uncollectible 
portfolios for 413 million dollars (4 per cent of GDP) before the end of 
1982, to improve their balance sheets so that they could be sold later. Four 
banks were sold to banks of European origin. Second, the central bank 
bought from local branches of international banks some portfolios of loans 
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(not necessarily nonperforming) in exchange for international credit in 
dollars granted by their headquarters, as the government needed to recom- 
pose its depleted international reserves. While these purchases amounted 
to 215 million dollars (2 per cent of GDP), the debt the central bank 
acquired totalled 540 million dollars (5.5 per cent of GDP). This was not 
destined in principle to rescue banking institutions, but the central bank 
actually incurred in considerable losses during the 1980s, as loan collect- 
ion was virtually nil. Total portfolios purchased by the central bank were 
11 per cent of GDP at the end of 1984. A third type of government inter- 
vention took place between 1985 and 1989. The main three nationally 
owned commercial banks were seriously affected by the crisis, and, 
though insolvent, continued their activity until they had severe liquidity 
problems in the mid-1980s. They were bought out by government agen- 
cies to clean up their portfolios and leave them in condition to be resold to 
the private sector. These banks, known as 'government-managed' (bancos 
gestionados), held almost 30 per cent of total private banking deposits. 
Another area of government intervention was the several laws passed 
(the last of them in 1992) imposing compulsory debt restructuring and sus- 
pending the enforcement of judiciary sentences to bail out firms from 
bankruptcy. Firms' debts were rescheduled several times throughout 
the 1980s. This fact set an atmosphere of uncertainty over the value of 
collateral and the enforceability of contracts. 
From 1982 to 1989 there was an overall contraction of the private 
banking system (total credit to private sector fell by more than 10 per cent 
of GDP), but it did not return to the levels pertaining in the financial 
repression. Less credit was provided, owing to increasing default risks 
from the recession period, and also for fear of government intervention 
impeding loan collection. 
Total deposits, however, did not fall and, in fact, they even increased in 
GDP terms. The financial rescue by the central bank and public sector 
agencies might have been perceived as an implicit insurance on deposits. 
This helps to explain why banks kept on attracting funds. 
Government Financing 
Financial liberalization was associated with changes in government 
financing, basically related to the structure of public sector liabilities. In 
the years of financial repression, fiscal deficits were financed mainly 
through monetary expansion and foreign credit, while national-currency- 
denominated public debt was steadily shrinking. Dollar-denominated bills 
and bonds started to be issued domestically in 1968. From 1974 to 1976, 
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when high fiscal deficits were run, all dollar-denominated liabilities, and 
especially domestic bills and bonds, increased. These means of financing 
probably would not have been available without the financial liberalization. 
As financial liberalization played a significant role in the creation of a 
domestic market for dollar-denominated bonds, it helped to ease the gov- 
ernment's financial constraint after 1974, and reduced the urgency of fiscal 
deficit adjustments. It is a remarkable fact that even in the midst of the 
1982 episode, a domestic financial market for public debt survived. 
Because of this, during the 1980s, when foreign credit was not available, 
fiscal crises did not lead to hyperinflation. 
As in the case of non-financial firms, the government balance sheet 
position started to be correlated to the real exchange rate. As the public 
sector is a net debtor in dollar-denominated assets, it benefits temporarily 
from a real exchange rate that is below its long-run equilibrium level. 
This, however, has consequences particularly for the performance of 
stabilization attempts. 
Structure and Performance of the Banking System 
Financial liberalization in Uruguay was basically the liberalization of the 
banking system. Non-banking financial markets, that is, the stock markets, 
were not important, except as secondary markets for public debt.' Given 
the importance of banking markets, it is worth while to recall some basic 
features of their structure and evolution after liberalization. In Table 6.3 
the main structural indicators by type of agent are shown. 
There are three main periods in the banking system after financial liber- 
alization: (1) the initial phase, which lasted until the 1981-3 crisis; (2) the 
adjustment period that followed this crisis and continued approximately 
until 1987, when the last nationally owned private bank fell; and (3) the 
period starting 1987 until the present. 
The first stage is characterized by an increase in the number of institu- 
tions, in their branch network, the amount of funds intermediated and the 
development of an offshore segment of the market. Commercial banks 
could take deposits from abroad, but in 1977 the opening of banking 
houses specializing in offshore transactions (Figure 6.2) was authorized 
and their number grew. 
However, the idea of promoting an international financial center was a 
low priority in the overall public policy strategy.3 Uruguay became a 
regional financial centre in spite of itself, and mainly because of high 
capital flight from Argentina in those years. Evidence is given by the fact 
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Figure 6.2 Uruguay: private banking offshore activity (% of GDP) 
sharply after 1990. Behind these movements lie Argentina's financial 
system cycles, the origin of most offshore deposits. 
The second period started with the 1982 financial crisis. As a result, by 
the end of the 1980s, all private banking institutions were foreign-owned, 
with the sole exception of the financial cooperatives (which were growing 
fast, but had a share of less than 2 per cent of total banking deposits). 
This structure of property was reinforced by an implicit licensing policy 
of the central bank, which restricted access to the banking system to 
international banks' branches. This would exempt it from being respons- 
ible for potential losses due to the insolvency of institutions. The physical 
network of the surviving private institutions contracted, a sign of the 
adoption of a `wholesale' business strategy. This strategy implied 
increasing concentration in the private banking credit supply, particularly 
in corporate credit. 
Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the crisis, public banks increased their 
share. From 1980 to 1990, BROU became the largest bank in the market, 
increasing its share in total deposits from 4 to 20 per cent of GDP, particu- 
larly in time deposits in dollars, and to a lesser extent in corporate credit 
(from 8 to 15 per cent of GDP). This can be explained by a relative lack of 
confidence in the private banking sector after the financial crisis, while 
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government backing of BROU's deposits made it seem relatively safer to 
the public. 
The most recent stage, starting between 1987 and 1990, shows a rever- 
sal of the declining trend in the banking physical network, an expansion of 
consumer credit, but not of corporate credit, and a reduction in the public 
bank's share, particularly in the credit market. Even though there were 
significant capital inflows in this period, they were not channelled to the 
banking system. If we take the sign of errors and omissions in the balance 
of payments as an indicator of a decrease in foreign assets then its counter- 
part can only be domestic absorption expansion. This means at least partial 
improvement in the firms' balance sheets, which is consistent with data 
reported by Pascale (1993, 1994), because the government was then 
reducing its net liabilities. 
After two decades of financial liberalization, the main problems of the 
banking system may be summarized as follows: 
(1) The relatively small role of private national agents in the ownership of 
institutions. The main explanation is related to the private national 
bankers' structural vulnerability to financial crisis in a context of high dol- 
larized intermediation. As the crisis implied important capital losses to 
banks, their viability depended on equity contributions. However, in the 
midst of a balance of payments crisis, those contributions could not come 
from a domestic credit expansion from the central bank. Therefore, rescu- 
ing these private national banks needed a mix of increased foreign indebt- 
edness of the central bank and their sale to foreign banks. The 
above-mentioned implicit licensing policy also explains why entry of 
national agents after the crisis was nil. 
This constitutes a problem, because as an almost general rule, private 
foreign institutions are more restrictive in credit granted to nationally 
owned firms (not in personal credit). This leads to credit market segmenta- 
tion, particularly for medium-sized and small firms and sectors where 
foreign firms show little interest. The recent growth of financial coopera- 
tives (from 1 per cent of total credit in 1990 to 4.7 per cent in 1994) may 
be seen as a market reaction to this increasing segmentation.' 
(2) A high financial intermediation spread. This spread, about 35 per cent 
to 40 per cent in domestic currency credit, and 9 per cent to 12 per cent in 
dollar credits to prime rate and non-prime-rate clients respectively, 
explains the high real loan rates, since real deposit rates have been nega- 
tive or slightly above zero. In Figures 6.5 and 6.6 are shown the evolution 
of the BROU and private banks spreads, net of the financial cost of 
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mandatory reserves. The cost of mandatory reserve requirements explains 
only about 10 per cent of spreads in national currency. The high spread is 
due basically to the high costs of BROU and the lack of competition in the 
private banking sector. Evidence is provided by the fact that when in 1991 
a series of implicit subsidies to the BROU were eliminated, it was forced 
to increase its spreads. Then, private banks followed that increase in the 
spreads without facing any additional cost (Figures 6.3 and 6.5), which 
can be interpreted as a rent-capturing situation by private banks with 
smaller costs. 
Further evidence on the low degree of competition in the credit market 
is provided by Bergara and Cladera (1995), from an analysis of interac- 
tions in credit and deposit private markets at a micro level. They find that 
a competitive model cannot be accepted and that some degree of market 
power exists, in the sense of a finite price elasticity of demand at the 
banking firm level. 
(3) The low development of the long-term credit market, particularly by 
private banks. Only public banks (BROU and BHU) constitute the long- 
term credit market. Just recently, in the 1990s, some private banks started 
to develop long-term lines, basically in personal credit to purchase of 
durable goods and real estate. 
(4) The absence of a definite role for public banks. In contrast to their 
clear objectives during the financial repression period, the public banks' 
function is not well defined in the financial liberalization context. This is 
aggravated because as a result of higher public trust after the crisis their 
market share increased. There is an increased need to improve their 
efficiency and to define which market failure are they set to correct. In 
principle, in the Uruguayan case the lack of intermediaries catering for 
small and medium-sized firms or long-term credit may give a first 
approach to the answer, but high operative costs and lack of managerial 
skills prevent them from performing this function efficiently. 
6.3 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Evolution of Regulations 
Until the mid-1960s banking regulation was based on a 1938 Banking 
Law. This law provided neither deposit insurance mechanisms nor lender- 













































































































































































































































































banks' portfolio structure. In practice, there were no limits to entry to the 
banking market. Furthermore, there was no central bank, and the monetary 
authority role was played by the issue department of the BROU. 
As a reaction to the 1965 banking crisis, a deposit insurance scheme was 
established, but the fixed, peso-denominated ceilings on the amounts 
covered implied a rapid erosion of the effective coverage, given the 
inflationary environment. A set of measures were designed to decrease the 
high number of financial institutions and their physical network, which 
were seen as expressions of excessive competition. These measures include 
prohibitions of entry, official encouragement to mergers and acquisitions, a 
ceiling on the number of branches, and a ban on curb market subsidiaries. 
From an institutional point of view, an important innovation was the cre- 
ation of the central bank in 1967. Despite the new regulations, new banking 
crises occurred in 1970 and 1971. The BROU purchased five bankrupted 
institutions that had a 27 per cent share of the credit market. 
Financial liberalization modified the financial system regulation. All 
constraints on the allocation of loanable funds were lifted early. 
Regulations affecting credit concentration by debtor were also loosened, 
raising the maximum allowed ratio of credit to a single firm to the bank's 
net wealth. In 1979 all the restrictions were lifted, only to be re-established 
in 1980. The minimum liabilities-to-net-worth ratio was increased from 
16 in 1974 to 30 in 1979. Only in 1981 was a programme approved to 
progressively lower this limit to 22 in 1984. 
In 1977 the central bank revised the interpretation of the ban on entry, 
under the 1965 law, prompting the creation and rapid development of 
banking houses. In November 1981, the prohibition to establish new banks 
was finally replaced with a ceiling on the number of new entrant institu- 
tions, set as 10 per cent of the number of incumbent banks in the previous 
year. The 1982 Banking Law compiled the regulatory framework that 
emerged from the reform. 
After 1989 new reforms were undertaken, aimed at strengthening the 
central bank's overseeing prerogatives and preventing the occurence of 
new crises. Prudential regulations and capital adequacy requirements were 
revised along the Basle Committee guidelines. The new regulatory scheme 
was gradually introduced between 1989 and 1993, in the context of struc- 
tural adjustment agreements with the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank. 
Shares were required to be nominative, and every transference had to be 
authorized by the central bank. The minimum net worth requirements 
were linked to the quality of the bank's assets. A compulsory classification 
of loans on the basis of their risk, a corresponding scale of provisions for 
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default, new capital adequacy requirements on the basis of a net-worth-to- 
risk-weighted-assets ratio, and a limit to credit concentration were estab- 
lished. The prohibitions of bank's holding of shares in non-financial 
activities were maintained. More analytic compulsory accounting stan- 
dards were introduced, and banks were required to keep up-to-date and 
detailed individual debtor information. 
In 1992, additions to the Banking Law of 1982 were made to counteract 
the generalized perception of an implicit insurance policy that was 
prompted by the central bank's behaviour during the financial crisis. The 
1992 law stated explicitly that no government agency would be liable for 
any failure to comply on the part of any private financial institution. The 
law, however, has also allowed the central bank to grant financial assist- 
ance to threatened institutions up to their net worth. 
The resulting scheme was not, in fact, one of absolute lack of any insur- 
ance mechanism. It must be kept in mind that state-owned banks held a 
very significant share of the overall amount of deposits, and all the com- 
mercial banks were then branches of international institutions, so the gov- 
ernment and the international banks would act as de facto insurers in case 
of crisis. 
The functions of the central bank were specified in its 1994 charter, and 
the maintenance of monetary stability was defined as its main, although 
not exclusive, objective. Though the lender-of-last-resort function scheme, 
stipulated in the 1992 law, was maintained, the elimination of any refer- 
ence to financial assistance limits may amount to an authorization to bail 
out troubled private institutions. Hence, the 1994 charter allows for a per- 
ception of implicit deposit insurance ruled out in 1992. Less determined 
was the move toward greater independence of the central bank with 
respect to the Treasury. An ambitious package - including changes in the 
rules on board members' tenure, bank's duties and greater fiscal and mon- 
etary policy prerogatives - failed to pass Congress. Also removed from the 
original proposed charter were stipulations to increase the subordination of 
the rest of the state-owned financial institutions to the central bank. 
Quantitative ceilings on the amounts lent to the Treasury and more strin- 
gent interest rate parameters were defined to improve the central bank's 
ability to avoid financing fiscal deficits. 
Though the legal norms on licensing and entry are dominantly those 
contained in the 1982 law, the central bank's discretionary decisions have 
become more relevant in recent years. The implicit rule seems to be that 
no new institution will be allowed to enter without significant support 
from well-known banking institutions established in industrialized 
countries. 
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Financial Crisis and Regulation 
We may draw the conclusion that in each financial crisis the regulation 
scheme had only part of the responsibility. It has been argued that as 
deregulation of the economic aspects of the financial system proceeded, 
the absence of reinforcement of prudential regulations and supervision of 
the banking activity had a key role in determining the 1982 financial crash 
(Rold6s, 1991; Rold6s and Viana, 1992). Though measuring the extent to 
which this contributed to the financial collapse is difficult, it was an 
important element in aggravating the instability of the system as a whole. 
However, it seems clear that the causes of the crises, both in the 1960s and 
in the 1980s, are given by the coincidence of macroeconomic instability 
and laxity of regulation. 
Before the 1965 crisis, the regulation scheme was enacted for more than 
twenty-five years without any disruption. Only in the late 1950s did the 
conjunction of inflation and fixed deposit interest rates stimulate more 
risky (and sometimes fraudulent) behaviour by the banks, at the same time 
as they became more vulnerable. Probably that behaviour might have been 
limited by better supervision rules, but the incentives provided by strongly 
negative real interest rates could hardly have been compensated com- 
pletely. Changes introduced as a result of the 1965 crisis, seeking to 
explicitly limit competition, stimulating bank concentration and banning 
entry to the system, are important background for understanding the facts 
after financial reforms, especially the lack of competition in private 
banking. 
Financial liberalization eliminated or made more flexible some pruden- 
tial regulation items introduced in the 1960s. It is, however, difficult to 
claim that more stringent prudential rules would have avoided the conse- 
quences of the 1982 abandonment of the exchange rate policy - with a 
real devaluation that implied bankruptcy of firms - for the solvency of 
financial institutions. These consequences were generated by high expo- 
sure to exchange rate risk due to dollarization and strongly negative exter- 
nal shocks, combined with errors in macroeconomic policies management. 
The need for capital adequacy of insolvent institutions, even if anticipated, 
could not have been fully met through foreign-currency-denominated 
funding. Furthermore, in such a context, the regulatory authority would 
have been in a dilemma, because anticipating policy inconsistency would 
have reinforced lack of confidence in exchange rate policy. 
These questions are also relevant in evaluating the ability of the new 
regulations against the ones in late 1980s should such events occur. 
However, under the present structure of property of the private banks, 
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the role of last-instance insurer of the system is played by the foreign 
headquarters of local branches, and not by the central bank. The role of 
the central bank would be limited to the state-owned banks. Taking 
into account the de facto rules excluding nationally owned banks from 
entry, prudential regulation along the Basle guidelines would be then 
redundant. 
6.4 LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
According to the McKinnon-Shaw perspective, three main effects are to 
be expected from financial liberalization: an increase in domestic savings, 
an increase in investment and an improvement in its quality. Here we 
review the results of some research on trying to measure these effects. 
Financial Liberalization and Savings 
The original liberalization literature predicted an increase in the savings 
ratio, once the real interest rates were allowed to reach their non-repressed 
market levels. However, such a positively sloped savings function was not 
explicitly derived from microfoundations, and standard models (as the 
simple life-cycle model of consumption) yield ambiguous results in this 
respect (see Deaton, 1992). A comparison of the savings ratio in Uruguay 
before and after the reforms shows no significant changes (Table 6. 1), sug- 
gesting in a crude approximation that the McKinnon-Shaw predictions 
were not fulfilled in this case. 
De Melo and Tybout (1986) find very limited sensitivity of private 
savings to the real interest rate in Uruguay. They conclude that the real 
exchange rate appreciation played an important role in discouraging 
savings throughout the 1970s. Furthermore, slight decreases in the private 
savings rate are observed immediately after the reforms, when absorption 
was stimulated by low real exchange rates. 
Recent analysis suggests that liquidity constraints are relevant to 
explain the behaviour of aggregate private savings in Uruguay after 1955 
(Nova et al., 1996a). Empirically, this is reflected in a significant positive 
coefficient for income changes in a consumption function derived from a 
standard life-cycle model, where a fraction of the population is assumed to 
consume all their income owing to a liquidity constraint (Campbell and 
Mankiw, 1988). In this framework, financial liberalization could have an 
effect not fully anticipated by the McKinnon-Shaw theory. Specifically, 
the credit expansion allowed by the liberalization would lift the liquidity 
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constraint and, perhaps, induce an expansion in consumption and hence a 
fall in savings. 
The hypothesis of changes in the sensitivity of consumption (and 
savings) to income changes is tested by interacting the explanatory vari- 
able with dummy variables reflecting three relevant periods (1955-75, 
1976-81 and 1982-94). The results present some econometric difficulties6 
and relate to changes and not levels, so they do not allow us to be conclu- 
sive about the impact of the reforms on the rate of private savings. After 
1975, changes in consumption (and savings) were affected by changes in 
current income (that is, there is a significant `liquidity constraint effect'). 
However, the parameter reflecting the liquidity constraint proportion of 
population is shown to have decreased with credit expansion from 1975 to 
1994. But the results show an intriguing pattern, implying the absence of a 
liquidity constraint in the period before the financial reforms. Interpreting 
these resultes deserves further research. 
Financial Deepening and the Quality of Investment 
The expected effect of financial liberalization on the quality of invest- 
ment is positive, because at higher real interest rates the relatively low- 
yielding projects cease to be lucrative. Additionally, efficiency gains 
are predicted to result from the extension of banking activities and its 
impact on pooling, spreading and trading of risk, information-gathering 
and distribution, screening of investment opportunities, etc. Both the 
investment level and its efficiency determine the long-run rate of econ- 
omic growth. The McKinnon-Shaw view would predict a significant 
effect of liberalized interest rates on the rate of growth, in both the short 
and long runs. 
There is no consensus on the best method to assess these effects. A 
recent approach (King and Levine, 1992, 1993) relies on standard growth 
accounting methods to assess the extent to which the financial reforms 
impact on the rate of growth of the economy. Starting from a very general 
production function, the growth rate of potential output is decomposed 
into an employment component, a capital stock component and a produc- 
tion function shift component. The empirical implementation consists in 
regressing the latter on the interest rates and other variables reflecting 
financial depth, in conjunction with other policy variables and measures of 
changes in the stock of human capital. 
Our approach consists in directly evaluating the effects of financial lib- 
eralization on productive efficiency by estimating the impact on the 
coefficients of a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function of changes 
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of credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP using annual observa- 
tions for the period 1955-94. All the details of the econometric analysis of 
this section can be found in Noya et at. (1996b).7 
We find only one significant cointegration relationship between the 
variables, when the traditional Cobb-Douglas labour and capital coefficients 
are dependent on the credit over GDP ratio: 
log GDP, = (0.123 + 1.212CRE) log K,+ (0.793 - 0.958CRE) log L, + A 
where Kt is machinery and equipment stock, Lt is hours worked, CRE, is 
the ratio of credit to GDP and At is a term capturing the transitory dynam- 
ics in the model. In other words, credit expansion did not affect factor pro- 
ductivity neutrally. 
This result does not imply that financial deepening explains higher 
observed per capita output growth after financial liberalization. The net 
impact of credit in per capita output growth is related to changes in both 
labour and capital, and can be positive or negative, depending on rela- 
tive changes in both inputs. For instance, the years 1974-79 show GDP 
per capita growth, with increases in capital stock, but even higher 
growth in labour input. But strikingly, as capital/labour ratio declines, 
the contribution of financial deepening to output growth in this period 
was negative. 
Effects on the Investment Rate 
According to proponents of financial liberalization, investment would be 
affected via two main channels. The first is the increase in credit availabil- 
ity that would follow the freeing of interest rates. The second is that a rise 
in interest rates from the repressed to market equilibrium levels will ease 
the need of the firms to accumulate money to finance investment 
(McKinnon, 1973). 
We analysed the determinants of aggregate investment trying to test 
whether firms have been subject to binding credit constraints before and 
after financial liberalization, based in the models of investment determina- 
tion in different disequilibria regimes.8 An aggregate investment function 
can be derived by considering representative firms that maximize their net 
market value, subject to technology and product demand. Credit shortages 
imply an additional constraint, that is, net investment must not exceed 
available funds. 
The ratio of machinery and equipment investment over capital stock, 
IIKt, is the dependent variable determined by Tobin's average q (proxied 
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by an index of the market value of shares deflated by industrial equipment 
prices), capturing the changes in the expectations of the return on future 
investment; the difference between marginal and average q, measured by 
the output capital ratio and the output - capital price relation, which can be 
interpreted as capturing the accelerator effect; and the availability of loan- 
able funds, defined as the change in total deposits adjusted by legal reserve 
requirements, Ft. 
Our econometric analysis is again based on Johansen (1988), and the 
model is estimated with annual series for the period 1959-94. The results 
do not allow us to reject the existence of only one cointegration relation- 
ship among the variables. Further exclusion tests determine that the accel- 
erator variable can be excluded from the cointegrating relation. 
Exogeneity tests performed on the variables in the model suggest that 
the model can be interpreted as an investment function. The long-run 
equilibrium relationship is characterized by 
(IIK), = 0.067 + 0.07gt + 0.155F, + Ar 
Beyond the statistical significance, it is interesting to decompose the 
contributions of each of the determinants of the investment rate. This is 
done only with respect to the long-run relationship, excluding a constant 
(Figure 6.5). These results suggest that investment in Uruguay after 1959 
is `explained' partly by the availability of loanable funds. Thus, to the 
extent that fluctuations in this variable can be attributed to the financial 
reforms, the liberalization would have had the expected effect on the level 
of investment. 
Though investment closely follows the evolution of Tobin's q, the 
available funds variable shows a non-negligible explanatory power. There 
seem to be two different situations, before and after the financial reforms. 
In the period before the reforms, the contribution of Tobin's q is rather 
flat, probably reflecting the poor prospects for investment. It would seem 
as if, in those years, changes. in the investment rate were linked more 
closely to the variation in available funds, which is consistent with the 
idea of a rationed credit market. On the contrary, in the years after the 
reforms the pattern of the investment cycle looks closely determined by 
the Tobin's q. There are theoretical reasons to think that the parameter of 
the availability of funds might not be constant through time, a higher one 
corresponding to financial repression and a possibly smaller value after 
liberalization. However, it was not possible to test such a hypothesis, 




























































































































































































6.5 MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND MONETARY FACTORS 
In this section, we make a brief summary of the main macroeconomic 
policy orientations along the two decades of the Uruguayan financial liber- 
alization experience. We then consider a set of analytical issues on the 
structural consequences that financial liberalization and an environment of 
openness brought to the conduct of monetary policy. 
Basic Features of Macroeconomic Policies after Financial 
Liberalization 
After financial liberalization, Uruguay experienced many kinds of macro- 
economic policy. In Table 6.4 we summarize their main features. 
The main concerns of macroeconomic policies varied between price sta- 
bilization and external equilibrium. The latter was particularly significant 
during the implementation of financial liberalization as well as in the 
external debt crisis of 1982-5. In the remaining periods, anti-inflationary 
objectives were pursued. During 1978-82 and after 1991, gradualist stabil- 
ization programmes, based on the exchange rate as an anchor, were imple- 
mented. 
Policy-makers perceived as early as 1977 that old-style stabilization, 
which is based on monetary control, had difficulties. In the each 1970, the 
fixed exchange rate regime with a real exchange rate target forced the 
monetization of capital inflows, leading to the loss of control of monetary 
aggregates. Neither management of reserve requirements nor open market 
operation was a useful instrument. As higher reserve requirements implied 
higher loan interest rates, their usage ceased to be convenient. Open 
market operations were used to sterilize capital inflows in 1976-7, but 
those attempts altered the yield differentials between peso- and dollar- 
denominated assets, inducing further capital inflows. When emphasis was 
progressively shifted to price stabilization, this loss of autonomy of mone- 
tary policy was one of the explicit reasons stated for the adoption of a 
programme based in a nominal exchange rate anchor after October 1978. 
Though the period 1983-4 was marked by external equilibrium and 
fiscal adjustment rather than price stabilization objectives, a monetary 
anchor was adopted again when the pre-announced exchange rate policy 
was abandoned in 1982 and the currency was devaluated. It was soon 
evident that pure flotation implied excessive volatility. Compulsory 
reserve requirements were restored, but such measures had only transitory 
effects. Policy-makers attempted to control monetary aggregates by 
issuing monetary regulation bills, and by the sterilization of the increasing 
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BROU's deposits. This policy continued by discretionary management of 
the mandatory reserves of the BROU, as well as by establishing a target 
for the BROU's nominal credit to the private sector in the late 1980s. 
By 1990 a new stabilization programme, based on exchange rate 
fixation, was launched and the innovation was the setting of targets for 
the foreign-currency-denominated credit than the BROU granted to the 
private sector. This stabilization programme was modified in mid-1991 to 
more gradual targets, explicitly setting the exchange rate as a nominal 
anchor and again abandoning the control of monetary aggregates. A band 
for exchange rate flotation was introduced, and its bounds evolved at a 
monthly rate of 2.5 per cent, then reduced to 2 per cent in October 1992. 
Though there was no formal commitment to such devaluation pace, in 
practice, private agents assumed that it would be the future devaluation 
and adjusted their expectations accordingly. The exchange rate was always 
near the lower limit of the band. 
The Mexican crisis at the end of 1994 did not impact on Uruguay 
through capital outflows as it did on many Latin American countries (such 
an impact was known as the `tequila effect'), but it did indirectly, through 
the current account. Given Uruguay's large share of trade with Argentina 
and Brazil, the tequila effect was channeled by a fall in foreign demand. 
Not only was there no capital outflow, but there were even larger inflows, 
basically to the offshore segment of the banking market (with no effects 
on the domestic credit market). 
This different reaction is explained by the different nature of the previ- 
ous capital inflows in the 1990s. Though there are no systematic statistics, 
the limited data available show that there was neither large-scale direct 
nor portfolio investment flows. The stock market did not experience a 
boom similar to that of the so-called `emerging markets'. At the same 
time, the relatively high creditworthiness of the Uruguayan government, 
which never failed to comply with its foreign commitments - even in the 
most difficult moments of the 1980s - must be borne in mind. 
Some Analytical Issues 
The Uruguayan experience of macroeconomic policy in a financial liberal- 
ization context allows us to draw some significant lessons related to mone- 
tary policy autonomy, the effects of dollarization on such autonomy and 
the sustainability of exchange-rate-based stabilization plans. 
Liberalization and financial openness tightly integrated the domestic 
financial markets to the international markets, in such a manner that the 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Additionally, dollarization of financial assets reduced still more the 
monetary base demand, and with it the possibilities of practising steriliza- 
tion policies. The clearest evidence is provided by the very slight margin 
between rates of return of domestic dollar-denominated assets (both bank 
deposits and public debt instruments) and international interest rates (as 
the Eurodollar market rate). This measure of country risk (Figure 6.6) has 
at times even been negative after 1985. 
This integration with the international currency market was questioned 
in the debt crisis period, basically between 1982 and 1984. But then, both 
demonetization and the widening of the public deficit made active mone- 
tary policy even more difficult. 
The loss of autonomy of monetary policy is reflected in the fact that 
only for a very brief period before 1978 was there an active monetary 
policy in its strictiest sense, attempting to control monetary aggregates to 
attain inflation targets. When the priority is stabilization, monetary policy 
has been passive and the influence on the price level is pursued through a 
fixed exchange rate mechanism. 
Another sign of this is that, except during the most dramatic moments 
of the debt crisis between 1982 and 1984, the monetary authority exceeded 
its international reserves targets under the stabilization plans as well as in 
the rest of the period. The origin of this success was always an unexpected 
private capital inflow. 
As to the effects of dollarization on demand for monetary aggregates, 
all research findings show a persistency in the degree of dollarization 
beyond the explanation given by interest rate differentials. Evidence of 
this is the fact that the interest rate differential between peso and dollar 
assets is a stationary process, while the degree of dollarization is non- 
stationary. This can be seen on Figures 6.7 and 6.8. 
Dollarization limits the use of instruments to control domestic credit. 
An attempt to sterilize an increase in international reserves by raising 
mandatory reserve requirements in national currency will stimulate inter- 
mediation in dollars. If we assume loan rates and intermediation margins 
as given then higher reserve requirements in domestic currency will imply 
less return on domestic currency deposits. If, on the other hand, we 
assume equal yields in both types of deposits and fixed intermediation 
margins then higher mandatory reserves in national currency will deter- 
mine less demand of domestic currency credit. Either way, an increase in 
reserve requirements in domestic currency will lead to increased dollariza- 
tion, that is, substitution of domestic currency by foreign ones, reducing 
the demand for monetary base. The-alternative would be to compensate 
the banks for the additional cost of reserves, but then the consequences 































































































































































































































































































































































































would start to affect the fiscal situation, which would be reflected in the 
flow of interest payments in the central bank's balance sheet, just as in the 
case of open market purchases. 
Both exchange-rate-based stabilization attempts in Uruguay followed a 
similar evolution, along the pattern already characterized in the literature 
(Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992; V6gh, 1992). Briefly, this kind of stabilization 
plan generates an initial expansion, led by domestic absorption, together 
with capital inflows and real currency appreciation. Increasing dependency 
on capital inflows is the counterpart to the fall in domestic savings origin- 
ated in a fall in private savings (since the fiscal deficit is generally reduced 
as the activity level grows). Then, a contractive phase follows the expan- 
sion, in which fiscal deficit rises and the economy becomes highly vulner- 
able to capital flow reversals. 
From an economic policy view, as long as dependency from foreign 
savings seems to be the weakest point of this strategy, the fall in private 
savings must be avoided. If the initial private consumption expansion is, 
however, associated with increases in credit to the private sector, as the 
results by Noya et al. (1996) seem to show, then a conflict arises, at least 
in the short-run, between financial deepening and sustainability of the sta- 
bilization program. Control of domestic-currency-denominated monetary 
aggregates, beyond the issue of feasibility, would not be enough to avoid 
such initial expansion. 
6.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The financial liberalization process of the mid-1970s had important effects 
on the performance of the Uruguayan economy. Some of those effects 
coincide with the original predictions of the McKinnon-Shaw approach, 
but there are also others probably more important that were not foreseen in 
such literature. Within those unexpected effects are those related to dollar- 
ization and its consequences on the financial system fragility. 
Particularly, financial liberalization seems to have had positive effects 
on capital investment efficiency. But the final effect on economic growth 
depends on the evolution of the capital/labour ratio. Because of this, the 
final contribution does not seem to be relevant to explain the relatively 
higher GDP per capita growth of the 1970s and 1990s, in contrast with the 
stagnant 1960s. Also, the reforms reduced to some extent, though did not 
eliminate, credit rationing to firms. This fact allowed firms to attain a 
higher investment rate and hence permitted the economy to reach a higher 
pace of economic growth. Even though the private investment cycle in the 
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period that followed financial liberalization is explained basically by the 
entrepreneur's profitability expectations, the bank credit expansion plays a 
positive role, and is important in explaining investment at some particular 
stages. 
Both effects operate via the recovery of the degree of formal financial 
intermediation, and are relevant when compared in a long-run perspective 
to the highly distorted conditions of the period of financial repression. 
Financial deepening was not a result of a major change in savings. The 
main effect of the deregulation measures was, instead, a reallocation of 
the financial portfolio of private agents from the informal curb market and 
from assets accumulated abroad by capital flight toward the domestic 
financial system. 
Given that deregulation was implemented in a context of a balance of 
payments crisis, the authorities had strong incentives to legally allow and 
even promote financial intermediation in foreign currency. For that reason 
the recovery of financial intermediation proceeded basically in dollar- 
denominated assets. However, the degree of dollarization of the house- 
hold's asset portfolios was not a consequence of financial liberalization 
itself, but rather one of the phase of financial repression phase. This cur- 
rency structure of financial assets had already been built up in the most 
acute financial repression years, basically between 1964 and 1973. 
The fact that the reconstitution of financial intermediation proceeded by 
dollarization led to a higher financial fragility that had overwhelming neg- 
ative consequences when the economy faced adverse external conditions. 
Dollarization became a factor that magnified the effects of unexpected 
adverse external shocks and macroeconomic policy reversals. As the 
absorption of such shocks required unpredictable adjustments in the 
exchange rate, it led to substantial capital losses on the part of firms. 
Those were later transferred to banks, leading them into insolvency. In 
turn, the capital losses of the financial system were absorbed by the public 
sector and constituted a serious fiscal problem. 
Therefore, one of the lessons to be drawn from the Uruguayan case is 
related to the options available to economic policy to recover the financial 
intermediation levels. If there is high inflation at the starting point and lib- 
eralization precedes stabilization then the recovery of intermediation is 
more feasible when based in an asset free of inflation risk, that is, an 
indexed asset. If the starting point is such that assets held by the house- 
holds are already dollarized and if additionally there is a foreign exchange 
shortage then it is evident that strong incentives arise for economic 
policy to accept and even promote the making of the recovery in financial 
intermediation in foreign currency. 
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However, from a normative view the optimal financial asset menu must, 
in the long run, minimize the systemic risk or financial fragility. In the 
Uruguayan case, indexation to the exchange rate of the overwhelming 
majority of financial assets has made the economy more prone to critical 
situations in the face of negative external shocks. Diversifying the indexes 
seems to be the natural economic policy recommendation. A sound recom- 
mendation would be the use of indexes inversely correlated to the 
exchange rate movements, the nominal wage being the obvious 
candidate.9 
In case dollarization becomes inevitable, economic policy must clearly 
consider the increased systemic risk that it brings about. The only agent 
that may counteract such a systemic risk to a certain degree is the public 
sector, which hence should be auto-insured. That would imply increases in 
public savings destined to build up international reserves, which seems 
unlikely in contexts such as those in which liberalization reforms 
proceeds. 
The various negative external shocks or inconsistencies in policies in 
subsequent years may have induced further portfolio substitutions towards 
dollar financial assets. When such adverse conditions were reversed, they 
did not seem to have consequences on such substitutions, and private port- 
folios did not return to domestic-currency-denominated assets. Private 
agents seem to have a lasting memory on past events, which led them to 
an apparently irreversible portfolio substitution. The microeconomic 
rationale of such behaviour is a basic issue for future research. 
From a macroeconomic policy point of view, the structure of financial 
relations emerging after financial liberalization and openness seriously 
limited the possibility of making an active monetary policy. All stabiliza- 
tion attempts since then were based on exchange rate fixation. The mone- 
tary programme became part of fiscal policy, and was basically oriented to 
coordinate the financial needs of the public sector with the international 
reserve targets. The ability to sterilize capital inflows was limited, and the 
available instruments, both mandatory reserves and open market opera- 
tions, had very reduced effectiveness. Given high dollarization of the 
economy, it seems difficult to think that any kind of control of capital 
movements may give additional scope to monetary policy. 
On the other hand, the creation of a deep domestic market for dollar- 
denominated public debt, which was parallel to financial liberalization, 
gave larger flexibility to fiscal policy, allowing the smoothing of the the 
impact of the crisis of the 1980s. Such a market, for instance, allowed 
the maintenance of an average deficit of 5 per cent of GDP throughout the 
decade, without risks of hyperinflation in spite of the reduced money 
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demand, during a period of strong constraints in international credit, which 
was in sharp contrast to other Latin American experiences. 
Regarding central bank regulation, financial liberalization was accom- 
panied by the relaxation of prudential norms. This fact undoubtedly had a 
role in the development of the crisis in the 1980s, though more stringent 
supervision would hardly have avoided it. 
Another lesson arising from the Uruguayan experience is that financial 
crises in a context of high dollarization make nationally owned banks 
more vulnerable, except those backed by the government. The authorities' 
reaction since then has been to restrict those institutions from entry, in a 
policy aimed at preventing future crises. However, this seems to have 
as a counterpart the higher segmentation of the credit market and high 
intermediation margins in some of the segments. 
Notes 
1. We are graceful to Erol Balkan, Jose Fanelli, Silvia Laens and Guillermo 
Rozenwurcel for helpful comments on previous versions of this chapter, and 
for the research assistance given by Fernando Borraz and Luis Steneri. 
2. The stock market lacks relevance in private firms, funding. Private equity 
issues amounted to only 0.1 per cent of GDP in 1994. Transactions in the 
secondary market on private equity represent less than 0.3 per cent of GDP 
since 1960. Only 20 firms quote their shares in the Stock Market, 4 of them 
concentrating 80 per cent of the operations. 
3. New banking houses were allowed by reinterpreting a 1965 ban on new 
entrants, excluding non-resident deposits from the legal definition of 
`national savings'. There was a de facto government in office, so the lack of 
amendments to the Bank Law could be interpreted as a sign of weak polit- 
ical support to the international financial centre project. 
4. Banking regulation made the functions of financial cooperatives increas- 
ingly like those of banks, the differences between them being small at the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
5. Spreads are expressed as (1 + 010 + id) -1, where i, and id are the interest 
rates on credit and deposits. They should cover operating costs, the financial 
cost of reserve requirement immobilization, default risks and bank profits. 
6. The different order of integration of the involved series makes it difficult to 
interpret the interest rate coefficient. while variations in consumption and 
income are I(0), the interest rate enters the equation in levels and is I(1). 
7. Econometrically, the estimation is based on the methodology proposed by 
Johansen (1988), which allows the determination of the number of long-run 
(cointegration) relations among a set of integrated (I(1)) variables. 
8. We follow the approach of investment functions of Artus and Muet (1990), 
adapted and surveyed for developing countries by Rama (1990). 
9. Evidence that a long-run asset with such characteristics may be accepted by 
the public and complete with dollar-denominated assets is given by UR 
bonds (indexed to nominal wage), issued by the BHU since 1968 to finance 
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housing credit. They amounted to 3.7 per cent of GDP by 1979, losing share 
recently for supply reasons. The recent reform in the social security system 
provides the government with the possibility of issuing wage-denominated 
bonds again. 
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7 Micro- and Macro-Level 
Financial Reform in Canada 
James Powell 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past fifteen or so years, financial liberalization has become 
increasingly popular around the world. Among industrial countries, we 
have witnessed the elimination of exchange controls in Europe, interest 
rate liberalization in Japan and the USA and major financial sector reforms 
virtually everywhere, most notably London's `Big Bang' in 1986. In the 
USA, inter-state banking has been liberalized, while Glass-Steagall 
restrictions separating banking and securities business have been 
significantly eroded; this latter type of development is occurring in Japan 
as well. 
While they are at an earlier stage than industrial countries, developing 
countries are also liberalizing exchange markets and introducing financial 
sector reforms. The number of countries maintaining multiple exchange 
rate regimes continues to decline, while a growing number of countries 
have moved or are moving towards full capital account convertibility (see 
Quirk et al., 1995). On the domestic front, countries have concurrently 
liberalized interest rates and introduced financial sector reforms, often in 
the context of macroeconomic and structural programmes endorsed by the 
IMF and the World Bank. 
These developments have been motivated by many factors, including 
changing macroeconomic conditions, financial innovation and increased 
competition among suppliers of financial services. Behind these factors 
also lies a general acceptance of the market-oriented paradigm for econ- 
omic development and growth. By allowing market forces to set prices, 
including interest rates, economic decision-making should be enhanced 
which would lead to efficiency gains. Financial sector reform is viewed as 
a way to provide consumers of financial services with greater choice and 
access to financial instruments, make financial intermediation more 
efficient and possibly increase domestic savings and investment. 
At the macro level, liberalization can have a profound impact on capital 
flows, exchange rates, financial systems and, as a consequence, on 
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monetary policy. Not only must central banks learn to cope with market 
forces that do not always act in the fashion desired by the authorities, but 
liberalization often means learning new ways of doing things. For 
example, the elimination of interest rate and credit controls will require the 
central bank to shift to indirect means of controlling monetary growth. 
At the micro level, financial reforms such as changes in the powers of 
institutions to promote greater competition, are also important to a central 
bank. As lender of last resort and, in many countries, regulator and super- 
visor of financial institutions, a central bank has a very direct interest in 
monitoring developments that can affect more broadly the health of 
financial institutions and the financial system. A sound financial system is 
also important for the successful conduct of monetary policy, a central 
bank's principal responsibility. A weak financial system, for example, 
might inhibit a central bank from raising interest rates sufficiently to 
combat inflationary pressures. 
While there has been a general acceptance of the desirability of financial 
liberalization at both levels, its achievement has often been difficult and 
sometimes costly. The dismantling of capital controls has, for example, con- 
tributed to increased capital flows across national boundaries, which can 
complicate monetary policy and accentuate foreign exchange crises. The 
most recent examples include the collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
in Europe during 1992-3 and the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-5. 
By the same token, the granting of broader powers to financial institu- 
tions can lead to excessive risk-taking, particularly if the prudential and 
regulatory environment is weak. For example, the granting of additional 
powers to savings and loan companies in the United States during the 
1990s, combined with regulatory forbearance, exacerbated existing prob- 
lems related to interest rate mismatching. A costly government bailout 
estimated at $180 billion over the 1980-92 period was required (Edey and 
Hviding, 1995). Finland, Norway and Sweden also experienced serious 
bank failures during the late 1980s and early 1990s leading to government 
take-overs of major banks and massive liquidity and capital support. 
Currently, Japan is experiencing financial fragility that was caused in part 
by excessive risk-taking during the late 1980s. Major banking crises have 
also occurred in developing countries following financial sector liberal- 
ization (for example, in Chile, during the early 1980s, and, more recently, 
in Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina). 
Such experiences provide food for thought. Clearly, if done inappropri- 
ately, financial liberalization can have very unpleasant side-effects, 
however desirable it might be in the long run. Moreover, there appears to 
be a link between banking crises and balance of payments crises. While 
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the causality is unclear, experience has shown that a banking crisis often 
precedes the latter. (Kaminsky and Reinhart,3 1996) Note, however, that 
authorities may have little choice on whether to reform or not. Even if a 
tightly controlled financial sector is desired, the evidence shows that con- 
trols are likely to be circumvented. It may therefore be preferable for 
authorities to be proactive and manage the reform process rather than wait 
and be caught unprepared. In this light, it is advisable to examine the 
experiences of other countries to be better able to avoid the various pit- 
falls, or at least to learn how to deal with the consequences of a liberalized 
environment. 
Canada's experience may be of particular interest to developing coun- 
tries for a number of reasons. First, the structure of the Canadian economy 
is similar in many respects to that of a developing country. For example, 
Canada has traditionally been a major net borrower in international capital 
markets, relying on foreign savings to finance a significant proportion of 
domestic spending. In 1995, Canada's gross external indebtedness (includ- 
ing direct investment) totalled 89 per cent of GDP, while Canadian net 
external indebtedness was 45 per cent of GDP. In addition, Canada, like 
many developing countries, has a relatively small, open economy, 
significantly influenced by movements in its terms of trade owing to 
swings in commodity prices. 
Second, Canada has been, in many respects, a pioneer in financial 
reform, having eliminated foreign exchange and interest rate controls in 
1951 and 1967, respectively. With Canadian markets closely integrated 
with US markets, the Bank of Canada has developed considerable exper- 
tise in conducting policy in a very open, globalized environment. 
Third, over the past decade, partly in response to several failures of 
deposit-taking institutions, the federal authorities have examined very 
closely the structure of the Canadian financial system and have imple- 
mented reforms aimed at enhancing the soundness of the system, while 
improving efficiency. The issues examined have included such things as 
the structure and powers of financial groups, ownership, foreign competi- 
tion, the powers of the supervisor and or regulator, reserve requirements, 
and the payments and settlements system. While we do not necessarily 
profess to have found the definitive solution to all of these issues, what we 
have done and the supporting rationale may nevertheless be of interest to 
policy-makers in other countries. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 7.2 focuses on macro- 
level liberalization and examines how Canada deals with the challenges 
posed by open capital markets and increasing globalization. Attention is 
paid to the exchange rate regime, the current account balance and the 
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conduct of monetary policy, including the tools used by the central bank. 
Section 7.3 examines the micro-level reforms that have been introduced 
in Canada over the past decade. This review is followed by a short 
conclusion. 
7.2 MACRO-LEVEL LIBERALIZATION 
Capital Movements and the Exchange Rate 
The easing of exchange restrictions around the world, trade liberalization, 
advances in telecommunications and portfolio diversification have all con- 
tributed to the globalization of financial markets and greater cross-border 
capital flows. As a rough measure of these developments, preliminary data 
for April 1995 indicate that the daily turnover in major foreign exchange 
markets has increased by roughly 45 per cent to $1230 billion over the 
past three years (Bank for International Settlements, 1995). This compares 
with global international reserves of only $807 billion as of the same date 
(International Monetary Fund, 1995). 
Numbers such as these, combined with recent exchange rate crises in 
Europe and Mexico, have heightened concerns regarding the ability of a 
country to pursue independent policies in the face of global capital 
markets. Some observers have pointed to the `dollarization' of some 
developing country economies as further evidence of this loss of monetary 
control.' However, dollarization is not a product of capital market liberal- 
ization, but rather is due to a loss of confidence by residents in the domes- 
tic currency owing to years of poor macroeconomic policies. In Canada, 
despite three-quarters of the population living within a hundred miles of 
the US border and unrestricted foreign exchange markets, where domestic 
banks offer foreign currency accounts to residents, foreign currency 
deposits of Canadian residents booked in Canada amounted to only 
C$27 billion in March 1996, equivalent to less than 6 per cent of broadly 
defined money supply (M3). 
Nevertheless, concerns regarding the ability of countries to pursue com- 
pletely independent monetary policies in an environment of global, inte- 
grated capital markets contain an element of truth. In particular, a country 
cannot pursue an independent monetary policy and at the same time main- 
tain a fixed exchange rate. Moreover, while integrated capital markets and 
increased capital mobility have enhanced the ability of countries to 
borrow, they must maintain the confidence of the market. Persistent heavy 
borrowers, especially those with existing large debts, have therefore found 
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their freedom of action to be increasingly constrained. Deteriorating credit 
ratings and rising risk premia have put pressure on governments to make 
fiscal cuts and pursue consistent and sound macroeconomic policies. 
Although the market is a demanding taskmaster, most observers would 
still consider the discipline it exerts as being both necessary and appropri- 
ate. Indeed, the record has shown that exchange market pressures are 
typically well founded. 
Notwithstanding this sanguine assessment of capital flows, problems 
can be identified. The market does not necessarily apply the brakes to 
country borrowing in an even and consistent fashion. Experience has 
shown that market access is not continuous. Countries on the cusp of 
investor acceptance can find their access to funds cut off abruptly in 
response to changing market conditions. At other times, ready and easy 
access to foreign financing may encourage excessive borrowing by both 
governments and private entities. Market sentiment can also be affected 
by extrapolative expectations. Although such speculative bubbles are hard 
to identify, especially ex ante, they pose challenges in the conduct of 
monetary policy. 
How does Canada deal with potentially volatile capital flows? The short 
answer is a flexible exchange rate - a regime that Canada has pursued for 
much of the period since exchange controls were abolished in 1951, 
notwithstanding international pressures to conform to the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates prior to 1973. This preference reflects in 
large measure two factors - the usefulness of a flexible exchange rate 
regime in facilitating adjustment to external shocks, and the continuing 
desire of Canadian monetary authorities for an independent monetary 
policy.2 
Frequently over its history, Canada has been confronted with sizeable 
swings in its terms of trade and capital movements, which would have 
made it difficult if not impossible to sustain a fixed exchange rate. Indeed, 
the decision to float the exchange rate in 1951, and again in 1970 after an 
eight-year experiment with a fixed rate, was related to external factors. In 
both cases, faced with large balance of payments surpluses, the monetary 
authorities preferred a nominal appreciation of the exchange rate to keep 
domestic inflationary pressures under control over the maintenance of the 
fixed peg, which would risk an inflationary increase in the money supply. 
This choice is as relevant today as it was in 1951. A fixed exchange 
rate requires monetary policy to be directed toward maintaining the exter- 
nal as opposed to its internal purchasing power. In other words, fixing the 
exchange rate implies the relinquishment of monetary independence. In 
the face of large capital inflows such as those experienced in Canada in the 
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past, and more recently by a number of emerging markets, a fixed 
exchange rate will inevitably lead to a monetary expansion and higher 
domestic inflation. When such capital inflows slow, or reverse themselves, 
the exchange rate peg will be tested. This will be reflected in a drawdown 
of foreign exchange reserves leading potentially to an exchange rate crisis 
(as occurred for example in Mexico in 1994-5). 
While higher interest rates aimed at defending the exchange rate peg 
can forestall such a development, they may not be sufficient if the disequi- 
librium is large and the market views higher interest rates to be inappropri- 
ate given domestic economic conditions. The most notable example of this 
was the 500 per cent interest rate in Sweden during the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism crisis in 1992, as the Swedish authorities tried in vain to main- 
tain the Swedish crown's peg to the European Currency Unit, notwith- 
standing the prevailing weak domestic economic situation. Such a policy 
was correctly perceived by market participants as not being credible. 
These problems can be greatly mitigated by a flexible exchange rate 
regime. By allowing the nominal exchange rate to change in response to 
capital movements, the exchange rate can bear at least a portion of the 
weight of adjustment to shocks rather than being entirely borne by domes- 
tic variables. Moreover, the fact that the exchange rate will move may 
itself reduce or deter speculative flows; there are no `one-way' bets to 
attract speculators. 
Although a flexible exchange rate has much to recommend it, this is not 
to say that a fixed exchange rate is necessarily inappropriate in all circum- 
stances. There is an extensive academic literature examining the relative 
merits of fixed versus flexible exchange rates for countries (Barth and 
Wong, 1994). Of particular importance is whether two or more countries 
form an optimum currency area (see Fenton and Murray, 1992). Factors to 
be taken into account include the openness of an economy, the types of 
shocks countries experience, the objectives of monetary authorities and 
the impact of the exchange rate on trade and economic efficiency. Also, 
second-best considerations might be important. For example, while it is 
doubtful whether Argentina forms an optimum currency area with the 
USA, one could plausibly argue that the currency board arrangement 
introduced in Argentina was a good second-best solution, given the lack of 
policy credibility in that country and its history of hyperinflation. 
Nevertheless, the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, particu- 
larly by countries trying to acquire the credibility of the anchor country, is 
a high-risk strategy. Experience has shown that it can be very difficult 
politically to move to more flexible exchange rate arrangements in a 
timely fashion. 
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Flexible Exchange Rates and Monetary Policy 
Without an external anchor for policy, one needs to have an internal 
anchor. Various types of these are possible, including targeting the growth 
of monetary aggregates, nominal income or, as in the case of Canada, 
inflation control targets. Such targets were introduced in Canada in early 
1991 in conjunction with the government of the day. They were expressed 
in terms of the year-over-year rate of increase in the consumer price index 
and set to decline over time, reaching 2 per cent plus or minus 1 per cent. 
These targets were subsequently reaffirmed in December 1993 by the 
central bank and the current government, and extended out to the end of 
1998. By 1998, a decision will have been made regarding what rate of 
change in the CPI is consistent with our ultimate target of achieving price 
stability. 
Decisions regarding the conduct of monetary policy are taken in the 
context of these inflation control targets. In an open economy, such as 
Canada, monetary policy is transmitted through two channels - interest 
rates and the exchange rate. To operationalize this, the Bank of Canada 
has constructed a monetary conditions index (the MCI) for Canada con- 
sisting of changes in both real short-term interest rates and the real effect- 
ive exchange rate (see Freedman, 1994). The relative weights were 
derived from averaging the results of a number of empirical studies that 
estimated the impact on Canadian aggregate demand of changes in the two 
variables. On this basis, a 1 : 3 ratio of effects was obtained, that is, a one 
percentage point change in real interest rates has approximately the same 
impact on aggregate demand as a three percentage point change in the real 
effective exchange rate.3 For simplicity, and over short periods of time, the 
Bank typically focuses, however, on the nominal MCI, given the prevail- 
ing low level of inflation in Canada and its major trading partners. 
Given the lags between monetary actions and their effect on aggregate 
demand, the Bank of Canada establishes a path for monetary conditions 
that is consistent with achieving the inflation control targets six to eight 
quarters in the future. In this context, the monetary authorities explicitly 
take into account the impact of exchange rate movements on the economy, 
something that might be ignored were the short-term interest rate alone to 
be used as the operational target for policy. For example, should the 
Canadian dollar rise as a result of capital inflows associated with a port- 
folio shift then interest rates can be lowered to maintain the same overall 
level of monetary conditions. Note, however, that while the overall mone- 
tary conditions may be unchanged on balance, different sectors of the 
economy will be affected differently. Interest-sensitive sectors will be 
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affected primarily by changes in interest rates, the export sector primarily 
by movements in the exchange rate. 
While the central bank can affect the level of the MCI, through its 
influence over short-term interest rates, it has little or no control over the 
mix, which is determined by the market. In essence, there are an infinite 
number of interest rate and exchange rate combinations, which, on 
balance, will have similar effects on aggregate demand. 
The conduct of monetary policy can at times be complicated by market 
dynamics related to the interaction of money and foreign exchange 
markets. For example, should market expectations be poorly anchored and 
the exchange rate come under downward pressure then market forces may 
simultaneously cause short-term interest rates to rise in such a fashion that 
monetary conditions on balance tighten. In such circumstances, should the 
monetary authorities add liquidity to the system in an effort to re-establish 
the desired easier monetary conditions then the market may react nega- 
tively, putting still further downward pressure on the currency. 
As a consequence, tactical considerations may lead the Bank of Canada 
to take steps to calm the market even if in the short term this implies 
somewhat different monetary conditions than those desired. In short, even 
with a flexible exchange rate, the Bank does not have complete freedom of 
action. Indeed, it may have considerable difficulty in achieving a desired 
level of monetary conditions if the market has a markedly different view 
of the economic outlook and inflation trends (Zelmer, 1995). Nevertheless, 
once market conditions settle, the monetary authorities can take the neces- 
sary steps to return the MCI to the desired path. 
To anchor the expectations of financial markets more soundly, the Bank's 
policy actions have become more transparent. In addition to the setting of 
inflation control targets on the road to achieving price stability, it now pub- 
lishes a monetary policy report twice a year that is designed to improve the 
public's understanding of Canadian monetary policy. The Bank has also 
made efforts to explain its day-to-day operations in a clearer fashion. 
What About the Current Account? 
The recent Mexican experience has focused attention on international 
competitiveness and the current account. In an effort to maintain a `sus- 
tainable' current account, policy-makers may be tempted to use monetary 
policy to target a specific real exchange rate. Two observations can be 
made about such a policy. First, given the absence of a nominal anchor, it 
will be destabilizing. For example, an exchange rate depreciation could 
lead to higher domestic inflation and, as a result, a stronger real exchange 
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rate. An easing of monetary policy aimed at restoring the original real 
exchange rate would raise domestic inflation, leading once again to a 
stronger real exchange rate. 
Second, as a central bank has essentially only one tool at its disposal - 
changes in its balance sheet - it can only achieve one objective. Faced 
with this choice, the Bank of Canada focuses on something that it knows a 
central bank can achieve, that is, price stability. 
However, it is nevertheless true that a sizeable current account deficit 
can be a sign of excessive domestic demand pressures. If a tightening of 
monetary conditions to slow demand results in a real appreciation of the 
exchange rate that is unacceptable to the authorities then other tools are 
required. Tighter fiscal policy, an approach used by several countries in 
recent years, may be a useful alternative, though one that may not be very 
timely (Schadler et al., 1993). 
Another potential tool that has received a lot of attention in recent 
months is short-term capital controls. Particular attention has been given 
to Chile, which introduced such controls in 1991 and managed to avoid 
the problem with surges in capital that were experienced by Mexico and 
other countries in Latin America. Although the Chilean authorities and 
certain authors argue that controls on short-term capital inflows were in 
part responsible for Chile's success,' other observers disagree, noting that 
the controls were easy to evade, an observation borne out the repeated 
need to broaden the controls (Resende, 1995). Moreover, recent empirical 
work has indicated that long-term flows, even direct investment, can be as 
volatile as short-term flows. Hence, an attempt to reduce the volatility of 
the capital account through the introduction of controls over short-term 
capital movements is unlikely to be effective (Claessens et al., 1995). 
It is also worth noting that Chile introduced during the early 1990s a 
number of changes to its exchange rate policy, which effectively provided 
the exchange rate greater nominal flexibility. This flexibility may have been 
more important in curbing speculative inflows than the controls on short- 
term capital. Measures taken included the adoption of a basket of curren- 
cies to determine its reference exchange rate, a widening of the fluctuation 
band and, on several occasions, upward revaluations of the band itself. 
The Instruments of Monetary Policy in a Liberalized Environment 
Much has been written on this subject. Most recently, the IMF published 
an extensive overview of research in the area and a number of developing 
country case studies (Alexander, 1995). Suffice to say that the Bank of 
Canada has found that the use of indirect instruments in the conduct of 
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monetary policy is strongly supported on the grounds that such a system 
provides effective monetary control and leads to efficient financial inter- 
mediation. Moreover, credit can be allocated by the market in an imper- 
sonal, non-discriminatory fashion. 
Conversely, it is difficult to find examples where administrative con- 
trols have been useful in the long-run for monetary policy. In this regard, 
controls are typically designed to achieve non-monetary objectives such as 
the maintenance of low interest rates to promote investment or the provi- 
sion of subsidies to certain sectors, notably the government. As with 
exchange controls, direct monetary controls are welfare-reducing. They 
also provide strong incentives to the public to try and circumvent them. 
This leads to disintermediation and, in the extreme, thriving informal 
markets. 
In Canada, the central bank currently uses a number of techniques to 
adjust the liquidity of the financial system. These include the movement of 
government deposits between the central bank and commercial banks, 
repurchase agreements and open-market operations. It is noteworthy that 
mandatory reserve requirements are not used, having been phased out by 
mid-1994. The rationale for this development was threefold. First, banks 
were at a disadvantage vis-a-vis other financial institutions, since they 
were the only institutions required to hold mandatory, non-interest-bearing 
reserves at the central bank - in essence a hidden tax. On competitive 
equity grounds, the decision was made to eliminate reserve requirements 
rather than try to extend them to all financial institutions that took deposits 
(or offered products that closely resembled deposits) or to compensate 
banks for having to maintain mandatory deposits at the central bank. 
Second, it was appreciated that reserve requirements were not required 
as some sort of prudential measure. Rather, Canadian authorities took the 
view that prudential concerns are better addressed through appropriate 
capital adequacy requirements, proper asset valuation and regulations 
regarding the type and concentration of assets that financial institutions 
can hold. 
Third, and most important, mandatory reserve requirements were recog- 
nized as being unnecessary in the conduct of monetary policy. As large 
deposit-taking institutions (`direct clearers') are required to settle their 
obligations with each other on the books of the central bank, they must 
hold deposits (settlement balances) at the Bank of Canada to cover the 
daily clearing of cheques and other payments.5 As these deposits do not 
earn interest, direct clearers have an incentive to minimize them. At the 
same time, overdrafts from the central bank incur interest charges. As a 
consequence, the major financial institutions aim to hold zero, or only very 
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small positive balances with the Bank of Canada. Given this environment, 
the central bank can influence short-term interest rates, thereby maintain- 
ing monetary control, through its ability to alter the banks' settlement bal- 
ances by transferring government deposits between itself and the direct 
clearers or through open-market operations.6 
7.3 MICRO-LEVEL LIBERALIZATION 
Even though financial sector reform does not have a direct impact on mon- 
etary policy, central banks, even those not responsible for regulation and 
supervision of financial institutions, take a keen and understandable inter- 
est in financial liberalization. As noted previously, not only is the health of 
the financial system an important goal for public policy; systemic weak- 
ness of the financial system can compromise a central bank's ability to 
conduct monetary policy. Central banks are also typically lenders of last 
resort, and, as a consequence, must be confident that financial institutions 
are well managed and supervised. 
One of the key motivating forces behind financial sector reform has 
been to increase competition in the financial sector, thereby enhancing 
investment through lower borrowing costs and fostering greater domestic 
savings through higher returns on deposits and a wider range of invest- 
ment products. There may, however, be a trade-off between financial 
sector stability and market efficiency. A tightly controlled financial system 
may be, at least in the short run, more stable. However, this stability may 
come with a high pricetag in lost efficiency. Moreover, the stability could 
be illusory if a heavy regulatory burden gives rise to a large portion of 
financial activity being conducted in unregulated, unsupervised, informal 
markets, or if highly disruptive changes to the system occur in the longer 
run. 
On the other hand, a competitive, market-based financial system will 
have failures, notwithstanding an effective regulatory and supervisory 
system. Indeed, the right of entry must also imply the right of exit. It is 
therefore important to ensure not that financial institutions cannot fail, but 
that they have the right incentives to avoid excessive risk-taking, and that 
failures, when they occur, do not destabilize the financial system. The 
authorities must also have the capacity and the willingness to act quickly. 
As can be seen in many countries, most vividly with respect to the savings 
and loan problem in the USA and most recently in Japan, regulatory for- 
bearance not only delays the resolution of financial problems, but it can 
also often compound them. 
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Over the past decade, partly in response to the failures of two small 
chartered banks in the mid-1980s and subsequently other non-bank 
financial institutions, the federal authorities in Canada have examined 
closely all federal financial legislations.7 In 1992, sweeping changes were 
made to the legislative framework for federal financial institutions cover- 
ing the powers of financial institutions, ownership structure and prudential 
safeguards.8 Considerable attention is now being paid to risk-proofing the 
payments and settlements system - an often overlooked but essential 
element of a financial system's infrastructure, and enhancing more gener- 
ally the soundness of the Canadian financial system. (Government of 
Canada, 1995). While the Canadian system may still not be perfect, 
Canadian authorities believe that Canada has a financial system that is 
both competitive and safe. 
Before examining the consensus that has emerged in Canada on 
financial sector reform over the past decade, it is important to note that the 
starting conditions in Canada were very different from those in many 
developing countries. For example, the macro-level reforms discussed in 
Section 7.2, such as capital account convertibility, market-set interest rates 
and a competitive financial industry, have long been features of the 
Canadian financial landscape. Canada also has a well-established legal 
structure, dealing with such things as property rights, contracts and bank- 
ruptcy and a solid supervisory structure - essential elements for a success- 
ful financial system. Canada has additionally maintained a relatively stable 
macroeconomic environment, something that experience from around the 
world has shown to be highly desirable in embarking upon financial sector 
reform (see World Bank, 1989). 
As a consequence, Canada, unlike many developing countries, has not 
had to deal with many of the problems that can arise from the interaction 
of macro and micro liberalization. For example, a stabilization programme 
that is anchored by a fixed nominal exchange rate can lead to a real appre- 
ciation and an unsustainable consumption boom. Capital inflows made 
possible in part by the opening of the capital account, and which are typi- 
cally intermediated by the banking system in developing countries, can 
further fuel this boom. In this regard, concern has been expressed about 
the possibility of excessive optimism emerging in a reforming developing 
country, leading to `overborrowing' and ultimately a financial crisis 
(McKinnon and Pill, 1994). Greater intermediation, combined with 
banking-sector liberalization in an environment of explicit or implicit gov- 
ernment guarantees, can lead to banks venturing into little-understood, 
high-risk types of lending (for example, property development). This is 
particularly a concern for institutions that prior to liberalization were pri- 
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marily in the business of lending to governments. Such institutions may 
have little knowledge about assessing credit risk. 
Moreover, financial institutions in developing countries may also be 
encumbered with low-yielding or non-performing loans, the product of 
government-directed lending. Unless their balance sheets are put on a 
more solid footing through capital injections, or the bad debts offloaded 
(presumably to the government), then they will not face the right incen- 
tives. High risk, 'shoot-for-the-moon' strategies may result as these insti- 
tutions attempt to restore their solvency. Such institutions would also be 
competitively handicapped, potentially making it more difficult politically 
to introduce greater competition, especially from potential foreign 
entrants. As a result, the benefits of financial liberalization may be slow to 
materialize. 
At the same time, lenders may also face the wrong incentives. Capital 
inflows into developing countries may be partially a response to a `chain 
of guarantees' provided by governments (Dooley, 1994). Such guarantees 
would include a commitment to a fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate, 
implicit or explicit guarantees to domestic financial institutions and, 
conceivably, international `guarantees' to provide financial support to 
countries that get into difficulties. 
The following is a summary of the consensus in Canada on a range of 
issues associated with financial-sector liberalization. 
Powers of Financial Institutions 
Under the new Canadian federal legislative framework, financial institu- 
tions are permitted, either directly on their own books or indirectly 
through subsidiaries, to engage in a wide spectrum of financial activities. 
These include: deposit-taking, corporate lending, insurance (life and 
general accident), stockbrokerage and investment dealing, and fiduciary 
business. Suitable `Chinese walls' are required between various types of 
business to minimize conflicts of interest. Some restrictions are imposed 
on small financial institutions with regard to the extent to which they can 
engage in corporate lending, which is viewed as being more risky than 
other activities. 
One important missing item from this list of permissible activities is the 
power of financial institutions to own controlling positions in non- 
financial enterprises (that is, downstream commercial linkages), other than 
on a temporary basis through the realization of collateral. Thus, Canada 
subscribes to a narrow universal bank model as opposed to the broad 
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model practised in Germany. This reflects our concern about possible dis- 
tortions to the credit allocation process arising from such linkages, and the 
appropriateness of deposit-taking financial institutions holding substantial 
amounts of equities given the nature of their liabilities. 
By the same token, concerns have been expressed about upstream cor- 
porate linkages, which are viewed by some as being more problematic 
than downstream linkages, given the risk that the financial institution 
might be used as a funding tool by its corporate parent. Wide ownership is 
one method of controlling this risk. Strong rules on non-arm's-length 
transactions are another method, though one that would be dependent on 
such rules being enforced. 
Ownership 
Historically, there has been a preference in Canada for widely held 
financial institutions (that is, no single shareholder owning more than 
10 per cent of the outstanding shares). As a result, all major banks are 
widely held, as are many major insurance companies by virtue of them 
being mutual companies and hence owned by their policyholders. In the 
past, this preference in part reflected concerns about the possibility of 
foreign ownership of the financial sector; the requirement of wide owner- 
ship deterred foreign take-over of Canadian financial institutions. More 
recently, and perhaps more importantly, this preference has reflected a 
view that such institutions are less prone to serious (that is, solvency- 
threatening) forms of non-arm's-length transactions. Experience both in 
Canada and abroad has shown that such loans, which lack independent 
third-party judgement, can pose a significant hazard to the health of 
financial institutions. 
However, it is also recognized that a controlling shareholder can 
provide a useful direction to a financial institution; in contrast, wide own- 
ership can contribute to complaisant management practices. Indeed, suc- 
cessful, closely held, deposit-taking institutions exist in Canada. 
Nevertheless, even if regulations are put in place to deter and limit self- 
dealing, concerns remain regarding this type of ownership, particularly 
when large institutions are involved - those whose failure may have sys- 
temic implications. Therefore, a compromise was reached. Canadian- 
owned banks must remain or become widely held, while non-bank 
financial institutions must have at least 35 per cent of their shares widely 
held when they attain a given size set in terms of capital. A widely held 
position of this magnitude was viewed as being sufficiently large to attract 
independent third-party scrutiny by market analysts. 
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It is interesting to note that Canada does not permit foreign deposit- 
taking institutions to operate in Canada via branches; only subsidiaries 
are permitted. While this provision has been criticized by some of 
Canada's trading partners, and may have to be modified in the light of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, it has served Canada well. 
Because subsidiaries have their own capital base, Canadian depositors 
and the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) are better pro- 
tected than if the Canadian operations of the foreign entity took the 
form of a branch. In this regard, a foreign parent financial institution 
can fail without its Canadian operations being forced to close. Legally 
separate Canadian operations are also helpful in clearing and settlement 
systems, because, in the event of a failure, it would be clear which 
country's laws would apply, namely those of Canada. More legal cer- 
tainty is also provided regarding collateral pledges and the netting of 
payments. 
Self-Dealing and Conflicts of Interest 
Mention has already been made regarding the problem of non-arm's- 
length transactions, often called self-dealing, and conflicts of interest. 
Given that Canada has closely held institutions, controls over transactions 
involving a financial institution and its controlling shareholders, directors, 
their relatives and their outside commercial interests were viewed as 
essential. Widely owned institutions are also subject to this regime, 
although the risks posed by such transactions were seen to be less serious 
for these institutions, given the nature of their ownership. In addition to 
regulations and supervisory oversight of non-arm's-length transactions, 
corporate governance has been enhanced. The new legislation requires that 
at least a third of a financial institution's board to be unaffiliated, directly 
or indirectly, to the financial institution. These directors are required to 
make up the majority of conduct review committees that must approve 
non-arm's-length transactions. 
The control of non-arm's-length transactions and conflicts of interest 
may be more difficult in developing countries than in a relatively large 
industrial country such as Canada. First, developing countries, particularly 
small ones, may have a very small pool of qualified financial talent form 
which to draw. It may therefore be difficult to find `unaffiliated' directors 
for financial institutions. Second, cultural practices may pose a problem 
in some countries. Impersonal lending practices that characterize a 
market-based financial system can conflict with `accepted social norms 
that family and friends come first' (Tanzi, 1995). 
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Supervisory System, Market Discipline and Transparency 
Strong prudential supervision is clearly important for the health of a 
financial system, especially systems undergoing liberalization, because 
liberalization usually implies exposing financial institutions to new, unfa- 
miliar risks. Indeed, in the sequencing of financial reforms, the introduc- 
tion of an adequate supervisory system is key if delays or, worse, financial 
crises are to be avoided (Sundararajan, 1995; Quirk and Evans, 1995). 
Such supervision has two elements - the formal supervisory system and 
market discipline. 
While a formal supervisory and regulatory framework ought not to, 
eliminate failures, and indeed cannot, it should permit an orderly resolu- 
tion of problems. After examining supervisory models used in other coun- 
tries, the Canadian authorities favour a flexible approach that permits early 
intervention, and, if necessary, allows the supervisor to close a financial 
institution in financial difficulty, even though it still has positive capital 
and, hence, is not technically insolvent (Government of Canada, 1995). 
This latter power is valuable in ensuring that depositors and the deposit 
insurance fund are better protected from loss. It can also minimize the sys- 
temic consequences of a failure, as well as the problem of institutions 
being `too big to fail'.9 
This early intervention policy should be expressed in a legislated 
mandate for the supervisor. The value of this is twofold. First, it clarifies 
the intent of the authorities and what the supervisors will do or require a 
financial institution to do should it get into difficulty. Second, greater 
transparency will enhance the rule of law and makes the supervisory 
agency more accountable. It would also help to clarify that the failure of 
a financial institution does not imply a failure of the supervisory and 
regulatory system. 
Reliance cannot, however, be placed solely on the formal supervisory 
system. Market discipline is an essential element of strong prudential over- 
sight. The key to effective market discipline is timely and accurate informa- 
tion on the activities of financial institutions, both on their balance sheets 
and off. Greater financial transparency will contribute to more prudent 
behaviour by banks and help to nip any problem in the bud. For this to be 
possible, however, accounting standards must be high and assets valued 
appropriately. Of course, for market discipline to work, governments, 
cannot extend any explicit or implicit guarantees of financial institutions 
(that is, it must be possible for depositors and shareholders to lose money). 
While the market can discipline financial institutions that take exces- 
sive risk, non-diversifiable systemic risks may exist that may be difficult 
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for markets to cope with. A major negative terms of trade shock could, for 
example, pose difficulties for a country's financial system. However, even 
in countries that routinely experience unstable macroeconomic conditions, 
financial institutions can adapt by maintaining conservative lending prac- 
tices and larger capital bases. To the extent that policy is responsible 
for the unstable macroeconomic conditions, capital outflows will help 
discipline governments. 
Capital Adequacy 
While the Basle standards regarding adequate capital for financial institu- 
tions with an international presence provide a good foundation upon which 
to assess capital adequacy, they may not be sufficient. For example, the 
guidelines are currently meant to address only counter-party risk. While 
they will be broadened to cover market risk by 1997, there are other forms 
of risks that will still not be covered. For financial institutions taking 
advantage of broader powers following liberalization, more capital than 
otherwise may be required. Although broader powers may reduce overall 
risk, assuming the returns on the new activities are not positively corre- 
lated, the opportunity for excessive risk-taking in unfamiliar areas by man- 
agement who may have little experience in making credit judgements 
argues for a stronger capital base, at least initially. Higher capital stan- 
dards could, but not necessarily, lead to interest rates that were somewhat 
higher than they might otherwise be. 
Deposit Insurance 
Deposit insurance has been hotly debated in Canada. On the one hand, 
Canadian authorities are very aware of the moral hazards associated with 
deposit insurance. In particular, depositors, at least those below the insur- 
ance threshold of 60 000 C$, have no incentive to monitor the health of 
financial institutions. Concurrently, financial institutions that engage in 
relatively risky activities can borrow and fund such activities on the basis 
of the government guarantee. On the other hand, deposit insurance 
reduces the likelihood of runs on financial institutions, facilitates the 
entry of new deposit-takers and protects small, unsophisticated depositors 
from loss. 
In recognition of these conflicting arguments, there has been consid- 
erable discussion regarding ways of improving the incentive structure of 
deposit insurance, while preserving its beneficial aspects. Coinsurance, 
a plan whereby depositors would share in any losses was considered 
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but in the end rejected. Instead, a risk-based deposit insurance system 
has been proposed, under which the deposit insurer would charge a 
deposit-taking institution a variable premium based upon a number of 
criteria, including the quality and diversification of assets, financial 
strength and the quality of management. This is expected to be 
implemented in 1997. 
Payment and Settlement Systems 
Payment and settlement systems have become a major topic of interest in 
international fora, especially the Bank for International Settlements and 
the G-10, in recent years. Part of the essential infrastructure of the 
financial system, such systems have often been overlooked, because most 
of the time they function behind the scenes without any apparent problem. 
However, problems can arise, and when they do they can pose a 
significant systemic threat to the financial system. This fact was made very 
apparent in the USA in 1985, when owing to a computer malfunction, the 
Bank of New York was unable one day to make payments due on its 
security operations. In order to avoid knock-on defaults of institutions that 
were expecting funds from the Bank of New York, the Federal Reserve 
made an unprecedented discount window advance of about $23 billion to 
the Bank of New York (Corrigan, 1986). 
It is in this context that considerable work has been done in G-10 coun- 
tries to develop effective and competitive payments and settlements 
systems that deal with systemic risk concerns. Two approaches are being 
pursued - a gross real-time payments system and `Lamfalussy-compliant' 
netting arrangements, that is, arrangements that meet internationally re- 
cognized prudential standards for the design and operation of cross cur- 
rency and multi-currency netting and settlement systems (Committee on 
Interbank Netting Schemes, 1990). Both approaches provide the same 
benefits, in particular certainty of settlement for participants and intro-day 
receiver finality to end users. 
Most G-10 countries favour a gross, real-time payments system, 
whereby payments are cleared and settled one at a time. Such a system 
ensures intra-day finality and minimizes risk, because a payment cannot be 
made until sufficient funds are in the paying financial institution's account. 
However, to avoid gridlock at the beginning of the day, high-quality 
securities, typically government securities, are required to serve as collat- 
eral or be used in repo transactions. 
Canada has opted for the second alternative, and intends to introduce by 
1997 a Lamfalussy-compliant netting system for clearing and settling pay- 
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ments. Each transaction will be processed in real time and will be subject 
to risk control measures, that is to caps on bilateral and multilateral expo- 
sures, which will be set at the beginning of the day. Collateral will also be 
required to ensure that the system will settle in the event of the failure of 
the largest single participant in the system. The Bank of Canada will stand 
ready to provide if necessary additional guarantees to cover the very 
remote possibility of two or more large failures occurring the same day. 
Intra-day certainty of settlement for large payments will be assured 
through the large value transfer system (LVTS), which is currently being 
developed by Canadian financial institutions through the Canadian 
Payments Association in conjunction with the Bank of Canada. 
Draft legislation has also been introduced into Parliament that would 
give the Bank of Canada a more formal and explicit role in the oversight 
of clearing and settlement systems, with the objective of controlling sys- 
temic risk. This would mean that private sector operations of those clear- 
ing and settlement systems that could potentially pose systemic risks (for 
example, systems for clearing and settling foreign exchange transactions 
or securities transactions) would be required to obtain the approval of the 
Bank of Canada regarding the arrangements in their systems to monitor 
and control risks (see Thiessen, 1995). 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
The transition from a closed, heavily regulated financial system to one that 
is open and market-based can be difficult. The removal of foreign 
exchange and interest rate controls will accelerate the integration of 
domestic and international financial markets. For those countries unfamil- 
iar with the ebb and flow of market forces, this may feel like a loss of 
control. However, an independent monetary policy is possible if a country 
adopts a flexible exchange rate regime. This independence is, however, 
not absolute. A central bank's actions will be circumscribed by market 
forces. However, it can acquire manoeuring room by pursuing credible 
policies. Greater transparency of central bank policy objectives and 
actions is helpful in this regard. 
Micro-level reforms, including most importantly a broadening of 
powers available to financial institutions, can be costly if not undertaken 
carefully. For countries attempting to undertake such reforms concurrently 
with a removal of barriers to capital movements, the introduction of a sta- 
bilization programme and a move to indirect monetary instruments, the 
challenges are that much greater. To the extent possible, thought should be 
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given to the sequencing of reforms. Evidence from around the world 
strongly suggests that a stable macroeconomic environment is very helpful 
when embarking upon financial liberalization. Other prerequisites include 
a suitable legal and accounting environment. Nevertheless, problems can 
be minimized if: (1) institutions have the right incentives to act prudently 
and competitively; (2) the supervisory system is effective; (3) institutions 
are strongly capitalized and (4) there is a strong dose of market discipline. 
Notes 
1. In dollarized economies, foreign currency, typically US dollars, is preferred 
by residents over domestic currency in transactions and as a store of value. 
2. For a review of the case for a flexible Canadian dollar, see Laidler and 
Robson (1990) and Crow (1995). 
3. In constructing MCIs for other countries, different weights are likely to be 
required, depending on how open their economies are. For example, a rela- 
tively closed economy would have a small weight for the exchange rate. 
4. For example, see Ffrench-Davis, R. et al. (1995). 
5. Direct clearers consist of major banks and large, non-bank deposit-taking 
institutions that maintain deposits at the central bank. Smaller financial 
institutions (indirect clearers) clear through one of the direct clearers. 
6. For more information, see Thiessen, G.G., `Uncertainty and the transmis- 
sion of monetary policy in Canada,' the Hermes-Glendon Lecture, York 
University, March 30, 1995, Bank of Canada Review, Summer 1995. See 
also, N66, T., `Bank of Canada Operations,' Remarks made to the Toronto 
Association for Business and Economics and the Treasury Management 
Association of Toronto, October 25, 1995. 
7. Note that financial institutions in Canada come under both federal and 
provincial jurisdiction. All banks are incorporated at the federal level and, 
hence, are federally regulated and supervised. While most large non-bank 
deposit-taking institutions and insurance companies are also under federal 
jurisdiction, some such institutions are provincially incorporated and super- 
vised. Dealers in securities are also provincially supervised. 
8. For a review, see Daniel et al. (1993). 
9. Risk-proofing major clearing and settlement systems can also reduce the 
problem of some institutions being considered as `too big to fail'. 
10. Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes (1990) Report of the 
Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes of the Central Banks of the 
Group of Ten Countries (Basle: Bank for International Settlements) 
(November). 
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8 The Unforgiving `Market' 
and the Tequilazo 
Guillermo A. Calvol 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Mexico's financial debacle and its impact on other emerging markets (the 
`Tequila effect') has raised many fundamental questions. Mexico achieved 
fiscal balance in 1993, undertook several fundamental market-oriented 
reforms, signed a free trade agreement with a very large market (the 
NAFTA), became a member of the OECD, and was hailed by international 
institutions as a paramount example of successful reform. Yet the 1994 
devaluation of 20 December brought the economy down like a house of 
cards. Output fell by more than 7 per cent in 1995, the current account 
deficit sharply swung from about 8 per cent of GDP in 1994 to zero and 
investors turned their noses away from high-yield Mexican public debt, 
even though the international community had pledged about $50 billion in 
a rescue package. In addition, Mexican problems quickly spread around 
the world's emerging markets, including those exhibiting long and envi- 
able track records. 
Argentina is even more puzzling than Mexico. After adopting the 
Convertibility Programme - which in March 1991 established, by law, a 
fixed exchange rate against the US dollar - the economy grew by more 
than 6 per cent annually. Fundamental reforms were undertaken that went 
far beyond those in Mexico, and fiscal imbalance was sharply cut. In 
contast to Mexico, Argentina did not devalue the peso and, instead, 
adopted a significant IMF-sponsored adjustment programme. Emergency 
finance was provided through the IMF and the Bono Patriotico (national 
bonds), although it amounted to only about a tenth of the Mexican rescue 
package. In spite of that, in 1995 output fell by 4.4 per cent and unemploy- 
ment reached 18.5 per cent in May, an unprecedented level.2 
This chapter discusses several issues linked to the above phenomena, 
and offers a tentative but coherent explanation. Section 8.2 discusses 
current account sustainability, an issue that has received renewed attention 
after the Mexican debacle. Section 8.3 discusses the seminal paper by 
Krugman (1979), which laid the foundation for modern balance of pay- 
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ments crisis theory. It will be argued that although these approaches offer 
crucial insights into balance of payments problems, they represent highly 
incomplete rationalizations of recent events. 
Section 8.4 brings to the analysis some key financial considerations and 
puts forward the conjecture that a Mexican-type crisis could partly be pro- 
voked by exogenous or external factors. Among other things, it is argued 
that financial market `globalization' could lead investors to move their 
portfolios around on the basis of flimsy data, disregarding `fundamentals'. 
Section 8.5 examines some links between balance of payments crises and 
output collapse. Two channels are identified: (1) price/wage stickiness and 
(2) supply-side effects associated with pro-cyclical fiscal adjustment. 
Section 8.6 recapitulates and brings up some general policy issues. Section 
8.7 closes the chapter. 
8.2 CURRENT ACCOUNT SUSTAINABILITY 
Shortly after it became obvious that Mexico was about to crash, a number 
of financial analysts `discovered' that Mexico had been running an unsus- 
tainably large current account deficit. Thus, the crisis was seen by those 
analysts as an inevitable `correction' to keep Mexico within its budget 
constraint. In my view, this assessment is seriously incomplete, although, 
as is argued in Sections 8.5 and 8.6, current account deficits (especially 
when they are accompanied by an unusually appreciated currency) could 
be a sign of impending trouble. 
The sustainability literature is based on the budget constraint equation. 
To illustrate, let us denote by b and CAD net international debt and current 
account deficit (both as a share of GDP), respectively. Then, 
b = CAD -rlb (8.1) 
where 71 is the rate of growth of output (the overdot signifies the first dif- 
ference). Sustainability analysis focuses on steady states. Thus, setting 
b = 0 in equation (8.1), the steady-state - sustainable - current account 
deficit satisfies 
CAD- =rlb- (8.2) 
where the subscript - denotes `steady state.' This equation establishes a 
relationship between steady-state debt and current account deficit. If no 
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growth is possible, that is, q = 0, then the sustainable current account 
deficit is necessarily equal to zero. In contrast, with positive growth a 
sustainable current account deficit is possible. 
This analysis is unable to give us a definite answer on CAD. until we 
pin down b_ Recent experience shows that the capital market is reluctant 
to keep lending to developing countries that exhibit levels of indebtedness 
exceeding 80 per cent of GDP (see Williamson, 1993). Hence, this addi- 
tional piece of information allows us to write the sustainability condition 
(8.2) as follows: 
CAD <- 0.871 (8.3) 
Thus, a country that can be expected to grow at 4 per cent per year cannot 
sustainably run a current account deficit exceeding 3.2 per cent. Since 
4 per cent was, if anything, an upper bound for Mexico, this analysis 
would conclude that its 8 to 9 per cent current account deficits were 
grossly unsustainable.3 
Notice that the current account deficit CAD = rb - TS, where TS denotes 
trade deficit (including non-financial transfers) as a share of GDP, and rb 
denotes debt service (r is the `international' rate of interest). Therefore, by 
equation (8.2), 
TS_ = (r -71)b_ (8.4) 
Thus, if again we set the growth rate 77 = 4 per cent and, in addition, we 
assume the international interest rate r = 10 per cent per annum, then, by 
(8.4), at steady state the economy must run a trade balance surplus of 
0.06b. as a share of GDP. The trade balance surplus increases with the 
steady state debt/GDP ratio b.. In particular, at the upper bound for b. 
(80 per cent) the trade balance surplus would be 4.8 per cent of GDP. 
Presumably, the reason for capital markets to be unwilling to extend 
credit to developing countries beyond 80 per cent of GDP is that it may 
become tempting for those countries to renege on their debt obligations. 
Temptation, in turn, is likely to be related to the sacrifice associated with 
servicing the debt. Gross sacrifice of servicing the debt can be measured 
by the associated trade balance surplus. The previous computation sug- 
gests that the capital market becomes nervous about a country's willing- 
ness to repay when debt service represents only about 5 per cent of GDP. 
Notice that the net sacrifice from servicing the debt could be much 
less once we take into account international penalties from debt 
delinquency. 
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Thus, one criticism of current account sustainability computations is 
that they are highly sensitive to the definition of sustainable debt/GDP 
ratios. Besides, the above example shows that the implied critical sacrifice 
levels are low when compared with other capital market transactions. For 
example, mortgages in the USA are easy for a household to get if total 
mortgage payments are less than 25 per cent of the household's income. 
Thus, if this ratio were also relevant for countries' debt then, using the 
above parameters, the critical steady state debt/GDP ratio would be 4.16 
(calculated by 0.25/(r - 71), where r - 71 = 0.06). Therefore, if we recall 
equation (8.2), a country growing at 4 per cent per year could run a sus- 
tainable current account deficit of more than 16 per cent of GDP! Of 
course, countries are not mere households, because they are protected by 
sovereignty clauses. However, prior to the crisis Mexico had given very 
clear signals that it wanted to belong to the First World and had signed 
treaties that would have made it very costly to engage in strategic repudia- 
tion of international debt (or any debt, for that matter). 
Another even more fundamental criticism of standard current account 
sustainability analysis is that it is constrained to steady states. Why should 
these measures be of any relevance for a reforming economy like Mexico 
and Argentina? The budget constraint equation underlying the above 
steady-state analysis (but also applying to non-steady-state paths) is 
b0 - f 
TSre-(r-71 )dt = 0 
0 
(8.5) 
where subscript t denotes calendar time, and present time is normalized to 
zero. Thus, budget equation (8.5) would allow very large trade deficits if 
they were expected to be eventually followed by equally large trade sur- 
pluses (discounted to the present). As a result, steady-state sustainability 
computations may have little to say about the economy's solvency, cap- 
tured by equation (8.5), which is, or should be, the fundamental issue 
addressed by this literature. 
However, it may still be the case that large current account deficits in 
the short run may quickly call for unsustainable future trade surpluses. 
The following example will address this issue. Suppose the country's net 
international indebtedness is 50 per cent of GDP. Consider the case in 
which the country runs a trade balance deficit that will result in increasing 
the debt/GDP ratio to 80 per cent in seven years. (The trade deficit as a 
proportion of GDP will be held constant over the first seven years.) 
Assuming, again, that the international interest rate is 10 per cent and 
output grows at 4 per cent per year, then one can show that the trade 
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deficit as a share of GDP during the first seven years will be about 1 per 
cent. Thus, because the initial debt/GDP ratio is 50 per cent, the debt 
service amounts to 5 per cent of GDP, implying that the current account 
deficit at the start will be about 6 per cent of GDP. Similarly, recalling that 
after seven years the debt/GDP ratio is 80 per cent, it follows that the 
current account deficit will be rising over time to reach about 9 per cent of 
GDP during the seventh year. Consequently, this economy would be able 
to run current account deficits much larger than the 3.2 per cent sustain- 
ability benchmark for an extended period of time (seven years) before 
hitting the supposedly critical high debt level (80 per cent). 
Finally, suppose for the sake of the argument that Mexico was trying to 
run an unsustainable large current account deficit and, realizing this, the 
capital market refused to extend any more credit to Mexico. Why would 
this result in a balance of payments crisis? 
A balance of payments (BOP) crisis takes place when international 
reserves held by the official sector (normally at the central bank) threaten 
to fall below some minimum tolerable level. It should be recalled that as a 
matter of accounting, under fixed exchange rates, for example, interna- 
tional reserves are lost or accumulated if the demand for money falls or 
increases, respectively. Thus, to the extent that refusal to extend further 
credit to a given country does not affect the demand for money then, under 
fixed exchange rates, the stock of reserves will be intact and no BOP crisis 
will take place. Consequently, there is no obvious causal relationship 
going from current account sustainability difficulties to BOP crises. 
To summarize, usual current account sustainability computations apply 
to steady state and could be very misleading, especially for reforming or 
transition economies. Furthermore, there is no obvious link between 
current account sustainability and BOP problems.4 
8.3 KRUGMAN'S MODEL 
The literature on balance of payments crises has developed along different 
lines. The classical example is Krugman (1979), which studies the sus- 
tainability of a fixed exchange rate regime, implicitly assuming that the 
government has no access to international credit and, thus, once reserves 
threaten to go below their minimum tolerable level, there is no option for 
the government but to abandon the peg. Therefore, this model goes to the 
heart of the kind of difficulties that forced Mexico to abandon its stabiliza- 
tion programme, but leaves unexplained why the government is unable to 
tap international capital markets. 
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A government's inability to borrow further in international markets 
could be the result of sustainability considerations of the sort discussed in 
previous section, or of other considerations that we will collect under the 
rubric `liquidity constraints'. If the former considerations are relevant, 
then Krugman (1979) provides the missing link explaining BOP crises in 
the context of a current account sustainability model. However, this would 
make the present model liable to most of the criticisms raised against the 
sustainability approach. Fortunately, there is nothing in Krugman (1979) 
that requires the country to be running unsustainable large current account 
deficits. As will be seen when we discuss the formal model below, a key 
parameter is the fiscal deficit, which is only one component of the current 
account deficit (the other one being the excess of private sector invest- 
ment over savings, that is, the private sector's current account deficit). 
I now turn to describe the model in greater detail. 
The exchange rate is assumed to be fixed if there are enough reserves to 
sustain the value of the domestic currency (that is, if reserves are above or 
at their `critical' or minimum tolerable level, which we assume to be 
zero); otherwise, the exchange rate is allowed to float freely. Furthermore, 
the government is assumed to run a fiscal deficit that is fully monetized. If 
we assume perfect capital mobility (for the private sector), no uncertainty, 
and perfect foresight, then the domestic interest rate is equal to the interna- 
tional one during the fixed-rates phase, and to the international interest 
rate plus the rate of devaluation, during the floating-rates phase. 
Let the demand for real monetary balances be denoted by L (i), L'(i) 
< 0, where i is the domestic nominal interest rate. Assuming PPP and no 
international inflation, we can identify the domestic price level with the 
exchange rate E. Let the government run a fiscal deficit that is fully 
financed by the central bank. Denoting the deficit in real terms by d, and 
the stock of international reserves at the central bank by R, we have:5 
RT = -d (8.6) 
during the fixed-rates regime. This is so because the demand for money 
(monetary base in the present example) in real terms is constant at level 
L(i*), where i* denotes the international interest rate. Equation (8.6) states 
that credit to government will result in reserves losses because the additional 
flows of domestic money that it entails are not demanded by the public. 
Given PPP, excess money supply cannot result in higher prices. Thus, there 
is no internal mechanism to get rid of excess money supply at equilibrium. 
But there exists an external mechanism, that is, exchanging excess money 
for international reserves - which is the implication of equation (8.6).6 
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Equation (8.6) is an important building block in Krugman's model, but 
not its `clincher', which actually is showing that the loss of reserves will 
take a steep plunge down to their critical level exactly at the time the 
system switches from fixed to floating exchange rates (hereon referred to 
as `switch time'). This is so for the following reasons. 
First, after reserves are exhausted, the mechanism implied by equation 
(8.6) will not be available. Thus, the external mechanism for getting rid of 
excess money will no longer be operative. However, since the exchange 
rate is allowed to float, prices will now be able to rise in line with currency 
devaluation. Let the inflation rate (equal the rate of devaluation, due to 
PPP) be denoted by 7r. Then, during the floating-rates phase, we have:' 
7TL(i* +7r ) = d (8.7) 
In other words, flow seigniorage from money creation is used to finance 
the fiscal deficit, which, of course, requires the inflation rate to be positive, 
implying an abrupt jump in the domestic nominal interest rate at switch 
time. Hence, as the economy switches to the floating-rates regime, the 
demand for money takes a precipitous fall. 
Krugman argues (in the continuous-time version of the model) that 
under perfect foresight the exchange rate cannot jump at any time, because 
if it did then individuals would be able to reap unbounded arbitrage profits 
(recall the assumption of perfect capital mobility). Thus, at switch time 
the exchange rate exhibits no appreciation or depreciation. 
Therefore, at switch time - which sooner or later has to arrive given the 
constant drain on reserves implied by equation (8.6) - we have: 
Loss of reserves at switch time = AR= L(i* +7r) > 0 (8.8) 
A typical Krugman balance of payments crisis is depicted in Figure 8.1. 
Reserves are steadily lost during the period from 0 to T when reserves 
reach level AR. At that point in time, there is a run against domestic 
money and reserves fall down to zero (that is, a balance of payments crisis 
takes place). After time T, reserves remain at zero and inflation is positive 
(and constant, owing to our steady-state assumptions). 
The most remarkable feature of a Krugman crisis is the sudden loss of 
reserves at time T, even though individuals have perfect foresight and, 
thus, nobody is taken by surprise. Therefore, the model has the ability of 
rationalizing, in a perfect-foresight context, an often-observed feature 
about balance of payments crises, namely, a speculative attack on the cur- 
rency leading to the abandonment of fixed exchange rates. This was also a 






Figure 8.1 Krugman crisis 
feature in Mexico where international reserves fell by $4 billion in two 
days preceding the crisis (see IMF, 1995).8 
Notice that the current account deficit is not a key factor in this model. 
Of greater significance is the fiscal deficit, and in fact it is the rigidity of 
the latter that lies at the heart of the model - and helps to rationalize why 
this government would be unable to finance its deficit in a non-inflationary 
way. In other words, liquidity constraints in Krugman's model stem from 
the government's inability to cut the fiscal deficit even after the BOP crisis 
takes place. 
Fiscal deficit rigidity is not explained by the model and is, undoubtedly, a 
very strong assumption. If, instead, the government was assumed to be com- 
mitted to operate within its basic budget constraint (like equation 8.5) above, 
but involving only fiscal variables) then deficit finance would in principle be 
available to head off a BOP crisis, unless physical constraints impeded 
generating the corresponding future surpluses in a non-inflationary context. 
Thus, Krugman's example - as rendered above - is of limited interest for 
countries that express a clear desire to achieve non-inflationary fiscal 
equilibrium, as Argentina and Mexico before the recent crises. 
An alternative interpretation of Krugman's model is that the crisis calls 
for a draconian fiscal adjustment and/or a fall in aggregate demand that 
results in significant output loss and, as a consequence, the government is 
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physically unable to lower the deficit given the new circumstances. More 
precisely, the assumption would be that the crisis lowers fiscal revenue as 
to prevent the lowering of the the fiscal deficit (although government 
expenditure may exhibit a significant cut) and, thus, requires the use of 
seignorage to avoid bankruptcy. Thus, in this interpretation, the crisis is 
explained by sustainability considerations of the type discussed in the pre- 
vious section (except that here they apply to the government sector). 
However, the crisis itself plays an active role in generating the conditions 
under which sustainability considerations force the government to resort to 
higher inflation. 
I believe the above twist to Krugman's story is relevant for understand- 
ing Mexico and Argentina. However, before going any deeper into this 
issue. I will first discuss other types of financial aspects that, in my view, 
played a crucial role in recent times. 
8.4 FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Volatility of Monetary Aggregates 
The above model focuses on fiscal deficits as the key factor for reserves 
losses. However, even in the absence of domestic credit expansion, in a 
regime of fixed exchange rates reserves rise or fall as a consequences of 
fluctuations in the demand for money. This is not a minor consideration 
for developing countries, because some of them exhibit substantially 
higher fluctuations in their demands for money than do advanced indus- 
trial countries. To illustrate the significance of these considerations, let us 
examine the case in which the (log) demand for money follows a random 
walk and, to abstract from the effects highlighted in Krugman's model, let 
us assume that the demand for money is totally inelastic with respect to 
the nominal interest rate, and that there is fiscal balance, that is, d = 0. To 
simplify the exposition, we will continue making the assumption that 
domestic prices equal the nominal exchange rate, which is kept constant 
unless there is a BOP crisis. 
Letting m denote the demand for real monetary balances, then we 
postulate (in discrete time) that 
log mt+I = log mt + et (8.9) 
where m stands for real monetary balances and a is an i.i.d. random vari- 
able. Under these circumstances, the demand for money can fall and create 
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a BOP crisis, even though there is no fiscal deficit. If e exhibits a mean- 
zero normal distribution then the larger is its variance and the larger will 
be the probability of a BOP crisis, given an initial level of international 
reserves. I have estimated the variance of e under the above assumptions. 
Mexico, for instance, comes out with a relatively high standard deviation 
(about 4 per cent per month), while a country like Austria, which has suc- 
cessfully pegged to the Deutsche Mark for about fifteen years, shows a 
standard deviation of only about 1 per cent per month (see Calvo, 1996b). 
The main point is that BOP crises could be due entirely to financial 
considerations irrespective of fiscal performance. 
In addition, problems could be exacerbated by external factors. For 
example, Calvo and Mendoza (1996) shows that there is a significant effect 
from US short-term interest rates on Mexico's demand for money 
(specifically, M2). This was reflected in a sizeable fall in the demand for 
money during 1994 and, I suspect, lay at the heart of the Mexican difficulties 
at the end of the year. I will further elaborate on this in what follows. 
Mexico and other Latin American countries experienced sizable capital 
inflows in the first half of the 1990s. As argued by Calvo et al. (1993), 
about 50 per cent of these flows stem from external factors, among which 
US interest rates hold a prominent role. Capital inflows gave rise to an 
expansion in consumption and investment, which, in turn, increased mone- 
tary aggregates. Thus, the above-mentioned link between domestic mone- 
tary aggregates and external rates of interest may stem from direct 
opportunity-cost or indirect absorption-type considerations. Experience in 
several countries, most notably in Mexico, suggests that the fluctuations in 
monetary aggregates provoked by external factors - and more specifically, 
by capital flows - could be substantial (see Calvo and Mendoza, 1996: 
Calvo et al., 1996). 
An equation like (8.9), enhanced by taking explicit account of external 
factors, would be needed to assess the implication of different reserve 
levels. To illustrate, consider the simple case in which external factors are 
fully captured by the random term in equation (8.9). We proceed as 
follows. Let Pt = m,1Rt, where R stands for international reserves, and let m 
be interpreted as the monetary base. Hence, a BOP crisis in period t + 1 
will take place if mt - mt + 1 < Rt. Or, equivalently, if 
log 
mt+i = et+1 < log vt -1 (8.10) 
mt vt 
Clearly, the probability of a BOP crisis is an increasing function of v. 
Notice that this `vulnerability' index is totally independent of the popular 
230 The Unforgiving `Market' and the Tequilazo 
index of reserves/one-month's-worth-of-imports. The latter hails back to 
periods in which reserves were held to ensure smooth trade, while the 
index developed here is associated with the probability of a BOP crisis as 
a result of financial fluctuations. 
In the above example there exists a direct connection between m and R, 
because we assume m stands for base money (that is, monetary liabilities 
of the central bank). Were m to stand instead for M2 then the connection 
would be more indirect and would depend on how the central bank reacted 
to shocks in the larger monetary aggregates. 
If the central bank is not responsible for banking problems but defends 
the exchange rate parity by intervening and swapping base money for 
international reserves, then the same analysis as that developed above is 
applicable, except that one has to derive the demand for base money from 
the M2 equation (8.9), minimum reserve requirements, and an equation 
describing the demand for banks' excess liquidity. 
In turn, if the central bank is responsible for ensuring adequate banks' 
liquidity, then it may expand domestic credit whenever M2 falls. In the 
extreme case, in which banks are fully insulated from any liquidity loss as 
a consequence of a fall in M2, then M2 is equivalent to base money and 
the first example in this section is fully applicable. It is worth noting, 
however, that in practice M2 is much larger than money base and, hence, 
the probability of a BOP crisis, given international reserves, is likely to be 
higher than in the first example (unless the volatility of M2 is substan- 
tially lower than that of base money). 
However, by providing liquidity to offset the fall in M2, the central 
bank does not prevent M2 from falling. Thus, if a central bank is keen on 
not letting monetary aggregates fall then it will increase domestic credit 
even more, and provoke a large loss of reserves after just a small contrac- 
tion in monetary aggregates. This seems to have been the case in Mexico 
during 1994. As noted above, Calvo and Mendoza (1996) shows that the 
demand for M2 fell in 1994. Since banks held sizable domestic public debt 
in their portfolios, rolling back private debt could have been prevented 
simply by an open market operation that lowered domestic public debt in 
banks' portfolios by an amount equal to the fall in M2. However, the 
central bank went beyond that and prior to the crisis succeeded in stabiliz- 
ing the level of M2. This meant a sizeable expansion of the banks' credit 
to the private sector (more than 40 per cent from January to December 
1994). This is quite remarkable, given that these measures were under- 
taken as the country was suffering from a sizable loss of international 
reserves. Why was the central bank not content with stabilizing credit to 
the private sector? 
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A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that Mexico tried to keep 
the peso rate of interest within (what it deemed) reasonable levels (see 
Calvo and Mendoza, 1996). This was hard to achieve, given that the 
market expected the incumbent administration to devalue, in keeping with 
Mexico's history of presidential transitions. Under these circumstances, 
the misalignment between expectations and the target interest rate was 
likely to lead firms to repay foreign currency loans and borrow in domestic 
currency, putting an upward pressure on the peso-denominated lending 
and borrowing rates. This led banks to run down their stocks of peso- 
denominated public debt (CETEs) and substitute them with loans to the 
private sector. However, if one relies on the Calvo-Mendoza estimates 
then this situation was unsustainable, because the demand for M2 was 
bound to fall. This is an interesting case, because it shows that if the 
government attempts to stabilize monetary aggregates, then no level 
of international reserves can prevent a BOP crisis once the demand for 
monetary aggregates take a plunge. 
Short-Maturity Debt 
The BOP crisis literature has on the whole ignored the role of domestic 
debt, and followed Krugman (1979) in assuming that fiscal deficits are 
fully monetized. However, the assumption that fiscal deficits are fully 
monetized is becoming increasingly unrealistic, as governments have 
started to have access to the international capital market. It has, thus, 
become increasingly possible to finance fiscal deficits by floating domestic 
or international public debt. The maturity structure of this debt varies 
across countries, but it is perhaps fair to say that emerging markets gov- 
ernments are likely to exhibit a debt maturity structure slanted towards the 
short end of the spectrum. Mexico again shows an extreme case in this 
respect, since in December 1994 about $10 billion domestic debt was due 
to mature in January, and about $30 billion during 1995 (these are large 
numbers, compared with the $6 billion stock of international reserves held 
by Mexico prior to the crisis). 
As argued in Calvo (1995), the demand for emerging markets' assets 
(including public debt) could be highly volatile for two basic reasons. In 
the first place, the effective rate of return on these assets depends on policy 
- like everywhere else, but with the added complexity that policy in 
emerging markets is itself highly volatile, reflecting imperfect knowledge 
of structural parameters and, most importantly, relatively unstable political 
equilibria. The instability of the latter is likely to have increased after the 
breakdown of communism. Therefore, assessing the `state of nature' in an 
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emerging market could be quite costly. It is not enough to know the partic- 
ulars of the investment project, because, in general, its profitability will 
depend on government regulations. Thus, a project could be very lucrative 
and yet be unattractive to foreign investors if, for instance, profits are 
expected to be subject to high taxes (either directly or through the imposi- 
tion of, for example, foreign exchange controls). Consequently, assessing 
the state of nature in a given emerging market is likely to entail large 
`fixed' costs. 
The second basic ingredient for high volatility of demand for emerging 
markets assets is the so-called `globalization' phenomenon, which is char- 
acterized by the fact that investors diversify their portfolios across a large 
number of emerging markets. Portfolio diversification, in the absence of 
tequila or contagion effects, helps to lower portfolio risk. Interestingly, 
however, the benefit from portfolio diversification does not depend on 
specific knowledge about the actual state of nature in these economies. 
For risk-hedging, the return on the different assets across countries should 
not be perfectly correlated. Thus, for instance, by the law of large 
numbers, risk could become very low were the different investment 
projects to be stochastically mutually independent. 
It is intuitive, and can be shown rigorously in a canonical example 
(Calvo, 1995), that under the above circumstances (that is, high informa- 
tion costs and globalization) investors will be (1) very sensitive to `news' 
about expected returns and, furthermore, (2) their incentives to learn 
about the state of nature in each emerging market will eventually 
decrease as the number of emerging markets rises. Consequently, it is 
likely that in a globalized capital market investment in emerging markets 
assets will be highly sensitive to rumours, and relatively unresponsive to 
'fundamentals'. 
The above-mentioned volatility poses no direct threat of a BOP crisis, 
to the extent that it involves only fluctuations in stock market prices. 
However, if a large chunk of domestic debt is coming due in the short 
run then adverse changes in investors' sentiments about a given emerg- 
ing market may cause a BOP crisis, particularly if the exchange rate is 
held fixed. The only policy available under those circumstances (short of 
devaluing) is to raise interest rates on newly issued domestic debt. 
Unfortunately, because investors are ill informed about fundamentals, 
the interest rate hike could possibly be taken as a sign of weakness and 
not of strength, because they may feel that higher interest rates are due 
to the `market' being aware of serious difficulties. Furthermore, even 
though investors were not all that ill informed, I later argue (in Sections 
8.5 and 8.6) that this bonds attack phenomenon could lead to socially 
Guillermo A. Calvo 233 
costly crises (along the lines mentioned at the end of the previous 
section). 
Domestic Debt and Credibility 
In addition, the existence of domestic-currency-denominated public debt 
can generate BOP difficulties if the exchange rate policy is not fully credi- 
ble. Suppose the government announces fixed exchange rates, but the 
public believes that the currency will be devalued in the next period by a 
factor E with probability p. Then, if investors are risk-neutral (in terms of 




where i and i* are the domestic and international one-period interest rates, 
respectively. Clearly, if E and p are positive numbers then the domestic 
interest rate will exceed the international one. This phenomenon is called 
the `peso problem' and is a common characteristic of exchange-rate based 
stabilization programs. 
Suppose the government has a fixed debt level b and the primary fiscal 
surplus is equal to interest on domestic public debt if the exchange rate 
peg was fully credible, that is, if e = 0. Thus, under full credibility the 
fiscal deficit (which we called d in equation (8.6) would be zero. 
Assuming, for simplicity, that fiscal deficits are fully monetized, then it 
follows that the discrete version of equation (8.6) becomes: 
R,j - R, _ (i - i, )b (8.12) 
if the currency is not devalued. Hence, the peso problem may put into 
motion Krugman's BOP crisis machinery. In this fashion, lack of credibil- 
ity may result in an unsustainable balance of payments, even though 
`fundamentals' could be fully in line with a sustainable situation. 
Credibility, the Demand for Money and Fiscal Deficit 
Credibility problems may be reflected through other more subtle but 
equally important phenomena. For example, there is general consensus 
that lack of credibility may lead to a consumption boom during the early 
stages of an exchange-rate-based stabilization program (see, for instance, 
Calvo and Vegh 1993, Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992). Therefore, the demand 
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for money will contain a cyclical component associated with the stabiliza- 
tion programme. Higher monetization at the start of the programme may 
give the impression to policy-makers that the program enjoys a high 
degree of credibility. An argument one commonly hears from policy- 
makers is that higher monetization reflects the return of flight capital due 
to the higher confidence inspired by the stabilization plan. While this is 
partially true, policy-makers may wrongly conclude that the higher stock 
of real monetary balances is a permanent positive shock. However, if 
monetization is provoked by the expectation that the programme will be 
abandoned in the non-too-distant future, then the real stock of money will 
eventually collapse, possibly generating a BOP crisis. 
In a recent study Talvi (1996) shows that if tax revenue is an increasing 
function of consumption then prior to crisis the fiscal deficit could shrink, 
giving the false impression that the fiscal house is in order. In an example, 
Talvi shows that the fiscal deficit is nil before the crisis, only to explode 
afterwards. This pattern of the fiscal deficit is understandably quite con- 
fusing to the average policy-maker. It is not unusual for the initial slack- 
ening of the fiscal constraint to be read as an indication that tax evasion 
has fallen and, hence, that the higher fiscal revenue has a significant per- 
manent component. As a result, considerable political pressure is built up 
for more government spending. Unfortunately, if imperfect credibility is 
the key reason for the initial consumption boom, and policy-makers give 
in to pressures to increase government expenditure, then after-crisis 
fiscal deficits could reach dangerously high levels - which will become 
apparent only after a crisis erupts and policy-makers have little room to 
manoeuvre. 
8.5 OUTPUT COLLAPSE 
This chapter has argued that the usual current account sustainability 
algebra leaves a lot to be desired, and receives little empirical support. 
Furthermore, it has discussed the mechanics of a BOP crisis in a model 
that focuses on fiscal sustainability (a close relative of current account 
sustainability). The latter approach was argued to be closer to the mark 
as an explanation for BOP crises, and extensions showed that the model 
can accommodate a set of highly relevant features related to capital 
market globalization. However, none of those models is capable 
of explaining the sharp output collapse in Argentina and Mexico. For 
that, we need to develop some links going from BOP crisis to output 
collapse. 
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In this section I examine two such links: (1) Keynesian price/wage 
stickiness, and (2) supply-side effects. 
Price Stickiness 
As background, let us take the BOP crises scenarios discussed in Sections 
8.3 and 8.4. In addition, we will assume that the price level is downward- 
inflexible in the short run. First, consider an anticipated BOP crisis, as in 
the simple Krugman model. As I have argued in Section 8.3, the exchange 
rate will not jump when crisis hits, and afterwards it will show an upward 
trend. Thus, at first blush, the crisis does not seem to call for downward 
nominal flexibility. However, this intuitive reasoning ignores the complex- 
ities of a sticky-prices world. 
Consider, for example, the case in which there are tradable and non- 
tradable goods. If prices are perfectly flexible then Calvo (1987) shows 
that - in a cash-in-advance, perfect-foresight world - the relative price of 
non-tradables with respect to tradables will exhibit a one-step rise before 
crisis, and a collapse to a lower plateau afterwards. This is so because 
inflation is expected to rise in the future, which, as argued earlier, gives 
rise to a consumption boom. Because the supply of non-tradables is less 
than perfectly elastic, their equilibrium relative price must rise. However, 
perfect price flexibility ensures that the economy will always be on its 
full-employment transformation frontier and, thus, the model is not 
enough to rationalize the fall in output observed in Argentina and 
Mexico. 
One can extend the above model to allow for price stickiness. For 
example, let us assume that tradable goods exhibit perfectly flexible 
prices, while non-tradable goods prices are set in advance in a staggered 
fashion. In this setup one can show that, prior to crisis, prices of non- 
tradable goods will be higher than their after-crisis equilibrium level. This 
is so because the forces discussed in the perfectly-flexible-prices case are 
still at work. Although price setters take into account after-crisis condi- 
tions (calling for lower prices for non-tradables), they take advantage of 
booming circumstances prior to crisis, and set prices higher than their 
after-crisis, full-capacity-utilization equilibrium level. Thus, when crisis 
erupts the non-tradable sector will go into a state of excess capacity and 
GDP will fall for Keynesian reasons. 
In a Keynesian-type world, governments can offset the fall in GDP by 
printing money and triggering a currency devaluation. However, as noted 
in Section 8.3, this would be inconsistent with perfect foresight. If govern- 
ments were expected to resort to this type of expansionary policy after a 
236 The Unforgiving `Market' and the Tequilazo 
BOP crisis, then no crisis-prone fixed exchange rate system would be sus- 
tainable under perfect foresight.9 
Because governments are always tempted to resort to expansionary 
policies and, in practice, BOP crises are accompanied by sharp currency 
devaluations, then, by the above considerations, the Keynesian scenario 
is likely to be more relevant in cases in which BOP crises contain an 
important unanticipated component. 10 
Let us consider an unanticipated attack, of the sort Mexico faced in 
which short-term foreign-currency-denominated public bonds holders 
refuse to roll over their bonds and cause a sudden loss of international 
reserves. Under these circumstances, if remaining reserves are not 
sufficient to accommodate the Krugman-type fall in the demand for money 
then the currency will have to depreciate. Prior to depreciation, the relative 
price of non-tradables will be too high to ensure full capacity utilization. 
However, currency depreciation will help to move it towards full capacity 
utilization. In addition, if government can accurately assess the situation 
then it can control domestic credit to lock the economy into full capacity 
utilization, and GDP need not fall! 
Therefore, according to the above point of view, the Mexican and 
Argentinean downturns are the consequence of insufficient devaluation 
after mostly unanticipated shocks. If the exchange rate had devalued 
further then no output loss would have taken place. 
The last corollary sounds highly unrealistic. Non-tradables are not just 
one type of good but a wide variety of goods. Thus, in more realistic cir- 
cumstances the exchange rate cannot solve the excess-capacity problem 
for all sectors, unless it generates overheating in the whole economy. 
Overheating is not a solution, because it substitutes one problem for 
another. However, even in the more realistic restatement of the Keynesian 
model (allowing for a variety of nontradable goods), the large output loss 
in Mexico was probably excessive and could have been avoided by a more 
lax monetary policy.] l 
The implication that emerges from the Keynesian approach is that 
appropriate monetary policy could prevent major output losses after BOP 
crises. Furthermore, if the government is solvent then appropriate mone- 
tary policy could stave off major crises. Small hiccups could be unavoid- 
able, but major debacles should on the whole be fully preventable. 
In practice, after a major debacle like that in Mexico, policy-makers 
become wary to resort to expansionary policies. A dominant concern is 
that the initial devaluation will be followed by a price-wage-exchange- 
rate spiral. Although this is a legitimate concern, in my opinion the 
inflationary spiral is partly, if not largely, the consequence of lack of 
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understanding on the part of the country's key players (policy-makers, 
trade unions and so on). For example, it is not unusual that in order to 
avoid falling into a high-inflation mode, nominal wages (especially in 
the public sector) are used as a nominal anchor. This leads to below- 
equilibrium real wages, labour unrest, and so on, which cause supply-side 
negative output shocks, a decline in the demand for money, and higher 
inflationary pressures. Furthermore, this lopsided devaluation is likely to 
result in a real (over) depreciation of the currency, thus hurting trading 
partners. Mexico, for example, had recently joined the NAFTA and a large 
devaluation (not accompanied by an equiproportional rise in wages) would 
have strained the relationships between Mexico and the USA (in particu- 
lar) - especially if the lopsided devaluation was seen as a conscious policy 
decision on the part of Mexican authorities. 
So far we have taken a Mexico-style Tesobono attack as fully exoge- 
nous. However, if solvency is not at stake then the country should have 
been able to regain access to international capital markets, undoing the 
negative effects of the initial attack. Thus, although this is a useful piece 
of analysis, it is not enough to explain deep recession after crisis. The next 
subsection deals with this issue. 
Supply-Side Effects 
In this subsection I explore two possible channels: (1) credit, and (2) fiscal 
adjustment. In both cases, the driving force will be an unanticipated shock 
in the capital account of the balance of payments, based on negative 
expectations that, in equilibrium, turn out to be confirmed. (Hence, the 
reader should be warned that he or she is entering the world of self- 
fulfilling prophesies.) 
Suppose a country is running a current account deficit financed by a 
surplus in the capital account. Consider the case in which rumours circu- 
late about the country's inability or unwillingness to service its debt 
(domestic or international). In line with the comments in Section 8.4 about 
the high sensitivity of investors with respect to `news', we further assume 
that the negative rumours lead to a sudden drying up of new funds to the 
country. The latter calls for an abrupt adjustment in the current account of 
the balance of payments, and a fall in the relative price of non-tradables 
with respect to tradables (that is, a real depreciation). Since the shock is 
unanticipated, real depreciation implies that some outstanding loans are 
likely to become non-performing, and bankruptcies will rise. More import- 
antly, in a complex industrial economy in which firms are linked, directly 
or indirectly, by an inter-enterprise-credit network, even those firms that 
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have not been directly unfavourably hit by the relative price change could 
stop being creditworthy. Consequently, output will fall for direct reasons 
(for example, bankruptcies, litigation costs), and for indirect ones (for 
example, losing access to bank overdraft facilities owing to a rise in sys- 
temic risk). In the end, both borrowers and lenders may decide that it is 
optimal to stop the flow of new funds to the country, validating expecta- 
tions. Notice that this example does not require the existence of rationing 
in the final equilibrium, since everybody will be content with the lower 
flow of funds. Moreover, the crisis need not be prompted by the realization 
of any kind of current account or fiscal deficit unsustainability. And, 
finally, the fall in domestic profitability need not be considered permanent 
for it to bring a sudden stop in capital inflows. If investment decisions 
have some degree of `irreversibility' - as recently highlighted by Dixit 
and Pindyck (1994) - then the associated increase in the variance of rela- 
tive prices may induce potential investors and lenders to wait a little 
longer until the `dust' settles, bringing the flow of funds to a screeching 
stop. 
The second channel (that is, fiscal adjustment) is akin to the Tesobono 
crisis in Mexico. Suppose investors refuse to roll over maturing public 
debt. A solution is to find a new set of investors that would fill up the 
vacuum. However, if the shock was unanticipated then information prob- 
lems may hinder finding new investors, because they might take the 
refusal of the previous set of investors as a signal that bad news is afoot. 
Consequently, in the short run the government would be forced to finance 
the principal of maturing bonds by engaging in sharp cuts in government 
expenditure or by resorting to tax surcharges that can be easily collected. 
In practice, government expenditure is difficult to cut. Recent experience 
shows that cuts often fall either on public investment - having an eventual 
deleterious effect on output, or public sector on real wages - having 
immediate negative output effects by causing labour strikes, and so on. 
Furthermore, taxes that are effective in raising revenue in the short run 
tend to be highly distorting, for example, import tariffs, gasoline taxes, 
and so on. Even when the authorities react by raising a homogeneous VAT 
rate, the policy is likely to be distorting because compliance is highly 
uneven. As a result, the strong fiscal adjustment may have negative effects 
on present and/or future output, lowering the marginal productivity of 
capital. Thus, for reasons similar to the ones raised in connection with the 
previous example, net capital inflows may fall, validating expectations. 
Does price/wage stickiness exacerbate or ameliorate the effect of the 
above capital account shocks? This is a difficult question, which is 
unlikely to have an unambiguous answer. It is worth pointing out, 
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however, that if supply effects are dominant then a devaluation could 
make things worse, because the resulting change in relative prices may 
exacerbate the bad-loans problem. 12 
8.6 RECAPITULATION - POLICY ISSUES 
The current account approach applies to situations in which solvency is 
the key problem behind BOP crises. However, none of the countries 
involved in the tequila episode fall clearly in that category. On the other 
hand, the seminal model in Krugman (1979) refers to unrepentant gov- 
ernments that persist running unsustainable fiscal deficits even after a BOP 
crisis takes place. This approach is not very appealing, when countries are 
keen on eliminating fiscal deficits. However, our discussion has extended 
Krugman (1979) by bringing financial, Keynesian and supply-side consid- 
erations to the discussion, increasing the empirical relevance of the model. 
The major conjecture suggested by the analysis is that unanticipated 
shocks seem crucial for rationalizing recent crises, and that the large 
output fall reveals the existence of multiple equilibria. Under this interpre- 
tation, Argentina and Mexico were each pushed from a `good' to a `bad' 
equilibrium. In this section I discuss some issues linked to this viewpoint. 
Good policy advice requires a thorough understanding of equilibrium- 
multiplicity models. A key question in this respect is, Why would the 
economy settle on one particular equilibrium? In my opinion, there is no 
plausible answer to the question in the context of an equilibrium- 
multiplicity model. However, it is easy to append an equilibrium-multi- 
plicity model with additional relevant equations that help to pin down a 
unique equilibrium. As argued in Calvo (1996a, Introduction to Part 11), 
however, these models yield equilibria that, although unique, are highly 
sensitive to parameter changes. This outcome is in line with the recent 
tequila episode. Economies that had equilibrium-multiplicity conditions in 
their `cores' were badly hit (Argentina, Mexico), while those that did not 
quickly returned to their pre-tequila conditions (Chile, Hong Kong). 
In the present interpretation, a key lesson is that policy-makers should 
avoid creating conditions that are conducive to multiple equilibria. Factors 
that may help create those conditions are, for example: (1) large short- 
term public debt, particularly if it is held by `pure' investors (that is, deriv- 
ing no liquidity services from those assets), (2) a large expansion of 
monetary aggregates relative to international reserves, (3) large expansion 
of bank credit coupled with insufficient supervision, (4) existence of a 
mostly local banking industry with little support from the international 
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financial community, (5) maturity mismatch between deposits and loans, 
and (6) large current account and/or fiscal deficits relative to international 
reserves (net of the amounts needed to repay short-term public debt and 
bail out the banking system in case of a run). Points (1) to (5) are straight- 
forward implications of previous discussion (see also Calvo, 1996b). 
However, point (6) requires some further elaboration. 
Point (6) is an implication of the previous section's discussion. It bears 
some resemblance to the current account approach examined in Section 
8.2, but it does not rely on that approach's arithmetic. Large current 
account deficits, for example, could be undesirable, even though the 
country is solvent. A drastic cut in internationally financed consumption 
accompanied by supply-side effects, for example, may bring about a situ- 
ation in which consumers and investors feel that it is optimal for them to 
lower, or at least not to increase, their total indebtedness, making the 
initial cut consistent with no-quantity-rationing equilibrium. If the govern- 
ment has enough reserves then it can implement a counter-cyclical policy 
that offsets the initial credit cut. However, international reserves must be 
large enough to cover other short-run government obligations. Otherwise, 
the government could substantially increase its vulnerability to a BOP 
crisis. For that reason, a key piece of information for gauging how large is 
the current account deficit is the level of reserves net of short-run govern- 
ment obligations (for example, stock of bonds maturing in the short run, 
implicit or explicit government's commitment to help banks in case of a 
liquidity crunch, and so on). 
Current Account Deficit, Openness and Output Contraction 
The size of the current account deficit must be normalized by some index 
of trade openness. The same current account deficit as a share of GDP 
may have radically different implications, depending on the share of trad- 
able goods in GDP. To illustrate this point, consider the simple case in 
which there is no capital accumulation, and thus expenditure takes the 
form of consumption only. There are two types of goods: tradables and 
non-tradables. Intertemporal utility is time-separable, and the instanta- 
neous utility index is homothetic. Hence, given the real exchange rate (that 
is, the relative price of tradables in terms of non-tradables), these two 
types of goods are consumed in constant proportions. Let us normalize 
prices and exchange rate to unity. We denote by CT, CNT, YT and YNT the 
consumption and production of tradables T and non-tradables NT, respect- 
ively. Output of tradables is exogenous, while output of non-tradables is 
demand-determined, that is YNT = CNT. Therefore, GDP = YT + CNT, and the 
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current account deficit as a share of GDP satisfies (ignoring transfers and 
factor payments): 
CAD = 
CT - YT (8.13) 
YT +CNT 





and consider the case in which the current account deficit shrinks to zero. 






Consequently, if we measure a country's openness by y, then the impact 
on GDP of a sudden shrinkage of the current account deficit is inversely 
proportional to openness. Openness, y, is affected by the real exchange 
rate and, ceteris paribus, y declines as the currency exhibits real apprecia- 
tion. Therefore, output contraction associated with an elimination of the 
current account deficit increases, the larger are the real currency apprecia- 
tion and the initial expansion of the nontradable sector. 
General Policy Implications 
Elimination of equilibrium-multiplicity conditions is costly. For example, 
it may call for an enormous accumulation of net international reserves. 
Therefore, in general, economies are likely to exhibit some vulnerability to 
exogenous shocks. However, what is large for an individual country could 
be small for, say, its trading partners that have a stake in that country's sta- 
bility. Thus, it could be to everybody's advantage to set up a contingency 
fund to prevent BOP crises. This is of course an old idea that dates back to 
the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions. However, as was seen in 
the case of Mexico, available sums from international financial institutions 
could be small relative to the size of capital account crises. The Mexican 
rescue package necessitated concerted action on the part of the IMF, the 
US Treasury and the G-10. In the Bretton Woods world international 
funds were necessary to cover trade balance deficits. In the new world of 
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fluid capital mobility, funds could be necessary to avoid a massive col- 
lapse of the banking system. Six months' worth of imports hardly exceed 
20 per cent of GDP, while M2 can easily surpass 40 per cent of GDP.13 
Nevertheless, in the near future emerging markets are likely to be vul- 
nerable to exogenous shocks. It has now become clear to professional 
investors that vulnerabilities exist independently of how well designed are 
certain structural reforms. This is likely to imply that investors have 
become much more sensitized, and will be closely watching vulnerability 
indicators. Thus, countries that exhibit stock vulnerabilities (for example, 
large M2/Reserves ratios) will be kept in the list of suspects, even though 
they exhibit healthy flow statistics, like fiscal or current account surpluses. 
8.7 FINAL WORDS 
The short answer to the question raised in the title of this chapter is that 
`the market' is unforgiving, because a crisis may set in motion negative 
factors that sharply change the country's economic outlook. However, the 
power of `the market' to modify a country's equilibrium is a function of 
how vulnerable the country is to self-fulfilling prophesies. Mexico, for 
example, had exposed itself to self-fulfilling prophesies by creating a large 
maturity mismatch between its liabilities and assets, dollarizing its liabil- 
ities and placing them in the hands of pure investors. Argentina had a 
longer maturity bond structure and could, therefore, `ride the storm' from 
a financial point of view. However, in both cases the crisis brought about a 
sharp reduction in the current account deficit, which generated Keynesian 
and supply-side effects (partly associated with the pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy in the IMF-sponsored adjustment programmes). Therefore, `the 
market' is unforgiving because the initial turmoil - which `the market' is 
largely responsible for, but which could have been avoided had countries 
paid more attention to controlling their vulnerabilities - generates condi- 
tions that make it incentive-incompatible for the former `good' equilib- 
rium to be revived. 
The tequila effect has shown how relevant the factors discussed in the 
present chapter are for a world of high capital mobility. For this world to 
be improved, countries will need to be more watchful of stock and flow 
vulnerabilities, and the financial community will need to attain a much 
higher level of international cooperation. This cooperation will have 
to involve not only significantly larger funds, but also their much more 
automatic availability. 
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Notes 
1. I am grateful to Carmen Reinhart for useful comments. 
2. Unemployment in Argentina had never been a serious problem. Prior to 
the Convertibility Programme, unemployment had seldom exceeded 6 per 
cent. However, unemployment rose steadily from 1991 onwards, reaching 
about 13 per cent prior to the tequila effect. Hence, the tequila effect 
appears to have added from 5 to 6 percentage points to the rate of 
unemployment. 
3. It should be noted that the same analysis would not single out Argentina as a 
current account derelict, because its current account deficit was about 
3.7 per cent of GDP in 1994, and growth exceeded 4 per cent. 
4. Thus, it is not surprising that the empirical literature has found no 
significant relationship between current account deficits and BOP crises. 
See, for instance, Frankel and Rose (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) 
and Sachs et al. (1996). 
5. In what follows, it is assumed, for simplicity, that output growth rate rf = 0, 
and that either international reserves earn no interest or the deficit d is net of 
interest on reserves. 
6. Individuals may want to invest these funds in the capital market or increase 
their expenditure, depending on factors that the present discussion need not 
be specific about. 
7. In case the following equation has more than one solution, we will assume 
that the economy settles to the one exhibiting the lowest rr. We assume that 
the economy follows a steady-state equilibrium path, because, in line with 
the rational expectations literature, we rule out explosive perfect-foresight 
paths. 
8. However, as discussed in Calvo and Mendoza (1996) and Flood et al. 
(1996), monetary aggregates did not collapse as predicted by the theory. 
This is further discussed in Section 8.5 below. 
9. This argument is parallel, although far from equivalent, to the one devel- 
oped in Flood et al. (1996), according to which no crisis-prone fixed 
exchange rate regime is sustainable under rational expectations if 
individuals expect the government to insulate money supply from changes 
in international reserves (that is, full sterilization). 
10. Another reason for the relevance of unanticipated shocks is that price sticki- 
ness would be hard to justify if the timing of the BOP crisis was accurately 
predicted by the public. 
11. According to this perspective, Argentina's policy was even more excessive 
because the exchange rate was pegged to the US dollar. 
12. This is an area in great need of further theoretical analysis. 
13. For an extended discussion of these issues, see Calvo and Goldstein (1996). 
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9 `Big Bang' versus `Go 




Two recent changes in the management of the Indonesian and Malaysian 
economies have altered the economic environment in which their central 
banks operate and the instruments used to control monetary aggregates. 
First, adjustment programmes adopted in these countries since the early 
1980s have moved the management of their economies to a more market- 
based system. In general, these adjustment programmes have changed 
each country's development strategy from a policy of state-led, import- 
substituting industrialization (ISI) to one of private-sector-led export ori- 
entation (EO). Second, both countries have improved the infrastructure of 
their financial markets by adopting the CAMEL (capital adequacy, asset 
quality, management, earnings and liquidity) system, under which capital 
adequacy, asset quality and liquidity are the key variables. On capital ade- 
quacy, both countries use the risk-based-capital guidelines for all banks as 
suggested by the Basle Supervisors' Committee in 1987. The guidelines 
bring a full range of on- and off-balance-sheet assets into the risk-based 
system. A harmonized risk-weighting system has been developed to assess 
the different degrees of risk associated with each category of assets. 
The impetus for the reforms in these two countries was the world econ- 
omic recession of 1981-3, which depressed the prices of their export com- 
modities, particularly petroleum. The sharp decline in export earnings and 
government revenue forced them to re-evaluate their development strat- 
egy, including fiscal, trade, financial, investment and labour policies. The 
financial liberalization, which included removal or relaxation of financial 
repression, capital controls and the policy to lower barriers to entry in 
financial industry, has increased competition between banks and non-bank 
intermediaries. 
The subsequent rise in exports and domestic interest rates, and improve- 
ments in financial services, have improved domestic savings mobilization 
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and resource allocation. The reforms, however, have diminished the auto- 
nomy of the two countries in directing monetary policy for attaining 
domestic policy targets. By definition, internal deregulation shifts the 
interest rate decision to the market. External deregulation, which relaxes 
capital controls, on the other hand, increases capital mobility and makes it 
sensitive to interest rate differential and exchange rate expectations. Closer 
integration of the domestic market for financial assets, goods, services and 
labour with international markets, therefore, makes the domestic economy 
more sensitive to foreign economic events and policies. 
The purpose of this chapter is to contrast the gradual process of 
financial sector reform in Malaysia with the rapid one in Indonesia since 
the early 1980s. This study focuses mainly on reform in the banking 
sector, because it is the core of the financial system and the main channel 
for the private sector's short-term capital inflows into these countries. 
Along with deregulation, the authorities in these countries have strength- 
ened rules and regulations, stepped-up prudential measures and developed 
money markets. 
The rest of this chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 9.2 dis- 
cusses the structure of the financial sector in each country and the influence 
of the central banks on it. Section 9.3 analyses the leadership and sequence 
of the financial sector reform. Section 9.4 summarizes the contents of the 
reforms. Section 9.5 investigates programmes to restructure the distressed 
banking industry. Section 9.6 describes policies to develop money markets. 
Section 9.7 analyses the impacts of the reforms on monetary aggregates. 
Concluding remarks are provided in the last section. 
9.2 THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 
The economic environment and market infrastructure have been more con- 
ducive to growth of the financial system in Malaysia than they have in 
Indonesia. First of all, political and social systems in Malaysia have been 
relatively stable. This country also has a well-established market infra- 
structure, particularly the legal and accounting systems. In contrast, from 
the beginning of World War II to the first half of the 1960s, Indonesia had 
been constantly in political turmoil, with successive civil wars, 
hyperinflation, monetary purges, nationalization of private assets and 
economic stagnation. Moreover, as shown in Table 9.1, Malaysia has 
higher income per capita (1993: $3140) than Indonesia (1993: $740). In 
the World Bank's classification Malaysia belongs to the upper-middle- 
income group and Indonesia is in the lower-middle-income group. 
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The financial repression during the oil boom period in the early 1970s 
hindered development of the financial sector in these countries. The 
financial repression was a part of the policy they had adopted to channel 
the oil windfall for pursuing economic nationalism and to redress racial 
economic imbalances. As a result, the oil money was used to finance 
import substitution industrial policies and to provide credit at subsidized 
interest rates to target groups and economic sectors. As will be discussed 
in later sections, the abuse of the programmes for patrimonialism and out- 
right corruption has been more profound in Indonesia than in Malaysia. 
When Malaysia and Indonesia started their broad-based economic 
reform, their economies were relatively stable. With an annual average 
inflation rate of 2.2 per cent in the 1980s, Malaysia belongs to a group of 
countries with a low inflation rate. In contrast, Indonesia belongs to the 
group of countries with a moderate inflation rate, at 8.5 per cent per 
annum (Table 9.1). The movement toward a private-sector-oriented 
economy has reduced the share of government expenditure in both coun- 
tries. Between 1985 and 1993, public spending, measured as a percentage 
of GDP, was reduced from 31.4 to 25.4 per cent in Malaysia and from 
23.5 to 16.3 per cent in Indonesia. During the same period, the fiscal 
deficit was reduced from 5.7 per cent to -0.2 per cent in Malaysia and 
from 3.7 per cent to 0.4 per cent in Indonesia. 
The fiscal deficit has not been the prime source of credit expansion in 
these countries. In the case of Indonesia, the deficit has been financed by 
external borrowings, particularly from official sources at concessionary 
terms. Because it has already been graduated from being a recipient of 
official development assistance, Malaysia finances its budget deficit pri- 
marily by selling government bonds in the domestic market. To ease the 
rising burden of external debt service, both countries have adopted a 
policy to make substantial repayments of public external debt by using the 
rising revenues from privatization of state-owned enterprises. These two 
countries have also reformed their tax systems in order to raise revenue 
from domestic taxation and thereby reduce the need for external financing. 
The decline in budget financing from external borrowings has reduced the 
sensitivity of their governments budget expenditures to exchange rate and 
interest rate risks. Real interest rates in Indonesia were negative until the 
June 1983 liberalization, whereas in Malaysia they have always been 
positive. 
Tables 9.2 and 9.3 indicate that, in terms of total assets and number of 
institutions and their branch offices, the core of the financial sector in both 
Malaysia and Indonesia is still the banking system. Other financial institu- 
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firms, unit trusts and building societies are fast-growing segments of the 
financial system. As of December 1994, the banking system of Malaysia 
consisted of Bank Negara Malaysia (the central bank); 37 commercial 
banks; Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad; 45 finance companies; 12 merchant 
banks; 7 development finance companies; 7 discount houses; and 8 money 
and foreign exchange brokers that are regulated and supervised by Bank 
Negara Malaysia. Of the commercial banks 21 are domestically owned 
and the remaining 16 are foreign-owned. 
To comply with the Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1989, the 
14 branch offices of foreign banks were locally incorporated in 1994. 
Seven of the domestic commercial banks belong to tier I (well-managed 
with strong financial standing) institutions and are authorized to deal with 
foreign exchange transactions. The commercial banks account for about 
85 per cent of the total assets of the banking system. In terms of total asset 
and number of branch offices, the state-controlled Bank Bumi Putra 
Malaysia Berhad and Malayan Banking Berhad are the lead banks. 
Although Malaysia has no official state-owned bank, state-owned compa- 
nies do hold major shares of banks - for example, Petronas - the state- 
owned oil company - is the major shareholder of Bank Bumi Putra 
Malaysia. 
The banking system in Indonesia, as of March 1994, consisted of Bank 
Indonesia, which serves as the central bank; 7 state-owned commercial 
banks; 163 national private commercial banks; 39 joint venture banks; 27 
commercial banks owned by provincial governments; 1 Islamic bank 
(Bank Muamalat); 8757 rural banks; 13 merchant banks; and a number of 
money and foreign exchange brokers all of which are regulated and super- 
vised by Bank Indonesia. Of the commercial banks 67 were licensed to 
deal with foreign exchange transactions. 
Consisting of development finance corporations and investment finance 
corporations, NBFIs - non-bank financial institutions - operating in both 
Malaysia and Indonesia are linked to commercial banks. In theory, the first 
type of NBFI is similar to a development bank, because its activity is 
focused on medium- and long-term financing and equity participation. The 
activities of the second type of NBFI are similar to those of a merchant 
bank, acting as intermediary and underwriter of financial papers and pro- 
viding financing for medium- and long-term investment. However, 
because of the narrowness and shallowness of domestic money and capital 
markets, NBFIs in these countries provide short-term business finance and 
loans for the purchase of consumer durable goods such as motor vehicles. 
The largest institution in the group of NBFIs in Malaysia is the 
state-controlled Employees' Provident Fund (EPF), which mobilizes 
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contractual savings in the form of provident and pension fund contribu- 
tions. At the end of 1990, this fund accounted for over 22 per cent of the 
total assets of the financial system. The operations of NBFIs and their 
impacts on money supply will be discussed further in Section 9.7. 
There are four financial ratios that measure roughly the size of financial 
system relative to the size of the total economy, as presented at the bottom 
of Table 9.3. They, respectively, measure the percentage share of narrow 
money (M1), broad money (M2), total assets of all types of financial insti- 
tutions (TAFI), and equity shares to the gross domestic product (GDP). 
The first two ratios are standardized across countries because of standard- 
ized statistics compiled by the IMF. However, they only cover the mone- 
tary liabilities of the central bank and deposit money banks (DMBs).1 M1 
includes currency, coins, demand or checking deposits and other current 
deposits that are highly liquid.2 M2 is equal to M1 plus the less liquid 
savings and time deposits, money market mutual fund shares available for 
individuals, overnight repurchases agreements, and foreign exchange 
deposits at DMBs that are not directly utilized as a means of payments. 
Even though they are denominated in foreign currency, the characteristics 
of foreign currency deposits are similar to those of other components of 
quasi-money. 
Authorized DMBs in Indonesia and Malaysia are allowed both to 
receive deposits from and to lend to residents in foreign currency. Mainly 
because of economic overheating, the share of dollar deposits - as a per- 
centage of M2 - at DMBs in these countries has increased rapidly since 
1991. TAFI provides a rough indicator of growth and structural change of 
the financial system. However, it also has disadvantages (Cole, 1993), 
because it excludes the equity and debt securities held by firms and house- 
holds. Moreover, simply adding total assets of financial institutions 
involves double counting. Furthermore, financial accounts of some non- 
bank financial intermediaries are available only for selected years and with 
much longer time lags as compared with the components of M1 and M2. 
The financial ratios are higher in Malaysia than in Indonesia. A large 
share of TAR in Indonesia during the past financial repression period was 
the central bank's assets, because it refinanced most of state-owned banks' 
credit. The rapid and steady growth of M2 and TAR since the late 1980s 
indicates the rapid growth of bank assets following the reforms in 1988 
and those of the capital markets in the following years. Within the banking 
system, the shares of state-owned banks and merchant banks dropped sub- 
stantially, while the shares of private domestic banks rose dramatically. 
This will be discussed more thoroughly in the next subsection. Despite the 
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in Indonesia is still relatively small and is only beginning to provide a 
competitive challenge for the banks. 
The domination of the financial sector by commercial banks is mirrored 
in a heavy reliance of business firms' heavy reliance on debt financing in 
these countries. This has adverse effects at the microeconomic level, 
because it has led to an unbalanced funding structure among firms in the 
real sector. 
High debt-to-equity ratios present few problems as long as the con- 
cerned firms continue to grow. A highly leveraged financial system, 
however, simultaneously renders enterprises and their banks vulnerable to 
internal and external shocks. Thus, the rise in interest rates together with 
major currency realignments (such as in the second half of 1980s and early 
1995) meant that heavy reliance on debt strained the cash flows of compa- 
nies. On the other hand, many of these companies are becoming less 
profitable because of reductions in economic rents, as levels of protection 
have been much reduced, reflecting new government policies aimed at 
economic restructuring. 
TAR the fourth indicator, focuses on the stock market, which has 
become an important source for raising funds to finance private invest- 
ment following the financial sector reforms in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) was separated from the Stock 
Exchange of Singapore (SES) and established as an independent exchange 
effective from 1 January 1990. The Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE) was 
established in August 1977, and this was followed by the establishment of 
the Surabaya Stock Exchange (SSE) on 30 March 19893 and the Parallel 
Bourse in the same year. Despite divestment schedules for foreign invest- 
ment and generous tax incentives to sell shares, the three stock exchanges 
in Indonesia were relatively undeveloped before 1989. On the supply side, 
there was no need for domestic companies to raise capital by selling secur- 
ities in the capital markets, because they could easily get credit with low 
interest rates and low risks from the state-owned banks. The state-owned 
enterprises could obtain zero interest capital from the state budget. On the 
demand side, domestic securities were unattractive, because PT Danareksa 
set their gross yields at the equivalent to interest rates on one-year time 
deposits at state-owned commercial banks 4 As a result, there were only 24 
companies (mostly foreign companies to meet the mandated divestment 
schedules) selling shares and 9 floated bonds (mostly state-owned firms on 
promotional basis) in these markets in 1988. 
There are several factors that made the KLSE much more matured than 
the JSE. First, government control in both bank credit and the capital 
market was not seen as distortive in Malaysia like it was in Indonesia. 
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Table 9.3 Malaysia and Indonesia: financial ratios 1980-90 (percentage of 
GDP) 
Malaysia Indonesia 
1980 1985 1990 1995 1980 1985 1990 1995 
M1 15.0 16.9 21.9 35.1 4.3 7.0 12.2 12.9 
M2 42.3 58.7 66.2 103.1 6.7 16.0 43.3 53.5 
TAFI 0.3° 0.52° 0.78° 
Market capitalisation 52.0 113.7 341.9b 0.1 7.6 22.76 
TAR for Indonesia are for the years of 1982, 1988 and 1991. 
b for the year of 1993. 
Sources: ADB (1995) Asian Development Outlook 1995 and 1996, Table 3. 1, 
p. 199; IFC (1995); IMF (1995). 
Second, privatization of the state-owned enterprises - as a mechanism for 
domestic savings mobilization for long-term capital investment - was 
started earlier, and was more advanced, in Malaysia. To reduce the burden 
of external debt service, these countries have recently used the proceeds 
from the selling of equity of state-owned enterprises for early repayment 
of part of their external debts. In Indonesia, foreign investors are permitted 
to purchase up to 49 per cent of shares in listed companies. Acquisition of 
15 per cent or more of the voting power (equity interests) by foreigners in 
the aggregate of 30 per cent or more of the voting power of a Malaysian 
company or business requires prior approval from the authorities. In 
December 1994, there were 478 companies listed in Kuala Lumpur with 
the ratio of stock market capitalization to DP at 274.54 per cent, as com- 
pared with 261 companies and market capitalization at 27.52 per cent 
of GDP in Indonesia. The size of market capitalization of the KLSE 
(at $278 billion) ranked it among the 15 largest markets in the world and 
more than 3.5 times than that of the JSE. 
The rise in financial deepening indicates not only positive develop- 
ments, but also the existence of potential problems. The rising ratios of 
domestic liquid assets to foreign assets, and the increase in the share of 
domestic assets held by foreign private investors, have made management 
of monetary policy more difficult and have increased domestic economies' 
susceptibility to external shocks. Moreover, deposits at state-owned com- 
mercial banks are generally perceived by the public as contingent liabil- 
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ities of the monetary authorities. As a result, a bank run can easily trans- 
late into a currency run when the proportion of short-term liabilities to 
central bank liquid assets is quite high (Calvo, 1994). 
9.3 THE LEADERSHIP AND SEQUENCE OF THE REFORMS 
The scope and sequencing of banking policy reforms in the 1980s were 
much wider and faster in Indonesia than the gradual approach in Malaysia. 
These differences may be linked to a variety of economic and political 
environments (including the stage of financial development and policies 
prior to the reforms) and administrative capacity of individual countries. 
Prior to the reform, the financial repression, which included direct alloca- 
tive and pricing controls over financial institutions, was more profound in 
Indonesia. Like in Indonesia, the authorities in Malaysia administered 
interest rates, set ceilings on bank credit, and imposed guidelines on credit 
allocation as instruments to pursue the twin national objectives of the 
eradication of poverty and the restructuring of society. However, Malaysia 
has used a less rigid, more general and flexible mechanism than Indonesia. 
The `technocrats'5 have been the driving force for economy-wide liber- 
alization, including financial sector reform in Indonesia. Having been 
retired and becoming advisors to the government, the `technocrats' no 
longer enjoy the executive power of the government. Nevertheless, they 
are still listened to by both their successors and foreign lenders. Partly 
owing to a concern about the difficulty to improve its capabilities to regu- 
late and supervise the banking system and other financial institutions, 
Bank Indonesia has tended to retain more direct controls over the financial 
system. The Ministry of Finance is the licensing authority for all financial 
institutions, and Bank Indonesia is given the tasks of regulating and super- 
vising the banking system. In the case of Malaysia, however, the central 
bank has been the initiator of the financial liberalization, and the Ministry 
of Finance has played a supporting role (Cole, 1993). 
Economic reform cannot be achieved overnight. It takes some time to 
improve market infrastructure. In addition, the speeds differ at which dif- 
ferent sectors of the economy adjust and respond to the deregulation. This 
raises questions concerning the efficiency and equity of the adjustment 
program. Thus, the economic literature poses an important question about 
the order, or sequence, in which to carry out deregulation. Edwards (1989) 
and McKinnon (1991) introduced the concept of sequencing. They recom- 
mend that, first, financial liberalization should be done after trade and 
fiscal reforms - the former to align domestic prices with international 
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prices and the later to curtail budget deficits. Their second recommenda- 
tion is that liberalization in the capital account should be made only after 
the liberalization of the domestic financial market. 
Indonesia and Malaysia have adopted a reversed sequence of broad- 
based economic reform. Since its independence from British rule in 1963, 
Malaysia has maintained relatively relaxed foreign capital control. 
Deregulation of the capital account in Indonesia was introduced, along 
with unification of the exchange rate, in April 1970, though both countries 
have at times imposed capital control for the sake of stability. Under such 
an open exchange rate system, in both Malaysia and Indonesia, there was 
no requirement for the surrender of export proceeds, nor taxes on or subsi- 
dies for the purchase or sale of foreign exchange. The system is more 
liberal in Indonesia, however, because foreign nationals and local citizens 
are free to open accounts in either domestic or foreign currency in the 
authorized banks, whereas in Malaysia only non-residents are allowed to 
open foreign currency deposits at local commercial banks and merchant 
banks. The seven discount houses in Malaysia are allowed to accept inter- 
est-earning deposits from the general public, the banks and non-bank 
financial institutions. The minimum size and tenure of such deposits in 
foreign currency are however regulated by the Malaysian authorities. The 
commercial banks in both countries are free to extend credits in foreign 
currencies. 
It is also interesting to note that the initial response of Malaysia to 
external shocks in the early 1980s was the complete opposite of that of 
Indonesia. In the early 1980s, Malaysia continued to expand domestic 
absorption as the government continued to guarantee massive foreign bor- 
rowings, mainly from Japan, to finance a heavy industrialization pro- 
gramme including steel, cement, auto and motorcycle plants set up 
through public enterprise. The federal budget deficit and current account 
deficit in Malaysia rose from 7.2 per cent of GNP and 1.2 per cent of 
GNP, respectively, in 1981, to 18 per cent and 14 per cent in 1982. The 
policy reversal was introduced in 1985, as the government announced 
various measures of economic stabilization and adjustment. The stabiliza- 
tion programme included a big cut in government investment spending, 
the adjustment programme measures to consolidate and rationalize the 
activities of non-financial state-owned enterprises. The privatization policy 
was announced in 1983 and the Privatization Master Plan issued in 1991.6 
In contrast, Indonesia immediately adopted a short-run stabilization 
program in 1983, by cancelling a number of large, capital-intensive invest- 
ment projects. To raise government revenues, Indonesia reformed its tax 
system between 1983 and 1985. As in Malaysia, the deregulation pro- 
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gramme in the real sector of the economy was begun only in 1985. But the 
privatization of the 180 Indonesian state-owned enterprises has been much 
slower than the comparable process in Malaysia. Part of the problem is 
that the government has focused its efforts on public listings on both 
domestic and international stock exchanges. This method may be more 
transparent and have promoted wider equity ownership, but most state- 
owned enterprises cannot meet the stringent listing requirements of 
financial health and performance. 
To prevent the reckless overexpansion of credit, which may result in 
causing overexpansion of credit, rising inflation, widening current account 
deficits and banking distress, some economic theoreticians (including 
Corbo and de Melo, 1987; McKinnon, 1991) have suggested a `proper' 
course of banking deregulation. This begins with improving the market 
infrastructure by tightly monitoring and regulating the commercial banks, 
by means that include temporary credit rationing. The second step is to 
recapitalize the existing banks and their clientele. Third, during the trans- 
ition period, the banking industry is closed temporarily to new entrants 
both domestic and foreign, mainly because any new entrants would not be 
burdened with low-yield loans, and could easily out-compete the banks 
that have existed since the pre-reform period. 
Malaysia has taken a gradualistic but steady approach to financial sector 
reform, more or less in line with such a `proper' sequence and better co- 
ordinated with the reforms in other sectors of the economy. Malaysia 
began liberalization of deposit rates in 1971 by allowing commercial 
banks to set market-determined interest rates for fixed deposits with matu- 
rities of more than four years. In January 1992, the authorities lifted the 
ceilings on rates of commercial bank deposits with maturities of more than 
one year. The phasing out of the administered interest rate regime was 
completed on 23 October 1978, when the commercial banks were allowed 
to set their deposit and loan interest rates. Prior to the fully fledged 
liberalization of interest rates, Malaysia has had improved financial market 
infrastructure and developed money markets. 
Banking sector policy reform began in Indonesia in June 1983, when 
Bank Indonesia reduced the scope of its credit programme and liberalized 
most deposit and lending interest rates. But instruments of indirect mone- 
tary management were introduced in April 1984, a year after the reform. A 
more drastic reform was introduced in October 1988, but prudential rules 
and regulations to risk-based capital standard were not introduced until 
February 1991 (Table 9.4). However, the authorities had to lower the pru- 
dential standards because many banks, particularly the state-owned ones, 
were unable to meet them. Such amendments, corrections, extended 
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periods of consolidation and retreats make the liberalization programme 
less transparent and sometimes confusing. 
9.4 CONTENTS OF THE REFORMS 
The coverage of financial sector policy reforms has been much wider in 
Indonesia than in Malaysia. The reforms in Indonesia contain measures 
that affect market competition, interest rates, the allocation of financial 
instruments, prudential rules and regulations, money markets and the 
financial market infrastructure (Table 9.4). In contrast, the reforms in 
Malaysia have been dealt mainly with the deregulation of interest rates, 
prudential measures and the market infrastructure (Table 9.5). The reforms 
that allow new entry in offshore banking, charge card businesses and 
insurance and reinsurance are in line with both countries' commitments to 
the interim WTO financial services agreement. 
Types of Bank and the Scope of Bank Activities 
Both Indonesia and Malaysia have adopted the Anglo-Saxon system, lim- 
iting commercial banks' activities to operating the payments system and to 
extending short-term commercial credit. Non-bank financial institutions 
(NBFIs) and securities markets are assigned to mobilizing and allocating 
long-term savings. The October 1988 banking reform in Indonesia 
removed the traditional functional specialization between different banks 
and major areas of specialization for state-owned banks. Since, the intro- 
duction of this reform, there have been only two types of banks operating 
in the country - commercial banks and rural ones. Also known as a Bank 
Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR), a rural bank is a unitary local bank that is not 
allowed to accept demand deposits. The new prudential safeguards, 
however, retain the portfolio constraints on banks in bonds and equities. 
The status of the existing special-purpose institutions such as develop- 
ment, savings and mortgage banks was converted automatically into that 
of commercial banks. Each of the 12 non-bank financial institutions (mer- 
chant and development banks) was given one full year, starting from 
December 1991, to make the adjustment to be either a security company 
or a commercial bank. Each existing `secondary bank' was given the 
option either to convert its status into a BPR or else to cease operation. 
Immediately, the secondary banks all converted into BPRs and all of the 
NBFIs opted, between January and March 1993, to become fully fledged 
joint venture commercial banks. 
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Table 9.4 Indonesia: reform in the banking industry, 1983-95 
Policy measures 
L Competitive measures 
Before reform After reform Date 
(1) Entry of new banks 
(a) Private banks 
(b) Foreign banks 
(2) Branching power 
(a) Private banks 
(b) Foreign banks 
(3) Foreign exchange 
licence 
(4) Types of loans 
(a) State banks 
b) Private banks 
(c) Foreign banks 
Moratorium since 1970 
Moratorium since 1970 
Restricted, 
Restricted to Jakarta 
Restricted, 
Mainly the extended 
subsidized credit 
programs, as set and 
refinanced by Bank 
Indonesia 
Free to set 
Free to set 
Permitted 
Permitted to enter as 
joint venture 
Permitted to sound banks 
Permitted to seven cities 
(later Batam) 
Eligible for sound banks 
The scope and coverage 
of the subsidized 
credit Programs 
reduced 
20% total credit must be 
extended to small 
business' 
50% total credit must be 








27 January 1990 
ctober 1988 
October 1988 
(5) Types of saving and 
deposit schemes 
(a) State banks Set by Bank Indonesia Free to set 1 June 1983 
(b) Private banks 
(c) Foreign banks 
(6) Deposits of the 
Free to set 
Free to set 
Restricted to state banks 
Free to set 
Free to set 
Restricted to state banks October 1988 
public sector 
(7) Deposits of the Restricted to state banks Up to 50% with private October 1988 
state enterprises 
(8) Deposit rates 
(a) State banks Set by Bank Indonesia 
banks 
Free to set 1 June 1983 
(b) Private banks 
(c) Foreign banks 
(9) Loan rates 
(a) State banks 
Free to set 
Free to set 
Controlled by Bank 
Free to set 
Free to set 
Free to set June 1983 
(b) Private banks 
(c) Foreign banks 
(10) Credit ceilings 
(a) State banks 
Indonesia 
Free to set 
Free to set 
Set by Bank Indonesia 
Free to set 
Free to set 
Eliminated June 1983 
(b) Private banks Set by Bank Indonesia Eliminated 1 June 1983 
(c) Foreign banks Set by Bank Indonesia Eliminated 1 June 1983 
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Table 9.4 (continued) 
Policy measures Before reform After reform Date 
(11) Foreign exchange Subjected to ceilings set Net open position, November 1989 
power (limited to by Bank Indonesia 
licensed banks) 
(12) Reserve requirements 15% of deposits 2% of deposits October 1988 
(differentiated 
between banks) 
(13) Entry to new activities December 19884 
(a) Leasing Not regulated Subsidiary 
(b) Venture capital Not regulated Subsidiary 
(c) Securities trading Not regulated Not for own account, 
not as broker/dealer 
(d) Factoring Not regulated Directly 
(e) Consumer finance Not regulated Directly 
(f) Credit cards Not regulated Directly 
(g) Underwriting - Prohibited 
sharese 
(h) Custodian Not regulated Approval required for 
capital market Otherwise can do 
as part of 
(i) Trustee and Not regulated Approval required for usual activities 
guarantor capital market 
0) Securities Not regulated Prohibited 
administrative 
agency 
(k) Investment Not regulated Subsidiaries 
manager 
H. Prudential measures 
(1) Capital Requirements 
(a) General banks 
(i) Private banks Rp 10 billion October 1988 
Rp 50 billion October 1992 
Rp 50 billion October 1988 (ii) Joint venture - 
banks 
(minimum 15% Indonesian ownership) 
(b) Bank Perkreditan 
Rakyat 
(2) Legal lending limits None 
(3) Loan to deposit ratio None 
Rp 100 billion October 1992 
Rp 50 million October 1988 
(1) Old credit: 29 May 1993 
(% of bank capital) 
Individual Group 
20% 50% By 29 May 1993 
20% 50% By December 
1995 
20% 50% By March 1997 
(2) New credit 
20% for individual 
and 20% for group 
110% February 1991e 
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Table 9.4 (continued) 
Policy measures Before reform After reform Date 
(4) Capital adequacy ratio None 
(5) Net open position None 
(6) Accounting standard None 
(% of ri sk-weighted assets) February 1991 
5% by March 1992 
7% by March 1993 
8% by Dec. 19939 
25% of capital March, 1989 
1 January 1993 
111. Money market 
Reintroduced in February 1984, SBI is the most important money market 
instrument at present. On 1 June 1993 the auction system of SBI changed from 
`cut-off rate' (COR) to 'stop-out rate' (SOR). The private sector commercial 
paper (SBPU) introduced in January 1985. Until now, the government has not 
floated treasury bonds in domestic market. 
N. Transparency and accountability of reporting and management 
(1) To improve banking supervision by (a) standardizing accounting and January 1995 
reporting system; (b) requiring commercial bank to submit detailed 
business plans to the central bank and banning person involved in fraudulent 
transactions or defaulted on significant loans from becoming shareholders, 
executives or member of the board of commissioners of banks. 
(2) Banks are required to (a) submit detailed credit plan to Bank Indonesia and March, 1995 
those with uncollectible amounted to 7.5% of total credit or more are 
required to submit credit recovery plans; (b) standardize internal audit 
system and (c) adopt information system technology. 
Permitted in principle, but economic and social requirements made it prohibited in practice. 
b Since 29 May, can be channelled through other banks and BPRs. 
Overseas borrowing for public sector is subject to ceilings set by TKPLLN (Coordinating Team for 
Management of Commercial Offshore Loans) since October 1991. 
e Items (g) to 0) are subject to Ministry of Finance's Decision no. 1548 of 4 December 1990. 
e Can underwrite bonds and other debt instruments. 
f Since 29 May 1993 own capital; included in the denominator. 
9 In 29 May 1993 this schedule was extended to December 1994. 
Sources: Packages of government regulations (circulars and announcements): Pakto 1988, Pakmar 1988, 
Pakjan 1990, Pakfeb 1991, Banking Law Number 7, 1992; Banking Regulation, May 29, 1993; Nasution 
(1983); Cole and Slade (1991). 
In contrast, Malaysia retains various types of specialized financial insti- 
tutions, which include the Industrial Development Bank of Malaysia 
Berhad (IDBM), the Agricultural Bank of Malaysia (ABM), the 
Development Bank of Malaysia (DBM) and the Sabah Development 
Bank. In addition, there are a number of public development statutory 
agencies that extend finance to individuals and enterprises for investment 
in commerce, agriculture and industry. These agencies include the Council 
of Trust for Indigenous People (MARA), the Federal Land Development 
Authority (FELDA), the Rubber Industry Smallholders' Development 
Authority (RISDA), various state development corporations, and a number 
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Table 9.5 Malaysia: reform in the banking industry, 1987-95 
Policy measures 
1. Competitive measures 

















(2) Branching power 
(3) 
(a) Private banks 










Permitted to sound banks 
Not allowed 
Eligible for sound banks 
(4) Types of loans 




(5) Deposits of the public 
sector 
(6) Deposits of the state 
enterprises 




programs to specific 
target groups, as set 
and refinanced by 
Bank Negara 
Malaysia 
Subject to lending 
guidelines as set and 
periodically revised 
by Bank Negara 
Malaysia 
Preferably to certain 
banks, such as Bank 
Bumi Putra and 
Malaysian Banking 
Bhd.. 
After reform Date 
Permitted 1 October 1989 
By the Banking Act 1973 
and the Banking and 
Financial Institution Act 
1969 (BAFIA) the 16 
foreign banks were 






Regulated by Islamic March 1983 
Banking Act of 1983 
Permitted to sound banks 
Not allowed 1966 
7 banks are granted to 1 December 94 
operate in tier I to 
accept deposit and give 
loans in foreign 
currencies 
October 1976 
Preferably to certain 
banks, such as Bank 
Bumi Putra and 
Malaysian Banking Bhd. 
Net open position 17 January 1994 
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Policy measures 
(8) Reserve Requirements 
Table 9.5 (continued) 
Before reform After reform Date 
(a) Standard 81% 
(b) Placement of the Not required 
ringgit funds 
of foreign banks 
in non-interest 
bearing vostro 
account at Bank 
Negara Malaysia 
Increased three times to 
1 I I % since 1 July 
1994 
Required 
(9) Deposit rates Set by Bank Negara Free to set 
Malaysia 
(10) Loan rates Set by Bank Negara Free to set 
Malaysia 
Between January 
and July 1994 
2 February 1994 
23 October 1978 
23 October 1978 
(11) Entry to New 
Activities 01 October 1994 
(a) Leasing Subsidiary Subsidiary 
(b) Venture Capital Subsidiary Subsidiary 
(c) Securities Trading Subsidiary Regulated 
(d) Factoring Directly Directly 
(e) Consumer Finance Directly Directly 
(f) Credit Cards Directly Directly 
(g) Underwriting Prohibited Prohibited Can underwrite 
shares bond and other 
debt instruments 
(h) Custodian Approval required for no change 
(i) Trustee and capital market, 
Guarantor otherwise can do 
as part of usual 
activities 
0) Securities Adm. Prohibited Prohibited 
Agency 
(k) Investment Subsidiary subsidiary 
Manager 
II. Prudential measures 
(1) Capital Requirements 
(a) Domestic banks M$2 million M$10 million January 1981 
(b) Foreign banks M$5 million M$10 million 
(2) Legal lending limits Yes Yes 
(3) Loan to deposit ratio Yes Yes 
(4) Capital adequacy ratio 8% by 1987 
Sources: Bank Negara Malaysia (1989); Bank Negara Malaysia (1994); Sheng (1996). 
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of development authorities. They are funded mainly by the federal 
government's development budget. 
Market Entry 
The October 1988 banking reform in Indonesia has significantly strength- 
ened market competition. It has achieved this by relaxing restrictions on 
market entry, and by removing a 1967 regulation that gave state-owned 
banks special access to public sector funds. Since this banking reform, any 
state-owned enterprise has been allowed to hold up to 50 per cent of its 
deposits at private banks. The issuing of new bank licences, stopped in the 
early 1970s, was resumed, and new licences given to both domestic and 
foreign institutions. The reform also rationalized and relaxed the require- 
ments for obtaining licences to operate in foreign exchange transactions 
and to open new branches. Whereas the national banks can open branch 
offices anywhere in the country, the foreign and joint venture banks were 
limited to opening one sub-branch each in the eight major cities. 
Foreign banks can penetrate the Indonesian domestic market only 
through joint ventures with local banks. The foreign partners must already 
have representative offices in Jakarta, be reputable in their country of 
origin and be from countries that have reciprocal agreements with 
Indonesia. Domestic partners must be classified as `sound' for at least 20 
of the last 24 months. Although there is no regulation concerning estab- 
lishment of new branches by foreign banks in Indonesia, no new licence 
has been issued. The maximum share of foreign partners in a joint venture 
bank is set at 85 per cent. 
Table 9.6 indicates that the Herfindahl indexes of total deposits, loans 
and assets by bank ownership have been reduced sharply following the 
financial sector reform in Indonesia. A rapid drop - since 1988 - in all 
indexes for all banks indicates an erosion in the market power of the state- 
owned banks (including Bank Indonesia). This, however, was accompa- 
nied by the increasing market power of certain dominant private banks, 
some of which are technologically more advanced than the bureaucratic 
state-owned banks. 
The index for the foreign banks group has not changed significantly 
since the reforms. Among foreign banks the Jakarta branch of the Bank of 
Tokyo may be the most affected; before the 1988 banking reform, it was 
the only Japanese bank that had fully fledged branches operating in 
Indonesia. As a result, it had a monopoly right to channel the lucrative 
Japanese foreign aid and loans to Indonesia and to handle financial 
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In contrast, Malaysia still protects its domestic banks from foreign com- 
petition, and gives special market preference to state-controlled banks. Of 
the 37 commercial banks operating in Malaysia in December 1994, 23 
were domestic banks (with 749 branches) and the remaining 14 were 
foreign-incorporated banks (with 146 branch offices). To protect domestic 
banks, since 1966 the authorities have issued no new licences to foreign 
banks for establishing branch offices. 
The 5 largest banks accounted for 53 per cent of total bank resources, 
55 per cent of total bank deposits and 50 per cent of total bank loans. 
Special access to public funds is given to 2 leading government-controlled 
commercial banks, namely Bank Bumi Putra Malaysia Berhad and 
Malayan Banking Berhad. These 2 banks have 310 branch offices, or 
31 per cent of the country's total of 995 bank branches. They also own 
45 per cent of total assets of the domestically incorporated commercial 
banks, or 33.7 per cent of the total assets of all commercial banks in 
Malaysia (Table 9.7). 
Prudential Rules and Regulations 
Malaysia had managed to improve its prudential supervision and to 
develop monetary instruments prior to the liberalization of interest rates 
and credit policy in 1987. These, along with the contractionary demand 
measures (including restrictive monetary policy), have countered the 
expansionary impacts of the economic reform to help maintain short-term 
internal and external balances in the country. To have equal footing, 
effective from April 1988, pension funds and insurance companies in 
Malaysia are supervised by the Malaysian central bank. In Indonesia, such 
financial institutions are regulated and supervised by the relatively weak 
insurance commissioners of the Ministry of Finance. 
Indonesia also has a much weaker legal and accounting system. Major 
laws on corporations, bankruptcy and the enforcement of contracts are 
obsolete and were inherited from the colonial era. A special accounting 
system for banks was introduced in January 1995. The long period of 
financial repression has eroded the central bank's capacity to regulate and 
supervise the banking system. It has also made the state-owned banks 
more bureaucratic and decreased their ability to select borrowers, adminis- 
ter credit and monitor how it is used, and recover matured loans. The 
problems have been exacerbated because the central bank and the state- 
owned banks are prone to political pressures. 
Until recently, bank supervision in Indonesia was focused very much on 
regulatory functions. Relatively little work was carried out on quantitative 
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Table 9.7 Malaysia: concentration in the commercial banks, 1980-9 
1980 1985 1989 
Share of 5 largest banks in 
commercial banks' total assets (%)° 57.1 50.2 54.0 
Herfindahl concentration index 0.076 0.061 0.077 
The five largest commercial banks and years of their establishments or com- 
mencement of their businesses in Malaysia are: Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd. 
(1966), Malaysian Banking, Bhd. (1960), United Malaysian Banking Corporation, 
Bhd. (1960), United Overseas Bank Ltd (1966) and Public Bank, Bhd. (1966). 
Sources: Yan and Fan (1995) Table 5.13; (1995); Bank Negara Malaysia (1989). 
risk analysis or on in-depth risk appraisal of individual institutions. Thus, 
when the risk positions of the banks increased following the liberalization, 
there was neither clear warning nor restraining action forthcoming from 
the supervisory authority. Similarly, Bank Indonesia failed to anticipate 
the consequences of credit expansion following the reform. The recent 
collapse or near-collapse of a number of domestic private banks such as 
Bank Duta in 1990, Bank Summa in 1992 and Bank Yama and Bank 
Pacific in 1995, and of the state-owned development bank Bapindo in 
1993, illustrate the need to improve implementation of the new prudential 
standard. The new rules and regulations were introduced in February 
1991. However, Bank Indonesia relaxed these rules in May 1993 because 
the banks were having difficulty in meeting the schedule of the prudential 
standard. 
To strengthen implementation of the prudential supervision, Bank 
Indonesia has expanded the organization of its bank supervision from one 
department to three. The supervisory responsibilities of Bank Indonesia 
have also been substantially broadened to cover the BPRs and finance 
companies. Until February 1990, the BPRs were supervised by Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia, the state-owned agricultural bank, merchant banks by 
the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance also continued to super- 
vise the leasing, factoring, and consumer financing activities of finance 
companies until December 1995. 
The shift of prudential measures from the system of reserve require- 
ment ratio to the risk-based capital standard in Malaysia was started in 
September 1981, with the introduction of a minimum capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR). The capital of the commercial banks was further 
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strengthened by the authorities raising their minimum capital funds in 
February 1982. Effectively from January 1981, domestic banks have been 
mandated to each maintain a minimum capital fund of M$10 million (as 
compared to M$2 million previously), the equivalent of $3.8 million at the 
exchange rate of M$2.6 per $1 in 1981, and the minimum capital fund for 
foreign banks was raised from M$5 million to M$10 million. In the begin- 
ning, the CAR was defined as the ratio of `free' capital, that is sharehold- 
ers' funds, less investment in long-term assets to total assets. The ratios 
were set at 4 per cent for domestic banks and 6 per cent for foreign banks. 
A comprehensive revision of the capital adequacy ratio at 8 per cent, along 
the BIS recommendation, has been fully implemented since 1987. 
The banking reform in Indonesia raises the required minimum capital 
for newly established banks and, although it has eliminated geographical 
discrimination it discriminates between domestic and joint venture institu- 
tions. In October 1992, the minimum required capital for newly estab- 
lished domestic and joint venture banks were doubled respectively to 
Rp50 billion and Rp100 billion (less than $25 million and $50 million, at 
the prevailing exchange rate of Rp2285 per $1). The risk-based prudential 
rules and regulations automatically require that each bank raises its capital 
base in line with the size and the quality of its assets. Thus, to strengthen 
their capital base, 22 private domestic banks raised funds by selling equi- 
ties on the Jakarta Stock Exchange from October 1995 onwards. 
The statutory reserve requirement ratio and minimum liquidity ratio 
have been actively used in Malaysia for achieving three objectives: first, as 
a prudential function, second, as an instrument for affecting the capacity 
of deposit money banks to generate loans (demand deposits) and hence 
money supply, and third, to help finance deficit of the public sector at 
large. Aside from paying inflationary tax for holding a non-yielding 
reserve requirement, the commercial banks are also required to absorb 
government securities, treasury bills and bonds issued by state-owned 
enterprises such as Cagamas, and the national housing mortgage corpora- 
tion. Between May 1989 and 1994, Malaysia raised the reserve require- 
ment ratio eight times, from 4.5 per cent to 11.5 per cent. In response to 
destabilizing capital inflows, in January 1994 Bank Negara Malaysia 
extended its application to include foreign currency deposits and transac- 
tions (such as foreign currency borrowings from foreign banks and inter 
bank borrowings). Prior to this, it had only applied to ringgit-denominated 
transactions (IMF, 1995: Box 1.4). 
On the other hand, the money multiplier increased substantially as 
Indonesia reduced the reserve ratio from 15 per cent to 2 per cent in 
October 1988. Although it is still binding, the role of the reserve require- 
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ment is less important as a tool of monetary policy under the CAR system 
as long as the banks are under-capitalized. Under such a system, a bank 
with insufficient capital is required to shrink the size of its portfolio and/or 
to place greater emphasis on those assets with a low risk weight. 
Credit System 
Although the policy reforms have reduced distortions in the credit market, 
the credit policy remains segmented and pro-cyclical in both countries. 
This is because banks are still mandated to channel certain portions of 
their credit to specific economic sectors (such as agriculture) and specific 
classes of customers (such as small-scale enterprises and indigenous entre- 
preneurs in the case of Malaysia). Nevertheless, interest rates charged in 
these special credit programmes are now much closer to market rates and 
their insurance is voluntary, with market-based premia. 
Four credit regulations were introduced between 1989 and 1990 in 
Indonesia.? The first is implied in the legal lending limits regulations 
(LLR). It sets limits on the aggregate amount of loans and advances 
(except credit programmes financed by Bank Indonesia's liquidity credit) 
to any insiders, whether they are single borrowers (persons or firms) or 
groups of borrowers. The second rule requires new joint venture banks 
and branches of foreign banks outside Jakarta to allocate at least 50 per 
cent of their loan portfolios to export-related activities. The third rule man- 
dates domestic private and state-owned banks to allocate at least 20 per 
cent of their loan portfolios to small-scale enterprises and cooperatives 
(Kredit Usaha Kecil, or KUK). The fourth rule was introduced in January 
1990, when Bank Indonesia narrowed the scope of the subsidized credit 
programme further to four areas, which include rice production, market- 
ing, buffer stock and investment financing in the eastern part of the 
country.a 
The objective of LLR and credit allocation is to democratize access to 
bank credits in order to inhibit concentration of financial power, protect the 
interests of uninformed depositors, and prevent misuse of funds by insiders. 
This is because, like in other Asian countries, through networks of owner- 
ship, business and management interlocking, most of the business con- 
glomerates in Indonesia and Malaysia are affiliated with banks. As 
predicted by Stiglitz (1994), the LLR rules are difficult and costly to 
monitor and enforce, particularly in a country with weak legal and account- 
ing systems, like Indonesia. To circumvent these rules, bank owners swap 
loans among themselves and industrial conglomerates use their banking 
units to give favourable treatment to their suppliers and customers. 
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Malaysia sets a single customer limit at 30 per cent of any bank's share- 
holders' funds, or net working funds in the case of a foreign bank, and an 
overall limit for large loans at 50 per cent of the total credit facilities. A 
large loan is defined as any loan that in the aggregate exceeds 15 per cent 
of capital funds. In addition, Bank Negara Malaysia issues lending guide- 
lines that require commercial banks to channel certain percentages of their 
credit to certain classes of customers (such as indigenous community and 
small-scale enterprises) and to specific economic sectors (such as agricul- 
ture, manufacturing industry and residential housing). Both the definitions 
of beneficiaries and the percentage allocations of the credit are changing 
over time in line with changes in government policy. The 1994 Lending 
Guidelines issued on 31 March 1994, for example, require commercial 
banks to extend at least 20 per cent of total loans outstanding to the 
Bumiputra community and to purchase low-cost housing units. 
Established in 1993, the Credit Guarantee Corporation of Malaysia pro- 
vides guarantee cover to commercial banks for loans extended to 
small-scale enterprises (including the hawkers and petty traders). Bank 
Negara Malaysia also provides refinancing facilities for export credit, and 
credit for the promotion of investment in primary food production and 
distribution. 
Foreign Exchange Exposure 
As noted earlier, both Malaysia and Indonesia adopt a liberal, open foreign 
exchange system with a unified exchange rate. However, commercial 
banks in these two countries require a special permit to deal in foreign 
exchange transactions, which are issued only to well-managed banks of 
strong financial standing. In addition, both countries try to influence the 
size and structure of short-term capital inflows through a number of quan- 
titative and qualitative restrictions. The restrictions are aimed directly at 
limiting the size of external borrowings and/or at raising their effective 
costs. At present, there are four instruments being employed to influence 
the size and structure of capital flows into Indonesia. The first is a daily 
net open position (NOP), the rate of which can be varied according to the 
government's monetary policy; on 25 March 1989, this system replaced 
the set of complex ceilings on foreign borrowings of banks. The second 
instrument is the non-trade-related exchange rate swap facility at Bank 
Indonesia. Established in January 1979 to attract foreign investment, the 
swap facility offers a special exchange rate to domestic borrowers by pro- 
viding explicit subsidy on the exchange rate. Under this facility, Bank 
Indonesia provided forward cover to foreign-currency liability. The swap 
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premium was set below the level of the realized depreciation of the rupiah. 
The size of the subsidy also depended on the interest rates chosen to calcu- 
late interest rate differential. In reality, the swap facility was also used by 
the financial institutions either to fund themselves or to hedge or even 
speculate against a declining rupiah. The third instrument is the system of 
ceilings on offshore borrowings of state-related sectors, including those in 
the private sector that rely on public entities for their bankability. The last 
instrument is incorporated in the Income Tax Law of October 1994, made 
effective from 1 January 1995. It imposes a 0.1 per cent tax on the sale of 
shares and other certificates in stock market transactions (founder share- 
holders of listed companies are subject to an additional 5 per cent tax). 
Malaysia mainly uses six instruments for limiting and raising costs of 
the short-term capital inflows. These measures include: (1) imposing limits 
on non-trade-related swap transactions of the banks; (2) imposing ceilings 
on banks' non-trade- and non-investment-related external liabilities; 
(3) requiring banks (from January to May 1994) to place with Bank 
Negara, interest-free, the ringgit funds of foreign banking institutions, 
which are referred to as Vostro accounts; (4) raising the statutory reserve 
requirement (SRR) ratio; (5) the prohibition of domestic residents from 
selling short-term money market instruments to foreigners; and 
(6) banning commercial banks from undertaking non-trade swap and out- 
right forward transactions on the bid side with foreign customers. As has 
been pointed out earlier, the Vostro accounts were also considered part of 
the eligible liabilities base for the calculation of required reserves. In early 
1994 alone, the SRR was raised three times by a cumulative 3 percentage 
points to 11.5 per cent in order to siphon off the increase of liquidity from 
the capital inflows. This penalised all banks, because it raised their cost of 
funds. 
Quantitative restrictions or capital controls are perceived as inferior to a 
tax on foreign borrowings, which is regarded as the first best policy. In the 
short run, they are seen as made to measure devices to bring about reduc- 
tion of capital inflows quickly without having to lower interest rates. In the 
longer run, however, the quantitative controls on capital movements have 
several major disadvantages. As they are inevitably involved with non- 
price rationing, they result in very different effective rates of tax on differ- 
ent domestic borrowers. They are also cumbersome to administer, and 
there is some potential policy rigidity or pressure group activity that 
ensures that restrictions, once imposed, are not eased or removed after the 
macroeconomic reasons for their introduction have been resolved. 
Because of such macroeconomic crisis-protection ratchet effects, 
the capital controls are subject to abuse and to dissipation because of 
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inducements to rent-seeking, as allocations through quantitative controls 
inevitably involve non-price rationing. 
The principal, less distorting alternative policy that may help reduce 
the motivation to shift capital around is the so-called `Tobin tax' (Tobin, 
1989; Eichengreen et al., 1995), that is, a tax on financial transactions 
that involve a currency exchange. This includes a non-remunerated 
reserve requirement deposit at the central bank on deposits associated 
with direct borrowing in foreign currency. The tax should be a 
insignificant burden on exchanges in the goods and services market, on 
the labour market and on long-term capital investment. However, it 
would add significantly to the cost of short-term arbitrage to reduce spec- 
ulative transactions. Such a tax increases government revenue, and 
reduces both speculative transactions and exchange rate volatility. The 
feasibility of collecting such a tax, however, depends on the existence of 
an international agreement to cooperate in imposing it. As of now, tax on 
short-term capital inflows is not covered in double-taxation treaties 
between nations. A high tax may act as a disincentive to borrow overseas, 
particularly on short-term maturities. Moreover, the high tax can be 
avoided or rerouted through other channels. These channels include over- 
invoicing of imports or under-invoicing of exports when export credits 
are exempted from the tax. In addition, a tax measure is a long-term solu- 
tion, while excessive capital inflows are a temporary phenomenon only. 
As a result, it would be difficult to readjust the tax ratio once short-run 
capital inflows return to a more manageable level. 
9.5 DISTRESS OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
The transition process to the new competitive environment with stricter 
rules and regulations has been more difficult for the banking system in 
Indonesia, particularly for the state-owned banks. Unused to competition, 
these banks were concerned mainly with targets, and they were less con- 
cerned about developing new instruments, improving services, credit 
analysis and profitability. Recovery efforts were weak owing to problems, 
of moral hazard because most of the risks of the credit programmes were 
assumed by the state-owned credit insurance companies, by the central 
bank or by the Ministry of Finance. Recovery specialists are lacking, 
because this division was perceived as career-dead for state bank employ- 
ees. Such internal problems for the commercial banks are less severe in 
Malaysia, because they are encouraged to compete in serving the target 
groups. Moreover, the financial repression was less damaging in Malaysia, 
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because the system of credit ceilings was more general and the interest 
rates were closer to market rates. 
The insolvency of financial institutions in Malaysia and Indonesia was 
brought about by a combination of the world-wide economic recession, 
which led to falling commodity prices in the first half the 1980s, with 
other factors. Many of the banks' corporate clients were highly geared, 
and their values of loan security were found to be no longer adequate after 
the drastic fall in prices of pledged assets. Much of these were in the form 
of land, property and shares in investment projects, which became less 
profitable because of economic reforms. The financial crisis broke in 
Malaysia in 1985. It started with the failure of the Overseas Trust Bank 
(OTB) in Hong Kong in July followed by the failures of a small leasing 
company (Setia Timor credit and leasing) in September and of twenty- 
four deposit-taking cooperatives (DTCs). The failure of Pan-Electric, a 
large, public-listed company in Singapore, had led to the closure for three 
days of the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore Stock Exchange. The failure was 
triggered by a run on a medium-size finance companies associated with a 
businessman with interests in Pan-Electric. Three other commercial banks 
(United Asia, Bank Perwira Habib and Sabah Bank) failed in 1986. 
The number of bank crises that have led to closure, merger, take-over or 
the provision of large-scale assistance by the public sector is higher in 
Indonesia than in Malaysia. The much-publicized bank crises in Indonesia 
started with the failure of PT Bank Duta in September 1990, followed by 
the bankruptcy of PT Bank Summa in 1992, and the case of outright cor- 
ruption at PT Bapindo, the state-owned development bank, in 1993. In 
1995 Bank BNI, the healthiest state commercial bank, was assigned to 
take over two private banks, PT Bank Pacific and Bank Yama. Despite 
relatively high economic growth of over 6 per cent a year since 1990, 
problem loans by Indonesian banks appear not to have diminished 
significantly, though a combination of factors has made financial reports 
unreliable and it is difficult to estimate the exact size of the problem loans 
in the country. The first factor is the weak legal and accounting system. In 
addition, there was a practice of refinancing the problem loans to make 
them `evergreen'. In February 1994, problem loans were estimated at 
$7.5 billion in the seven state-owned banks and $5.8 billion at private 
banks. The total sour loans - at $13.3 billion - were equivalent to 16 per 
cent of the total credit of all commercial banks. Assuming the recovery 
rate to be 30 per cent, the potential loss for the state-owned banks amounts 
to $5.25 billion, representing more than 2.5 times their entire paid-in 
capital, or 15 per cent of the government budget for fiscal year 1993/1994, 
or 4 per cent of GDP. 
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The bad debts need to be recovered, because they are financially para- 
sitic, eating up capital and growing faster on capitalized interest rate that 
the banks will never see. The large-scale problem loans of domestic banks 
are concentrated in some 300 firms, particularly among the 50 politically 
well-connected business conglomerates. Land is the main collateral of 
banks' credit in Indonesia. As a result, the health of the banking system 
has depended on the ability and willingness of the conglomerates to repay 
their matured loans, on legal status and on land prices. Driven by easy 
bank credit following the October 1988 banking reform, land prices had 
risen significantly. The high capital gain from owning property, which was 
higher than the lending rates, attracted new investors and drove prices of 
land higher still. This is characteristic of a bubble process. The peak was 
reached in 1992, and since then land prices have lost most of their gains 
from the rise during the bubble period. Many real estate companies and 
developers, who had borrowed to acquire assets, have become insolvent. 
Many of these companies belong to major business conglomerates, which 
use their banking units to finance their speculative real estate business. 
This was exactly what happened to Bank Summa in 19929 and Bank 
Pacific in 1996. 
Recapitalization is the costliest of the financial sector reform. As 
required, capital is proportionally linked to both the size and the quality of 
assets, and the banks' need to raise capital has been rising with the 
increase in the size of their total assets and problem loans. The problem 
has become more difficult because banks in Indonesia have traditionally 
depended on the central bank's refinancing facilities, and non-bank com- 
panies have relied heavily on debt financing at subsidized interest rates. 
Such a high debt-to-equity ratio represents few problems as long as the 
firms continue to grow and real interest rates remain very low or negative. 
However, a high-leveraged financial system exposes enterprises and banks 
to external and internal shocks, such as the rise in interest rates and reduc- 
tion in economic rents that are happening in the process of economic liber- 
alization. In particular, state-owned banks are undercapitalized, but 
inherited a much larger proportion of low-yield but high-risk programme 
loans. 
Neither Malaysia nor Indonesia has any type of security funds such as 
deposit insurance for paying depositors' claims in cases of bank insol- 
vency. In principle, owners and management of the banks are responsible 
for strengthening the capital base and solving the problem loans of their 
banks. However, when they cannot solve the problems themselves, the 
central banks usually step in. This is because central banks in both coun- 
tries have traditionally a wide range of responsibilities to forestall system- 
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atic risk that might jeopardize public confidence in the banking system. 
The central bank may advise the problem banks to undergo a merger, con- 
solidation or take-over by new investors, or provide them with fresh 
capital injections. 
Bank Indonesia exercises its role as lender of last resort for upholding 
systemic stability in the financial markets on a case-by-case basis. Neither 
the size nor the terms of the liquidity and capital support programmes for 
rescuing the problem financial institutions have ever been made transpar- 
ent to the general public. When PT Bank Duta collapsed in September 
1990, owing to losses from foreign exchange speculation, it immediately 
received a capital injection of $419 million from the `friends' of the three 
social foundations (all chaired by President Suharto), who are also the 
major shareholders of the bank. Of the insolvent banks, only PT Bank 
Summa was allowed to go bankrupt in 1992. 
Bank Indonesia provides support programmes to insolvent domestic 
private banks on an adhoc and non-transparent basis. The supports include 
capital injections and other emergency financial supports, and they are 
made available to banks owned by those who are politically well con- 
nected. To strengthen their primary (tier I) capital, Bank Indonesia 
acquires shares of the problem banks and provides them with other types 
of equity capital. The central bank also provides loans, guarantees and 
other types of support to strengthen liquidity of the financially distressed 
banks. Aside from providing credit and buying equity shares, Bank 
Indonesia also arranges the merger, consolidation and take over of the 
problem banks either by stronger institutions or by new investors. As 
shown by the case of PT Bank Pacific, providing access to lender-of-last 
resort funding for the distressed banks on a continuous basis often com- 
mitted Bank Indonesia to lend money to institutions that had no capital. 
Owners had no incentive to use the new money wisely, because they had 
nothing at risk. On 31 July 1995, Bank Pacific had Rpl trillion sour loans, 
or about 40 per cent of its total assets, used mainly for financing car loans 
and real estate projects. To rescue Bank Pacific, Bank Indonesia had asked 
Bank BNI to inject fresh loans to it which were rediscounted at the central 
bank. The bank was originally fully owned by the family of General Ibnu 
Sutowo. When Bank Pacific collapsed in the early 1980s, Bank Indonesia 
rescued it by taking over 38.25 per cent of its equity share. 
At present, the government has no resources to strengthen the capital 
base of its banks. On the other hand, the high non-performing loans have 
been largely responsible for the weakening of the net interest income of 
the state-owned banks. The interest income is, however, further squeezed 
by the rising interest rate on deposits. The severe market competition on 
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both sides of their balance sheet makes it difficult for banks to raise the 
spread between lending and deposit rates as a way to pass at least some 
losses to prime customers. Meanwhile, only Bank Tabungan Negara and 
Bank BNI have met the criteria for raising equity capital in domestic 
capital markets. 
The government of Indonesia has opted for various mechanisms to 
strengthen the capital base of the state-owned banks. The first was by bor- 
rowing the sum of $307 million as a Financial Sector Development Project 
loan from the World Bank on 12 November 1994;10 In addition, state- 
owned (and domestic private) banks borrow long-term floating-rate notes 
from international capital markets that can be regarded as capital. The 
second means was to either convert some of the outstanding Bank 
Indonesia refinancing facility into the capital of these banks or to provide 
them with new credit lines. The third method was for the Treasury to take 
over part of the bad debts. The fourth was by shifting part of these banks' 
sour loans to state-owned insurance companies, such as PT Askrindo, PT 
Asei, and Perum PKK.11 The fifth was to relax prudential standards by, 
among things, modifying the definition of capital and weights to calculate 
banks' portfolios, as shown by the revised prudential rules and regulations 
issued in May 1993. The sixth was to encourage, on a limited basis, the 
securitization of the non-performing assets. This included absorption of 
some of the problem loans at state-owned banks by state-owned enter- 
prises or government ministries, as in the case of the huge loan losses of 
the state development bank Bapindo in dealing with the Golden Key 
Group.12 
The way Bank Negara Malaysia, between 1988 and 1994, rescued the 
four insolvent commercial banks and 24 DTCs was by means of transpar- 
ent mechanisms. The operation to rescue the DTCs was divided into four 
schemes involving over 685 000 depositors with about RM3.4 billion 
in outstanding deposits. The central bank made available a total of 
RM1.1 billion in soft loans at 1 per cent annual interest rate and RM280 
million in commercial loans at 4 per cent per annum to the programme. 
Various solutions to the distressed DTCs have been tried thus they have 
been: de-registered by the Register-General of Cooperative Societies; 
banned from deposit-taking activities; sold to new investors; managed by 
appointees; and put in receivership. The management of three other dis- 
tressed banks (United Asia, Bank Perwira Habib Bank and Sabah Bank) 
were revamped by the central bank in 1986. The capital base of the four 
insolvent commercial banks was also strengthened by a combination of 
the injection of fresh equity through right issues from the existing share- 
holders and financial assistance from the Bank Negara, the central bank. 
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Orders to freeze the operations of the insolvent commercial banks and 
DTCs in Malaysia, the lifting of the freeze orders, or the variation of the 
terms of the scheme to rescue them all require the sanction of the High 
Court. In contrast, the rescue schemes in Indonesia have been determined 
solely by administrative fiat. To identify and assist domestic banks to 
solve their problem loans, Bank Indonesia and the Ministry of Finance 
have established the State Bank Supervision Team for the state-owned 
banks and the Special Task Forces for private banks. 
9.6 MONEY MARKETS 
A list of financial instruments traded in money markets in Malaysia and 
Indonesia is provided in Table 9.8. Malaysia developed its money market 
in the first half of 1980s, mainly for selling government securities to 
finance public-sector budget deficits. The deficits have typically been 
financed by external borrowings and from domestic non-bank sources, 
particularly the EPF. In the beginning, treasury bills and other maturing 
government securities and investment certificates were the money market 
instruments traded in the Malaysian money market. Other financial instru- 
ments, such as profit-sharing investment certificates, housing bonds, 
floating rate negotiable certificate deposits, banker acceptance, and nego- 
tiable certificates of deposits were introduced during period 1988-9. Partly 
because of federal government budget surpluses and the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises, both public sector deficits and the amount of gov- 
ernment securities have significantly declined. 
To cope with the need to have instruments to conduct open market oper- 
ations amid the rising short-term capital inflows, in February 1993 Bank 
Negara began to issue Bank Negara Bills (BNBs), which are similar to 
treasury bills and Malaysian Saving Bonds (MSB). Established in 1990, 
the Rating Agency Malaysia Berhad (RAM) is assigned to rate non-bank 
corporate issuers of debt securities. In addition, private companies who 
wish to issue bonds were required to obtain prior approval from the central 
bank. 
Indonesia, in contrast, has no domestic government debt, because the 
government has a policy of financing its budget deficit through external 
debt, preferably at concessionary terms from official sources. The money 
market was introduced in April 1984, nearly a year after the first stage of 
banking reform on 1 June 1983, which reduced the scope of the credit 
programme and liberalized interest rates. Since then, the SBI (Bank 
Indonesia Certificate) has been the most important money market 
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instrument. The Surat Berharga Pasar Uang (SBPU), a second money 
market instrument, was introduced in February 1985. The SBPU is a 
short-term bill in the form of a promissory note or trade bill co-signed by 
a bank or NBFI, which can be rediscounted at Bank Indonesia. Because 
the market has not worked effectively, at times, the Ministry of Finance 
and Bank Indonesia have forced the state banks and non-bank, state- 
owned companies to buy SBIs. A small amount of bonds have been 
issued by Bapindo, some regional development banks, a state-owned toll 
road company (PT Jasa Marga) and a small number of private compa- 
nies. The number of corporate bonds and commercial papers issued by 
state-owned and private non-bank companies is expected to increase 
following the establishment of PT Pefindo, a privatly owned rating 
company, in 1995. 
9.7 THE IMPACTS ON MONETARY AGGREGATES 
One problem associated with the financial reform has been the erosion of 
the autonomous power of the monetary authorities to direct monetary 
policy at domestic policy targets in order to preserve internal and external 
stability. As will be discussed later, the erosion of monetary policy has 
been happening in Malaysia and Indonesia since long before the financial 
sector reforms were initiated in the 1980s. The reason has been the rising 
roles of less regulated NBFIs - non-bank financial institutions, which 
operate much like commercial banks. 
Controls on Monetary Aggregates 
In the beginning, the financial sector policy reforms in Malaysia and 
Indonesia brought about major changes in the financial system that caused 
shocks both in the money supply and in the money demand function. The 
end of direct control on interest rates and credit rationing has made interest 
rates the opportunity cost of holding money and has raised the usefulness 
of interest rates for monetary policy. The rise in interest rates, however, 
has ignited portfolio shocks and altered the characteristics of money 
demand function. Although market interest rates have risen, the effective 
rates may have fallen following the reforms, certainly at the margin. In the 
old system of financial repression, the official interest rates were low, but 
effective marginal rates were high because the credit was rationed. To a 
certain extent, household interest rate payments are tax-deductible, lower- 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































280 `Big Bang' versus `Go Slow': Indonesia and Malaysia 
level of interest rate. On the other hand, the new rules and regulations on 
commercial banks also affect the money supply function, making the 
developments in money supply and credit aggregates more difficult to 
interpret. Under the present risk-based capital standard, an expansion in 
loans (assets) of a commercial bank is linked directly to the size of its 
capital. Unlike in the system of reserve ratio, a commercial bank cannot 
simply borrow funds from surplus institutions in order to increase its capa- 
bility to make loans. In the credit ceiling model, the authorities determine 
directly the amount of an individual bank's loans, independently of the 
level of its reserve deposits and capital base. Under the CAR system, those 
banks with limited capital were forced to shrink the size of their capital 
portfolio or to replace greater emphasis on those assets with low risk 
weight and, therefore, a lower capital cost. 
A combination of the rise in domestic interest rates, of market expecta- 
tions of changes in local currencies and of liberalization of capital 
accounts has attracted larger private sectors capital inflows to both 
Indonesia and Malaysia enabling the financing of larger current account 
deficits and the accumulation of international reserves in both countries. 
Meanwhile, the structure of the private capital inflows has also been 
moving more towards short-term private flows. Commercial bank loans 
remain the main type of private capital inflows to Indonesia. Meanwhile, 
the share of portfolio investments through capital and money markets has 
been rising fast in Malaysia. In an open economy with a fixed exchange 
rate and more developed financial markets, monetary policy is less effec- 
tive, because it can affect only the composition of liquidity. To maintain 
the same level of money supply, the increase in international reserves from 
a surplus in the current account should be accompanied by a reduction in 
domestic credit (either from the central bank or commercial banks) by an 
equivalent amount; otherwise, the credit expansion ignites inflation and 
reduces interest rates. Massive capital inflows also tend to appreciate 
domestic currency and to lower prices and wages. 
During the early period following the financial liberalization, capital 
inflows were effectively controlled and financial markets were relatively 
underdeveloped in both Malaysia and Indonesia. These allowed sufficient 
autonomy for the interest rate and exchange rate objectives to be treated 
separately. The ability of the central bank to raise domestic interest rate 
has drastically diminished as the capital movements have became increas- 
ingly interest-rate-sensitive. Internationalization of financial markets 
makes capital flows increasingly sensitive to interest rate differential and 
exchange rate expectations. As a result, monetary policy has become more 
complicated, constrained as it has been by foreign economic policies and 
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events. As we saw earlier, this, and the inadequate size of the available 
money market instruments to mop up the capital inflows, have forced the 
authorities to reimpose stricter quantitative and qualitative controls on 
short-term capital inflows. Because these are perceived as inadequate, both 
countries are willing to use the central banks and state-controlled firms as 
fiscal agents to mop up the excess reserves. 
The developments of components of monetary bases in Malaysia and 
Indonesia, shown in Figure 9.1, indicate the different responses of mone- 
tary policy to the surging capital inflows in the 1990s. The annual rates 
of growth of M1 in Malaysia and Indonesia were around 36 per cent and 
25 per cent, respectively, between 1992 and 1994. To keep the nominal 
external value of the ringgit stable, the authorities in Malaysia sterilized 
much of the short-term private capital inflows. The other part of the capital 
inflows, which initially were in the form of bank deposits, did not have a 
significant impact on lending, because they were absorbed as excess 
reserves of the banking system at Bank Negara Malaysia. The combina- 
tion of these policies has resulted in the continuous buildup of the net 
foreign assets of the banking system. 
The rapid rates of growth of both the domestic and the foreign assets of 
the Malaysian banking system had reduced commercial banks' (lending) 
interest rates between 1993 and the first quarter of 1994 (Figure 9.2). 
Beginning in February of that year, the ringgit was allowed to slightly 
appreciate (Figure 9.3). Starting from the second quarter of the same year, 
the interest rates were moving upward slowly, because of the increasing 
sterilization operations and quantitative restrictions on capital inflows 
imposed by the authorities. The interest rates, further increased owing to 
more stringent restrictions, were put in place to minimize the contagion 
effects of the tequila effect the currency crisis in Mexico in late 1994, 
which was felt in Asia, after a time lag, in the first quarter of 1995. To 
hold back further rises in interest rates, Bank Negara Malaysia defended 
the external value of the Malaysian ringgit by intervening in the foreign 
exchange market. This reduced the net foreign assets of the banking 
system. 
Monetary policy in Indonesia is constrained by the financially distressed 
domestic banking system. The ability of Bank Indonesia to raise interest 
rates and the ratio of the reserve requirement is limited, because this 
would further weaken the banking system. In addition, the bailout of the 
banking system has contributed to the acceleration of Bank Indonesia's 
net domestic credit. Part of the capital inflows is used to strengthen the 
capital of domestic banks. Figure 9.1 shows a rapid growth of the net 
domestic assets of the banking system at the cost of a sharp erosion in its 
282 `Big Bang' versus `Go Slow': Indonesia and Malaysia 
net foreign assets in 1989-90. There was a sharp decline in net domestic 
assets of the banking system in 1991, as a result of the instruction of the 
Minister of Finance Dr J.B. Sumarlin, in February of that year, to a 
number of large state-owned enterprises to switch their deposits at state- 
owned banks into SBIs. This initially withdrew Rp7 to Rp8 trillion ($3.64 
to $4.1 billion at the then exchange rate of Rp1923/$) from the monetary 
base. The net withdrawal amounted to Rp2 trillion, as Bank Indonesia 
offset part of the sale of SBI with its purchase of SBPUs. 
The interest rates in Indonesia, as measured by cutoff rate in auctions of 
90 days SBIs, peaked in March 1991 following the Sumarlin shock in the 
previous month. Interest rates started to move upward again in the first 
quarter of 1995, following the Tequila effect. As in Malaysia, Bank 
Indonesia also intervened in the foreign exchange market, depleting its 
foreign exchange reserves by between $500 and 600 million to defend the 
external value of the rupiah and hold the rise in interest rates. 
As indicated earlier, exchange rate policy plays two roles. On the one 
hand, jointly with other policies, it plays an important role in promoting 
both external and internal macroeconomic stability. On the other hand, 
exchange rate policy, also jointly with other policies, helps to maintain 
the international competitiveness of the domestic economy. There is no 
indication that Malaysia and Indonesia have used the exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor and have allowed the rupiah to appreciate as an instru- 
ment for generating fiscal revenues and curbing domestic inflation rates. 
As a matter of fact, the authorities in both countries have used the 
exchange rate policy to correct `the Dutch disease' problem, or the 
appreciation of their domestic currencies, since the oil boom period in 
the 1970s.13 As shown in Figure 9.3 (for Malaysia) and Figure 9.4 (for 
Indonesia), in general, both countries have been using the same 
exchange rate policy to encourage the production and exports of non-oil 
traded goods, to curb both domestic demand and imports and to attract 
capital inflows. The figures, however, indicate that both nominal and real 
effective exchange rates have been recently appreciating that have been 
aimed at reducing in both Malaysia and Indonesia. This is partly as a 
result of government policies in these countries the high cost of the ster- 
ilization operations of the large capital inflows through enlarging the 
intervention bands of their currencies, so as to allow market forces a 
greater role in setting the exchange rates. Concurrently, greater exchange 
rate flexibility introduces uncertainty, which may well discourage part of 
the purely speculative capital flows and allow a higher degree of 
freedom for the monetary authorities to exercise control over monetary 
aggregates. 
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286 `Big Bang' versus `Go Slow': Indonesia and Malaysia 
The Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs) 
As noted earlier, the autonomy of monetary authorities in conducting 
monetary policy in both Malaysia and Indonesia was greatly reduced or 
lost long before the financial sector reform. The repressive rules and regu- 
lations in the financial sector were felt mostly in the state-owned banks (in 
the case of Indonesia) and the state-controlled banks (in the case of 
Malaysia). The rapid growth of unregulated investment finance companies 
and merchant banks had increased the share of the grey market during the 
era of the `oil boom' in the early 1970s. The finance companies are the 
second largest group of deposit-taking institutions in both Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Merchant banks are licensed to operate as specialized financial 
intermediaries in the money and capital markets. In reality, however, mer- 
chant banks have operated like finance companies in Indonesia. As noted 
earlier, prior to the recent reforms, the non-bank financial institutions in 
Indonesia were regulated and supervised by the Ministry of Finance. 
However, they were practically unregulated owing to the low supervisory 
capability of the Ministry of Finance. As a result, the authorities found 
themselves with the a choice of either letting the unregulated markets 
dominate the state-owned banks or else permitting financial reform and 
accepting some associated erosion of the autonomy of state-owned banks. 
On the external side, capital flows were also rising because of increasing 
transactions with foreigners and the internationalization of the business 
sector. 
Except that they are prohibited from accepting demand deposits, in 
reality, the operations of the investment finance companies are very 
similar to those of commercial banks. The finance companies are allowed 
to accept savings and time deposits with a minimum of three months' 
maturity from the general public. Loans extended by the finance compa- 
nies are mainly instalment-plan loans, leasing finance, housing loans, and 
loans for a variety of other purposes, particularly for the purchase and 
development of real estate and other durable investment and consumption 
goods. The finance companies are, therefore, the competitors of commer- 
cial banks in providing short-term business financing and consumer credit. 
Unlike the heavily regulated banking sector, particularly the state-owned 
banks, the investment finance companies were unregulated. The operations 
of these financial institutions are constrained only by regulations on 
gearing ratio, that is, the maximum an investment finance company may 
borrow in relation to its own shareholders' fund (limited to fifteen times in 
both countries), and the ceiling on foreign borrowings. This freedom of 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































288 `Big Bang' versus `Go Slow': Indonesia and Malaysia 
rapidly and effectively to changes in the economic and financial situation 
than the banks. To attract large-denomination certificate deposits, finance 
companies have offered higher deposit rates than those offered by com- 
mercial banks. In Indonesia, these institutions were also being used by the 
state banks and Bank Indonesia to extend short-term credit and to invest in 
sectors and activities that the banks themselves could not reach during the 
previous financial repression. These practices ended with the elimination 
of the repressive system of credit ceilings cum selective credit policy with 
subsidized interest rates in January 1990. As their experiences had been 
mostly in providing short-term credit, the twelve investment finance com- 
panies in Indonesia opted to become commercial banks in 1992. 
As noted earlier, other finance companies (such as leasing, factoring, 
consumer financing and credit card companies) in Indonesia were by law 
regulated and supervised by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) until 
December 1995. Because the MOF has no capability to implement the 
supervisory tasks, these institutions were, in reality, unregulated and unsu- 
pervised. Following the financial sector reform in the late 1980s, the 
finance companies were the main suppliers of housing and car loans and 
other types of consumer credit. In both countries, these institutions have 
also been used as `cash dispensers' to buy shares of companies owned by 
the politically well-connected private sector business conglomerates. 
9.8 CONCLUSIONS 
All the financial indicators (M1/GDP, M2/GDP, TAFI/GDP, and market 
capitalization/GDP) point to the financial system of Malaysia being more 
developed than that of Indonesia. Aside from having a much higher level 
of income per capita, this country has a relatively more stable economy 
and social system than that of its neighbour. Moreover, prior to recent 
reforms, the financial repression in Indonesia was much longer and more 
severe than in Malaysia. In terms of assets and of the number of institu- 
tions, however, the banking system remains the core of the financial 
system in these countries. Other financial institutions are fast-growing 
segments of the system, but their roles have not been as important as that 
of the banks. 
The technocrats are liberalizers in Indonesia. As advisers to the govern- 
ment, they may not have formal executive positions. But they are still 
powerful, and are listened to by their successors and foreign lenders. 
Whereas Bank Indonesia has tended to retain direct controls on the 
banking system, Bank Negara Malaysia has been the initiator of financial 
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sector reform in Malaysia and the Ministry of Finance has played a 
supporting role. 
Indonesia has adopted a different sequencing of both economic and 
banking sector reforms since the early 1980s. In general, the coverage 
and speed of policy reform in the financial sector has been much wider 
and faster than in the real sector of the economy. The banking sector 
reform started in June 1983, with the relaxation of controls on interest 
rates and the elimination of sectorial loan allocations. However, the short- 
term money market was only beginning to develop in April 1984. A more 
drastic reform was introduced in October 1988, but new prudential rules 
and regulations were announced only two years later. Furthermore, as 
many of the banks, including the state-owned banks, were having 
difficulty in meeting the prudential standards, the authorities have had to 
retreat by relaxing the rules and regulations. Because a legal and account- 
ing system cannot be built overnight, the focus of bank supervision in 
Indonesia is likely to remain more on the regulatory aspects of the super- 
visory functions. Inherited from the colonial past, the basis for securing 
contract and credit transactions is weak, while the laws and procedures on 
exit and bankruptcy are unclear. Financial disclosure is poor, owing to the 
weakness in the implementation of accounting requirements and in the 
standards and training of public accountants. 
In contrast, Malaysia implements a gradual but more consistent 
approach of financial sector deregulation, accompanied by a more proper 
sequencing as prescribed by the textbook. In contrast to Indonesia, 
Malaysia retains special-purpose banks, heavily protecting its domestic 
banks from foreign competition and giving special market preferences to 
state-controled institutions. Traditionally, Malaysia has a modern and ade- 
quately good market infrastructure. Partly in order to dump public sector 
debt, Malaysia developed a short-term money market in the early 1980s, 
before it deregulated interest rates in 1987. 
The transition process to the more competitive environment and stricter 
rules and regulations has been more difficult for the banking system in 
Indonesia. The problems are not limited to the state-owned banks, which 
are traditionally undercapitalised, and to the inherited larger portion of 
low-yield but non-performing assets from the past credit programme; the 
number of bank crises among the private banks has also been rising in 
recent years. In contrast, insolvency in Malaysia occurred only in the 
1980s, involving a single commercial bank and a number of deposit-taking 
cooperatives. 
Both Malaysia and Indonesia have neither compulsory nor voluntary 
security funds, such as deposit insurance. In principle, the owners and 
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managers of the banks are made responsible for strengthening the capital 
base and for solving the problem loans of their banks. However, when 
they cannot solve the problem themselves, the central banks usually step 
in to prevent systematic risks that might jeopardize public confidence in 
the banking systems of their countries. Nevertheless, it is not very clear 
how the central banks in both Malaysia and Indonesia exercise their role 
as the lender of last resort to prevent systemic risks in the financial 
markets. 
The exchange policy in Malaysia and Indonesia has been used mainly to 
help maintain international competitiveness of domestic economy. In the 
case of Indonesia, however, the weak financial condition of the banking 
system has limited the ability of the central bank to exercise monetary 
policy, raise interest rates and decelerate domestic credit. Higher interest 
rates worsen the financial conditions of the commercial banks and raise 
the interest burden of Bank Indonesia's certificates of deposits. 
Notes 
1. Deposit money banks (DMBs) are commercial institutions whose demand 
deposits are important or form a large share of their total liabilities. 
Although the commercial banks are the main component of DMBs, other 
special purposes financial institutions such as development, savings, and 
cooperative banks may also included in this category when their liabilities 
are regarded as money (see IMF Institute, 1981). 
2. Includes savings deposits and NOW accounts, automatic transfers service 
accounts at banks and thrifts institutions, and share draft accounts held at 
credit unions or cooperative banks. 
3. Prior to the present form, JSE was reopened on 4, June 1952 after being 
closed since the beginning of the World War II. However, owing to econ- 
omic and social instability its activities were again officially suspended in 
1968. In August 1995, the less active Surabaya Stock Exchange was taken 
over and merged into the Parallel Bourse of Jakarta, to allow smaller com- 
panies with good growth prospects to have access to the capital market, for 
example via the second board established in Kuala Lumpur in November 
1988. 
4. Until 1989, PT Danareksa had a special right to buy at least 50 per cent of 
every new issue in the first instance, but no obligation to purchase any per- 
centage of an issue. Once PT Danareksa has taken up a percentage of an 
issue, it places the shares in its investment portfolio and may then issue 
bearer certificates, relating to the specific companies backed by certain per- 
centage shares in its portfolio, in small denominations which it sells to 
general public in order to democratize the companies' ownership. Foreign 
investors were banned from the security markets. Until October 1988, 
income from investment in financial securities was subject to 15 per cent 
withholding tax, while interest on bank deposits was free from such tax. 
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5. Under the leadership of Professors Widjojo Nitisastro (the former Minister 
of Development Planning) and Ali Wardhana (the former Minister of 
Finance) the `technocrats' have been the architects of the economic devel- 
opment of Indonesia since 1966. The group consists of professors of the 
Faculty of Economics at the University of Indonesia. 
6. State-owned enterprises in Malaysia are defined as those with more than 
50 per cent of their equity held by the government. In the mid-1980s, there 
were 56 non-financial state-owned enterprises, but this number was gradu- 
ally reduced to 42, as of the end of 1993, through privatization. The privat- 
ization includes transfer of the equity ownership to the private sector of the 
following companies: PETRONAS (the petroleum company), Telekom 
Malaysia Berhad (TMB), Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB), Malaysian 
Airlines (MAS), Cement Industries of Malaysia, Edaran Otomobil Nasional, 
Sports and Toto Malaysia and the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia 
(HICOM Holding Berhad). On the performance, problems and prospects of 
privatization of state-owned enterprises in Malaysia see, among others, 
Mohammad Sheriff bin Mohammad Kassim (1991) and on criticisms to the 
programme see articles edited by K.S. Jomo (1995). 
7. Aside from formal budgetary and credit programmes, Indonesia has also a 
number of semi-formal schemes to help finance the cooperatives and small- 
scale enterprises and poverty alleviation programs. These include a decree 
issued by the Minister of Finance in 1989 to require all state-owned enter- 
prises, including banks, in Indonesia to channel between 1 and 5 per cent of 
their profits to provide funds to the cooperatives and small-scale enterprises 
at concessionary terms. Domestic conglomerates have been called to donate 
between 1 and 25 per cent of their listed shares to those sectors. In 
December 1995, the President and a group of cabinet ministers, the Director 
General for Taxation and private businessmen, in their private capacity, 
established the Yayasan Dana Sejahtera Mandiri (Self-Reliant Prosperity 
Funds). The foundation aims to help the government's poverty alleviation 
programme under the coordination of the office of the state Minister of 
Population. The target funds collection is Rp1.15 trillion, to be loaned to 
11.5 million poor families: Rp100 000 each, with interest at 6 per cent per 
annum. Presidential Decree no. 90 of 1995 calls on individual and compa- 
nies with income tax of more than Rp 100 million per annum to donate up 
to 2 per cent of their earnings to the foundation. 
8. At the end of 1990, this concessionary credit was made available for BPPC 
(Badan Penyangga dan Pemasaran Cengkeh) to finance its buffer stock of 
cloves, the main ingredient of clove cigarettes. The recipient of this credit is 
a consortium of private traders who have powerful political backing and 
have been granted the exclusive right to operate a buffer stock for that 
agricultural commodity. 
9. The collapse of Bank Summa in 1992 has resulted in the loss of control 
over the flagship company of the Surawijaya family, PT Astra International, 
then the largest company listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange. 
10. The World Bank, Annual Report 1993, Table 7-5, p. 177. This amount 
is much less than the amount of capital injected into PT Bank Duta 
($419 million), a relatively much smaller private bank, in September 1990, 
to cover its losses from foreign exchange speculation. The injection come 
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from outright gifts from the `friends' of the three social foundations (all 
chaired by President Suharto), the major shareholders of the bank. 
11. PT Askrindo is a state-owned insurance company, established in 1974, pri- 
marily to insure the past investment and working capital credit programme 
for medium and small-scale enterprises (KIK and KMKP programmes). PT 
Asei is a state-owned export insurance company, and Perum PKK a state- 
owned company for insuring credit for cooperatives. Mainly because of 
insuring the excess credit of commercial banks above their legal lending 
limits, PT Askrindo accumulated losses amounted to Rp390 billion 
($1987.52 million) in 1992, equivalent to nearly ten times its paid-up 
capital. 
12. The trials of former Directors and key officials of Bapindo allegedly indi- 
cate that Admiral (ret.) Sudomo, the then Coordinating Minister for Security 
and Political Affairs, and Professor J.B. Sumarlin, the then Minister of 
Finance, were, between 1989 and 1992, directly involved in arranging unse- 
cured loans from the bank to the Golden Key Group (originally in partner- 
ship with President Suharto's son Tommy Mandala Putra) of the sum 
$565 million for financing highly inflated investment costs of petrochemical 
projects. All former Managing Directors and key official of Bapindo were 
sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, and Mr Edi Tansil, the owner 
of Golden Key Group, was sentenced for 17 years prison term in August 
1994. At present, Mr Sudomo is the Chairman of the Supreme Advisory 
Council and Dr Sumarlin the Head of Supreme Audit Board. With the help 
of a bribed chief warder, Eddy Tansil escaped from Jakarta's Cipinang 
prison on May 4, 1996. 
13. Following the partition of Singapore from the Federation of Malaya, 
Malaysia terminated interchange ability of the Singapore dollar at par with 
the Malaysian ringgit on 8 May 1973. This was followed by the introduction 
of a freely floating Malaysian dollar regime in the following month on 21 
June. Indonesia replaced the nominal anchor of the rupiah from the US 
dollar to as undisclosed basket of convertible currencies in November 1978. 
Because the growth of their economies depends on non-oil exports, the 
central banks in these countries monitor exchange rate developments against 
baskets of currencies and intervene in the interbank foreign exchange 
markets to influence the external value of their respective national 
currencies. 
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10 Banking on the Transition 
Rodney Schmidtl 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1989-91 the centrally planned countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE)z liberalized most prices and international trade. These and other 
transition reforms revealed how little the physical capital of state enter- 
prises is worth in a market economy.3 The low value of the capital assets 
is due to investment inefficiency under central planning and the decline in 
the investment rate preceding the transition, the abrupt change in relative 
prices that initiated the transition period, and the discontinuation of 
external subsidies when the Soviet trade bloc collapsed. 
State enterprises were uniformly affected by these changes. Carlin et al. 
(1995) report that a review of enterprise-level surveys in CEE failed to turn 
up a single state enterprise that benefited from the transition reforms. As a 
result, the low capital value of individual enterprises is reflected in produc- 
tive resource misallocation at the sector level .4 The combined impact of the 
low worth of state enterprises, macroeconomic resource misallocation, and 
the entry of new private enterprises manifests itself in a structural duality 
characteristic of transition economies in CEE. This duality is evident in the 
systematically low productivity rates in state enterprises relative to the new 
private enterprises.5 The goal of the transition in CEE is to eliminate the 
productivity differential and integrate the economy. 
Recent advice on how to achieve this goal focuses on privatization of 
state enterprises, in the belief that establishing clear property rights over 
assets would encourage enterprise restructuring. However, this emphasis 
has been frustrated by the influence of insiders in the privatization process 
(Aghion et al., 1994a; Blanchard and Aghion, 1996). As a result, privatiza- 
tion has had no systematic effect on state enterprise restructuring and pro- 
ductivity. Paradoxically, state enterprises have engaged in significant 
restructuring before being privatized, although it does not normally involve 
investment (Carlin et al., 1995; EBRD, 1995; Grosfeld and Roland, 1995). 
While the relative roles and optimal sequence of privatization and bank 
reform in the transition remain under-researched, two observations are 
evident. First, widespread defensive enterprise restructuring observed in 
state enterprises in the advanced transition economies is due largely to the 
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success banks have had in imposing financial control, or hard budget con- 
straints, on enterprises.6 Second, the transition cannot succeed without 
significant investment in enterprises,7 which must be financed from outside 
sources. Moreover, the only potential outside capital market during the 
transition is one based on banks. Transitional securities markets have capit- 
alization and liquidity levels lower than those in developing countries 
(Neave et al., 1994), a situation that is likely to continue for the foreseeable 
future. These markets cannot price risk or generate information efficiently 
(Cashin and McDermott, 1995), or provide the control and governorship of 
enterprises necessary for raising investment by issuing minority equity. 
This chapter assesses the role of banks in the transition to a market 
economy. We are interested in describing and explaining bank performance 
and identifying constraints that prevent banks from playing a more active 
role. Early opinion on this issue was sharply divided. Optimists tended to 
equate the transition with the achievement of decentralized credit alloca- 
tion, without delving into sequencing issues (Calvo and Kumar, 1993; Fries 
and Lane, 1994; Long and Sagari, 1991). Pessimists questioned the ability 
of banks to control enterprises, where control is interpreted as the ability to 
select viable enterprises and liquidate non-viable ones (Bofinger, 1992; 
McKinnon, 1993; Perotti, 1993; Rostowski, 1993). More recent contribu- 
tions focus on particular aspects of bank performance, including their 
ability to provide credit efficiently (Thorne, 1993), restrict enterprise credit 
(Dittus, 1996; 1994) and complete enterprise debt workouts (Baer and 
Gray, 1995; van Wijnbergen, 1992). There has also been a vigorous discus- 
sion of the merits of a unversal banking structure (Corbett and Mayer, 
1992; Grosfeld, 1994; Mayhew and Seabright, 1992). 
Thus far there has not, however, been a systematic review of the 
performance, and role of banks in the transition. This chapter attempts to 
fill the gap. We do so by reviewing, in Sections 10.1 and 10.2, bank credit 
performance and financial control over enterprises. In Sections 10.3 and 
10.4 we explain this performance by identifying bank incentives individu- 
ally and the way they, as a package, condition bank behaviour. Our con- 
clusions are tentative, because the evidence is often spotty and sometimes 
conflicting. We end the chapter with policy recommendations and 
suggestions for further research. 
10.2 BANK PERFORMANCE 
This part reviews aspects of bank credit performance characterizing bank 
lending to enterprises and financial control over enterprises during the 
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transition. These aspects are, first, the path of real enterprise credit in the 
months immediately after the initial transition reforms and the years fol- 
lowing, and the divergence in real credit provision between the advanced 
and the less advanced economies of CEE; second, the large quantity of 
non-performing loans on bank balance sheets inherited from the central 
planning era, and the recurrence of such loans during the transition; third, 
the general shortening of loan maturities and the possible effect on 
enterprise investment; and finally, the infrequency and limited success of 
intervening in the affairs of defaulting enterprises. 
Credit to Enterprises 
Monetary reform is a central component of the transition strategy, and 
consists of a shift from passive to non-accommodating monetary policy. In 
the early months and years of the transition this shift was achieved by 
imposing bank-specific credit ceilings. As a result, and owing also to 
unexpectedly steep price climbs, real enterprise credit initially fell sharply 
(Table 10.1; bank claims on non-government are mostly claims on enter- 
prises). The fall in Hungary was more gradual, possibly because of the 
earlier partial introduction of bank reforms.8 
In subsequent years, enterprise credit performance in the less advanced 
and the advanced transition countries diverged. In Bulgaria and Romania 
enterprise credit as a percentage of GDP declined dramatically. This was 
due to a fall in the ratio of deposits to GDP, and, via the balance sheet 
relation of deposit-taking banks, total claims outstanding. The Bulgarian 
figures are not as dramatic as the Romanian, but the effect is similar, given 
the very high percentage of deposits denominated in foreign currency 
(about 50 per cent). In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, deposit 
growth actually improved in the years following the transition reforms, 
and total bank claims held steady or, in the Czech Republic, rose substan- 
tially. Real credit to enterprises in these countries recovered from the 
initial shock, and then rose substantially in the Czech Republic, where 
fiscal deficits were eliminated by 1993, declined slightly in Poland with an 
increasing share of credit going to finance large fiscal deficits, and 
declined significantly in Hungary, owing to sharply rising fiscal financing 
requirements. 
Although there is evidence of fiscal crowding out of enterprise credit in 
various countries, it does not explain the different paths of credit in the 
two country groups (compare fiscal deficits in Hungary and Romania). 
The different outcomes are related to inflation performance, but, again, 
inflation is not consistently correlated with fiscal developments. This, 
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together with the high share of bank credit allocated to enterprises, sug- 
gests that a main channel of inflation in CEE is through nominal enterprise 
credit. If such credit is non-discriminatory then it is a hidden subsidy to 
enterprises (Bofinger, 1992). A central challenge posed by bank credit per- 
formance during the transition is to explain why the advanced countries 
have succeeded in controlling inflation and increasing real enterprise 
credit while the less advanced countries have not. 
Non-Performing Loans 
At the beginning of the transition, banks were burdened with a high share 
of non-performing loans in total enterprise lending (Table 10.2). This 
share fell significantly in the following year, owing to bank recapitaliza- 
tion and debt restructuring schemes in most countries. However, non- 
performing loans rose again to significant levels during the transition, at 
least in the Czech Republic and Hungary (data are not available for 
Bulgaria and Romania).9 This is worrying, because it indicates the failure 
of banks to control lending to enterprises which, if widespread and 
systematic, would lead to loss of control over the money supply. 
Investment Finance 
Another prominent feature of bank performance in CEE during the transi- 
tion has been shortening of maturities of lending to enterprises: 
The reality is that the main element of banks' lending policies is the 
restructuring of the maturity compositions of their loan portfolios by 
reducing the shares of longer term loans (with maturity longer than a 
year) and substituting short-term loans, or securities issued by the state 
(Szekely, 1993, p. 31). 
Long-term loans, common prior to the transition, have all but disap- 
peared, and it is difficult to obtain loans with a maturity of more than one 
year in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (Dittus, 1994). In the 
Czech Republic, 73 per cent of bank lending in 1993-4 had a maturity of 
one year or less, with 18 per cent having a maturity of between 1 and 
4 years. This compares with about 20 per cent short-term lending in indus- 
trial countries (EBRD, 1995). In Hungary and Poland, over 80 per cent of 
total enterprise debt, including that held with banks and other enterprises, 
is short-term, defined as having a maturity of less than a year (Baer and 
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Table 10.2 Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic: non-performing loans of 
the banking system (% of total loans) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Poland 40 28.0/16.0° 0.126 - 
Hungary 50 16.9/11.1° 17.5/22.2 25.8 
% of enterprise loans - 35.9/27.4° 46.2/71.7 68.9 
Czech Republic 55d 19.0 23.8 37.7 
Before/after loans consolidation. 
b Sample of six state banks. 
1991/1993 classification rules. 
d Czechoslovakia. 
Source: National sources as reported by the IMF; Baer and Gray (1995); Dittus 
(1994); Thorne (1993). 
Table 10.3 Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic: sources of investment 
finance in enterprises (% of total investment) 
Poland° Hungary Czech Republic 
1992 1993 1993 Jan-Jun.1993 
Internal sources 58.1 63.3 54.2 72.7 
Subsidies 5.6 4.7 26.1 4.8 
Bank credit 10.8 8.7 3.4 16.8 
Otherb 25.5 23.3 16.3 5.7 
a Excluding housing cooperatives. 
6 Poland: includes incompleted investment and foreign investment (9.8% in 
1993). (Hungary: includes credit from international financial institutions. Czech 
Republic: includes foreign investment 2.0%). 
Source: Grosfeld and Roland (1995). 
effect on the maturity structure of the outstanding stock of bank credit. 
There is a significantly higher proportion of medium and long-term credits 
in the debt stock which, in view of the composition of current new 
lending, must have been made prior to the reforms. 
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There is also evidence that the shortening of bank credit maturities 
during the transition has constrained investment. Table 10.3 shows that in 
1993 bank credit accounted for 10 per cent or less of investment finance in 
Poland and Hungary, and about 17 per cent in the Czech Republic. Most 
enterprise investment during the transition, which is low relative to levels 
in the era of central planning or in industrialized countries (EBRD, 1995), 
is financed from enterprise savings. Moreover, enterprise-level survey 
evidence suggests that this constraint is binding: 
The overwhelming impression from the case studies is that major 
investment in new capital equipment is a form of restructuring only 
available to enterprise managers where profits have been accumulated 
in the enterprise (Carlin et al., 1995, p. 435). 
Bankruptcy 
Early analyses of the role of banks during the transition emphasized the need 
for banks to intervene when enterprises fail to service their debts (Bofinger, 
1992; Calvo and Kumar, 1993). Such intervention might be to liquidate the 
enterprise in an attempt to recoup the value of the debt, or, where the liquida- 
tion value is low, owing to the low quality or value in alternative use of the 
capital assets, to reorganize the enterprise to increase its profitability (before 
debt service). In the event, however, intervention has not been an important 
instrument of control despite the adoption of a variety of legislative 
approaches (Dittus, 1994; EBRD, 1995; Grosfeld and Roland, 1995). 
Hungary and Poland were among the first to implement market-based 
bankruptcy and debt workout procedures (for details see Baer and Gray, 
1995, and references therein). In Poland, a bank conciliation law adopted in 
February 1993 shifted power from the courts and the borrower to banks to 
negotiate a workout agreement on behalf of all creditors. Furthermore, 
under the law, responsibility for monitoring the enterprise-restructuring 
programme is delegated to the lead bank. If the lead bank does not term- 
inate an agreement when the restructuring plan is violated then it becomes 
liable for any additional losses incurred by the other creditors. The range of 
possible workout options is broad, and includes exchanging debt for equity. 
The conciliation record has had mixed success. Agreements were 
reached by the April 1994 deadline with only about a third of the affected 
enterprises accounting for about half of the bad loans. Another 25 per cent 
of enterprises were placed under liquidation or bankruptcy proceedings, 
accounting for only 13 per cent of the relevant loans. The remaining enter- 
prises repaid their debts, had them auctioned by the banks or had their 
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collateral executed. Only 13 per cent of all affected enterprises (19 per 
cent of affected loans) actually resumed debt service during the period 
from 1991 to 1994 (Baer and Gray, 1995). There was also little response 
to the option to swap bad loans for equity in the enterprise. 
In Hungary, an automatic trigger mechanism for initiating bankruptcy 
or liquidation proceedings was adopted in 1992. The debtor enterprise was 
required to file for reorganization or liquidation after being in arrears for 
more than 90 days, failing which managers were personally liable. 
Creditors could file for liquidation after payment was 60 days overdue. 
Managers of bankrupt enterprises have the first opportunity to present a 
reorganization plan, and retain their jobs after filing. Creditors then vote 
on the plan, and can present alternatives. If an agreement cannot be 
reached then the procedure reverts to liquidation. The courts have rela- 
tively little involvement in the process. In the first two years of operation 
over 22 000 cases were filed, including over 5000 reorganization cases 
and over 17 000 liquidation cases. Only a very small number of these 
cases have been completed to date. The number of reorganization filings 
declined dramatically in 1994, possibly because of an amendment to the 
law in September 1993 to remove the automatic trigger. 
These results are due in part to major problems with liquidation proce- 
dures in these countries. These problems include the low priority given to 
bank creditors in both Hungary and Poland, and poor information and 
accountability. Procedural costs and government (especially social secur- 
ity obligations), as well as employees' claims, often consume more than 
the entire estate. It is also hard to prevent enterprise managers from fraud- 
ulently disposing of assets before filing for or being forced into bank- 
ruptcy. Although debt workouts are becoming more common, creditors in 
both countries are still quite passive when it comes to initiating and over- 
seeing enterprise liquidation. 
In the Czech and Slovak Republics, revised bankruptcy laws were imple- 
mented in 1993. Between 1993 and mid-1995, 4500 petitions were filed, 
but only 600 bankruptcies had actually been declared, owing largely to a 
lack of judges and administrators. In Bulgaria and Romania bankruptcy 
laws have been in force only since 1994, and enforcement is cautious. 
10.3 MONEY, CREDIT AND HARD ENTERPRISE BUDGET 
CONSTRAINTS 
Banks tend to avoid intervening in enterprises that default on bank debt. 
They prefer instead either to refinance those enterprises or to cut them off 
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from further long-term credit and impose a discipline of inside or self- 
finance. This represents a failure of monitored lending throughout the CEE. 
Thus, the stylized facts of bank credit performance in the transition to 
explain are enterprise refinance and self-finance. Before attempting an 
explanation, however, we devote this section to a deeper characterization 
of bank performance. In particular, we would like to address the difference 
in monetary impact of enterprise refinancing between the advanced and 
the less advanced transition economies and the consequent divergence in 
real enterprise credit performance. We would also like to comment briefly 
on the impact of the banks' performance on the pattern of enterprise 
restructuring and the transition dynamic. 
We accomplish these goals first by discussing further the concepts of and 
relationship between refinancing and self-financing, and their motivations. 
We also present more evidence on the extent of refinancing behaviour. We 
then show how these concepts and behaviour patterns are related to inside 
and outside money systems. Next, we suggest that the achievement of an 
inside money system is equivalent to creating a banking sector that generally 
succeeds in imposing financial control or hard budget constraints on enter- 
prises. Finally, we refer to the nature of hard budget constraints, which 
depends on the depth and fragility of the inside money system, to interpret 
the impact of bank credit performance on the transition itself. 
Enterprise Refinance 
Enterprise refinance is likely to be realized in the form of short-term oper- 
ational or commercial credit, designed to allow the defaulting enterprise to 
survive. Contrary to normal commercial lending, short-term refinancing 
credit will tend to be rolled over. Because such credit is extended in order 
to avoid liquidating or closing the enterprise, thereby retaining an option 
value on long-term non-performing debt, it is effectively equivalent to 
long-term lending. Self-finance refers to the refusal to extend long-term 
credit or investment finance, either directly and independently of the enter- 
prisis history of debt service, or by automatically rolling over unserviced 
short-term credit. Self-finance is consistent with the existence of a com- 
mercial credit line which is ended as soon as the enterprise falls behind on 
debt service. Both self-finance and refinance are inconsistent with moni- 
tored lending. In particular, monitored lending does not necessarily follow 
refusal to refinance. 
The monetary impact of enterprise refinance depends in part on whether 
it is done by rolling over principal due and/or capitalizing interest, or by 
providing new cash disbursements. While both methods imply a degree of 
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softness in enterprise budget constraints, the latter comprises operational 
financing of known money-losing enterprises, a practice that may deter- 
mine a lower limit on money supply growth. Whether it does so depends 
on the pervasiveness and scale of cash refinancing. General refinancing is 
likely to be the chief reason for differences in inflation and real enterprise 
credit performance between the advanced and less-advanced transition 
countries in CEE. 
One indicator of refinancing behaviour allowing direct comparison 
between these country groups is a revealed preference for lending to enter- 
prises with large bank debt or non-performing loans (Bergl6f and Roland, 
1995, claim this is the case in Hungary). Absent bank and enterprise-level 
data, 10 a proxy for this indicator can be constructed by comparing lending 
to enterprises of different owner types (Table 10.1). When we normalize 
enterprise credit by the owner-type share in value added, we find that, in 
the advanced transition economies, banks are applying similar treatment to 
state and new and privatized enterprises. In the Czech Republic, bank 
credit has been consistently distributed evenly between state and private 
enterprises. In Poland, a larger share of credit went to state enterprises 
until 1991. Then credit to private enterprises caught up, and credit has 
been evenly distributed thereafter. In the less advanced transition 
economies, however, banks show a strong preference for lending to state 
enterprises. In Bulgaria and, in the extreme, Romania, the private sector 
has consistently obtained a lower share than the state sector throughout 
the transition. However, banks have withdrawn long-term credit from 
enterprises of all owner types in all these countries. 
Other evidence on refinancing behaviour is available from enterprise 
surveys in the advanced countries. These suggest that, for the most part, 
banks in these countries have proven capable of withholding new credit 
from defaulting enterprises. Pinto et al. (1993) show that in Poland banks 
as well as profitable enterprises are refusing to lend to enterprises that are 
unlikely to be able to repay. Baer and Gray (1995) report that, since early 
1993, a sample of seven Polish treasury-owned commercial banks have 
made no new loans to non-performing enterprises. (Such loans would be 
illegal under the Law on Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and 
Banks). Bonin and Schaffer (1994) report less comprehensive evidence 
that Hungarian banks, while continuing to roll over bad loans and capital- 
ize some unpaid interest, are not offering new money to problem firms on 
a large scale. Dittus (1994) reports that enterprises place a high priority on 
servicing commercial bank debt. 
In the advanced transition countries, non-performing debt is limited to a 
small core of non-viable enterprises. Polish and Hungarian enterprises 
Rodney Schmidt 307 
carry a significant amount of bank debt. However, average ratios of debt to 
total assets are moderate, while average ratios of bank debt to total assets 
are low (Baer and Gray, 1995). Most of the loans are held by a small 
number of enterprises, from particular industrial sectors and regions 
(Bofinger, 1992). In Poland, 10 per cent of state-owned enterprises 
account for nearly all of banks' non-performing loans (Gomulka, 1994), 
while in Hungary bank debt is more evenly spaced among a larger number 
of firms (Bonin and Schaffer, 1994). This concentration of debt and non- 
performing loans in a few enterprises in the advanced countries may 
permit banks to exercise restraint in lending to most enterprises, while 
still posing a significant threat to aggregate monetary control and credit 
misallocation. 
Money, Outside and Inside 
The key difference in bank credit performance between the advanced and 
less advanced transition countries is the degree to which enterprise 
refinance is systemic. Recall that refinancing credit is non-discriminatory. 
An environment that permits extensive enterprise refinance is equivalent 
to an outside money system with accommodating monetary policy. It will 
be characterized by periodic bank bailouts and rescue packages that do 
not conform to deliberate and well-planned recapitalization schemes (see 
Perotti, 1994b, for evidence of this in Bulgaria and Romania). By con- 
trast, a financial environment that succeeds in containing refinancing 
behaviour to isolated instances, with limited resort to indiscriminate new 
cash credit, is equivalent to an inside money system, based on discrimina- 
tory lending to enterprises. 
The connection between refinancing behaviour and the nature of the 
monetary system is useful, because it provides a link between individual 
bank behaviour and aggregate credit performance. Credit creation with 
outside money is inherently inflationary. Only inside money can create 
non-inflationary credit. Given the balance sheet relation of commercial 
banks, inside money creation as real credit to enterprises depends on 
deposit mobilization. Indeed, one of the key impacts of the transition 
reforms was to introduce dependence of enterprise credit on demand for 
deposits: Calvo and Coricelli (1994, 1993) show formally that a regime 
shift from passive to tight money results in a sharp reduction in real credit 
to enterprises. However, in their model, accommodating the money supply 
to the credit needs of individual enterprises would merely create inflation, 
and reduce overall real enterprise credit. The reason is that in that model 
real credit is equivalent to outside money. 
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Maintaining a non-accommodative monetary stance in an outside 
money system imposes high real costs, for two reasons. First, substantial 
real enterprise credit is needed to support the restructuring and resource 
reallocation process. Second, banks may prefer to lend to enterprises that 
carry a large amount of non-performing debt, in order to avoid writing it 
off, thereby crowding out credit to viable enterprises (Perotti, 1993). 
Hence, non-accommodative monetary policy in an outside money system 
is less likely to be sustainable or, if it is sustained, is costly in real terms. 
The solution, as argued by Perotti (1994b), is to provide enterprise credit 
selectively, with real credit backed by inside money, since inside money is 
built on discriminatory lending backed by deposit mobilization. This 
selectiveness in lending is the main mechanism by which banks exercise 
control over enterprises in the transition, and is therefore the essence of 
the bank role in imposing hard budget constraints on enterprises. 
Hard Budget Constraints 
That hard enterprise budget constraint as an institution is equivalent to 
inside money has not been universally perceived in the literature. Both 
Dittus (1996, 1994) and Baer and Gray (1995) assume that the hard enter- 
prise budget constraints that are indicative of good bank behaviour are 
demonstrated by declining real credit to enterprises. They assert that 
declining real credit is evidence of the exercise of bank control over enter- 
prises. Such a view implicitly equates real enterprise credit with outside 
money, in which case the role of banks is merely to deliver base money to 
enterprises. During the transition, a developing inside money system, man- 
ifested in deposit mobilization, and based on bank discriminatory lending 
to enterprises, would rather be characterized by growing real credit to 
enterprises. We argue here that the diverging enterprise credit performance 
in the advanced and the less advanced transition economies, based on dif- 
ferences in general refinancing behaviour and the corresponding spillover 
effects onto monetary policy, corresponds to the realization of inside 
money in the former and outside money in the latter (Perotti, 1994a). 
Our final concern is over the impact of hard budget constraints on enter- 
prise restructuring and, in particular, the nature of the resulting incentive 
to restructure. Our interpretation of hard budget constraints exclusively in 
terms of the incidence of bank refinancing is incomplete. Hard budget con- 
straints are also affected by the failure of monitored lending, or self- 
finance. In so far as inside money is based on short-term commercial 
lending, to the exclusion of long-term or investment finance, it is inher- 
ently fragile. That is, the overall transition dynamic, in which resources 
Rodney Schmidt 309 
are reallocated at the macroeconomic level, is the same for both the 
advanced and the less advanced transition economies, regardless of the 
nature of the money system. Whether the money system is an inside or an 
outside one does matter, in terms of the speed and efficiency with which 
resources are reallocated (Ruggerone, 1996). However, the transition 
dynamic itself, similar for both advanced and less advanced countries, 
does not derive from success or failure in achieving hard budget con- 
straints via an inside money system, but rather from the failure of 
monitored lending. 
Hard budget constraints with self-finance imply that enterprise restruc- 
turing occurs by financial distress (Carlin et al., 1995; Pinto et al., 1993). 
This fosters an arbitrary, backward-looking and defensive posture to enter- 
prise restructuring, in which only enterprises with historical surpluses 
obtained in the central planning and transition periods can invest. Bank 
lending is limited to a commercial credit line that cannot support deep 
restructuring projects involving investment, product development and 
active marketing strategies. Ultimately, while hard budget constraints 
based on self-finance can establish monetary stability and defensive 
restructuring, they do not promote resource reallocation at the enterprise 
level, within state enterprises. They therefore address the economic duality 
of transition only indirectly, by altering the rate of change in the shares of 
the state and private sectors over time. 
10.4 MONITORING INCENTIVES 
In this section we seek to explain the stylized facts of bank credit perform- 
ance, namely refinance and self-finance, with reference to the incentives 
facing individual banks in their lending decisions. We address the failure 
to achieve monitored lending by identifying disincentives to monitor. 
These include high monitoring or agency costs, deriving from the diverse 
incentives that borrowers and lenders have in pursuing the investment 
project, and perverse incentives to refinance failing enterprises, deriving 
largely from poor credit policy design. Our discussion of perverse incen- 
tives deals with refinancing behaviour directly, but we treat them here 
primarily as disincentives to monitor lending. 
Our coverage of monitoring disincentives is comprehensive. However, 
that banks have withdrawn from the market for long-term credit in both 
advanced and less advanced transition economies suggests that it is moni- 
toring costs rather than perverse incentives that currently underlie enter- 
prise self finance. Furthermore, that banks have withdrawn long-term 
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lending from both state and private enterprises suggests that monitoring 
costs are not limited to enterprises that require restructuring, or in which 
insiders retain a strong influence. We therefore direct the discussion to 
monitoring costs that are common to all types of enterprise owner." 
Diverse Incentives of Borrowers 
This section focuses on monitoring costs associated with the diverse 
incentives facing borrowers and lenders. We begin by identifying the 
sources of such costs, emphasizing those that are distinct to the transition, 
and then consider how they affect bank lending decisions. 
Sources of Monitoring Costs 
There are two sources of exceptional agency costs in CEE. The first is the 
large amount of unsecured outside finance required for enterprise restruc- 
turing, which intensifies the diversity in borrower-lender project incen- 
tives. The second is severe informational asymmetries, coupled with 
incomplete lending contracts. 
Lending in the transition on the scale required to implement long-term 
enterprise restructuring projects with investment will consist mostly of 
unsecured outside finance. This is because enterprise net worth and liquid- 
ity are limited relative to the size of the restructuring and investment 
project. A crude indicator of the capital and financial status of enterprises 
in CEE is the share of enterprises that continue to make losses. Table 10.4 
shows that, five years into the transition, this share remains very high. 
Low net worth is characteristic of state and new private enterprises alike, 
although possibly for different reasons. The latter do not need to restruc- 
ture, but are mostly small- and medium-scale, labour-intensive and 
family-owned (EBRD, 1995). 
Table 10.4 Czech Republic and Poland: share of loss-making enterprises (%) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Czech Republic - 32.7 42.8 - 
Poland 46.3 49.2 45.3 39.6 
Source: National sources as reported by IMF staff. 
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The impact of the outside finance requirement for monitoring costs in 
the transition is exceptional for two reasons. First, low enterprise net 
worth primarily derives not from a debt overhang, as may be the case in 
developing or industrial countries hit by a systemic macroeconomic, 
financial or external shock, but from the low value of capital assets real- 
ized with the transition shock. Hence, monitoring costs cannot be fully 
addressed by debt restructuring. 12 Second, to the extent that monitoring 
costs are negatively correlated with net worth, they will be particularly 
large in the transition. 
Informational asymmetries during the transition are also severe. These 
derive from the transition reforms themselves, which resulted in a 
systemic change that reduced the value of prior information; from poorly 
developed accounting systems and reporting requirements; high tax rates 
that encourage misrepresentation; weak institutions, including poorly 
skilled bank employees and bank supervisors, and poor enforcement (Baer 
and Gray, 1995; Calvo and Kumar, 1994, 1993). These informational 
asymmetries create a wide scope for secret, non-contractual behaviour on 
the part of the borrower. 
Nature of Monitoring Costs 
Monitoring costs come from the diverse incentives borrowers and lenders 
have in choosing and implementing restructuring and investment projects. 
The borrower has an ownership or equity stake in the project. If the project 
succeeds then the borrower gets the full return from the project, less the 
cost of debt service. If the project fails then the borrower incurs no loss 
(aside from possible transactions costs), because the debt is unsecured. So, 
the borrower is primarily concerned with the upside potential of the 
project, and is inclined to choose riskier projects, or to expend less cost 
and effort in evaluating the project. The lender, however, has a fixed- 
return, contractual stake in the project. The lender is therefore conserva- 
tive in outlook, wishing primarily to protect the project against failure, 
regardless of the upside potential of the project. The standard Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) framework for assessing monitoring costs is not adequate 
for the transition economies. In that framework, individual projects have 
exogenous risk-return characteristics known only to the borrower. The 
bank's problem is to select the desired project types. Because there is a 
monotonic relationship between project risk and the macroeconomic inter- 
est rate, banks avoid excessively risky projects by rationing credit at below 
market interest rates. However, a major challenge in the transition is to 
identify and evaluate viable investment projects (Grosfeld, 1994). It is not 
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therefore suitable to treat the search for good ideas as a problem of select- 
ing from a pool of projects with given characteristics. Furthermore, real 
interest rates are low, often negative, suggesting that perverse project 
selection due to high interest rates cannot explain rationing leading to the 
complete collapse of the long-term credit market. 
It is more appropriate to view the nature of monitoring costs in trans- 
ition in terms of enterprise failure to engage in costly project identification 
and evaluation. When informational asymmetries are significant, enter- 
prises have a comparative advantage in project evaluation. The less effort 
expended on project evaluation, the lower the quality of the project, since 
it is more likely to fail. Therefore, borrower-lender incentive divergence 
depends on the expected net return to enterprises to evaluating projects. 
The lower the enterprise's investment stake in the project, the lower its 
incentive to evaluate, since the enterprise does not bear the consequences 
of project failure. The bank incurs the cost of project failure by virtue of 
the loss of its investment. This analytical framework has been formalized 
by Bernanke and Gertler (1990), who show that there is a positive correla- 
tion between enterprise net worth, and therefore the share of the project 
financed from internal enterprise savings, and the enterprise's stake in the 
project. That is, where enterprise net worth is low, and therefore invest- 
ment co-financing is limited, bank monitoring costs will be high. When 
enterprise net worth falls below a critical threshold, bank credit for 
investment finance may collapse. 
Universal Banks 
In general, monitoring costs derive from the excessive willingness of enter- 
prises to take risks, by failing to evaluate projects sufficiently. Enterprises 
would be more conservative, that is, more like banks in outlook, were more 
of their own capital to be invested in the restructuring project. We empha- 
sized above that this option is largely precluded because of the structurally 
low net worth of enterprises in the transition. However, there is potentially 
an alternative approach to reducing the diversity of borrower-lender incen- 
tives. That is to make banks less cautious, at least in the sense of being 
more willing to undertake project evaluation themselves. It could be 
achieved by giving banks equity stakes in enterprises, and thus an interest 
in the full project return. In the transition economies, this idea has often 
been raised in proposals for a universal banking structure (Corbett and 
Mayer, 1992; Grosfeld, 1994 and references therein). 
A universal banking structure has two advantages with respect to moni- 
toring costs. First, as noted above, the bank earns a stake in the upside 
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potential of the project, and therefore has a greater incentive to monitor or 
evaluate the project. Second, the bank becomes an insider, gaining 
increased access to information, as well as rights of discretionary interven- 
tion, including residual rights of control over non-contractual enterprise 
actions. 
Universal banks are not, however, a panacea for bank reform in the 
transition. The increased incentives to monitor projects and to accept 
higher risk depend for effect on the capacity to monitor and evaluate pro- 
jects. But banks in transition have limited risk assessment skills and expe- 
rience. Furthermore, unless the bank becomes like an enterprise, 
concentrating its investment resources in one enterprise or project, it will 
have to evaluate or monitor numerous projects. This may spread its scarce 
resources too thin. For instance, encouraging banks to intervene in default- 
ing enterprises may mean that fewer resources are available to monitor 
new lending (Aghion et al., 1994b). In addition, the equity position of the 
bank in the enterprise may introduce a conflict of interest. If enterprise 
equity has low value, or the enterprise is not viable, banks may be tempted 
to extend refinancing credit to avoid writing down its own net worth. This 
is similar to the effect of non-performing loans on bank balance sheets 
(see below). 
Reformers have encouraged banks to move towards a universal struc- 
ture by programming voluntary debt-equity swaps into bank recapitaliza- 
tion and enterprise debt restructuring schemes, primarily in Poland 
(Grosfeld and Roland, 1995; van Wijnbergen, 1992). However, take-up of 
the option has been disappointing. In the Czech Republic an unforeseen 
form of universal banking has developed through unregulated trading in 
secondary equity markets. Investment funds have emerged to diversify 
equity ownership. The six largest of these are owned by banks, which have 
a controlling interest in the associated enterprises. However, it remains to 
be seen whether the banks intend to take an active role in enterprise 
control. Evidence to date suggests not. In particular, the new equity posi- 
tion of banks in enterprises has not encouraged investment financed with 
long-term debt. 
Dittus (1996) reports from interviews with bank managers on attitudes 
toward taking equity interests in enterprises. Managers see the enhanced 
monitoring role as too costly in terms of human capital and management 
time, yielding a low payoff relative to traditional commercial lending 
practices. Bank managers have a strong sense of the scarcity of their moni- 
toring resources (which are in any case, they say, better spent on tradi- 
tional lending). Banks can only effectively control three or four firms. 
Banks also believe that commercial and investment banking require 
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completely different skills, and do not want to use their loan officers for 
restructuring activities. One major Polish bank prefers to invest with a 
strong partner (ideally foreign) to take care of corporate control. Hence, 
banks resist taking a direct equity position in enterprises because it 
would require a greater investment in monitoring activity to protect their 
interests. 
Perverse Incentives of Lenders 
Perverse incentives of banks to refinance enterprises unconditionally arise 
from credit market imperfections and poor policy design. Refinancing 
incentives raise the opportunity cost of monitoring, and refinancing 
crowds out loanable funds available for alternative uses. In this section we 
identify three sources of perverse incentives to refinance. The first is the 
static effect of a large stock of non-performing loans on bank balance 
sheets. The second is moral hazard arising from poorly designed or non- 
credible bank recapitalization programs. The third depends on the hesi- 
tance of governments to terminate money-losing enterprises, which can be 
strategically exploited to the banks' advantage. 
Outstanding Non-Performing Loans 
The earliest warnings that transitional banks would not be able to resist 
refinancing enterprises stemmed from the observance that banks carried a 
large quantity of outstanding non-performing loans on their balance 
sheets, inherited from pre-transition days (Begg and Portes, 1993; 
McKinnon, 1993). Many, if not most, of the banks were technically 
insolvent as a result of these loans. The issues are the same when non- 
performing loans accumulate again during the transition. They affect both 
incentives to monitor and incentives to refinance. In the former case, non- 
performing loans on bank balance sheets immediately reduce the incentive 
to intervene in defaulting enterprises, because the return to intervention in 
the form of resumed debt service must be shared with depositors or the 
deposits guarantor (Aghion et al., 1994b). 
In the latter case, refinancing incentives come from the option value of 
waiting for the enterprise to resume debt service (Perotti, 1993). The option 
value exists as long as the bank is the residual claimant on the debt and there 
is a positive probability that the enterprise, through good luck or costly 
restructuring effort, will one day generate an operational surplus (before 
debt service). The incentive to refinance also depends on the consequences 
of failing to refinance, in three respects. First, if it means that the enterprise 
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will close or be liquidated then the option value of the stock of bad debt will 
be lost. Second, it may imply loss of reputation, or bring down regulatory 
sanctions on the bank, which may then be required to undergo its own costly 
restructuring effort. Finally, the higher is the liquidation value of the 
enterprise then the lower is the bank's incentive to refinance. 
Neutralizing the negative incentive effects of non-performing loans on 
bank balance sheets requires debt restructuring (Begg and Portes, 1993). 
To be effective, such schemes must be large enough to reduce problem 
loans below a critical incentive threshold. Some of the bank recapitaliza- 
tion programmes in CEE, described briefly below, may have been 
insufficiently comprehensive for this purpose, and therefore partly to 
blame for the resurgence of non-performing loans in some countries 
(Aghion et al., 1994b). Partial recapitalization programmes were imple- 
mented in Bulgaria and the former Czechoslovakia and Poland, usually by 
specifying a cut-off date for eligible loans. 
Recapitalization Schemes 
Each of the advanced transition economies has initiated bank recapitaliza- 
tion schemes designed to deal with non-performing loans. However, many 
of these schemes are poorly designed, offered without conditions attached 
and without a convincing commitment not to recapitalize again in the 
future. They thus introduce a moral hazard incentive for banks to refinance 
enterprises. The anticipation of an unconditional bailout is like a loan guar- 
antee, which removes any incentive for costly monitoring. This reduces the 
quality of projects financed, and the quality of the loan portfolio over time, 
thus raising the level of debt restructuring required (Aghion et al., 1994b). 
The anticipation of a bank bailout is strengthened when they occur 
repeatedly. Hungarian banks have been recapitalized four times, once each 
year between 1991 and 1994. These schemes varied slightly in their 
details. Early ones depended on loan guarantees, while the later ones 
employed swaps with government bonds to raise capital asset ratios. In all 
cases bank recapitalization was to a large extent unconditional. In Poland, 
by contrast, bank recapitalization was conditioned on conciliation agree- 
ments being reached between banks and defaulting enterprises. Bank man- 
agers were actively discouraged from making new loans to problem 
debtors, with an outright prohibition eventually enacted into law. The law 
also required banks to set up workout departments and to take actions to 
resolve those loans that had been classified as non-performing at the end 
of 1991. Treasury-owned banks underwent repeated portfolio evaluations 
by outside auditors, and had to create management information systems. 
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Recapitalization also included a plan to privatize the 9 treasury-owned 
banks. So far, 3 have been transferred to private hands. Poland shows the 
least evidence of refinancing behaviour of all the transition economies. 
Strategic Behaviour 
Even when there is no intrinsic incentive for banks to refinance non-viable 
enterprises, stemming either from an outstanding stock of non-performing 
loans or from the moral hazard effects of recapitalization programmes, 
banks may wish to exploit the government's own unwillingness to close 
enterprises (Bergl6f and Roland, 1995). Banks may therefore commit 
capital to enterprises beyond their own lending capabilities. If such a 
capital commitment is a sunk cost ex post then the government will be 
forced to bail out the bank to rescue the enterprise. In this way, the bank 
forces the government to bear some of the cost of refinancing the enter- 
prise. The potential for strategic behaviour by the bank depends on the 
level of bank liquidity, the quality of the loan portfolio and the degree of 
undercapitalization of the bank. 
10.5 EXPLAINING BANK BEHAVIOUR 
Having examined both disincentives to provide monitored investment 
finance and incentives to refinance defaulting enterprises facing banks, we 
now take an overall view of the combined impact of these incentive struc- 
tures on bank refinance and self finance lending behaviour and the resulting 
transition dynamic. In particular, we attempt to explain both the general 
withdrawal of banks from the market for long-term credit in all transition 
economies in CEE, and the different monetary outcomes stemming from 
refinancing behaviour in the advanced and the less advanced transition 
economies. We begin by treating the hesitance of banks to intervene to liq- 
uidate or reorganize defaulting enterprises. We then discuss the alternatives 
to failing to intervene, namely refinancing the enterprise or withdrawing. 
Finally, we address the feedback effects of the withdrawal from long-term 
lending on the refinancing decision, and call on these effects to explain dif- 
ferences in monetary outcomes and the hardness of budget constraints. 
Liquidating Enterprises 
Banks do not, in general, intervene to liquidate or reorganize enterprises 
that are not servicing their debts. This is due in part to high transactions 
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costs, including lengthy and costly court procedures, relative to the effec- 
tive value of collateral or liquidation. More importantly, however, is the 
option value of the non-performing loans to the bank, deriving from a 
variety of sources, as already discussed. Writing off the problem loans 
puts to an end any possibility that a positive event affecting enterprise liq- 
uidity will enable the enterprise to resume debt service. For example, dis- 
tressed enterprises may shrink to a profitable core, making waiting a 
reasonable strategy. Or, waiting may pay off in the event of a government 
bailout of the enterprise or the bank. Even when there is no hope that debt 
service will be resumed, and the enterprise cannot survive without 
refinancing, banks may simply abandon the enterprise when the liquida- 
tion value is low, rather than pay the transactions costs associated with 
liquidating it through the court system. 
We are primarily interested in the behaviour of banks when they choose 
not to liquidate defaulting enterprises. If perverse incentives arising from 
poorly designed recapitalization schemes and government unwillingness 
to see enterprises terminated are strong then banks will tend to refinance 
such enterprises. These incentives are similar to moral hazard arising from 
government loan guarantees. In those circumstances, refinance is viewed 
as an alternative to monitored lending, a relationship we return to later. In 
the following paragraphs, however, we analyse refinance as an alternative 
to liquidation. 
Liquidating versus Refinancing Enterprises 
For Perotti (1993), who formally analyses the option value of non- 
performing debt on bank balance sheets, the only alternative to liquida- 
tion is refinancing. This linkage between liquidation and refinancing is 
based on the implicit assumption that, in the absence of refinancing, the 
enterprise will fail. However, in CEE enterprise liquidation or closure 
due to the pressure of market forces is rare. Furthermore, refinancing 
may itself introduce moral hazard into the enterprises' incentive struc- 
ture, and increase the static disincentive to restructure because part of 
the reward accrues to the bank. Hence, having decided not to liquidate a 
defaulting enterprise, the bank will be less likely to refinance the enter- 
prise if it is probable that the enterprise will survive without 
refinancing. Conversely, banks will be less willing to liquidate the 
enterprise if the alternative does not require refinancing to keep the 
enterprise alive. The crucial issue is separability of the liquidation and 
refinancing decision (see below), which is related to the probability of 
shutdown, or, equivalently, the probability of shrinking to a profitable 
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core as a result of financial distress following from bank-imposed 
self-finance. 
A major implication of the separability of the decision to liquidate or 
refinance enterprises is that the option value to the bank of non-performing 
loans is retained even without refinance. Hence, with separability, there is 
no intrinsic incentive for the bank to refinance. The bank can merely cut 
off the enterprise from further credit, and put loanable funds to alternative 
uses. This adjustment via financial distress may be cheaper for banks than 
either direct intervention or new monitored lending, because it enables the 
bank to pass monitoring or restructuring costs on to the enterprise because 
banks compete with each other and with foreign banks, they do not take 
into account the aggregate effects of their decisions not to intervene 
actively in enterprises. These aggregate effects include the failure of enter- 
prises to undertake deep, forward-looking restructuring with investment, 
with the result that the overall transition follows a sectoral resource 
reallocation pattern. 
If failing to liquidate requires refinancing, then monitored lending will 
be crowded out, unless monitoring costs are so high that the alternative to 
refinancing is withdrawal. However, liquidation and debt write-off may 
require provisioning to meet capital adequacy requirements, which would 
also crowd out monitored lending. 
The separability of the decision to liquidate or refinance depends on at 
least two things. First, it depends on the flexibility of production technol- 
ogy and organization, at both enterprise and aggregate levels. At the enter- 
prise level, production flexibility entails the ability to separate 
money-losing production units from profitable units, and organizational 
flexibility entails the ability to prevent adversely affected employees from 
building protective coalitions. Such flexibility is necessary for an enter- 
prise in need of restructuring to become profitable (Aghion et al., 1994a). 
At the aggregate level, production rigidity, determined by a core of 
money-losing enterprises that cannot adjust, may cause even viable enter- 
prises to bet on a general bailout, and therefore to collude with non-viable 
ones by extending inter-enterprise credit and accumulating inter-enterprise 
arrears (Perotti, 1994b). This, in turn, increases the cost to the government 
of refusing a bailout by implicating non-viable and viable enterprises, as 
well as creditor banks, alike. The less advanced transition economies, 
Bulgaria and Romania, have more rigid production arrangements at both 
enterprise and aggregate levels than do the advanced transition economies 
(Bruno, 1992; Perotti, 1994b). 
Second, the separability of the decision to liquidate or refinance 
depends on whether defaulting enterprises can find operational subsidies 
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elsewhere. If so, banks can pass on the cost of refinancing enterprises to 
government, primarily via accumulation of tax arrears. This is also an 
example of the banks exploiting the soft attitude of government to enter- 
prise termination, although it does not depend on strategic bank behav- 
iour. On government's role in supporting enterprises, Schaffer (1995) 
reports that fiscal subsidies have shrunk significantly since the transition, 
and are now small in the aggregate at between 3 and 5 per cent of GDP 
(Table 10.5). Furthermore, the remaining subsidies are highly sector- 
specific, with almost none in manufacturing. However, tax arrears are 
significant, and are growing at an annual rate of two percentage points of 
GDP (one or two percentage points in manufacturing). Since most tax 
Table 10.5 Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland: 
government expenditures, subsidies, and arrears (% of GDP) 
1986 1992 1993 





General government - 47.5 47.5 
5.0 4.4 
Subsidies - 2.0 4.0 
Slovak Republic: 
Fiscal arrears 
General government - 64.0 55.1 
5.4 4.8 
Subsidies - - 5.4 
Hungary 
Fiscal arrears 
General government 65.9 63.4 60.5 
25.4 5.8 4.8 
Subsidies - 5.8 6.9 
Poland 
Fiscal arrears 
General government 49.7 50.7 48.4 
16.3 3.3 2.5 
Subsidies - 3.8 4.6 
Fiscal arrears 
Note: Fiscal arrears are tax and social security arrears. 
Source: Schaffer (1995). 
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arrears will not be recovered, they are a non-cash fiscal subsidy. Tax 
arrears tend to be concentrated in a small number of financially distressed 
enterprises in the advanced transition economies. Recall that fiscal subsi- 
dies do not have direct monetary implications, in contrast to credit subsi- 
dies provided through unconditional refinancing, which may prevail in the 
less-advanced transition economies. 
Even without refinancing, choosing not to liquidate has adverse conse- 
quences for bank behaviour. Problem loans remain on the books, reducing 
the incentive to restructure at the enterprise level, and to monitor at the 
bank level. They also increase the incentive for strategic behaviour by 
banks (Berglof and Roland, 1995). As noted above, poor recapitalization 
policy will in addition raise the incentive to refinance as an alternative to 
monitored lending, rather than as an alternative to liquidation. 
Cutting off versus Refinancing Enterprises 
If monitoring costs are very high then banks may withdraw from the 
market for long-term credit, regardless of recapitalization programme 
design or separability of the liquidate or refinance decision. However, the 
effective impact of monitoring costs on monitoring behaviour depends on 
the return to alternative uses. Relevant alternative uses of loanable funds 
are those that do not require monitoring, including commercial lending, 
purchases of government bonds, and lending that is effectively guaranteed 
by government recapitalization policy or a soft government attitude to 
bank budget constraints. That is, as noted earlier, perverse incentives to 
refinance are also disincentives to monitor. 
At the same time, monitoring costs leading to a general bank with- 
drawal from long-term investment finance affects incentives to refinance 
through its aggregate effect on the economy. In particular, self-finance 
ensures that the reallocation of resources that defines the transition will 
occur between state and private enterprise sectors, rather than within 
enterprises. The transfer of resources entails the slow decline of the state 
enterprise sector and growth of the new private sector (Aghion and 
Blanchard, 1994). The success of this model requires coordinated speed of 
adjustment in the respective sectors, depending on the size of the produc- 
tivity differential between the two sectors and on various constraints on 
the resource transfer of a political or fiscal nature, or arising from imper- 
fect operation of aggregate markets, especially the labour market (Chadha 
and Coricelli, 1994; Rodrik, 1995). 
Very little is known about the determinants of the speed of adjustment 
in the two sectors when capital markets are absent. However, it appears 
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that it depends greatly on the inherent dynamism of the new private sector 
and production rigidities in the state sector, both stemming from structural 
conditions and features of the economy present at the beginning of the 
transition (Bruno, 1992; Johnson and Loveman, 1994). When, as in the 
less advanced countries of the transition, the initial private sector is small 
and underdeveloped and production in the state enterprise sector is rigid 
both within enterprises and in the aggregate, the resource transfer process 
will be slow. This in turn increases enterprise incentives to collude, and 
decreases the incentive for government to adopt a hard attitude to 
enterprise termination. 
With a more rigid production structure, and limited dynamism in the 
private sector in the less advanced transition economies, then, the alterna- 
tive to failing to refinance enterprises is a greater likelihood of enterprise 
shutdown. That is, in the less advanced countries, the bank decision to liq- 
uidate or to refinance the enterprise is not in general separable. In the 
advanced transition economies, by contrast, production structures, at both 
the enterprise and sectoral levels, are more flexible, and self-finance is a 
viable option. Hence, the former countries are likely to experience greater 
incidence of refinancing behaviour, and show greater spillover effects onto 
monetary policy. We believe that this may be the main explanation for the 
achievement of inside money systems in the advanced transition 
economies of CEE and the retention of outside money systems in the less 
advanced transition economies. Furthermore, the achievement of an inside 
money system itself affects the speed of transition in the macroeconomic 
adjustment model. 
10.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have examined the role banks have played thus far in 
the transition to a market economy in CEE. Our approach has been to 
identify the main aspects of bank lending to enterprises during the transi- 
tion, and to explain that performance with respect to bank incentives to 
monitor lending. We conclude that banks have played a more important 
role in the transition than generally recognized, given the preoccupation of 
the literature with enterprise privatization. However, that role has been a 
largely reactive and unintended one, stemming primarily from the failure 
to provide long-term investment finance leading to a macroeconomic 
resource reallocation model. In such an environment, where capital 
markets are absent, the ability of banks to establish an inside money 
system and a hard budget constraint regime, crucial to the success of the 
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macroeconomic transition model, itself depends in part on structural 
givens of the economy. 
The crucial issue regarding the bank role in the transition is whether 
monitoring costs leading to collapse of the market for long-term credit are 
a structural feature of transition economies, or whether they are responsive 
to policy. Indeed, some disturbing implications of the fact that long-term 
credit withdrawal is common to all the transition countries, even though 
financial policy and monetary performance differ, are that perverse incen- 
tives are not the primary source of the failure to monitor, and that monitor- 
ing costs are a structural feature of transition, and cannot be addressed by 
policy. If this is so then banks can have only a marginal role in the transi- 
tion, restricted at best to imposing self-finance on enterprises and thus sup- 
porting the sectoral adjustment model. At worst, if for structural reasons a 
sectoral adjustment model is not feasible, as may be the case for the less 
advanced countries, then banks will not even be able to impose self- 
finance on enterprises, and the system reverts to outside money one with 
centralized allocation of credit. 
In addition to perverse incentives to refinance, we have identified low 
enterprise net worth stemming from low asset values and severe informa- 
tion asymmetries as the primary sources of high monitoring costs in transi- 
tion economies. These sources, and the contributions of poor credit policy 
leading to perverse incentives to refinance, are likely to vary in intensity 
across countries. Nevertheless, if these critical factors fall below the crit- 
ical threshold then banks will withdraw long-term credit in all the coun- 
tries. Hence, the suggestion in the previous paragraph that monitoring 
costs are impervious to policy may be overly pessimistic. We therefore 
offer the following policy recommendations, which are divisible into two 
parts: those intended to eliminate perverse incentives and those intended to 
reduce monitoring costs directly. 
First, there are measures to deal with the outstanding stock of non- 
performing loans. This has been the subject of a great literature, and will 
not be dwelt on here. It is essential to remove the moral hazard effect of 
such measures, which act as a guarantee on lending, and therefore a disin- 
centive to monitoring. Such schemes should be sufficiently comprehen- 
sive, not repeated, and conditional on bank behaviour. Conditionality may 
include changing bank management, and investing in monitoring or 
investment banking capabilities. Bank recapitalization should occur before 
the government eliminates fiscal subsidies and otherwise hardens its own 
attitude toward enterprise termination, and before measures to increase the 
liquidation value of enterprises, such as streamlining procedures and 
raising the seniority of bank claims. This is so as not to increase the net 
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refinancing incentive associated with the option value of problem loans 
by reducing the separability between the liquidation and refinancing 
decisions. 
Second, there are measures to reduce monitoring costs. These include 
measures to reduce informational asymmetries, such as more adequate 
accounting systems and disclosure requirements, and transactions costs, 
such as reforming legislation governing use of collateral, involving the 
effective seniority of bank claims. In addition, the government may 
provide incentives or assistance in upgrading the monitoring capabilities 
of banks. It may be useful to centralize arrears collection and enterprise 
liquidation in a state agency, to avoid spreading bank monitoring and 
intervention resources too thin. 
The role of venture capital should be enhanced (Grosfeld and Roland, 
1995), ideally in partnership with bank-based investment finance. Venture 
capital would concentrate personnel skilled in long-term credit issues, spe- 
cialize in monitoring capabilities, and play a role in numerous enterprises, 
with financing supplemented by bank resources. This is the role played by 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which provides 
counterpart financing to enterprises, thereby raising effective enterprise 
net worth and lowering monitoring costs as far as banks are concerned. 
However, the agency providing the counterpart funds for the enterprise 
would have to have the incentive and capability to monitor the project, 
and thus play the part of the enterprise's stake in the project. This may 
then release long-term bank credit. 
Further research should focus on the potential for a more proactive role 
for banks in the transition, by inquiring some more into the nature of 
agency costs in transition. A particularly interesting question is whether 
monitoring costs differ by enterprise ownership type. As noted earlier, 
present evidence suggests not: banks are not lending long-term to either 
state or new private enterprises. However, given that state enterprises are 
largely owned or controlled by insiders, it is not clear that insiders will 
borrow to invest in a restructuring project and accept bank monitoring 
even if such lending were available. The answer to this question impli- 
cates both the sequencing of policy as between bank reform and privatiza- 
tion, and potential differences in policy approaches toward obtaining 
monitored lending to state or new privatized enterprises. If so, bank 
lending may be a substitute for failed privatization. It would also be worth 
while to pursue this issue with respect to the role of banks in the source of 
persistent productivity differentials during the transition. Is the absence of 
bank-based investment finance the binding constraint on enterprise-level 
restructuring? 
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Notes 
1. Thanks to Jose Maria Fanelli and Rohinton Medhora for helpful comments 
on earlier drafts. 
2. The countries studied in this chapter are Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak 
Republics (formerly Czechoslovakia), Hungary, Poland and Romania. 
3. Borensztein and Montiel (1991) estimate on the basis of world prices that at 
the time of the reform shock, between 50 and 75 per cent of the inherited 
capital stock in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland should have been 
written off. Sinn and Sinn (1992) calculate that under West German 
accounting rules between 50 and 66 per cent of the capital stock of East 
Germany at reunification would be written off. Hughes and Hare (1994) 
estimate that at the beginning of the transition, with immobile capital, 
between 20 and 25 per cent of production in the tradable industry sectors of 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary (3.5 per cent in Poland) added 
negative value to output measured at world prices. The Financial Times, 21 
November 1995, reports that between 70 and 80 per cent of the enterprises 
in CEE are insolvent by Western accounting standards. 
4. See Berg (1994) for a discussion and evidence of macroeconomic resource 
misallocation in CEE. 
5. In this chapter the term `state enterprise' refers to enterprise ownership at 
the beginning of the transition, unless otherwise specified. Hence, it 
includes enterprises privatized during the transition. 
6. Transition countries are often ranked by the depth of their transition reforms 
(EBRD, 1994, 1995). The advanced countries in CEE are the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland. The less advanced ones are Bulgaria and 
Romania. 
7. Berg (1994), disagrees, arguing that a sectoral resource transfer pattern from 
state to private enterprises will eventually eliminate resource misallocation. 
However, he does not account for endogenous changes in the productivity 
differential through this process, nor for macroeconomic constraints (fiscal 
and political) on the transfer process (Chadha and Coricelli, 1994; Rodrik, 
1995). 
8. See Thorne (1993), for a detailed account of bank reform measures in CEE. 
9. It is not easy to compare the quantity of non-performing loans across coun- 
tries, because of differences in accounting systems and classification and 
disclosure rules. For example, there is a substantial difference in the 
reported share of non-performing loans in Hungary in 1993 before and after 
a change in loan classification rules. Also, the economic significance of the 
non-performing loans is not apparent from these data, because of differ- 
ences in bank capitalization and provisioning. Finally, assessing data over 
time is hard, because the rules change. However, abrupt shifts in the share 
of loans that are non-performing or persistent trends, combined with survey 
evidence (reported in a later section) are informative. 
10. Thorne (1993), provides evidence that private banks prefer to lend to private 
enterprises. 
11. Aghion et al. (1994a) and Blanchard and Aghion (1996) discuss insider 
resistance to privatization, which may have a counterpart in monitoring 
costs. This is a promising area for future research; see the conclusion. 
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12. Debt consolidation is relevant to monitoring costs, however, since the inher- 
ited debt stock is a disincentive to enterprise managers to embark on costly 
restructuring, as some of the return accrues to the creditor. 
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11 Microeconomic Elements 
and Perspectives from 
Finance Theory 
Varouj A. Aivazianl 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
The current trend toward the restructuring of financial systems in many 
countries makes an evaluation of the economic merits of alternative 
financial systems timely and important. This chapter examines microecon- 
omic aspects of financial liberalization, paying attention to the range of 
market and non-market institutions composing the financial system and 
the impact of financial liberalization on real investment decisions. The 
discussion is also tied to the liberalization experience of the sample of 
countries studied in this volume. 
The financial system consists of institutions that facilitate the 
saving-investment process; it includes not only financial intermediaries, 
markets and instruments, but also the legal mechanism for enforcing con- 
tracts and resolving disputes (for example, corporate bankruptcy laws), 
regulations governing financial transactions and reducing fraud (for 
example, disclosure rules), the accounting system and the tax system. 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) have argued that there is a positive 
association between financial development and economic growth, and that 
a regime of financial repression, involving such policies as government 
controls on interest rates, or direct controls on credit allocation, tends to 
retard financial development and economic growth. 
Recently, King and Levine (1993) have tested the hypothesis that 
financial deepening induces growth using data on 80 countries over the 
period 1960-89. They show that various measures of financial develop- 
ment are strongly associated with real per capita GDP growth, the rate of 
physical capital accumulation, and improvements in the efficiency in 
which economies employ physical capital. They also show that financial 
development is a good predictor of future rates of economic growth, 
physical capital accumulation and economic efficiency improvements. 
328 
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The measures of financial development employed by King and Levine 
include the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (a measure of the size of 
the financial intermediary system), as well as several other indicators of 
the relative importance of specific institutions in the financial intermedia- 
tion process. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) also examine the relation- 
ship between economic growth and financial development, using the ratio 
of bank credit to the private sector to GDP as the measure of financial 
development. They find that financial development is positively associ- 
ated with long-run growth of real per capita GDP, and that the effect is 
particularly pronounced for middle and low-income countries.' They also 
find a negative relationship between financial development and economic 
growth for Latin American countries and explain this, `in light of the 
extreme experiments of financial liberalization that were witnessed by 
Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s, and which subsequently col- 
lapsed'.3 Odedokun (1996) examines data for 71 countries spanning the 
1960s to 1980s, and also shows that financial intermediation promotes 
economic growth. Missing from these studies, however, are separate 
measures of the development of stock and bond markets, as well as of the 
accounting, regulatory and legal systems. All of these could have an 
important bearing on financial development and growth. Still unresolved 
issues in the literature concern causality, whether the relationship pro- 
ceeds from financial development to growth or in the reverse way, or 
both, as well as the underlying microeconomic channels via which 
financial development affects growth. 
From a theoretical perspective, finance tends to matter for real econ- 
omic decisions when there are missing or incomplete markets due to trans- 
action costs and asymmetric information - that is, outside a Miller- 
Modigliani world. In incomplete markets there tend to be interactions 
between real and financial decisions of households and firms, and the level 
of financial development or deepening will have a bearing on economic 
growth. Improved efficiencies from financial development - as the scale 
and scope of transactions via capital markets and financial intermediaries 
increase - are expected to accrue from better coordination of savings and 
investments, better monitoring and screening of investment projects, 
improved mechanisms for effecting corporate control transactions and 
enhanced scope for value-maximizing decisions by firms, greater competi- 
tion and risk diversification, the lowering of the market price of risk, and 
reduced reliance on informal financial markets. 
To understand better the impact of financial liberalization on real invest- 
ment decisions and growth, it is important to identify the channels through 
which interactions between real and financial decisions occur, and the 
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impact of financial liberalization on these channels. Underlying these 
interactions are incentive problems facing individual agents and firms due 
to moral hazard and adverse selection, bankruptcy and recontracting prob- 
lems, tax factors, as well as broader informational problems pertaining to 
systemic risks. 
Critical to any discussion of financial liberalization and of the merits of 
a more market-based financial system are the roles of financial contracts 
and institutions in overcoming adverse incentive problems, and the 
informational role of security prices for efficiently coordinating saving and 
real investment decisions. A related issue concerns financing problems of 
individual firms. While developing country firms are in many ways like 
their counterparts in developed economies, variations in institutional envi- 
ronments - legal, accounting, tax, regulatory and macroeconomic - may 
generate differences in financing patterns of firms across economies. In 
assessing financial liberalization policies in developing countries, it is 
important to understand the nature of financing problems facing firms in 
such countries, because financial constraints on firms have an important 
bearing on investment and growth. 
Among important differences in the constraints governing decisions 
of firms in developing and developed countries are the following: devel- 
oping country firms typically are less diversified and have less access to 
security markets for arm's-length financing, while these markets tend to 
be informationally less efficient; they also have less access to institu- 
tions and instruments for managing risks, and face a less developed and 
more unstable institutional infrastructure, for example the legal system, 
the bankruptcy code, and prudential regulations in banking. Restricted 
access to security markets causes greater reliance by developing country 
firms on retentions and bank borrowing; this, in turn, makes their invest- 
ment activity more strongly dependent on past earnings and on the busi- 
ness cycle. Given the inadequate institutional infrastructure, a policy of 
rapid market deregulation in developing countries can create systemic 
risks4 and seriously aggravate the economic performance of firms, as 
illustrated by the experiences of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in the 
1970s. 
Limited risk diversification opportunities for investors in developing 
countries make corporate control an important objective for some 
investors. Thus, firms in many developing countries seem reluctant to list 
publicly in order to preserve owner control, and avoid disclosure rules, as 
in India where family ownership is common. Public policy measures have 
tried to reduce corporate control in many developing countries, as in 
Mexico where publicly listed and widely held shares are exempt from 
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capital gains taxes, and in India where widely held companies are subject 
to a lower corporate tax rate.5 With financial liberalization, and improved 
opportunities for domestic and international risk diversification, control 
goals may become less significant. Lack of diversification opportunities 
in developing economies may also aggravate agency conflicts with man- 
agers of firms, leading to suboptimal investment decisions. With financial 
liberalization, corporate take-over transactions may become easier, reduc- 
ing agency problems and increasing the scope for value-maximizing 
investment decisions by firms.6 
Financial liberalization involves complicated questions of institutional 
choice, and entails much more than the deregulation of market interest 
rates or the removal of direct government controls on credit allocation. 
Efficient financial liberalization probably dictates the removal of restric- 
tions on market transactions at one level, and the simultaneous imposition 
of new regulatory and legal provisions at another level. While it is possi- 
ble to study financial liberalization by examining each separate part of the 
financial system, one should not lose sight of the interdependence of the 
parts forming the whole structure. Judging from the experiences of coun- 
tries studied in this volume, as well as other countries, there is no clear-cut 
recipe for efficient financial liberalization; what is efficient tends to 
depend on a host of initial conditions prevailing in each country at the 
time of liberalization. There are, nevertheless, strong reasons for believing 
that institutional factors such as the legal infrastructure, bankruptcy code, 
accounting, disclosure and prudential regulations are all important for fos- 
tering the operation of financial markets and capturing any ensuing 
efficiency gains, and should be central elements in the process of financial 
liberalization. 
A major difficulty in discussing financial liberalization stems from the 
fact that the notions of liberalization, or repression, are vague and do not 
clearly differentiate between, on the one hand, regulations and institutional 
schemes that hinder the efficient functioning of markets and, on the other, 
those that sustain the operation of markets and overcome market failures.' 
Furthermore, given the fact that initial institutional structures, and transac- 
tion costs, tend to differ across countries, what might be restrictions on 
efficient market transactions in one country may serve to correct market 
failures in another.8 Also, the absence of one set of institutions or regula- 
tions in an economy may make others more important. For example, in the 
absence of a well-functioning legal infrastructure to enforce financial con- 
tracts, the banking system may perform an important role in overcoming 
incentive and information problems. Or, government controls on interest 
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rates and bank credit may be efficient, at least for a while, in overcoming 
adverse selection problems under asymmetric information.9 
One important lesson that emerges from the liberalization experiences 
of some of the countries discussed in this volume is that the relaxation of 
restrictions on financial markets without adequate regulatory and institu- 
tional infrastructure may engender serious financial crises, leading to a 
reduction rather than an increase in financial deepening.10 A related issue 
pertains to the optimal timing, or sequencing, of liberalization schemes." 
The experiences of some of the countries studied in this volume illustrate 
the importance of sequencing. India instituted financial liberalization 
schemes gradually (for instance, liberalizing the internal financial sector 
before the external one), and this approach has probably enabled it to 
avoid major macroeconomic crises. In Argentina and Uruguay, on the 
other hand, sequencing considerations were ignored (for instance, internal 
and external liberalization schemes were brought in simultaneously), 
which probably contributed to the financial and macroeconomic crises in 
these countries. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 11.2 dis- 
cusses the economic function of the financial system, the information 
aggregation role of financial markets, and the problems of `noise' and sys- 
temic risks in financial markets. Sections 11.3 and 11.4 discuss the issue 
of optimal financing of firms, and the interaction between financial and 
production decisions, taking into account the effects of taxes, legal infra- 
structure, and the bankruptcy code. It is shown that tax codes in many 
developing economies encourage borrowing, which in the absence of 
strong regulatory and legal safeguards makes firms more vulnerable to 
bankruptcy risks, possibly increasing the financial fragility of the 
economy.12 Section 11.5 discusses incentive problems due to asymmetric 
information as a further channel in the interaction between financial and 
production decisions of firms in developing economies. It also discusses 
institutional responses to incentive, informational and systemic risk prob- 
lems in developing economies. The discussion ranges from the choice 
between market-based and bank-based financial systems, to the role of 
prudential regulations in facilitating the process of liberalization and the 
viability of financial markets in developing economies. Section 11.6 
briefly compares patterns of firm financing for a sample of developed and 
developing economies. Section 11.7 highlights the liberalization experi- 
ences of the five economies surveyed in this book, while Section 11.8 
draws some general policy implications from the previous discussion. 
Section 11.9 concludes the chapter. 
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11.2 THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 
The financial system allows the economy to respond to the problems 
raised by time and uncertainty. Financial markets provide for the coordi- 
nation of intertemporal choices of households and firms, as well as for 
risk-sharing and risk diversification. A distinguishing feature of financial 
transactions is that the ultimate objects of choice are not perfectly syn- 
chronized, so that current goods exchange for promises and claims to 
future goods. Uncertainty attaches not only to the occurrence of future 
states of nature, but also to whether promises will be kept, and therefore 
the design of contract terms which induce performance is highly important 
for the financial system. 
In a symmetric information environment with zero transaction costs, 
perfect competition, and no problems of contract enforcement - a perfect 
market environment - the price of an asset will reflect its so-called funda- 
mental value and will change only when fundamental economic data 
change. A capital market with asymmetric information, but where prices 
aggregate information fully, is said to be informationally efficient in that 
prices of financial claims reflect their fundamental value. 
There is a school of thought, going back at least to Keynes, that argues 
that at least in stock markets prices do not aggregate or communicate 
information well. Keynes argued that speculative and strategic factors 
dominate the stock market, and the following often-quoted statement illus- 
trates his view: 
Professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competi- 
tions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces 
from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor 
whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the 
competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those 
faces which he himself finds the prettiest, but those which he thinks 
likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are 
looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of 
choosing those which, to the best of one's judgement, are really the 
prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the 
prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we denote our intelli- 
gences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion 
to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and 
higher degrees. 13 
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Indeed, when expectations are widely divergent, strategic factors may 
have an important impact on trading, so that market prices of financial 
assets may provide biased measures of fundamental values. There is ample 
historical evidence of financial market bubbles that dramatically illustrates 
divergences between fundamental and market values. 14 
Standard Walrasian models of economic equilibrium stress the 
constraining role of prices on resource allocation, rather than their 
informational role. As Grossman (1991) points out: 
In some ways these models treat people like rats in a maze. Prices are 
like the walls that the rats are bumping into, which produce pain and 
thus guide them in the right direction. The rats (presumably) do not get 
statistically useful information about the structure of the maze when 
they bump into a wall. 15 
Suppose we allow individuals more rationality. Consider a market where 
an individual's demand for a security depends on her private information 
about future returns of the security and where it is also common knowl- 
edge that others have private information about the security. Individuals 
may learn about the assessment of others, and about the economic envi- 
ronment from market prices, and such learning in turn induces a revision 
in their expectations about returns, making the original price no longer a 
market clearing price, and providing incentives to renegotiate the original 
price. The process stops when there are no further incentives to renegotiate 
market prices, and the market attains a rational expectations equilibrium. 16 
Significant deviations between market and fundamental values may 
prevail in such an equilibrium. Furthermore, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
have also shown that when information is costly to acquire then there will 
be no equilibrium if prices are fully revealing, because no one would have 
any incentive to acquire information. But if no one acquires information 
then prices cannot convey information. On the other hand, if prices are 
noisy signals, that is, if they are not fully revealing, then an equilibrium 
will exist where the noisiness of prices (the lack of full revelation) allows 
individuals to be compensated for the private cost of information acquisi- 
tion. Of equal importance, however, is that noise may make a financial 
panic more likely. It is possible, under rational expectations, for a panic 
(for example, a stock market crash) to result from incorrect inferences 
made by less informed investors (noise-traders) from non-fundamental 
price disturbances. 17 This signal extraction problem is also present when 
there is a bank run, where the negative signal is not market price but other 
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depositors' withdrawal actions. Such phenomena may lead to systemic 
risks.18 It is likely that developing country financial markets tend to have 
more noise and, as a result, face greater systemic risks than markets in 
developed economies. The problem of noise may become more severe as 
financial markets become more internationally integrated, and may have 
adverse consequences for developing economies - as illustrated by the 
experiences of emerging markets after the Mexican crisis. Calvo and 
Mendoza write, 
In the days after the Mexican crash, emerging markets worldwide also 
fell as the `Tequila effect' propagated, and global investors reacted to 
the news on Mexico by suddenly changing their views on the merits of 
investments in emerging markets... This kind of `herding' behavior by 
the global investor does not require any irrational behavior and does not 
require sophisticated theories to be justified. 19 
Thus, the liberalization of the external financial sector may generate, in 
a noisy financial environment, large and volatile capital flows; the 
experience of Argentina after the Mexican crash is one such example. 
11.3 TAXATION 
We discuss in this and the next two sections the various channels through 
which financial decisions interact with real investment decisions of firms. 
We consider the impact of taxes in this section, bankruptcy, and the legal 
infrastructure in Section 11.4, and adverse incentive problems due to 
asymmetric information in Section 11.5. 
As is well known, in perfect and efficient markets with no taxes or 
information asymmetries the particular mix of financing used by the firm 
(issuing stocks, bonds, borrowing from banks) is irrelevant; the form of 
financing does not affect the firm's overall cost of capital and its incen- 
tives governing real investment activity. This is the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem.20 While this irrelevance result provides a useful benchmark for 
analysis, real-world economies are characterized by transaction and bank- 
ruptcy costs, taxes and informational problems, so that a firm's financial 
structure tends to affect its cost of capital and optimal investment deci- 
sions. Investment and financing decisions then become interdependent, 
and the mix of financing used may induce or constrain the growth of firms 
and of the economy. For example, a standard corporate finance model con- 
siders optimal financial structure as the product of the trade-off between 
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the subsidy inherent in the tax deductibility of interest payments, and the 
potential bankruptcy costs engendered by debt. 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) introduced corporate, but not personal, 
taxation into their earlier model and showed that the market value of the 
firm is an increasing function of its debt. This result simply reflects the tax 
subsidy to borrowing due to the deductibility of interest, because the mar- 
ginal after-tax cost to the firm of borrowing is less than the debt holder's 
marginal valuation of debt. Miller (1977) gave a new twist to the tax argu- 
ment by showing that even with personal taxes on interest income debt is 
irrelevant to the firm, although the aggregate level of debt outstanding in 
the economy is relevant. In the Miller model, the marginal debt holder's 
personal tax rate equals the corporate tax rate, and an individual firm does 
not capture tax-induced surpluses generated by debt, although these sur- 
pluses are captured by inframarginal debt investors. While Miller (1977) 
assumes that all firms are taxed at the same rate, the subsequent literature 
has highlighted the fact that the effective corporate tax rate tends to vary 
across firms and that the marginal after-tax cost of debt to the firm 
depends not only on the statutory corporate tax rate, but also on potential 
tax shield substitutes to debt, the risk and probability of bankruptcy of the 
firm, and tax-loss carry-forward and backward provisions.21 Such consid- 
erations imply that the level of borrowing may well affect a firm's cost of 
capital and its investment decisions. 
A simple expression depicting the tax advantage of debt to firms (under 
the Miller assumptions) is given by the formula, 1 - [(1- tc) (1 - 0110 - t a), 
where tc is the corporate income tax rate and to and td are the personal tax 
rates in on equity and interest income, respectively. This measure is used 
in Table 11.1 to determine the tax advantage of interest income relative to 
equity income in different economies. The table allows for the fact that 
equity income accrues in two alternative forms, capital gains and divi- 
dends. Note that in most developing countries interest is deductible from 
business income, and that there are tax-loss carry-forward provisions (but 
usually no carry-backs). 
Tax systems have many features beyond personal and corporate tax 
rates. They impose limits on certain transactions, may change often and 
may not be well enforced, especially in developing countries. In addition 
to the direct effect of taxes on the financing decisions of firms, govern- 
ment tax policy indirectly influences such choices via its effects on the 
structure of financial markets. 2 In spite of the intricacies of the tax code, it 
is still useful to look at a general measure of the tax advantage of debt rel- 
ative to equity for the corporate sector in different economies, using the 
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advantage, it increased bankruptcy risk making firms vulnerable to unan- 
ticipated changes in demand and cost conditions, especially in economies 
offering limited opportunities for risk diversification and inadequate insti- 
tutions governing bankruptcy 23 
Table 11.1 assumes that the marginal investor is taxed at the highest 
personal tax rate, and that corporations are taxed at the corporate tax rate 
stipulated by the tax code, although effective corporate tax rates tend to be 
lower (note for example that all the countries in Table 11.1 have tax loss 
carry-forward provisions). The table calculates the after-tax value of a pre- 
tax dollar channeled to the investor via interest income, dividend income 
and capital gains income in each country, and determines the tax advan- 
tage of debt relative to equity. It shows that debt has a tax advantage over 
equity in most of the developing countries represented, except Argentina 
and Turkey. Thus, tax systems in many developing countries seem to 
encourage borrowing, increasing the vulnerability of firms to systemic 
shocks such as from abrupt currency devaluation or unanticipated interest 
rate movements. This may be especially serious for firms (financial and 
non-financial) in developing economies, because they tend to be less 
diversified, have less recourse to risk management schemes (such as via 
forward, futures and option markets), and face inadequately developed 
institutional infrastructures such as a bankruptcy code and deposit 
insurance. 
Foreign rather than domestic tax rates become relevant for estimates of 
the tax advantage of debt to a firm when the debt holder lives outside the 
country. Foreign tax rates may affect corporate financing choices in a 
climate of increased financial market liberalization and integration. 
Constraints imposed by the international tax environment on the process 
of financial liberalization and on the financing decisions of firms are an 
area that requires future research.24 
11.4 THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND THE LEGAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
The bankruptcy code provides standard procedures for the process of 
recontracting between the firm and its creditors. It reduces the transaction 
costs associated with recontracting in case of default by providing rules 
for liquidation and reorganization. An efficient bankruptcy code induces 
liquidation when the going concern value of the firm is less than its liqui- 
dation value, and induces reorganization when the reverse is true. The 
bankruptcy code also serves as a deterrent against opportunistic borrower 
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conduct. A country's bankruptcy code and legal infrastructure expand the 
scope for intertemporal exchange agreements by promoting the growth of 
security markets, and enable firms to obtain arm's-length financing 
through security markets.25 
Increased reliance on financial markets requires a well-functioning legal 
infrastructure, accounting norms and regulations such as disclosure rules, 
and a bankruptcy code without which not only will the recontracting 
process have high transaction costs but default risk will be mispriced, 
leading to socially suboptimal default incentives and investment decisions. 
Furthermore, significant externalities may be associated with bankruptcy 
whereby the failure of one firm may engender the failure of others. 
Financial fragility refers to such externalities. Such systemic risks may 
affect both the real and the financial sectors. An effective legal and regula- 
tory infrastructure and bankruptcy code may help attenuate such systemic 
externalities. 
Most developing countries lack well-developed and functioning legal 
infrastructures and bankruptcy codes. As a result, arm's-length financial 
transactions tend to occur through claims that are simpler to enforce and 
that do not require highly developed bankruptcy and legal infrastructures 
such as secured debt; for the same reasons, financing through retentions 
and bank loans tends to dominate in such economies. 
11.5 PROBLEMS OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE 
SELECTION 
Asymmetric information problems, because of adverse selection and 
moral hazard, induce interactions between production and financing deci- 
sions. For example, when it is difficult to screen borrowers, credit 
rationing can serve as a mechanism used by lenders to resolve adverse 
selection.26 Collateral can also serve a signalling role in such circum- 
stances. A similar problem emerges in corporate financing under asym- 
metric information when the qualities of firms are unobservable. Myers 
(1984) argues that a hierarchical pattern of financing, termed a pecking 
order, serves to signal firm quality in such circumstances. For example, 
suppose that a firm is considering undertaking a risky investment project 
when management has information about the quality of the investment that 
cannot be credibly communicated to the capital market. If in manage- 
ment's view the market undervalues the project then the firm prefers inter- 
nal over external funds to finance the project. If it must resort to the capital 
market, it prefers to use debt rather than equity, because fixed-income 
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securities such as debt provide lower benefits to outside claimants from a 
successful high-quality project. If, on the other hand, the project is over- 
valued by the market, then the firm prefers to finance through external 
equity rather than debt or retained earnings. Under rational expectations, 
the firm's pattern of financing signals its quality, and a pecking-order 
equilibrium emerges in which firms prefer internal to external financing, 
and, in the case of external financing, they prefer debt to equity. 
When there are moral hazard problems such as underinvestment incen- 
tives resulting from conflicts between debt and equity holders, then fea- 
tures such as protective covenants on debt, call options and conversion 
options serve to attenuate adverse incentive problems.27 However, as was 
argued in the previous section, with ill-developed legal and regulatory 
infrastructures (which is the case in most developing economies), financial 
transactions tend to involve instruments that are simpler to enforce such as 
secured debt; or there may be less reliance on arm's-length transactions 
and greater reliance on banking, because banks tend to have a comparative 
advantage in gathering information about potential borrowers and in 
screening and monitoring borrowers, thus reducing adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems.28 
Given the costliness of monitoring bank portfolios by depositors, 
banking can generate moral hazard problems of its own as banks accept 
(pursuing the narrow interests of their owner-shareholders) more risk 
than is optimal for depositors. However, such risk-taking incentives by 
banks in developing countries may be partially offset by a lack of risk 
diversification opportunities; with limited risk-diversification opportun- 
ities, bank owner-shareholders in developing economies may be less 
prone to risk taking than those in developed economies. A more serious 
problem in banking concerns systemic risks, where one bank's failure 
may trigger (as a result of the signal extraction problem discussed 
earlier) the failure of other banks. Government deposit insurance or the 
central bank's acting as a lender of last resort might attenuate these 
problems, but such insurance schemes create familiar moral hazard 
problems of their own, which might be overcome by imposing regula- 
tions on bank portfolio allocation or by making the price of deposit 
insurance a function of bank portfolio risk.29 If the regulatory monitor- 
ing and enforcement capacity is lacking for such schemes, as it is in 
many developing economies, bank risk can perhaps be controlled more 
efficiently by careful screening of potential banking firms and by 
restricting entry. If monopoly surpluses can be earned in banking then 
banks have more to lose if they fail, which reduces incentives to take on 
excessive risks.30 
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11.6 PATTERNS OF CORPORATE FINANCING IN DEVELOPING 
AND DEVELOPED ECONOMIES 
This section examines and compares patterns of corporate financing for a 
sample of developing and developed economies. Mayer (1990) has exam- 
ined financing patterns for eight developed economies for the period 
1970-85, using flow-of-funds statements as well as company accounts. 
The countries are: Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
UK and the USA. He observes31 that retained earnings are the dominant 
source of financing growth in all these economies; also, that banks are the 
dominant source of external financing, and that in none of these countries 
are securities markets a major source of financing new investments. Mayer 
argues that the heavy reliance on retentions in these countries is because 
they enable shareholders to maintain control over the company. However, 
an explanation based on asymmetric information wherein retained 
earnings are the cheapest form of finance, seems just as plausible. 
Singh and Hamid (1992) present data for nine developing economies 
(India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, and 
Zimbabwe) for the period 1980-8. The observations are for the fifty 
largest manufacturing firms listed on stock markets in these countries and 
indicate that, in general, firms in these countries rely more on external 
financing, and less on retentions than firms in developed economies. The 
average after-tax retention ratio was less than 50 per cent for the firms in 
developing economies, which is significantly less than for Mayer's sample 
of companies in developed economies. The figures also indicate that firms 
in developing countries financed significantly less of their expansion from 
internal sources compared with firms in developed economies. For 
example, for the fifty South Korean corporations, an average of about 
15 per cent of growth was financed from retained earnings, about 40 per 
cent by issuing stock and about 45 per cent by issuing debt.32 
It may be puzzling that financing through retentions is significantly 
lower for firms in developing economies than for those in developed 
economies. One would expect greater reliance on capital markets by firms 
in developed economies, given the lower transaction costs and informa- 
tional asymmetries in their markets. It must be remembered, however, that 
the firms in the Singh and Hamid data are not very representative; the data 
pertain to the largest (and presumably best-known) fifty corporations in 
each economy. Such firms have the best access to security markets to 
obtain financing. Smaller and less well-known firms would presumably be 
at a disadvantage in getting long-term market financing, and have to 
rely more on retentions or bank financing. Note, for example, the 
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predominance of short-term financing in the debt structures of firms in 
Argentina and the fact that the larger firms were much less dependent on 
short-term financing than smaller ones. 33 Heavy reliance on retentions and 
on short-term borrowing, which is likely for the majority of firms in devel- 
oping countries, tends to make investment activity strongly dependent on 
past earnings, the business cycle and macroeconomic stability. There is a 
great need for studies on the determinants of the financing behaviour of 
firms in developing economies.34 
11.7 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LIBERALIZATION 
EXPERIENCES OF ARGENTINA, INDIA, NIGERIA, TURKEY 
AND URUGUAY 
As can be deduced from the country studies in this volume, 35 the liberal- 
ization experiences of Argentina (in 1991), Turkey (in the 1980s) and 
Uruguay (in the 1970s) were in many ways quite similar. Financial liberal- 
ization in these three countries, and especially in Argentina and Uruguay, 
involved the simultaneous liberalization of the domestic and the external 
financial sectors; however, in all three cases, regulatory safeguards such as 
prudential regulations in banking, legal infrastructure, and bankruptcy 
code, were not very strong. Liberalization in each of these countries 
involved most if not all of the following: deregulation of interest rates, 
removal of controls on bank credit allocation, removal of entry prohibi- 
tions into banking and increased competition in the financial sector, dereg- 
ulation of stock markets, and full convertibility of currencies. While 
liberalization led to financial deepening and had a favourable impact on 
overall investment and macroeconomic performance for a while, it also 
increased systemic risks and engulfed these economies into serious 
episodes of financial crises. 
In Argentina and Uruguay, assets and liabilities of the banking system 
became increasingly dollarized as a result of external financial liberaliza- 
tion, exposing banks and borrowing firms to significant devaluation risks. 
In Argentina financial liberalization resulted in an increase in the financial 
leverage of firms, but debt maturity remained short-term. The Mexican 
crisis triggered a financial crisis in Argentina in 1995, leading to capital 
outflows and bank runs, and a major economic crisis was avoided through 
government intervention. The experience of Argentina was similar to that 
of Chile in 1982; in both instances, the crises could be at least partially 
attributed to the rapid liberalization of the financial system without an ade- 
quately functioning regulatory infrastructure. In Turkey, financial liberal- 
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ization led to highly volatile stock markets and exchange rate fluctuations, 
and exposed the financial and real sector to significant systemic risks. 
The Indian experience with financial liberalization (in 1991) seems to 
have been quite different. India followed a gradualist approach, and 
already had a reasonably well-developed financial sector; along with poli- 
cies such as the deregulation of interest rates, the easing of entry into the 
financial intermediary sector, and the deregulation of stock markets, India 
maintained certain regulatory controls and introduced others to insure the 
safety and solvency of the financial sector, and to induce further financial 
market development; while restrictions on international capital flows were 
eased, they were not removed. The financial liberalization experience in 
India led to financial deepening and has not been marked by episodes of 
major financial crisis. Since liberalization, the corporate sector has 
increased significantly its reliance on external financing, both from rapidly 
growing, near-banking institutions and from long-term, arm's-length 
financing in security markets. 
The financial liberalization experience of Nigeria (in the 1980s) seems 
more similar to those of Argentina, Turkey and Uruguay than to that of 
India. Financial liberalization in Nigeria entailed interest rate deregula- 
tion, the easing of controls on sectoral credit allocation, easing of entry 
into banking, and reduced control on international capital movements. The 
relaxation of entry into banking, while significantly increasing the number 
of banks, seems to have affected their quality and resulted in a large 
number of bank failures. A major problem for Nigeria has been its inade- 
quate legal and regulatory enforcement capacity. Financial reforms have 
not resulted in financial deepening but instead have generated significant 
systemic risks, leading to a wave of bankruptcies of financial and non- 
financial firms. 
11.8 SOME GENERAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As mentioned earlier, a major difficulty in discussing financial liberaliza- 
tion is due to the fact that the notions of liberalization, or repression, are 
vague and do not clearly differentiate between regulations and institutional 
arrangements that restrict the efficient functioning of markets and those 
that sustain the operation of markets and overcome market failures.36 
Furthermore, because initial institutional structures, and transaction costs, 
tend to differ across countries, what may be restrictions on efficient market 
transactions in one country may serve to sustain markets (correct market 
failures) in another. 
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We argued that the legal infrastructure, bankruptcy code, accounting 
and disclosure rules, and prudential regulations are all important for fos- 
tering the operation of financial markets and for capturing any ensuing 
efficiency gains, and should be central elements in the process of financial 
liberalization. It is, however, difficult to determine the most efficient mix 
of institutions and regulations for sustaining the saving-investment 
process for any specific economy. The absence of one set of institutions in 
an economy may make others more important. For example, in the 
absence of a well-functioning legal infrastructure to enforce financial con- 
tracts, the banking system performs an important role in overcoming 
incentive and information problems. Or, if the regulatory capacity for 
deposit insurance is lacking, as it is in many developing countries, then 
bank risk can perhaps be more efficiently controlled by screening potential 
banking firms and restricting entry. This way monopoly surpluses can be 
earned in banking, reducing banks' incentives to take on excessive risks. 
As another example, consider a market environment with asymmetric 
information; government controls on interest rates and bank credit may be 
efficient, at least for a while, in overcoming adverse selection problems.37 
This is illustrated by the experiences of South Korea and some other Bast 
Asian countries, where interest rate ceilings and government direct credit 
controls seem to have enhanced the operation of the financial system and 
economic development for a while; however, in other economies such reg- 
ulations on the financial system have created inefficiencies. 
An important policy lesson that emerges from the discussions in the 
previous sections is that the relaxation of restrictions on financial markets 
without adequate legal, accounting and regulatory institutions, and insur- 
ance markets, may engender serious financial crises, leading to a reduction 
rather than an increase in financial deepening. This is illustrated by the 
liberalization experiences of Argentina, Chile, Nigeria, Turkey and 
Uruguay. 
11.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that in order to assess financial liberalization 
policies in developing countries it is important to understand the nature of 
financing problems facing firms in such countries, because financial 
constraints on firms have an important bearing on investment and growth. 
The chapter has stressed the importance of legal, accounting and regulatory 
infrastructures for the process of financial liberalization. It also argued that 
there is no clear-cut recipe for efficient financial liberalization. What is 
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efficient will tend to depend on a country's initial institutional structure and 
transaction costs. Among important areas for future research suggested by 
this chapter are the following: an examination of the determinants 
of financing decisions of firms in developing economies; the impact of 
financial liberalization on agency problems and governance structures of 
firms in developing economies; constraints imposed by the domestic and 
international tax environment on the process of financial liberalization; the 
informational efficiency of financial markets in developing economies; 
the nature of systemic risks in a liberalized financial environment and the 
efficiency of alternative mechanisms for controlling such risks. 
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1. This chapter is a significantly revised version of a paper presented at the 
International Workshop on `Financial Liberalization in Developing 
Countries', held in Ankara, June 1996, sponsored by the International 
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Gulnur Muradoglu, for useful comments. I would also like to thank partici- 
pants of the Economic Development workshop at the University of Toronto 
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I would also like to thank Shihab Abu-Zeid and Joan Zabokrzycki for 
research assistance, and Kerstin Aivazian for editorial assistance. 
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2. De Gregorio and Guidotti argue that `the weak relationship observed in 
high-income countries is due to the fact that financial development occurs to 
a large extent outside the banking system, while our proxy for financial 
development focuses on banking sector development' (p. 434). 
3. Ibid., p. 434. 
4. Davis (1992) uses the term systemic risk `to describe a disturbance in 
financial markets which entails unanticipated changes in prices and quanti- 
ties in credit or asset markets, which lead to a danger of failure of financial 
firms, and which in turn threatens to spread so as to disrupt the payments 
mechanism and capacity of the financial system to allocate capital' (p. 117). 
5. See Glen and Pinto (1994). 
6. However, corporate take-over transactions in a stock market economy may 
not necessarily induce efficient investment decisions by the firm when there 
are problems of asymmetric information or free-rider problems. See 
Grossman and Hart (1980) and Stiglitz (1991). 
7. This point is recognized by several writers, including Gibson and 
Tsakalotos (1994). 
8. This is an implication of the theory of second best. 
9. This policy seems to have worked in some East Asian countries, such as 
South Korea, but failed in others. 
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10. In fact, Diaz-Alejandro (1985) has argued that financial liberalization can 
reduce the efficiency and increase the instability of financial markets. Akyuz 
(1994) points to the hazards of financial liberalization and the need for 
judicious government intervention. 
11. McKinnon (1991) has argued that, `Governments cannot, and perhaps should 
not, undertake all liberalizing measures simultaneously. Instead, there is an 
"optimal" order of economic liberalization, which may vary for different 
liberalizing economies depending on their initial conditions ...' (p. 4). 
12. The term `financial fragility' is usually used to refer to the externalities 
generated by bankruptcy. Thus, Davis (1992) writes, 
especially when default is widespread and involves households and large 
businesses as well as small businesses, all of these analyses may be guilty of 
taking a partial view (of an agent or firm in isolation), because there may be 
significant externalities to widespread loan default. The failure of a 
company is likely to impact on other companies and could cast their sol- 
vency into doubt, for example if it defaults on loans due, or if it is costly for 
firms to switch suppliers or markets. Unemployed workers may default on 
their own debts.' (p. 47) 
13. Keynes (1936), p. 156. 
14. See Fama (1991), Shiller (1931); for a dissenting but compelling perspec- 
tive see Miller (1990). Some economists (Hirshleifer, 1971; Fama and 
Laffer, 1971) have argued, in the same spirit as Keynes, that stock market 
research produces information with high private return but low social return, 
that stock price revaluations engendered by such research are primarily 
redistributive rather than productive. 
15. Grossman (1991), pp. 1-2. 
16. See Grossman (1991), Chapter 1. 
17. Ibid. 
18. See note 4 for a definition of systemic risk. 
19. See Calvo and Mendoza (1996). 
20. Modigliani and Miller (1958). 
21. For a review of these tax issues see Aviazian and Turnbull (1987). 
22. Tax policies in many developing countries have attempted to stimulate the 
development of security markets and to reduce corporate control. See World 
Bank (1990) and Glen and Pinto (1994). 
23. This is sometimes termed financial fragility, see Davis (1992). 
24. In this context, also see Helleiner (1996) for a discussion of tax policy and 
international financial flows. 
25. For a discussion of the importance of the legal infrastructure, see Modigliani 
and Perotti (1991). 
26. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Cho (1986). 
27. See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Aivazian and Callen 
(1980), Harris and Raviv (1991). 
28. For a model analysing the costs and benefits of arm's-length financing 
versus bank financing see Rajan (1992). Allen (1993) has argued that the 
reliance placed on the stock market versus the banking system depends on 
the nature of the production technology that is being financed. When the 
technology is new and information about it widely dispersed, the stock 
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market aggregates investor assessments of the likelihood of success of the 
venture and thus enables more efficient production decisions by manage- 
ment based on better information. Financing through a bank, it is argued, is 
not efficient in such circumstances, because the information aggregation 
function is weak or missing. On the other hand, when the technology is a 
standard one, so that the information aggregation function is unimportant, 
bank financing becomes more efficient, because banks have a comparative 
advantage in overcoming moral hazard problems. 
29. For a discussion of these issues see Davis (1992) and F. Mishkin (1996). 
Gerry Helleiner has pointed out (private communication) that governments 
in many developing countries have also frequently served as the ultimate 
source of bail-out for otherwise bankrupt institutions, which goes well 
beyond their lender-of-last resort function and seriously aggravates moral 
hazard problems. 
30. See, for example, Caprio and Summers (1993). 
31. See Mayer (1990), pp. 310-17. 
32. See Singh and Hamid (1992), who also find that firms in the high-growth 
economies of East Asia use more debt than firms in other countries in the 
sample. 
33. See Fanelli et al. (1998). 
34. Both and Aivazian (1996) perform an econometric study of determinants of 
financial structures (proportions of debt financing) for firms in developing 
countries. The data baseused for the study is an expanded version of that 
underlying the Singh and Hamid (1995) study developed by the World Bank 
(International Finance Corporation). Booth and Aivazian find that while 
certain variables such as profitability and tangibility of assets are important, 
country factors (dummy variables) matter at least as much for developing 
economies. These results indicate the importance of country institutional 
factors. 
35. See Ayogu et al. (1996), Balkan and Yeldan (1996), Fenelli et al. (1996), 
Noya et al. (1996) and Sen and Vaidya (1996). 
36. This point is made by several authors, including Gibson and Tsakalotos 
(1994). 
37. Stiglitz (1994) has argued that in environments with incomplete markets and 
significant asymmetric information, as in developing economies, higher 
interest rates can adversely affect the incentives and the quality mix of bor- 
rowers, and that government interest rate and direct-credit controls may 
enhance efficiency by improving this quality mix; also, that in such environ- 
ments, firms may prefer to finance with equity because of lower moral hazard 
problems (avoidance of potential bankruptcy problems) as compared to debt. 
A similar point is made by Cho (1986), who relies on the Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) argument. On the other hand, Myers (1984) and Kumar (1994) recog- 
nize that there also may be significant moral hazard problems with equity. 
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For the large number of developing countries undergoing significant struc- 
tural transformations, one of the most important and controversial adjust- 
ment areas is that of the financial markets. The consequences of poorly 
functioning or troubled financial sectors - on financial institutions, depositors, 
resource allocation and, ultimately, growth and development - are signifi- 
cant and well known. It is also now understood that financial liberalization is 
not an 'event' but, rather, a process. However, there is little consensus as to 
when to liberalize financial markets or how it should be done. 
This book contains the results of a research project initiated and supported 
by Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and 
managed by the Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES) in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
Focusing on the role of the institutional and enabling environment within 
which financial reform occurs, and the integration of principles of finance 
with more macro-economic approaches to the subject, this book contains 
case-studies of reform experiences in Argentina, India, Nigeria, Turkey and 
Uruguay. Thematic papers cover the following topics: the 'go-slow' versus 
'big-bang' approach; the tequila effect and financial reform at the supra- 
national level; implications of the Canadian experience for developing 
countries; links between banks and firms during reform in Eastern Europe; 
and a perspective from finance theory. 
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